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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2005, the South Korean government implemented a system of performance 
budgeting: Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP). Most studies on this 
system have focused on the relationship between SABP results and subsequent budget 
allocations. These studies are based on the premise that the SABP system itself is 
operating well, and consequently SABP results are reliable. However, this thesis 
questions that premise and analyses the process for arriving at SABP results, especially 
focusing on differences in views on the merit of programmes between the spending 
ministries and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), which controls SABP. 
The thesis addresses four key research questions: Which factors affect differences in 
views in the SABP process? What are the dysfunctional consequences of SABP? What 
is the impact of these dysfunctional consequences? And, lastly, what feasible policy 
alternatives can be proposed? The study suggests that there is a tendency to optimism 
bias by spending ministries in their self-assessment programmes, often leading to a 
subsequent drastic downward review of such assessments by the MOSF. These results 
are established by both quantitative and qualitative analysis. This thesis also provides 
evidence of dysfunctional effects arising from the SABP process, some of which are 
“unintended” by both spending ministries and the MOSF, while others are “unintended” 
by the designers of the SABP system but are likely to be “intended” by the spending 
ministries, as “agents” in the principal-agent relationship. The thesis concludes that both 
the unintended and intended dysfunctional consequences of SABP are sufficiently 
important to suggest that the performance budgeting system needs to be carefully re-
designed, and proposals are made for feasible refinements to the SABP process. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background  
 
Performance management of public services has spread widely across national 
boundaries in recent years. It arose widely around the late 1980s or early 1990s with the 
advent of New Public Management (NPM); however, performance management is not a 
new concept and its antecedents can be traced back to long before the recent era (Talbot, 
2010; Johnsen, 2005; Behn, 2003). The US Congress established the Bureau of 
Efficiency to increase the efficiency of the US Federal Government’s expenditure in 
1916 (Lee, 2006); and performance management was used as the measurement method 
for US metropolitan cities’ activities in the 1940s (Ridley and Simon, 1943). More 
recently, performance management has been developed in the form of Programme and 
Performance Budgeting (PPB) in the 1960s, and Management by Objectives (MBO) 
and Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB) in the 1970s. The Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) in the 1990s and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in 
the 2000s have also been used as measures for improving the efficiency of government 
expenditure (Schick, 1992; Ko, 2004).  
 
2 
 
Performance management in the public sector is a form of results-oriented management, 
focusing on the output, outcome and influence per input. Performance management can 
be seen as including the budgeting system as well as the organisational, personnel and 
accounting systems of an organisation, while performance budgeting 1 has the most 
important role in these processes (Ko, 2004). Many OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries which had suffered from fiscal deficits and 
subsequent high central government debts2 caused by the excessive requirements of 
welfare expenditures introduced performance budgeting from the 1980s onwards. NPM 
argues for the necessity of making a link between performance and budgeting in a 
process of controlling public expenditures. Under the influence of this view, advanced 
countries such as the UK, the US, Australia and New Zealand started to institutionalise 
performance budgeting (Shah, 2007). In the late 1990s, many developing countries also 
accepted performance budgeting as an important part of their national agenda (Mackay, 
2007). The reason why so many countries from the OECD to South America, Africa 
and the developing regions have introduced performance budgeting systems relates to 
the positive effects attributed to such systems. It is argued that a government can 
increase the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and democratic 
control of policies by applying performance information to strategic planning, 
organisational and personnel management, budgeting, service delivery improvement, 
and evaluation (Shah, 2007; Epstein, 1992; Wholey and Hatry, 1992; Wang, 2002; 
Ammons, 1995a; Mackay, 2007).  
                                                     
1 Performance budgeting has been implemented under various names, such as performance-
based budgeting, programme budgeting, result-oriented management, performance evaluation 
and management, monitoring and evaluation, results-based management, etc. This study uses 
the phrase performance budgeting as a concept that includes these various terms. 
 
2 Predicted average central government debt as percentage of GDP in 2011 in OECD countries 
is 103.0% (OECD, 2012) 
3 
 
 
After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the South Korean government also 
launched a performance budgeting system to overcome the problems it faced in its 
efforts to reform the public sector and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
budgetary programmes. The Budget Office of Korea3 adopted performance budgeting 
on a trial basis in 1999 and expanded it into the Performance Management System of 
Programmes (PMS) in 2003. Later, in 2005, Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes 
(SABP) was implemented in order to forge a link between the performance results of a 
programme and its budgeting. The performance budgeting system took its legal basis 
from the National Finance Act (NFA) of 2006. In the same year, the Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO) enacted the Government Performance Assessment Act (GPA) which 
specifies the concepts, principles and objectives of government performance 
management more broadly than the NFA, which treats Korean performance budgeting 
more directly and specifically (Cho, 2010). The NFA will be discussed in more detail 
later. SABP, which has played the most important role among the various performance 
management systems in Korea, was modelled on the PART employed by the United 
States and has been used in Korea since 2005 along with other fiscal reforms4. As so-
called the “top-down budgeting” has been introduced, every spending ministry has been 
able to propose a budget with greater autonomy than in the past, whilst adhering to the 
firm annual spending ceiling set by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF); so 
the stricter control of spending ministries’ expenditures has become more important. 
                                                     
3 This has been transformed into the Planning and Budget Commission (1998.2 – 1999.5), the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget (1999.5 – 2008.2) and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(2008.2 – present) as a result of government reorganisations. 
 
4  The Korean Government’s four major fiscal reforms at that time were “a medium-term 
expenditure framework”, “top-down budgeting”, “a performance budgeting system”, and “a 
digital budget information system” (Bang, 2009). 
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SABP has been used to assess a third of all the programmes of each spending ministry 
every year and has included mechanisms to reflect these assessment results in the 
ministries’ budget for the next year. From 2005 to 2010, a total of 2,920 programmes 
were assessed by SABP and the budgets for them totalled about 220,000 billion Won5.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Performance budgeting has been the subject of considerable analysis, most of which has 
focused on the relationship between performance results and subsequent budget 
allocations (Gilmour and Lewis, 2005, 2006; GAO, 2001; Melkers and Willoughby, 
2001; Park, 2005, 2008; Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010) or the factors that affect budgeting and 
performance assessment results (Kang, 2007; Chang and Yoon, 2002; Yoon, 2001). 
These approaches are based on the premise that the performance budgeting system itself 
is operating well, and consequently its results are reliable and accurately reflect a 
programme’s performance. However, in this thesis we ask whether performance 
budgeting systems in the public sector do genuinely indicate the success or failure of a 
programme. Are these systems measuring the actual performance of a programme 
accurately? Are they achieving their purposes successfully? Unfortunately, it is very 
hard to answer ‘Yes’ to these questions because many previous studies on performance 
management or budgeting in the public sector have suggested that there might be 
various kinds of dysfunctional consequences stemming from the restraints and 
limitations involved when performance is measured in this way (Ridgway, 1956; 
Weitzman, 1980; Smith, 1995; Bevan and Hood, 2006; de Bruijn, 2002; Kelman and 
                                                     
5 The Won is the unit of Korean currency. One Korean Won is equivalent to nearly 0.0006 UK 
pounds, as of February 2013. 
5 
 
Friedman, 2009; Bouckaert and Balk, 1991; LeGrand and Bartlett, 1993; Radnor, 2008; 
Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; Kong et al., 2009; Shin, 2010). These dysfunctional 
consequences can take many different forms, such as problems stemming from focusing 
on short-term performance, from focusing on only measured performance, from 
deliberately setting a lower performance target level, and from manipulating or 
interpreting performance in a favourable way. Despite the importance of performance 
management, the approach is not a panacea. Indeed, performance management may 
raise new problems or worsen existing ones. It can be a major obstacle to the successful 
modernisation of the public sector if it is inappropriately established and operated 
(Bouckaert and Peters, 2002). Ignoring these dysfunctional consequences or treating 
them as trivial phenomena can not only undermine the objectivity and reliability of 
performance measurement, but can also weaken the degree of acceptance of the results 
of performance assessment, and may, therefore, prevent performance budgeting from 
fully achieving its aims in the long term. Exploring the dysfunctional consequences of 
performance budgeting may therefore enable policy makers to identify the cause of 
these consequences systematically and design feasible improved policy alternatives.  
 
Against this overall background, this study examines differences of view between 
spending ministries and the MOSF that emerge in the process of reaching SABP results. 
As SABP consists of two steps – the spending ministries’ self-assessment stage and the 
MOSF’s review stage – differences between the SABP scores allocated by the spending 
ministries and the scores allocated by the MOSF are, in a sense, inevitable. In addition, 
considering the nature of performance budgeting, which gives incentives or penalties 
according to the performance of a programme, it can be said that this difference 
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between spending ministries and the MOSF is not an unexpected phenomenon. 
However, if particular differences have been significant, persistent and widespread 
between ministries6, it is important to analyse how this has arisen. The existence of and 
reasons for such differences are examined on the basis of two different approaches. The 
first focuses on explaining the factors which may affect the differences between SABP 
scores allocated by spending ministries and scores allocated by the MOSF by using 
numerical data drawn from SABP results covering 2005 to 2010. The second approach 
explores a range of dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the SABP 
context and the impact of these consequences on the behaviours of spending ministries 
and the MOSF. It does so by analysing qualitative data obtained from various 
documents, archival records and in-depth interviews. After analysing the existence and 
reasons for differences between spending ministries and the MOSF in the process of 
SABP, the study will suggest feasible policy alternatives for improving SABP.   
 
This is the background to the following research objectives.  
 
    To explain the factors which affect the differences in the SABP score 
between spending ministries and the MOSF 
  
    To examine the types of, extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP 
  
                                                     
 
6 As regards this, the SABP score gap between spending ministries’ self-assessment and the 
MOSF’s review was 26.1, 26.6, 25.7, 18.9, 26.3, and 25.8 points on the basis of 100 points in 
the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. Furthermore, the average of 
spending ministries’ self-assessment score for the six years is nearly 90 points (MOSF, 2012a). 
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    To explore the influences of these dysfunctional consequences of SABP on 
spending ministries’ self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores 
 
    To suggest the role of spending ministries and the MOSF in improving the 
SABP system 
 
These research objectives will be addressed through the four research questions. 
 
(1) What are the factors which affect the differences in SABP results between 
spending ministries and the MOSF? 
 
(2) What are the types of, extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP? 
 
(3) How do these dysfunctional consequences impact on both spending ministries’ 
self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores? 
 
(4) How can the SABP system in Korea be improved and refined? 
 
These questions are based on the relevant SABP results and on previous studies of 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the public sector. The first 
research question gives rise to much of the quantitative analysis and leads to an 
examination of whether factors within the SABP system, such as the MOSF’s review 
score, the budget percentage change of a programme, the programme type, the 
organisation type and the programme purpose can impact on the differences between the 
two scores by employing numerical data drawn from SABP results covering six years. 
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Answers to this question will be linked with the answers to the following research 
questions.  
 
The second research question aims to explore whether various dysfunctional 
consequences actually occur in the SABP system, and if so, to what extent and for what 
reasons. This question is investigated over eight programmes in three case study areas. 
In particular, the thesis categorises diverse dysfunctional consequences in spending 
ministries into “unintended” and “intended”, based on a structure informed by the 
principal-agent relationship.  
 
The third research question is designed to investigate the impact of these dysfunctional 
consequences, and focuses particularly on spending ministries’ “optimism bias” as 
manifested by spending ministries’ high self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s 
subsequent drastic cutting of these. High, significant, persistent and widespread 
differences during the implementation of SABP can be successfully explained by 
examining the impact of dysfunctional consequences; and they also indicate the need for 
feasible policy alternatives to prevent or reduce them.  
 
The last research question concerns ways in which dysfunctional consequences of 
performance budgeting might be reduced by feasible changes to the SABP system. This 
question stems from the fact that the most important thing in performance budgeting is 
not the existence of dysfunctional consequences but the question of what feasible 
policies can be devised to solve such problems. Also, the thesis suggests that policy 
makers should be cautious both about intended and unintended dysfunctional 
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consequences which are already evident in SABP and about those that subsequent 
policy changes might bring. 
 
1.3 The Scope of the Research 
 
This thesis will discuss dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the 
public sector broadly, but its empirical analyses will focus on the SABP system in 
Korea. Since SABP has both characteristics that relate to managing budgetary 
programmes’ performance and ones that relate to assessing government performance, 
the GPA and the NFA are both relevant to the SABP system. The GPA 
comprehensively stipulates the concepts, principles and objectives of “government 
performance management”, changing from input- and process-oriented to outcome-
oriented management to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government (Art. 2). 
As government performance management includes financial, personnel and 
organisational tasks, SABP is one part of this integrated government performance 
management in the GPA. At the same time, the performance budgeting system includes 
three sub-systems: the Performance Management System for Programmes (PMS), Self-
Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP), and the In-depth Evaluation System 
(IES). Consequently, SABP, the research object, is broadly related to government 
performance management in the GPA, and at the same time it is one of the performance 
budgeting systems in the NFA.  
 
There are two types of data analysed in this thesis: quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative data are analysed in order to explain the factors which affect the differences 
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in SABP score between spending ministries and the MOSF, as well as to give some 
useful indications for policy alternatives; while the qualitative data are examined in 
order to explore the types of, extent of and reasons for various dysfunctional 
consequences of the SABP system, their influences, and feasible policy alternatives. For 
the quantitative data, 2,920 budgetary programmes’ SABP results in 49 central 
government departments from 2005 to 2010 are used. These SABP scores include both 
spending ministries’ self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores for each 
programme. For the qualitative data, documents, archival data, and two sets of in-depth 
interviews with Korean government officials and experts in eight budgetary 
programmes covering three case study areas (public housing, youth employment and 
social overhead capital) are used. Interviewees were chosen because they all had 
experience of SABP and could give useful insights for analysing dysfunctional 
consequences of the SABP system and the policy implications for it.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
         
The objectives of the study are both to explain factors which affect the differences in 
SABP scores through a quantitative approach and to explore dysfunctional 
consequences of the SABP system and the impact of these on SABP scores through a 
qualitative approach. In other words, these aims include not only verifying the 
relationships between some factors and differences in SABP scores but also 
understanding the subjective meanings of government officials’ perceptions and 
behaviours. This approach does not “mix” different philosophical worldviews for study 
purposes, but uses an umbrella paradigm of pragmatism (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
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2011). Following the assumptions of pragmatism, the focus of the research is on the 
consequences of study, on the use of multiple methods as well as different forms of data 
collection and analysis, and on the “what” and “how” of research (Creswell, 2009; 
Cherryholmes, 1992; Morgan, 2007). Pragmatism as a worldview (Creswell, 2009) or a 
paradigm (Kuhn, 1970) for a study is closely associated with the mixed approach, 
employing both quantitative and qualitative analysis (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). 
Taking pragmatism as a philosophical worldview, the study collects both quantitative 
and qualitative data concurrently but separately. The main sources for quantitative data 
are the numerical results of SABP over six years, while the sources for qualitative data 
are document analysis, archival data analysis and in-depth interviews. The two data sets 
are analysed separately and independently by employing quantitative and qualitative 
analytic procedures. After summarising the two sets of data analysis, the study discusses 
issues raised by both approaches, interpreting and merging the findings from them in 
order to produce a more complete understanding of the differences between spending 
ministries and the MOSF in the process of arriving at the SABP results.  
 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The organisation of this thesis can be seen in Figure 1-1. The following is a brief 
overview of the structure of the thesis. As already noted, the thesis seeks to examine the 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF by using both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Thus, it starts by reviewing the relevant literature on the 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF, based on the principal-agent 
relationship and focusing on the dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting 
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(Chapter 2). At the same time, it also reviews studies of SABP results, focusing on 
factors which may affect differences in these results (Chapter 3). Drawing on these 
reviews of relevant literature, the thesis presents a methodological framework, including 
four key research questions, designs for both quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
and a data collection strategy (Chapter 4). It then explains the relationship between 
various factors and differences in SABP results through quantitative analysis, and 
explores differences between spending ministries and the MOSF by employing 
qualitative analysis (Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, the thesis discusses issues raised by 
both analyses and suggests further research (Chapters 7 and 8).  
 
The following is a more detailed description of the eight chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the background, research objectives and research questions, and 
the scope, methodology and structure of the research.  
 
Chapter 2 gives definitions of performance and performance budgeting, and then 
extensively explores previous studies on dysfunctional consequences of performance 
budgeting based on the principal-agent theory, which is one of the main streams of new 
institutional economics, in order to develop a conceptual framework for exploring the 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF through a qualitative approach.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews trends in performance budgeting in many countries, including Korea, 
and then describes the SABP system in detail, focusing on factors which may affect 
differences in SABP results.  
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Chapter 4 presents a methodological framework for the research. It begins by 
suggesting four research questions and provides grounds for a mixed approach. It then 
explains both the quantitative and qualitative approaches in detail.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the relationship between diverse factors and differences in SABP 
results by employing various kinds of statistical methods such as correlation analysis, t-
test, ANOVA and multiple regression analysis. The independent and control variables 
are drawn from the relevant literature reviews in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the types of, extent of and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP; the impact of dysfunctional consequences on SABP results; and initial ideas for 
policy alternatives to produce a better SABP system through various kinds of qualitative 
data. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses issues raised by both analyses and confirms the findings of these. It 
interprets and merges the findings from both analyses, and suggests feasible policy 
alternatives for minimising or preventing dysfunctional consequences. Also, it discusses 
the contribution of the thesis to three key areas.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by addressing the research questions and summarising 
the main findings of the study; and it considers the limitations of the research, while 
suggesting further research areas.  
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Figure 1-1 The Structure of the Thesis 
Raise a question about the effectiveness of the SABP system (Chapter 1) 
▪ Focus on the process for arriving at the SABP results 
▪ Focus on the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF 
 
 
Review previous studies on SABP results  
(Chapter 3) 
▪ Relationship between SABP results and budgeting 
▪ Factors which affect budgeting and SABP results 
▪ Differences in SABP results between spending    
   ministries and the MOSF 
 
 
 
and 
Review studies on dysfunctional 
consequences of performance budgeting 
(Chapter 2) 
 ▪ Categorise “unintended” and “intended”  
 dysfunctional consequences by spending  
 ministries (all are unintended by MOSF) 
 ▪ Develop a theoretical framework 
 
 
Design the quantitative strand (Chapter 4) 
 ▪ State quantitative research question (Qs 1&4) 
 
Collect the quantitative data 
 ▪ SABP results from 2005 to 2010  
 (2,920 programmes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
Design the qualitative strand (Chapter 4) 
 ▪ State qualitative research question  
 (Qs 2, 3 & 4) 
 
Collect the qualitative data 
 ▪ Select case areas and cases 
 ▪ Collect related documents 
 ▪ Collect archival records 
 ▪ Carry out semi-structured interviews (twice) 
 
 
 
Analyse the quantitative data (Chapter 5) 
 ▪ Relationship between diverse variables and the  
   differences in SABP results 
 (t-test, ANOVA, regression analysis) 
Analyse the qualitative data (Chapter 6) 
(document analysis, archival records analysis,  
 interviews analysis) 
 ▪ Types of, extent of and reasons for  
   dysfunctional consequences of the SABP 
 ▪ Impacts of these dysfunctional  
   consequences on SABP results 
 ▪ Policy alternatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence factor   
 
 
 
 
→ 
 
 
 
Differences in 
SABP results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Independent variable 
- MOSF’s score 
- Difference between 
specific program’s 
self-assessment score 
and the spending 
ministry’s average 
score in that year 
 
▪ Control variable 
- Budget process    
  factor 
- Programme  
characteristics factor 
- Policy factor 
 
 
 
▪Disagreement ratio 
 (DR) 
 
▪ Relative optimism  
ratio of spending  
ministry (ROR) 
 
 
  
 
 
Interpret two sets of results and merge the results (Chapter 7) 
▪ Summarise and interpret the separate results 
 ▪ Merge the quantitative and qualitative results 
Note: modified Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
THEORY OF PERFORMANCE BUDGETING 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is not easy to define public sector performance as a unitary concept, because 
performance can have different meanings according to who is doing the defining, at 
what point measurement of performance takes place, and the priority given to various 
aspects of performance (Stewart and Walsh, 1994). For example, performance can be 
diversely described in the short-term, in the long-term, in a quantitative way, in a 
qualitative way, according to the point in time reached or the characteristics of 
performance being measured. Talbot (2005) outlines various dimensions of performance 
– e.g., accountability, user choice, customer service, efficiency, effectiveness and results, 
resource allocation, and public value. He also raises some problematic issues of 
performance, such as: the “unit of analysis problem”, which relates to boundaries within 
the public domain; “conceptual problems”, which relate to the agreed, operable 
definitions of performance, “technical problems”, which are associated with measuring 
various aspects of performance; and “political and values problems” which relate to 
what is measured (Talbot, 2010). Bovaird (1996, p.147) indicates that performance “is 
not a unitary concept, within an unambiguous meaning. Rather, it must be viewed as a 
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set of information about achievements of varying significance to different stakeholders”. 
Smith (1995, p.278) also mentions that, “The definition of performance in a public 
sector organisation is often elusive”. These views give a useful insight into various 
aspects of performance, including process and results (Lee, 2007). For example, if the 
results of economic activities are focused on, then performance can be measured by 
cost-effectiveness, productivity and effectiveness; while if non-economic aspects are 
emphasised, then performance can be measured by satisfaction and service quality 
(Poister, 2003). However, this chapter will not focus on arguments about the concept of 
performance. Rather, it will apply the concept of “the three Es” (economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness, based on the input into, process by, and output of organisations), 
which have been widely used in public sector performance management literature to 
explain performance (Carter et al., 1995; Flynn, 1997; Rouse, 1999; Diamond, 2005; 
Johnsen, 2005; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008).  
   
In addition, the definition of performance management in the public sector is often 
elusive and means different things at different administrative levels. However, many 
scholars agree that performance management is one of the managerial approaches that 
emphasises the autonomy and responsibility of organisations by measuring outcomes 
among employees and providing them with rewards or penalties based on their results, 
rather than controlling input or procedure (Joyce and Sieg, 2000; Epstein, 1992; 
Andrews and Hill, 2003). Smith (2002, p.105) also defines performance management in 
the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK as “a set of managerial instruments 
designed to secure optimal performance of the health care system over time, in line with 
policy objectives”, suggesting that the three main aspects are: an emphasis on 
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managerial aspects, a longer time dimension for performance, and given policy 
objectives. These basic concepts of performance management have been adopted in the 
financial and budgetary areas: what is called performance budgeting in the public sector. 
Since the definition of performance budgeting also varies greatly, according to the 
scholars who have studied it, the process can reasonably be viewed by drawing common 
characteristics from various approaches to it.  
 
With regard to managing performance in the public sector, previous studies suggest 
both a necessity for and limitations to performance budgeting. In particular, limitations 
can lead to unexpected dysfunctional consequences when it comes to measuring 
performance, and that is why many scholars have indicated these and tried to define and 
categorise them, drawing extensively on empirical evidence. However, these 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting have not been considered 
seriously, or even regarded as exceptional phenomena, because many researchers have 
considered them as a sort of “cost”, and have decided that in the long-term the benefits 
of measuring performance can exceed these costs (Johnsen, 2005; Pidd, 2005). 
However, ignoring dysfunctional consequences or treating them as trivial matters can 
undermine the objectivity and reliability of performance budgeting and weaken the 
degree of acceptance by organisation members, leading to a failure in achieving the 
intentions and purposes of the introduction of performance budgeting in the long-term. 
Consequently, it is very important to understand the nature of dysfunctional 
consequences, and to analyse the reasons for them explicitly, in order to implement a 
performance budgeting system successfully (Shin, 2010). SABP in Korea, as a 
performance budgeting system, is exposed to various dysfunctional consequences not 
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only because spending ministries and the MOSF behave under different incentive 
structures but also because there is an asymmetry in the amount of information available 
to them about budgetary programmes. Also, these dysfunctional consequences can incur 
diverse types of transaction costs, such as target setting costs, programme 
implementation monitoring costs, performance measuring costs and performance 
confirming costs.  
 
Against this background, this chapter firstly describes relevant previous studies related 
to the definition of performance and performance budgeting, elements and types of 
performance budgeting, and dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting. 
Secondly, it presents the principal-agent theory as a theoretical lens through which to 
analyse the complex characteristics of dysfunctional consequences of SABP, focusing 
on the relationship between spending ministries and the MOSF. Thirdly, it develops a 
typology of dysfunctional consequences of SABP on the basis both of previous studies 
on dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting and the principal-agent theory. 
Finally, it suggests a conceptual framework within which to explore dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP based on the study’s own typology of dysfunctional 
consequences. The chapter does not focus on making an attempt to identify similar 
nuances of meaning that surround the definition of performance and performance 
budgeting. Instead, it focuses on drawing out general dysfunctional consequences of 
performance budgeting, and developing a useful typology to explore those of the SABP 
system, based on the principal-agent relationship between spending ministries and the 
MOSF. 
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2.2 Performance Budgeting in the Public Sector  
 
2.2.1 Definition of Performance  
 
This section describes the concept of performance, focusing on “the three Es”, that is, 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness based on input into, process by, and output or 
outcome of organisations (Carter et al., 1995; Flynn, 1997; Rouse, 1999; Diamond, 
2005; Johnsen, 2005; Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008, Boland and Fowler, 2000). An 
“input” refers to resources, such as personnel, finance and physical assets (Boland and 
Fowler, 2000). A “process” refers to activities or throughputs in which inputs are used 
to produce outputs. “Process” in the public sector means various activities undertaken to 
produce public goods and services. An “output” is the result of a process, and means the 
direct goods and services obtained by the process. An “outcome” is usually expressed in 
terms of final impacts on the society and beneficiaries resulting from the output. Based 
on a simple input, process and output model of organisations, “economy” can be 
defined as “the cost divided by the input (e.g., the cost per employee, the costs per 
office)” (Bovaird and Loffler, 2003, p.131; Diamond, 2005, p.5) and traditional budget 
systems put emphasis on inputs or resources, so the key to the performance of these 
systems is economy. Many measures of performance in the public sector can be defined 
on the basis of this economy or input-oriented perspective (Boland and Fowler, 2000). 
“Efficiency” can be defined as the ratio of input to output, and output-oriented budget 
systems concentrate on producing indicators of efficiency. Outputs can easily be 
measured in quantifiable terms: for example, number of crimes solved per police officer, 
patients treated per doctor, closures per inspection, and so on. It is in this way that 
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governments tend to measure organisational efficiency when it comes to producing 
operation results. Finally, “effectiveness” is related to the extent to which outputs 
achieve an organisation’s goals and requirements, defined as “outcome divided by 
output”, and outcome-oriented budget systems are concerned with producing indicators 
of effectiveness (Diamond, 2005, p.5). Outcome tells us more about the real success or 
failure of an organisation or a programme, and therefore it is much more difficult to 
measure or assess. According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
(2003, p.488), “high performing organisations have recognised that an effective 
performance management system can be a strategic tool to drive internal change and 
achieve desired results”. The Office of Management and Budget in the US (OMB) 
(2003; re-cited GAO, 2004, p.21) also states that a performance budget is “a 
performance-oriented framework in which strategic goals are paired with related long-
term performance goals (outcomes) and annual performance goals (mainly outputs)”.  
 
Although performance can be still conceptualised in various ways when presenting it in 
relation to tasks or activities undertaken by individuals or organisations, the focus of 
budgeting systems in the public sector has been changed from input to output or 
outcome; and therefore the focus of performance in the public sector tends to lie in the 
measurability of the efficiency and effectiveness of programmes (Miller et al., 2001; 
Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). Consequently, performance in the public sector, 
especially in government activities, can be defined as the outputs, outcomes and impacts 
which can be achieved by the use of both tangible and intangible assets derived from the 
citizens’ taxes in order to attain the intended and desirable purposes of government or 
government officials, and therefore this concept includes efficiency as well as 
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effectiveness. It is against this background that the next section will discuss the concept 
of performance budgeting in the public sector. 
 
2.2.2 Definition of Performance Budgeting  
 
Performance budgeting has been expressed in various terms, such as “performance-
based budgeting”, “result-oriented management”, “programme budgeting”, 
“performance evaluation and management”, and “result-based management”. Defining 
performance budgeting as a unitary concept is not easy, because each government has 
its own approaches, definitions and methods for transforming performance data into 
budget decisions. Thus, the rest of this section describes diverse definitions of 
performance budgeting and draws out common characteristics from them in order to 
define performance budgeting in the public sector.      
 
Shick (2007, p.123) states that “loosely defined, any system that provides information 
on the volume of outputs, the activities of government agencies, their workload, 
indicators of demand or need for public services, or the impact of expenditure qualifies 
as a performance budget. Strictly defined, only the budget systems which formally link 
increments in spending to increments in results would qualify”. Jordan and Hackbart 
(1999, p.69) describe performance budgeting, in a rather broad way, as “preparing the 
budget document with identified performance measures”. However, most academic 
researchers and international organisations define performance budgeting as a moderate 
version of the above definitions. Robinson and Brumby (2005, P.5) focus on the use of 
performance information, stating that it is “procedures or mechanisms intended to 
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strengthen links between the funds provided to public sector entities and their outcomes 
and/or outputs through the use of formal performance information in source allocation 
decision-making”. Mackay (2007) indicates the importance of formal performance 
information, pointing out that performance budgeting can be understood as a budget 
system which pursues fiscal efficiency and the priority of public expenditures on the 
basis of performance information. Lauth (1985), Melkers and Willoughby (2001), and 
McGill (2001) focus on a process of linking the performance of programmes and 
activities with their budget allocations. The GAO (1999) defines performance budgeting 
as a system which links performance information and budgeting, and the OMB (2006) 
states that it is a budget system which explains clearly the relationship between 
performance goals and the cost of achieving targeted performance. The OECD (2005a, 
2005b) states that it is a type of budgeting which links measurable results to budget 
allocation. The Ministry of Planning and Budget in Korea (2003) states that 
performance budgeting is an outcome-oriented budgeting system which measures the 
outputs and outcomes of public programmes and gives penalties or incentives on the 
basis of these. Finally, Park (2008) defines performance budgeting as a kind of financial 
reform which increases the links between performance management and budgeting in 
the public sector.  
 
From these diverse definitions, we can see that the main characteristics of performance 
budgeting are the clarification of performance goals and objectives, the development of 
performance indicators and measurement techniques, and the feeding of results back 
into the process of implementing budgetary programmes (Pollitt, 2001). Consequently, 
performance budgeting can be defined as a kind of budgeting system which is intended 
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to improve the performance and increase the efficiency of budgetary programmes by 
clarifying their goals and objectives, developing performance indicators in line with 
them, measuring and analysing performance, and reporting and reflecting the results of 
analysis.   
 
2.2.3 Elements of Performance Budgeting  
 
Performance budgeting undertakes several stages in order to ascertain the level to which 
a performance target has been achieved by measuring the performance of a programme. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) in the US (1995) divides performance management 
and the budgeting process into 11 stages, such as identifying a member’s understanding 
and analysing an organisation’s environment, selecting core programmes in line with 
the organisation’s mission and goals, clarifying the performance objectives of core 
programmes, defining performance indicators, determining the method of colleting 
performance data, measuring and analysing the performance, and reporting the results 
of analysis. The GAO (1996) simply categorises them into three steps: setting the 
objectives and desired outcome, measuring performance, and utilising performance 
indicators. Winstanley and Smith (1996) point out three core stages of performance 
budgeting: setting the goals and objectives, managing the performance, and measuring 
the performance. Similarly, Shin (2010) indicates four stages of performance budgeting: 
clarifying performance indicators and a desired outcome, implementing main 
programmes, collecting and analysing performance data, and evaluating and interpreting 
the analysis. Considering these previous studies and the characteristics of performance 
budgeting mentioned in Section 2.2.2, this study suggests three main stages of 
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performance budgeting: performance planning, performance measurement, and 
performance reporting.   
 
Performance Planning  
 
Performance planning includes clarifying the mission and goal for an activity, 
developing performance indicators, and setting the desired outcome. Of these, 
developing appropriate performance indicators is the core process of performance 
planning, because it is through measuring performance indicators that performance can 
be assessed. In general, a performance indicator is defined as a criterion against which 
the mission, strategic goal and performance goal of an organisation or a programme can 
be measured; and performance indicators can be divided into four types – input, process, 
output and outcome indicators – according to the progress of an activity (KIPF, 2006; 
Lee, 2003; Bang, 2009). Ammons (1995b) presents validity, reliability, timeliness, cost-
efficiency and controllability as the appropriate characteristics of performance 
indicators. The Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF) (2012) also suggests five 
criteria for relevant performance indicators in SABP: they should be specific, 
measurable, attributable, reliable and timely (SMART). According to the GPA, 
performance indicators should be outcome-oriented as much as possible, in order to 
measure the ultimate impact of a programme, while output as well as process 
performance indicators must be used supportively when creating outcome performance 
indicators proves difficult (Art. 6). Taken together, these criteria indicate that 
developing appropriate performance indicators for a programme is very important for 
successful performance budgeting, because if they do not measure performance 
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objectively and accurately, performance budgeting cannot achieve its purposes 
effectively. Thus, key performance indicators should be made in accordance with the 
mission, and the strategic and performance goals of an organisation or programme.                    
 
Performance Measurement 
 
Wang (2000, p.104) defines performance measurement as “the measuring of levels of 
activities and achievements through a range of indicators”.  Radnor and Barnes (2007, 
p.393) and Radnor (2008, p.317) define performance measurement more specifically as 
“a quantitative or qualitative value of the input, output, outcome or level of activity of 
an event or process”, while differentiating it from performance management and 
performance reporting. According to Wholey and Newcomer (1997), performance 
measurement goes beyond the technical methodology of applying performance data and 
includes measuring all the processes of decision-making and management using 
performance data. Interestingly, Lebas (1995) indicates that performance measurement 
and management are not separable, although there are distinct differences between them. 
If this is the case, performance measurement can be used as a similar concept to 
performance management and budgeting. However, in general, performance 
measurement plays a key role in performance management and budgeting, as one of the 
core components of these processes (Lee, 2007); and performance management and 
budgeting include all processes of performance planning, performance measurement 
and performance reporting (Shin, 2010). Radnor and Barnes (2007) also state that 
performance measurement is related to efficiency, productivity and utilisation, while 
performance management is concerned with effectiveness and a more holistic view of 
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operations. Furthermore, differentiating the concept of performance measurement from 
that of performance management will provide more meaningful ways to analyse various 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting systematically.  
 
The purposes of performance measurement are described in different ways by different 
people, according to their different intentions. Behn (2003, pp. 593-598) points out 
eight managerial purposes of measuring performance, focusing on public managers: “to 
evaluate the outcomes, to control the inputs, to budget efficient measures, to motivate 
almost-real-time outputs, to promote easily understood aspects of performance about 
which citizens really care, to celebrate periodic and significant performance targets, to 
learn disaggregated data that can reveal deviances from the expected and to improve 
performance”. In order to achieve useful performance information, he indicates, public 
managers firstly need to consider carefully the purposes of measurement and then to 
select the best measures available for each purpose (Behn, 2003). Also, performance is 
measured from various aspects at different levels, so public managers need to consider 
seriously the differences in the purposes of, and requirements for, performance 
information at each level, e.g., that of a project or a team, a programme or department, 
or a strategy, in order to choose relevant performance measures (Osborne et al., 1995). 
The GAO (1996, pp.24-28) identifies the characteristics of appropriate performance 
measures at each organisational level, such as “demonstrating results, telling each 
organisational level how it is achieving its goals, restricting to the vital few performance 
indicators per goal, responding to multiple priorities and linking to offices that have the 
responsibility for making programs work”. Also, Wholey (1999) indicates that public 
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managers should balance the cost of data collection against the benefits to be drawn 
from useful performance information.   
 
Consequently, performance measurement is not an end in itself but a means of 
performance budgeting (Osborne et al., 1995), and it is one of the key elements of 
performance management, as well as a useful tool for performance reporting, as will be 
seen in the next section.  
 
Performance Reporting 
 
Radnor and Barnes (2007, p.393) and Radnor (2008, p.317) define performance 
reporting as “providing an account, and often some analysis, of the level of input, 
activity, output or outcome of an event or process usually against some form of target”. 
As the final stage of performance budgeting, not only the results of performance 
measurement but also the evaluation opinions arrived at in the process of measuring 
performance, such as the reason for not achieving a performance target level, are 
reported and processed publicly following the end of a fiscal year (GAO, 1996; Kong, 
2008). In other words, performance reporting needs to provide specific information 
about the level achieved by a programme: whether this level attains the planned 
performance target level; to what extent performance has been improved; and how 
much it should be improved in the future (Kong, 2008). The GPA in Korea also deals 
with the open reporting of the results of performance measurement, the subject and 
method of performance reporting, and the feedback of performance results. Individuals 
and organisations, as well as programmes, can improve their performance by publishing 
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and utilising performance information openly. That is why performance reporting as the 
final component of performance management has an important meaning. The main 
contents of each stage of performance management are summarised in Table 2-1 below. 
 
Table 2- 1 Elements of Performance Management and their Main Contents 
Element Main contents 
Performance 
management 
Performance 
planning 
- Clarifying a vision, mission or goal  
- Developing performance indicators 
- Setting a desired outcome (performance target level) 
Performance 
measurement 
- Collecting performance data 
- Measuring a quantitative or qualitative value  
Performance 
reporting 
- Evaluating performance results 
- Providing an account of performance results 
- Feedback of performance results 
 
2.2.4 Types of Performance Budgeting 
 
Mackay (2007) divides performance budgeting into three types, according to the extent 
of the use of information provided by performance monitoring: direct performance 
budgeting, indirect performance budgeting and presentational performance budgeting. 
In direct performance budgeting, budget allocation for a programme is directly related 
to the performance results achieved, in order to eliminate political influence on budgets. 
In other words, budget allocation is determined by a formula or automatic process based 
on specific performance results or activity indicators. This type of performance 
budgeting has been applied to specific sectors in a small number of OECD countries, 
such as the education sectors of Denmark, Finland and Sweden (e.g., linking university 
funding to the number of students graduating), because direct performance budgeting is 
possible only if the outputs or outcomes of a programme are expressed accurately as a 
quantity (OECD, 2005c). With respect to indirect performance budgeting, performance 
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results are just one kind of information associated with budgeting for a programme, and 
other kinds of information, such as policy priorities, can also impact on budget 
allocation. Indirect performance budgeting is the most common type of performance 
budgeting in countries such as the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Korea. 
Under presentational performance budgeting, monitoring and evaluation of information 
is related not to budget allocation but to reporting past or future performance 
information for the Congress or Parliament. Performance information is presented as 
background information to increase the accountability of spending ministries and their 
affiliated institutes (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999). Countries such as Denmark and Sweden, 
which have no formal or systematic budgeting system, have adopted this kind of 
performance budgeting. Similarly, Shah (2007) divides performance budgeting into four 
types, according to the criteria of how performance information is used in budget 
allocation: performance-reported budgeting, performance-informed budgeting, 
performance-based budgeting and performance-determined budgeting. In performance-
reported budgeting, performance information is included as part of budget 
documentation, but it is not used for budget allocation. Performance-informed 
budgeting implies that performance information is used as a minor factor when it comes 
to budget decision-making. However, under performance-based budgeting performance 
results have a key role in budget allocation, along with many other factors. The UK, the 
US, New Zealand and Korea have adopted this kind of performance budgeting (Bang, 
2009). In performance-determined budgeting, performance information is directly and 
explicitly linked to budget allocation for a programme. In a policy context, budget 
allocation for a programme is determined by various economic, political and social 
factors including performance results, so it is difficult to link performance information 
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directly to resource allocation (Ko, 2004). Consequently, according to the criteria of 
Mackay (2007) and Shah (2007), SABP in Korea can be regarded as indirect 
performance budgeting as well as performance-based budgeting (Bang, 2009; Jung, 
2012).   
 
2.2.5 Necessities and Limitations of Performance Budgeting in the Public Sector 
 
Ferris and Graddy (1998) indicate that issues of public sector reform, including 
performance budgeting, have transcended national boundaries and have shed light on 
diverse policy areas for the last three decades; and they mention that the efforts made to 
reinvent government in the US (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) and to introduce new 
public management (NPM) in the UK (Hood, 1991) have been the most representative 
of these initiatives. The reason why so many countries from the OECD to South 
America, Africa and the developing regions have introduced the performance budgeting 
system is its diverse and positive effects. Governments can increase the efficiency, 
effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and democracy of policies by applying 
performance information to strategic planning, organisational and personnel 
management, budgeting, service delivery improvement, and evaluation (Shah, 2007; 
Epstein, 1992; Wholey and Hatry, 1992; Wang, 2002; Ammons, 1995a; Mackay, 2007). 
First of all, performance budgeting can solve the problem of lack of incentives for 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. The public sector 
generally offers fewer incentives for making an effort to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a programme than the private sector, because it is less exposed to 
competition and the risk of being wiped out. By evaluating the performance of a 
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programme and using it as one of the key factors in budget allocation, the public sector 
can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of a programme, its personnel, its 
organisation and its budget. Secondly, performance budgeting will lead to increasing 
accountability in the public sector, because it focuses on allocating not only more 
discretion but also more responsibility to a programme (Robinson and Brumby, 2005). 
By presenting performance targets explicitly and enabling public managers to focus on 
core tasks, it gives them more autonomy in their programmes while making them more 
responsible for performance. Thirdly, performance budgeting can improve the 
transparency of, and confidence in, the public sector by making it easier for people to 
understand its visions, missions, goals, strategies, programmes and activities. By 
reviewing performance results, citizens are able to identify more easily the core tasks of 
the public sector and the extent to which these have been achieved. Finally, 
performance budgeting can improve the democracy of policies by increasing 
opportunities for citizens’ participation in public programmes (Mackay, 2007).           
 
However, despite the importance of performance budgeting, as mentioned above, the 
approach is not a panacea. Indeed, performance budgeting may raise a new problem or 
worsen an existing one. It can be a big obstacle to the successful modernisation of the 
public sector if it is inappropriately set up and operated (Smith, 1995, 2005, 2008, 2011; 
Bouckaert and Peters, 2002). Performance budgeting in the public sector is based on the 
premise that performance objectives are quite obvious and can be measured objectively. 
However, studies indicate that in many cases performance targets in the public sector 
are unclear. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) raise the multi-tasking 
problem in the public sector when it comes to designing an economic incentive system. 
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By contrast with private companies, it is difficult for the public sector to have clear 
objectives, because a public organisation’s value is determined by multiple and 
competing objectives (Heinrich and Marschke, 2010). In other words, in general, the 
public sector has to be responsible to various groups such as taxpayers, local 
government, other public organisations and ordinary citizens, so that in many cases the 
public sector’s objectives cannot be clear and public programmes are complex by their 
very nature (Moore, 2002; Hood, 2006). Thus, policy makers who want to design 
economic incentive systems based on performance assessment in the public sector 
should consider carefully the multitasking problem. Dixit (1997, p.378) also describes 
this phenomenon using the phrase “common agencies with several principals”.    
 
In addition, although the objectives of public programmes are clear, it is difficult to 
measure and evaluate them accurately and objectively, due to their intangibility, 
indirectness, externalities and complexities (Wilson, 1989; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). In 
many cases, there is no equivalent of a public service in the market, so it is hard to 
measure performance on the basis of the market or competition. Another reason is that it 
takes a long time for public programmes to impact on, or influence, society. 
Performance measurement carried out too late will mean that incentives or penalties 
based on performance results will lose their relevance; while measurement carried out 
too early makes it impossible to calculate performance meaningfully. Also, in cases 
where several programmes or organisations contribute simultaneously to producing a 
performance, the problem of how to measure the joint inputs and outputs can arise. 
Downs and Larkey (1986) state that evaluating performance in the public sector is a 
very difficult task because uncertain or uncontrollable external factors can affect it. In 
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such cases, poorly evaluated individuals or organisations can shift their responsibilities 
onto the external factors; and, furthermore, co-operation and communication among 
them can be undermined in the long run.         
 
These limitations of performance measurement in the public sector can lead to various 
kinds of dysfunctional consequences for performance budgeting, and Smith (2005, p.1) 
indicates that these predicted and actual negative effects need to be monitored as “an 
intrinsic parts of the performance monitoring process”. In this sense, various 
dysfunctional consequences need to be explained in detail.  
 
2.3 Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Budgeting 
 
2.3.1 Previous Studies on Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Budgeting 
 
This section explores various dysfunctional consequences identified in previous studies 
based on the elements of performance budgeting mentioned in 2.2.3, and does so from 
the following angles. Firstly, the severity and extent of the impact of dysfunctional 
consequences may be different according to the elements of performance budgeting. For 
example, dysfunctional consequences in performance planning may produce the most 
negative impacts, because if there are dysfunctional consequences in performance 
planning, then the later stages cannot help but be exposed to various problems. Indeed, 
since the questions in SABP are logically linked with each other, dysfunctional 
consequences in performance planning are particularly likely lead to perverse effects in 
the later stages of assessment. Similarly, if there are some problems in performance 
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measurement, then performance reporting cannot produce meaningful information for 
people. Thus, by identifying dysfunctional consequences based on the elements of 
performance budgeting, policy makers can extract more useful performance information. 
Secondly, the possibility of identifying or controlling dysfunctional consequences may 
be different according to the elements of performance budgeting. In general, the 
Ministry of Finance and other related organisations, such as the National Assembly and 
the Board of Audit and Inspection, can more easily identify or control dysfunctional 
consequences in performance reporting than those in performance planning or 
measurement, because performance reports are published openly and can be evaluated 
objectively by several experts, whilst performance planning and measurement are more 
dependent on spending ministries’ discretion. Thirdly, identifying dysfunctional 
consequences based on the elements of performance budgeting may produce useful 
insights that will contribute to my typology of dysfunctional consequences, which will 
be explained later. Many previous studies deal with similar phenomena using different 
terminologies, so it is difficult to work out the exact meaning of, and the relationship 
between, other studies. By categorising dysfunctional consequences under the same 
element of performance budgeting, diverse terminologies reflecting similar phenomena 
can be presented by one terminology.            
 
Dysfunctional Consequences in Performance Planning 
 
Dysfunctional consequences at this stage are mainly related to the development of 
performance indicators and the setting of performance target levels. Firstly, as for the 
development of performance indicators, four out of the eight types of unintended 
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consequences suggested by Smith (1995) are associated with this stage. Smith suggests 
the concepts of tunnel vision, sub-optimisation, myopia and ossification arising in the 
process of monitoring and investigating performance in the UK public sector. Tunnel 
vision occurs when managers choose the most easily quantifiable performance 
indicators and ignore the rest (Smith, 1995). This phenomenon is likely to happen in the 
public sector because public managers have a tendency to avoid the uncertainty and 
externality caused by the ambiguous and unclear objectives of public programmes when 
they assess their performance. Sub-optimisation occurs when public managers pursue 
narrow objectives, damaging the performance of the overall system (Smith, 1995). In 
particular, in many cases public organisations’ final objectives and overall performance 
are made up of the joint outputs of several sub-divisions; so if they are not expressed in 
relation to these divisions’ objectives or performance, then it is possible not to achieve 
the overall performance of the organisations. Myopia arises when public managers 
focus on short-term targets at the expense of longer-term objectives (Smith, 1995). In a 
recent study on the intended and unintended effects of the British health care sector’s 
targets system for general practitioners (GPs) introduced in 2004, Smith (2008) states 
that if incentives are not carefully designed, GPs tend to focus on short-term objectives 
at the expense of long-term ones. In general, the results of public programmes can be 
shown after a long time, so performance indicators have some limitations when it comes 
to reflecting medium or long-term objectives well. Consequently, if public managers put 
excessive emphasis on this performance indicator, the long-term and strategic aspects of 
programmes may be ignored. Also, Smith (1995) refers to ossification to indicate that 
no one has the interest or capacity to revise or remove performance indicators which 
have already lost their purposes, due to ossification of the system. In particular, he 
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thinks that the public sector has not been faced with competition, in comparison with 
private companies, so it has less incentive to revise performance indicators at regular 
intervals. De Bruijn (2002) also mentions that performance measurement in the public 
sector may raise some negative effects as well as positive ones. He states that excessive 
emphasis on quantifiable performance will ignore the diversity and complexity of public 
programmes, and this can lead to the killing off of a professional attitude (Smith, 1993; 
Goddard et al., 2000). He also indicates that performance indicators focus on measuring 
quantities, that is clearly definable aspects of performance, and this leads to the 
blocking of professionalism. Similarly to Smith discussing ossification, he comments 
that measuring performance in the public sector can block innovations because the 
organisation faced with measuring performance tries to achieve its performance as 
efficiently as possible, not accepting the risk of exploring the unknown, which may 
reduce the organisation’s output (de Bruijn, 2002). About 55 years ago, Ridgway (1956) 
pointed out that indiscriminate use of quantitative performance indicators relating to job 
performance regardless of single, multiple and composite indicators might lead to 
unanticipated side effects and reactions if there was no better understanding of 
organisational behaviours for public managers, because of the complexity of large 
organisations. He mentioned possible dysfunctional consequences of quantitative 
performance indicators based on organisational theory. For example, a US federal law 
enforcement agency’s priority in the cases it investigated was the length of the case 
rather than its urgency (Blau, 1955; re-cited Ridgway, 1956); and contradictory 
managerial decisions might arise under multiple quantitative performance indicators 
such as profits and production.  
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Secondly, with respect to the setting of performance target levels, Weitzman (1980) 
verifies the ratchet effect on the basis of an economic theory: planners of an enterprise 
(e.g., individual workers, an intermediate sized department, or a giant sector) have a 
tendency to use a current performance target level as a criterion for setting future 
targets, especially under a repetitive contract relationship between principal and agents, 
in order to maximise the compensation. Smith (1995, p.297) refers to this phenomenon 
as “gaming”, which occurs when a manager deliberately under-achieves in order to 
secure a lower target in the next round of activity. More recently, Smith has also stated 
that quantitative performance targets need to have an appropriate basis which takes 
account of variations in key sources (Smith, 2005). Following Weitzeman’s 
conceptualisation of the ratchet effect based on an economic theory, Hood (2006) 
indicates that the ratchet effect is the most common dysfunctional consequence of 
managing public services by targets. Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 521) discuss three types 
of gaming problem that arose in the 60-year history of the Soviet target system – the 
ratchet effect, the threshold effect, and opportunistic output distortions – defining this 
gaming as “reactive subversion such as ‘hitting the target and missing the point’ or 
reducing performance where targets do not apply”. Of these three types of gaming, the 
ratchet effect and the threshold effect are closely related to the dysfunctional 
consequences of setting performance target levels. After referring to the ratchet effect as 
the tendency for public managers to set lower targets which they can easily exceed in 
preparation for the next year’s performance, and the threshold effect as a situation in 
which performance is aimed at a point near, but not reaching, the target, they discover 
the existence of these dysfunctional consequences in the UK’s NHS governance by 
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targets (star rating from 0 to 3) introduced in 2001 by the Department of Health in 
England.  
 
Dysfunctional Consequences in Performance Measurement 
 
Dysfunctional consequences in this stage are associated with collecting performance 
data and measuring the quantitative or qualitative value of a programme or activity. 
Smith (1995, p.290) indicates that when outcomes are difficult to measure, public 
managers have a natural tendency to focus on measurable outputs rather than the desired 
outcomes, and calls this phenomenon “measure fixation”. For example, he states that 
the quality of work in an important area that is not covered by performance 
measurement, such as mental health, could fall under a new contract system of quality 
targets and incentives for GPs introduced in 2004 (Smith, 2008). Bevan and Hood 
(2006, p.521) point out similar phenomena as opportunistic output distortions, which 
are “attempts to achieve targets at the cost of significant but unmeasured aspects of 
performance”. Hood (2006, p.517) points to evidence of “widespread storming which 
drafts in other medical staff and cancels other operations” in order to achieve measured 
performance indicators, in surveys by the British Medical Association. Kelman and 
Friedman (2009, p.917) conceptualise the dysfunctional consequences of performance 
measurement as “effort substitution (reducing effort on non-measurable performance 
dimensions)” and “gaming (making performance on the measurable dimension appear 
better, when in fact it is not)” when it comes to measuring performance. “Effort 
substitution” seems to be closely related to measure fixation, and it may easily happen 
in the public sector, which has diverse but simultaneous objectives (Holmstrom and 
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Milgrom, 1991), because public managers have a tendency to focus more on easily 
measured or achievable objectives. They state that “effort substitution” improves 
measured performance and causes non-measured performance to fall, whilst “gaming” 
does not improve any performance in terms of consumption of resources. They also 
indicate that although gaming includes direct data falsification or cheating, in many 
cases it contains indirect data falsification. Friedman and Kelman’s gaming is 
differentiated from Smith’s misrepresentation in the way that their concept of gaming is 
related to the manipulation of actual behaviour when measuring performance whilst 
misrepresentation, which will be explained later, deals with distortions in reported 
behaviour (Smith, 1995).  
 
In addition, LeGrand and Bartlett (1993, pp.31-34) refer to the concept of “cherry 
picking”, which is “the tendency of executive agents to discriminate against inefficient 
aspects of the policies to be implemented by providing services or goods only to those 
who make the least or least expensive use of them”. De Bruijn (2002) describes this 
phenomenon as blocking an organisation’s ambitions through optimising its inputs. 
Studies for the Job Training Partnership Act in the US showed that job training centre 
employees tried to select more likely trainees to increase their performance, and focused 
on methods which could increase the employment rate of trainees, not their long-term 
capability (Friedlander, 1998; Zornitsky et al., 1988). Bouckaert and Ulens (1998; re-
cited Thiel and Leeuw, 2002, p.273) state that some Belgian welfare programmes 
dropped more challenging clients in favour of ones who were easier to deal with.  
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More broadly, Bouckaert and Balk (1991) suggest 13 “measurement diseases” of public 
productivity measurement under three headings: measurement assumptions; perceived 
numbers and volumes; and the content, position and amount of measures – e.g., 
measuring performance in the public sector is impossible due to the complex and 
collective nature of public services (impossibility disease), perceiving larger or smaller 
volumes than are in reality the case (convex or concave disease), mixing input activities 
with output quantities and effects (pollution disease), and taking measurements that are 
different from those management wants (mirage disease).  
 
In addition to discussing these dysfunctional consequences, some studies focus on 
gaming based on the principal-agent relationship. In their studies for the US Federal Job 
Training Program, Courty and Marschke (2004, 2007) found that local job training 
centre mangers tried to adjust the timing of trainees’ graduation from the job centre in 
order to obtain more economic incentives, and that this behaviour impacted negatively 
on the true goals of the organisation. Also, they indicated the development of gaming 
relationships between the Federal Government and local managers, as local managers 
developed new strategies to counter the changes made by Federal Government in 
performance measurement methods. Similarly, in their study on economic incentives 
and their dynamics in public sector performance measurement, Heinrich and Marschke 
(2010) state that although some performance measurement seems to be very successful 
at some periods, agents adjust new performance measurement methods over time, and 
so gaming relationships between the principal and agents are possible. These studies 
imply that there is an information asymmetry between principal and agents in 
performance measurement systems in the public sector.  
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Dysfunctional Consequences in Performance Reporting 
 
Dysfunctional consequences in this stage are associated with evaluating performance 
results and providing an account of, and feedback on, performance results. In many 
cases the production and delivery system for public services is very complex; so 
developing performance management systems for assessing exact and genuine 
performance is also very difficult. This is the reason why various circumstances 
surrounding organisations should be considered when it comes to assessing 
performance. However, although public managers have all the performance information 
related to the object they are measuring, they are sometimes likely to suggest false 
policy alternatives, due to the bounded rationality of interpreting performance data. 
Smith (1995, p.294) calls this phenomenon a “misinterpretation”. Moreover, managers 
sometimes deliberately manipulate performance data when reporting them, leading to a 
weak relationship between actual and reported performance. In particular, if public 
managers have wide discretion regarding the collection, recording and analysis of the 
reported performance, then they can be tempted to report advantageous data rather than 
disadvantageous ones, or even intentionally report distorted performance data. Smith 
(1995, p. 292) calls this a “misrepresentation”. He also finds that if the new GP contract 
introduced in 2004 is dependent on their self-reported performance data, there may be a 
great risk of misrepresentation (Smith, 2008). In addition, while mentioning 
performance paradox as a phenomenon of low correlation between performance 
indicators and performance itself (Meyer and Gupta, 1994), Thiel and Leeuw (2002) 
state that performance paradox is more closely related to performance reporting than to 
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performance itself. They refer to the cases of the Dutch police and the British National 
Health Service 7  to show underrepresentation and overrepresentation of actual 
performance respectively. Also, they mention that misrepresentation or 
misinterpretation is a deliberate performance paradox, and they differentiate this from 
an unintended performance paradox, such as tunnel vision, measure fixation, 
suboptimisation, myopia and cherry picking. Heinrich (2007) also empirically analyses 
dysfunctional consequences in performance reporting through the high performance 
bonus systems of the US Government under the Workforce Investment Act. She finds 
that performance bonus systems encourage misrepresentation of performance rather 
than actual performance improvement, and this implies that economic rewards are too 
often false rather than fitting performance improvement or efforts to achieve 
organisational goals. Poister (2003) mentions the possibility of non-comparability of 
performance data and indicates that comparing performance data drawn from different 
organisations and collected according to different criteria can lead to distortions in 
performance interpretation. In particular, misinterpretation can occur in the process of 
benchmarking using other organisations’ performance. He also refers to underreporting 
and overreporting to explain the phenomenon in which actual performance is 
underrepresented or overrepresented. He argues that misrepresentation can sometimes 
occur because of problems of performance measurement, but in most cases it reflects 
the deliberate intention of individuals or organisations. Interestingly, Jones and Euske 
                                                     
7 The case of the Dutch police (Wiebrens and Essers, 1999; re-cited Thiel and Leeuw, 2002) 
illustrates under-representation of actual performance. Although the percentage of crimes 
solved is decreasing, that of arrest, prosecution and the imposition of penalties is increasing, 
compared to the past. The former means that the police’s performance is deteriorating. 
However, the latter indicates an improvement in performance. The case of the British National 
Health Service (Smith, 1995) is an example of overrepresentation of actual performance. 
Patients’ waiting time for an operation seemed to have dropped to less than two years. However, 
the waiting time was calculated after the first hospital consultation, so hospitals postponed 
consultations in order to reduce the waiting time following them.   
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(1991, p.437) discuss the concept of “strategic misrepresentation” in public budgeting 
and identify 13 budget process factors which may encourage strategic misrepresentation. 
They define strategic misrepresentation in public budgeting as “the planned, systematic 
distortion or misstatement of fact – lying – in response to incentives in the budget 
process”. The 13 budget process factors that may stimulate strategic misrepresentation 
include: “uncertainty regarding cause-and-effect relationships, information asymmetry, 
absolute constraints on revenues and expenditures, rigidity of control, excessive budget 
control, evidence that budgetary misrepresentation has worked” (Jones and Euske, 1991, 
pp. 443-454). Although their use of the term “misrepresentation” seems to be more 
related to the budgeting process than to the performance reporting itself, the nature of 
the misreporting or distortion, such as inflating budget requests, overestimating 
revenues or underestimating the expenditures of a programme, may be similar to other 
studies’ explanations of misrepresentation. A summary of previous studies on 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the public sector can be seen 
in Table 2-2 below.  
 
The next section will describe the construction of a theoretical lens through which to 
explore these dysfunctional consequences more effectively. 
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Table 2- 2 Previous Studies on Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Budgeting 
Author Research strategies Findings 
Dysfunctional 
consequences 
[ Dysfunctional consequences in performance planning ] 
Smith 
(1995, 
2005, 
2008) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Identify unintended consequences in 
relation to publishing performance data and 
targets systems, taking examples from the 
UK health service sector 
Tunnel vision 
Sub-optimisation 
Myopia 
Gaming (ratchet) 
Ossification 
De Bruijn 
(2002) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Indicate various perverse effects of 
performance measurement in the public 
sector and suggest five strategies for 
preventing these  
 * Blocking innovations, professionalism 
and systems responsibility are similar to 
ossification, tunnel vision and 
suboptimisation respectively.   
Blocking 
innovations,    
Blocking 
professionalism,   
Killing systems 
responsibility 
Ridgway 
(1956) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Indiscriminate use of single, multiple, and 
composite quantitative performance 
measures may lead to side effects and 
reactions from managers who overestimate 
the benefits  
No balanced stress 
on objectives,  
Unanticipated 
consequences 
Weitzman 
(1980) 
Multiperiod 
stochastic 
optimisation 
model 
Planners of enterprises have a tendency to 
use current performance as a criterion for 
setting future targets, especially under the 
dynamic incentive system  
Ratchet effect 
Bevan & 
Hood 
(2006) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Examine the reported successes and 
problems of measurement and gaming in the 
English public health  service 
Ratchet effect 
Threshold effect 
Hood 
(2006) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Interviews 
Identify the existence of classic types of 
gaming in the target regime by employing 
both documentary analysis and interviews  
Ratchet effect 
Threshold effect 
 [ Dysfunctional consequences in performance measurement ] 
Smith (1995, 2008) - Measure fixation 
Bevan & Hood (2006), 
Hood(2006) 
- Output distortions 
Kelman 
& 
Friedman 
(2009) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Regression 
analysis 
Conceptualise dysfunctional consequences 
such as effort substitution or gaming and 
find there were dramatic performance 
improvement in the England hospital trust 
Effort substitution 
Gaming  
LeGrand 
& Bartlett 
(1993) 
Documentary 
analysis 
 
Indicate executive agents’ tendency to make 
organisations appear to be more successful 
than they actually are 
Cherry picking 
(Cream skimming) 
 
De Bruijn (2002) - Blocking ambitions 
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Bouckaert 
& Balk 
(1991) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Suggest 13 dysfunctional effects of 
productivity measurement in the public 
sector 
13 diseases 
Courty & 
Marschke 
(2004 / 
2007) 
Experiment 
Questionnaire  
Archival records 
/ 
Documentary 
analysis 
Questionnaire 
Training agencies time graduation dates to 
maximise their awards and this behaviour 
has a negative impact on the organisation. / 
Local training managers learn how to game 
and develop new strategies in response to 
the federal agency’s new performance 
measurements 
Gaming 
Heinrich 
& 
Marschke 
(2010) 
Documentary 
analysis 
On the basis of the principal-agent model, 
indicate strategic behaviour of individuals 
over time in a dynamic framework for 
performance measurement and incentive 
systems 
Strategic gaming 
[ Dysfunctional consequences in performance reporting ] 
Smith (1995, 2008) - 
Misrepresentation 
Misinterpretation 
Thiel & 
Leeuw 
(2002) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Performance paradox is more related to 
performance reporting than performance 
itself and can be divided into unintended 
and deliberate performance paradox 
Deliberate paradox 
(Misrepresentation 
Misinterpretation) 
Heinrich 
(2007) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Regression 
analysis 
High performance bonus systems do not 
motivate improvements in performance but 
encourage misrepresentation of performance 
Misrepresentation 
Poister 
(2003) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Non-comparability of performance data can 
lead to misinterpretation, and performance 
is under- or over-reported through the 
intention of individuals or organisation 
Misinterpretation 
Under- or 
overreporting 
Jones & 
Euske 
(1991) 
Documentary 
analysis 
Define the concept of strategic 
misrepresentation in public budgeting and 
identify 13 budget process factors which 
stimulate misrepresentation 
Strategic 
misrepresentation 
 
2.3.2 New Institutional Economics and Principal-Agent Theory 
 
This section explains the theoretical usefulness of new institutional economics (NIE) for 
analysing the various dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting mentioned 
above. In particular, it shows how the principal-agent theory, as one of the main streams 
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of NIE, can provide a useful theoretical basis for examining dysfunctional consequences 
in SABP, the Korean performance budgeting system.  
 
Hood (1991) regards the NIE approach, including principal-agent theory and transaction 
cost analysis, as one of the major origins of NPM, which is the background for 
performance budgeting. In addition, Heinrich and Marschke (2010), Baker (1992) and 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) indicate the usefulness of the “principal-agent theory” 
for analysing the appropriateness of linking performance management to incentive 
systems. They argue that it provides important insights for policy makers interested in 
the design and implementation of an economic incentive system when it comes not only 
to analysing how the characteristics of performance measurement systems affect agents’ 
behaviours towards economic incentives but also to tackling a situation of information 
asymmetry. Ferris and Graddy (1998, p.226) also state that principal-agent theory, as 
one of the strands of NIE, provides a useful basis for “both a formal contractual 
relationships relating to the production of public services and a more implicit contract 
such as public budgeting and intergovernmental grants”. NIE puts emphasis on the 
importance of context in relation to the behaviour of individuals and the interactions 
among them, and it makes it possible to explain budgetary reforms within that context 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996; Ha, 2002).  
 
In the strict sense, it is possible to distinguish NIE from rational choice new 
institutionalism. However, this study makes no attempt to distinguish between the two 
approaches. Instead, it regards them as the same, because most arguments on 
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institutions are identical to each other8 (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Kang, 2000; Kim, 1997). 
NIE starts with the basic assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, such as 
rationality, complete information, utility maximisation and complete competition, which 
are the basis of micro-economics (Harris et al., 1995). However, NIE modifies and 
extends neo-classical economics’ rational individuals and perfect information 
assumptions to take in limited rationality and incomplete information (North, 1995). 
The starting point for this theory is “collective action dilemmas” due to the bounded 
rationality of individuals and imperfect information, which means that the combined 
rationalities of individuals can lead to irrational or sub-optimal results, as each 
individual seeks to pursue their own interest. Thus, institutions are created to solve the 
problem of collective action dilemma by providing stable rules for exchange (Ha, 2002). 
North (1992, p.4) states that “institutions are the rules of the game of a society or more 
formally are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are 
composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviour, and self- imposed rules of behaviour); and the 
enforcement characteristics of both”. Bates (1995) also argues that the core logic of new 
institutionalism is that rational individuals, who are faced with limited rationality, create 
institutions as a way of providing incentives or imposing new constraints, in order to 
overcome these limitations. Hall and Taylor (1996) indicate that NIE has explained 
distinctively how institutions originated, and they argue that the institution which 
                                                     
8 In addition, Eggertsson (1990) divides the major components of neo-classical economics into 
Lakatos’ (1974) hard core (rational choice, stable preferences and equilibrium) and a protective 
belt (full information, zero transaction costs, homogeneous goods and individual property 
rights/free competition). Then, he defines the perspective of denying hard core as “new 
institutional economics”, contrasting it with “neo-institutional economics”, which focuses on the 
protective belt while accepting the hard core. On the other hand, Lane (1993) treats neo-
institutional economics as the same thing as Eggertsson’s new institutional economics.This 
study too does not distinguish between new- and neo-institutional economics.    
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provides more benefits to its actors can better survive the process of competitive 
selection. Although it is very difficult to understand the diverse studies on NIE as a 
unitary framework, and NIE has been criticised for the way that it focuses too much on 
the perspective of efficiency, has too narrow a perspective, based on the economic and 
the formal side of institutions, and has no interest in the influence of unbalanced power 
relations and cultures on the formation of institutions (Lowndes, 1996), the logical 
framework and core components of NIE, such as bounded rationality, asymmetric 
information and subsequent opportunism, can provide very useful insights for exploring 
the dysfunctional consequences of SABP, focusing on the differences between spending 
ministries and the MOSF. 
 
In particular, principal-agent theory is the main branch of NIE (Nabli and Nugent, 1989) 
and this theory provides a powerful tool with which to analyse the dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP which arise within the relationship between spending ministries 
and the MOSF. Principal-agent theory starts by analysing an asymmetric information 
situation, when one party does not have access to information about the other party’s 
behaviour. The basic framework of this theory is that the principal employs the agent, 
who works for the benefit of the principal; but the principal does not have complete 
information about the agent’s behaviour. As a result, there are differences of opinion as 
to desirable behaviour between the principal and the agent, and so agency problems can 
arise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Lee, 1993). “Adverse 
selection” and “moral hazard” are identified in the context of insurance markets as two 
main agency problems relating to the information asymmetry of hidden action (Pauly, 
1974). Adverse selection occurs when an insurance company does not know the 
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characteristics of the people they insure. That is, someone who is high-risk in terms of 
driving is more likely to take out driving insurance than a low-risk person, and the 
insurance company cannot obtain complete information about the person’s driving 
habits due to information asymmetry (Pauly, 1974). While adverse selection is related 
to pre-contractual information asymmetry, moral hazard is associated with post-
contractual information asymmetry. In the car insurance market, moral hazard arises 
when people who are insured have the ability or economic incentive to do things which 
affect insurance benefits (Pauly, 1968, 1974). For example, an insured driver has a 
higher tendency to be careless when driving than a non-insured one. The core of the 
principal-agent problems lies in the information asymmetry, and the agent tends to 
engage in opportunistic behaviour in order to increase benefits at the expense of the 
principal. Asymmetric information leads to various agency costs (Yoon and Lee, 1992). 
Firstly, the principal has the burden of monitoring the agent’s behaviour (monitoring 
costs). Secondly, the agent also has to try to obtain the principal’s confidence (bonding 
costs). Finally, there can be a minimal cost level which cannot be reduced anymore and 
is caused by the difference between the preferences of the principal and those of the 
agent (residual loss). This theory puts emphasis on how to devise an incentive system to 
control agents’ hidden behaviour under conditions of information asymmetry.  
 
The framework of NIE and the principal-agent theory, and their assumptions about 
incomplete information, bounded rationality, opportunism and self-interest, are suitable 
for use in analysing the dysfunctional consequences of SABP. To do this, let’s start with 
the more general policy situations surrounding the MOSF and spending ministries, the 
two major actors in SABP. Simply put, the MOSF is the designer and controller of 
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SABP, and spending ministries are assessed through SABP; so the MOSF can be called 
“the principal”, whilst the spending ministries can be seen as “the agents” in the 
principal-agent relationship. Based on this principal-agent relationship, the actions of 
the MOSF and spending ministries can be divided into the following four types, as 
shown in Figure 2-1: type 1 (intended by the MOSF, intended by spending ministries), 
type 2 (intended by the MOSF, unintended by spending ministries), type 3 (unintended 
by the MOSF, intended by spending ministries), type 4 (unintended by the MOSF, 
unintended by spending ministries). 
 
Figure 2-1 Four Types of Consequences Based On the Principal-Agent Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of SABP, the consequences intended by the MOSF are to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of budget allocation and to improve spending ministries’ 
MOSF’s 
actions 
Spending
ministries’
actions 
Spending 
ministries’ 
actions 
Type 1 (Intended by the 
MOSF, Intended by 
spending ministries) 
Type 2 (Intended by the 
MOSF, Unintended by 
spending ministries) 
Type 3 (Unintended by 
the MOSF, Intended by 
spending ministries) 
Type 4 (Unintended by 
the MOSF, Unintended 
by spending ministries) 
Intended 
consequences 
Unintended 
consequences 
Intended 
consequences 
Unintended 
consequences 
Intended 
consequences 
Unintended 
consequences 
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performance management capability. With these intended consequences of the MOSF, 
if spending ministries follow them well, then type 1 results can be expected. However, 
if spending ministries do not understand and do not follow the intentions of the MOSF, 
then type 2 results are possible. On the other hand, in the process of SABP various 
kinds of unintended consequences by the MOSF may arise, such as the dysfunctional 
consequences mentioned in previous studies. All these dysfunctional consequences can 
also be regarded as unintended side effects by the MOSF. In addition, some 
consequences regarded as unintended by the MOSF may be intended and deliberate on 
the part of the spending ministries, while others may be unintended by the spending 
ministries as well. The former case can lead to type 3 consequences, while the latter can 
give type 4 consequences. Among four types of consequences of actions by both 
spending ministries and the MOSF, this study focuses on type 3 and 4, which are 
unintended consequences by the MOSF, because analysing unintended side effects of 
actions by the MOSF can provide an opportunity not only to indicate the potential 
problems of SABP in a practical way but also to create a new academic theory. More 
specifically, the unintended consequences of a policy have their own contexts or logics 
which have led to these consequences, so a new policy devised without careful 
understanding or consideration of these may make the problems more complex or the 
effort useless when the policy is implemented. That is, SABP cannot be a panacea 
without cautious consideration of potential unintended side effects by the MOSF. In 
addition, a study of intended consequences can only justify or confirm existing theories, 
whilst a study of unintended ones can suggest a possible new theory which cannot be 
drawn from the existing theories (Lee, 2009). In other words, a study of side effects not 
intended by the MOSF may lead a researcher to disprove existing theories, rather than 
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to verify them, thus giving the researcher a chance to create a new hypothesis or theory 
(Magee, 1985). In fact, many previous studies, such as those by Park (2005, 2008), 
Bang (2009) and Cho (2010), have focused on analysing consequences intended by the 
MOSF (type 1 and 2), which will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, while there have 
been almost no studies on consequences unintended by the MOSF (type 3 and 4). That 
is why the present study pays attention to consequences unintended by the MOSF, that 
is, types 3 and 4. Furthermore, it notes that NIE and the principal-agent theory can 
provide a useful insight for analysing type 3 and 4 consequences for the following 
reasons. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, NIE focuses on institutional factors and incentive 
structures for interested groups. Institutions affect the incentive system, which has an 
influence on actors’ behaviour; and actors seek to maximise their interests within the 
constraints of institutions. Thus, NIE can provide fundamental explanations for the 
unintended consequences of SABP, considering the behaviours of both spending 
ministries and the MOSF in relation to an economic incentive system. Secondly, the 
principal-agent theory is suitable for explaining spending ministries’ opportunistic 
behaviour within an asymmetric information situation, and so it can give a powerful 
insight into dysfunctional consequences, especially type 3 consequences, of activities by 
the MOSF and spending ministries. Moreover, these theories also suggest that policy 
makers need to consider unintended side effects seriously when designing and refining 
performance budgeting systems. The next section will specify the type 3 and 4 
consequences of SABP in detail. 
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2.3.3 Development of a Typology of Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP 
 
There are many previous studies focusing on the conceptualisation, categorisation or 
development of a typology of dysfunctional consequences of performance management 
and budgeting in the public sector. Smith (1990) indicates that the use of performance 
indicators in the public sector has not enhanced accountability as was expected, and he 
raises some possible issues and problems from the perspective of the principal-agent 
relationship. He also states that agents have continuous incentives to suggest modest 
performance target levels because the principal cannot help but set agents’ target levels 
on the basis of previous performance, and that there are difficulties in measuring 
efficiency and effectiveness by using performance indicators due to the diverse aspects 
of public services. On the basis of these findings, Smith (1995) identifies and 
categorises eight unintended dysfunctional consequences of publishing performance 
data in the public sector, such as tunnel vision, suboptimisation, myopia, measure 
fixation, misrepresentation, misinterpretation, gaming and ossification, all of which 
have been mentioned earlier. He indicates that the reason common to all eight 
dysfunctional consequences is “the lack of congruence between the goals of the agent 
and the actual goals of the principal” (Smith, 1995, p.283). In particular, “the 
divergence between organisational objectives and the measurement scheme” can 
produce the first three phenomena; “an inability to measure complex phenomena with 
precision or fidelity” is the reason for the next two dysfunctional consequences; “an 
inability to process performance data correctly” produces the sixth and seventh 
phenomena; and “an inability to respond to new circumstances” leads to ossification 
(Smith, 1995, p.283).  
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In addition, Pidd (2005) tries to categorise Smith’s eight unintended dysfunctionalities 
based on the concept of “grid and group”. He mentions that “grid indicates the degree to 
which people’s action are governed by externally imposed rules and conventions, and 
group indicates the degree to which actions are governed by group choice, that is the 
social collectivity to which someone is committed” (Pidd, 2005, p.490). Based on these 
two criteria, he suggests four types of people: hierarchists (high grid and high group 
type), individualists (low grid and low group type), fatalists (high grid and low group 
type) and egalitarians (low grid and high group type). He states that this typology will 
be helpful to understand the reason why dysfunctional consequences may occur. For 
example, if a fatalist is treated as a hierarchist, then people tend to focus on the easiest 
performance measures, and this leads to tunnel vision, suboptimisation, myopia, 
measure fixation and even misrepresentation undertaken to produce a good impression.  
 
De Bruijn (2002, pp.581-583) suggests seven negative effects of performance 
measurement in the public sector, referring to the work of Smith (1995), such as 
“prompting game playing, adding to internal bureaucracy, blocking innovations, 
blocking ambitions, killing professionalism, killing system responsibility and punishing 
good performance”. As mentioned earlier, among these seven negative effects, blocking 
innovations is closely related to ossification and blocking professionalism is related to 
the tunnel vision of Smith’s work (1995). Also, killing system responsibility seems to 
be related to suboptimisation because this effect refers to less willingness to share best 
practices among organisations.  
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Hood (2006, p.519) suggests that target gaming is based on two axes: one is 
performance data, “creatively interpreted/contrived/spun or invented/dropped/not 
provided”; and the other is whether “the underlying performance in provision of service 
alters or remains unchanged”. Within the table he divides gaming into being acceptable, 
generally seen as an unacceptable, seen as a fact of life in bureaucratic politics, or as 
generally seen as cheating. Hood (2007) also categorises dysfunctional consequences 
according to three types of performance management system (target systems, ranking 
systems and intelligence systems)9, identifying ratchet and threshold effects in target 
systems, indeterminacy and volatility in ranking systems, and output distortion in both 
systems.  
 
Radnor (2008, pp.324-325) suggests four types of organisational gaming – muddled, 
massaging, manoeuvring and manipulated – based on the ideas of Hood (2006) and 
others who have considered the extent, range and result of the impacts of gaming. She 
employs two axes: “level of gaming within the organisation” and “impact of gaming”. If 
the level of gaming is low, it just changes the output data; but if the level becomes high, 
the actual activities may be changed in order to achieve the target. The impact of 
gaming is related to whether the gaming happens within a department or organisation, 
or whether it affects citizens, consumers, customers or patients. She describes a 
situation where the level of gaming is low and has an effect only within a department as 
“muddled”; while if the level of gaming is low but affects citizens or consumers, she 
                                                     
9  Target systems measure how much actual performance has been achieved during the 
specified period. Taylor’s scientific management and the former Soviet Unions’ target system 
are good examples of this type. Under ranking systems, the ranking of individuals or 
organisations is determined by the results of comparing performance against that of others. 
Intelligence ranking systems comprehensively consider various kinds of background information, 
such as credit ranking, health care records, even rumour, as well as performance (Hood, 2007).      
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describes it as “massaging”. “Manoeuvring” and “manipulated” are labels for when the 
level of gaming is high, so that the gaming changes the actual activities in order to 
achieve the target.  
 
Thiel and Leeuw (2002) divide performance paradox into unintended performance 
paradox and deliberate performance paradox, mainly referring to Smith’s work (1995). 
They regard tunnel vision, measure fixation, myopia, suboptimisation and cherry 
picking as unintended performance paradoxes, and these paradoxes can occur as a result 
of the minimal accountability requirements of the public sector, the elusiveness of 
policy objectives, the non-quantifiability and non-measurability of policy goals, and an 
excessive emphasis on monitoring and efficiency within the public sector. In addition, 
they argue that public sector organisations can attempt to “sabotage an audit” and “hide 
ill performance by misrepresenting and misinterpreting performance indicators”, and 
they call these phenomena a “deliberate performance paradox”, contaminating the 
relationship between reported and actual performance (Thiel and Leeuw, 2002, p.274). 
Moreover, interestingly, they state that, “a deliberate performance paradox can occur 
only if the conditions for an unintended performance paradox are present as well.” They 
consider that the paradox is related not to performance itself but to reports on 
performance, and they seem to consider a deliberate paradox as an extension of an 
unintended paradox.  
 
Keum and Lee (2009) divide the dysfunctional effects of performance management 
systems into unintended and intended ones, while investigating whether those effects 
appear in the work of the central government of South Korea as it implements 
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performance management. They suggest tunnel vision, myopia, reinforcing internal 
bureaucracy/blocking innovations and blocking cooperation/irrational compensation 
systems as unintended dysfunctional effects, while measure fixation, suboptimisation, 
misrepresentation/misinterpretation, gaming (includes cherry picking and ratchet effect) 
are the intended ones. But they do not explain the reason why they assign some 
dysfunctional consequences to the unintended category, while others are assigned to the 
intended one. Table 2-3 summarises a typology of dysfunctional consequences of 
performance budgeting in the public sector suggested by previous studies.  
 
Table 2- 3 A Typology of Dysfunctional Consequences Suggested by Previous Studies 
Author Criterion or Reason Typology 
Smith 
(1995) 
Lack of congruence between the goals of the 
agent and the goals of the principal Eight dysfunctional consequences 
Divergence between organisational objectives and 
the measurement scheme 
Tunnel vision, suboptimisation, 
myopia 
Inability to measure complex phenomena Measure fixation, misrepresentation 
Inability to process performance data correctly Misinterpretation, gaming 
Inability to respond to new circumstances Ossification 
Pidd 
(2005) 
High grid and high group Hierarchist 
High grid and low group Fatalist 
Low grid and high group Egalitarian 
Low grid and low group Individualist 
De 
Bruijn 
(2002) 
There is no specific criterion. Prompting game playing, adding to internal bureaucracy, 
blocking innovations, blocking ambitions, killing professionalism, killing system 
responsibility, and punishing good performance are all mentioned. 
Hood 
(2006) 
Creatively 
interpreted, 
contrived or spun  
(performance data) 
Alters  
(underlying 
performance) 
Acceptable 
Remains unchanged Generally seen as an unacceptable form of gaming 
Invented, dropped or 
not provided 
Alters Fact of life in bureaucratic politics 
Remains unchanged Generally seen as a cheating 
Hood 
(2007) 
Target systems Ratchet and threshold effects 
Ranking systems Indeterminacy and volatility 
Both systems Output distortion 
Radnor 
(2008) 
Level of gaming within the organisation & 
Impact of gaming 
Muddled, massaging,  
manoeuvring, manipulated 
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Thiel 
&Leeuw 
(2002) 
Minimal accountability requirement, elusiveness 
of policy objectives, non-quantifiability and non-
measurability of goals, excessive monitoring and 
efficiency 
Unintended performance paradox 
(tunnel vision, measure fixation, 
myopia, suboptimisation, cherry-
picking) 
Sabotage an audit, hide poor performance  
+ condition of unintended performance paradox 
Deliberate performance paradox 
(misrepresentation,misinterpretation) 
Keum 
& Lee 
(2009) 
There is no specific criterion or reason for 
unintended or intended dysfunctional effects. 
Unintended dysfunctional effects 
(tunnel vision, myopia, reinforcing 
internal bureaucracy, blocking 
innovations, blocking cooperation,  
irrational compensation system) 
Intended dysfunctional effects 
(measure fixation, suboptimisation, 
misrepresentation, misinterpretation, 
gaming (includes cherry-picking, 
ratchet effect)) 
 
From the previous studies attempting to make a typology of dysfunctional consequences 
of performance budgeting, I have drawn three useful implications for my study. First of 
all, the studies on dysfunctional consequences mentioned in Section 2.3.1 can give a 
meaningful starting point for developing my own typology of dysfunctional 
consequences in order to explore the differing perspectives of spending ministries and 
the MOSF, because most of the works mentioned in Section 2.3.1 also started to make a 
typology on the basis of previous findings on the dysfunctional consequences of 
performance management systems. For example, the works of Pidd (2005), de Bruijn 
(2002), Thiel and Leeuw (2002) and Keum and Lee (2009) develop a typology while 
referring to Smith’s (1995) or other previous findings. Radnor (2008) also suggests a 
typology mainly based on the work of Smith (1995) and Hood (2006). Consequently, 
various dysfunctional consequences related to the elements of performance budgeting 
mentioned in Section 2.3.1 could be the basis of my work. 
 
Secondly, considering the overlapping of various terminologies relating to 
dysfunctional consequences, the comprehensiveness of interesting ones, the importance 
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of analysis, and the possibility of application to SABP, I decided that the potential 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP included the following seven phenomena: tunnel 
vision, myopic management, suboptimisation, measure fixation, ratchet effect, 
misrepresentation and cherry picking. Researchers explore or explain the same 
phenomena by using different terminology, so the meaning of a term sometimes 
overlaps that of another term, or is divided among different dysfunctional consequences, 
and as a result it was very difficult to find clear criteria for developing a typology of 
dysfunctional consequences. For instance, regarding the concept of gaming, Smith 
(1995) indicates Weitzman’s ratchet effect (1980), but Kelman and Friedman (2009) 
refer to it as an active manipulation of performance in measuring performance, and 
Courty and Marschke (2004, 2007) and Heinrich and Marschke (2010) identify it as the 
strategic behaviours of agents in response to a new performance measurement 
introduced by the principal. With respect to Smith’s measure fixation, Bevan and Hood 
(2006) and Hood (2006) explain similar phenomenon as “output distortions” and 
Kelman and Friedman (2009) as “effort substitution”. De Bruijn (2002) also uses 
different terminologies to indicate what Smith (1995) calls ossification and tunnel 
vision, and LeGrand and Bartlett call (1993) cherry picking phenomenon. He describes 
these phenomena as blocking innovations, killing professionalism and blocking 
ambitions respectively. Consequently, in order to analyse the complex phenomena 
surrounding SABP, I needed to draw out some dysfunctional consequences suitable for 
applying to SABP, and then define the interesting dysfunctional consequences on the 
basis of previous studies. According to Smith (1995, pp.284-290), Bevan and Hood 
(2006, p.521) and LeGrand and Bartlett (1993, p.31-34), my suggested seven 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP can be defined under the following headings: 
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• Tunnel vision: an emphasis on phenomena that are quantified in the performance 
measurement scheme at the expense of unquantifiable aspects of performance 
• Myopic management: concentration on short-term issues, to the exclusion of 
long-term criteria that may only show up in performance measurements in many 
years’ time 
• Measure fixation: an emphasis on measures of success rather than the underlying 
objectives 
• Suboptimisation: pursuit of narrow local objectives by managers, at the expense 
of the objectives of the organisation as a whole. 
• Ratchet effect: a tendency for managers to set lower targets, which they can 
easily exceed, in preparation for the following year’s performance measurement. 
• Misrepresentation: a deliberate manipulation of data, including “creative” 
accounting and fraud, so that reported behaviour differs from actual behaviour. 
• Cherry picking: a tendency by executive agents to counter inefficient aspects of 
the policies to be implemented by providing services or goods only to those who 
make the least or least expensive use of them. 
 
Thirdly, this study divides the seven dysfunctional consequences into unintended 
dysfunctional consequences and intended dysfunctional consequences by spending 
ministries, whilst all dysfunctional consequences are unintended by the MOSF. That is, 
some dysfunctional consequences are unintended by both spending ministries and the 
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MOSF, while others are unintended by the designers of the SABP system but are likely 
to be deliberate responses by spending ministries, as agents in the principal-agent 
relationship. My suggested typology of dysfunctional consequences of SABP is shown 
in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2- 4 Types of Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP Exhibited by Spending Ministries 
Unintended dysfunctional consequences Intended dysfunctional consequences 
   - Tunnel vision 
   - Myopic management 
   - Measure fixation 
   - Suboptimisation 
     - Ratchet effect 
     - Misrepresentation  
     - Cherry picking 
* N.B. All dysfunctional consequences are “unintended” by the MOSF. 
 
The first reason for this typology is that unintended dysfunctional consequences are 
more closely related to the intrinsic characteristics of performance management in the 
public sector, such as the difficulty of developing productivity indicators, measurements 
of quality, and long-term and whole performance indicators, whilst intended 
dysfunctional consequences include a more active and deliberate intention of gaming by 
a spending ministry as well as the conditions for unintended dysfunctional 
consequences (Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; Shin, 2012). For example, many previous 
studies have pointed out the difficulty of measuring and evaluating the performance of 
public services objectively and accurately, due to the complexity, multitasking problem, 
intangibility, indirectness and externality involved (Moore, 2002; Hood, 2006; Dixit, 
1997; Downs and Larkey, 1986; Wilson, 1989; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). These intrinsic 
characteristics of measuring performance in the public sector can lead to a tendency to 
focus on the quantifiable, short-term, measurable and narrow performance of a 
programme in order to achieve the target more easily. In other words, spending 
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ministries may have an intention to achieve higher performance targets more easily, but 
it can be said that the tendency is strongly influenced by these intrinsic limitations of 
performance budgeting. On the other hand, setting performance target levels as low as 
possible, manipulating performance data in performance reporting, and selecting more 
favourable groups when implementing a programme are more strongly influenced by 
spending ministries’ deliberate and active intentions to achieve high performance 
targets, although they are also affected by the intrinsic characteristics of performance 
budgeting in the public sector. In this sense, the former category includes tunnel vision, 
myopic management, measure fixation and suboptimisation while the latter contains the 
ratchet effect, misrepresentation and cherry picking. Although Thiel and Leeuw (2002) 
use similar terminology (e.g., unintended performance paradox and deliberate 
performance paradox) and Keum and Lee (2009) use the same terms, they do not 
suggest a clear criterion for their typologies as this study does. In addition, Thiel and 
Leeuw (2002) do not even mention the ratchet effect, one of the most probable 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting. 
  
The second reason is related to policy alternatives for a better SABP system. As 
unintended dysfunctional consequences are more closely linked with the intrinsic 
limitations of performance budgeting in the public sector, it might be very difficult to 
abolish them completely. However, in the case of intended dysfunctional consequences, 
which are more closely associated with spending ministries’ deliberate actions, the 
MOSF and other related organisations, such as the National Assembly and the Board of 
Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI), are likely to identify them more easily, and 
consequently it might be easier to change them than to change unintended dysfunctional 
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consequences. It may also mean that the focus of policy alternatives for preventing or 
minimising the two types of dysfunctional consequences need to be different from each 
other. Policy makers need to focus more on fundamental approaches, such as educating 
and increasing the expertise of spending ministries’ officials, while understanding the 
characteristics of performance budgeting in the public sector, if they are to reduce 
unintended dysfunctional consequences. As for intended dysfunctional consequences, 
less fundamental approaches, such as stronger audits of performance data, may be 
necessary. Various kinds of policy alternatives will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  
 
The study’s typology of dysfunctional consequences is distinguished from those of 
previous studies in the way that one specific dysfunctional consequence can be 
categorised as “unintended” and “intended” at the same time, based on the principal-
agent relationship between spending ministries and the MOSF. In other words, the 
ratchet effect, misrepresentation and cherry picking can be regarded as intended by 
spending ministries while at the same time they are unintended by the MOSF. Although 
many previous studies, such as those of Weitzman (1980), Smith (1995), Courty and 
Marschke (2004, 2007) and Heinrich and Marschke (2010), analyse dysfunctional 
consequences within the framework of a principal-agent relationship, they do not 
simultaneously divide specific dysfunctional consequences into unintended and 
intended ones based on this relationship. Also, Pidd (2005) and Radnor (2008) do not 
categorise dysfunctional consequences on the basis of the principal-agent relationship. 
Rather, Pidd (2005) focuses on the incongruence between the characteristics of 
individuals who are working under a performance management system and the way in 
which that system is being directed by the organisation, and he argues that this 
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incongruence can lead to various kinds of dysfunctional consequences, as mentioned by 
Smith. Radnor (2008) tries to categorise the types of organisational gaming based on the 
strength of gaming and the extent of its impact, not seeking specific types of 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting.  
 
The next section will develop a conceptual framework to analyse dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP based on the study’s suggested typology and the principal-agent 
theory.  
 
2.3.4 Conceptual Framework to Analyse Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP 
 
The Nature of SABP  
 
The Korean government introduced SABP with the intention of increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of budget allocation. In particular, the MOSF has tried to 
achieve these aims by offering some incentives as well as penalties based on SABP 
results. These incentives and penalties can affect the behaviours of spending ministries 
and their officials by working as economic incentives as well as constraints. In this 
sense, SABP can be regarded as a type of “implicit contract” between spending 
ministries and the MOSF, a contract that operates on the basis of performance targets 
and economic incentives. In addition to a contractual relationship between spending 
ministries and the MOSF, a hierarchical control system is at work, because the MOSF, 
the designer of the SABP system, develops and distributes an SABP manual in order to 
review the self-assessment results of spending ministries (Spiller, 2008; Lee, 1998). The 
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existence of both an implicit contractual relationship and a hierarchical relationship 
between spending ministries and the MOSF can lead to some problems of information 
asymmetry. In reality, the MOSF and spending ministries basically exist in an 
asymmetric information situation with regard to a programme’s performance. The 
MOSF tries to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of budget allocation by 
reflecting the exact performance results of a programme, but the MOSF has less 
knowledge of, and capacity to use, the performance indicators or performance targets of 
a programme than spending ministries. Thus, the MOSF hands over discretion on self-
assessment of a programme’s performance to spending ministries, although the final 
verdict belongs to the MOSF through its review of spending ministries’ self-assessment 
results. During this process the MOSF and spending ministries can have conflicting 
interests: that is, the MOSF focuses on overall improvement of budget efficiency and 
effectiveness based on fair SABP results, while spending ministries pay more attention 
to simply increasing their programmes’ budgets through high SABP results. This kind 
of information asymmetry can lead to various agency costs, such as the cost of 
developing appropriate performance indicators and targets, the cost of monitoring 
programme implementation, the cost of performance measurement and the cost of 
performance information checks and confirmation. The fact that the MOSF has to pay 
significant agency costs to review spending ministries self-assessment results, given the 
situation of information asymmetry, is likely to increase the possibility of moral hazards 
for spending ministries. High self-assessment SABP scores by spending ministries can 
be a good example of these moral hazards. Moreover, if moral hazards for spending 
ministries persist for many years, then the MOSF’s agency costs will be incurred 
continuously and increasingly. These can surely be regarded as dysfunctional 
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consequences of SABP. Consequently, SABP is a kind of “context” and “institution” 
that affects the behaviours and decision-making activities of spending ministries and 
their officials, containing the various potential dysfunctional effects mentioned above at 
the same time (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In the following components of the conceptual 
framework the nature of SABP will be explored in detail.                   
 
Actors in the SABP System and their Behavioural Assumptions 
 
The main actors participating in the SABP system are the MOSF and 48 spending 
ministries (including agencies). From the perspective of operating SABP, the MOSF 
plays a significant role in drawing up SABP guidelines, training spending ministry 
officials, reviewing spending ministries’ self-assessment results, and controlling the 
SABP system. In addition, the MOSF tends to be risk neutral and tries to maximise the 
value of SABP results by recommending performance indicators that reflect spending 
ministries’ efforts accurately. Consequently, the MOSF can be said, from the 
perspective of principal-agent theory, to have the characteristics of a principal. Similarly, 
spending ministries can be viewed as agents, because they tend to be risk-averse and to 
try and maximise their compensation whilst minimising their efforts. Moreover, two 
behavioural assumptions about stakeholders can be developed from traditional 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985, 1990). This study adopted the idea that 
the MOSF operates SABP under a condition of bounded rationality, which has been 
defined as “a semi-strong form of rationality in which economic actors are assumed to 
be intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Williamson, 1985, p.45). Similarly, as 
mentioned earlier, North (1995) and Bates (1995) have also indicated that rational 
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individuals are faced with limited rationality and incomplete information. The bounded 
rationality of the MOSF means that it cannot pursue substantial rationality (Simon, 
1978). To be more precise, the distinct characteristic of the bounded rationality of the 
MOSF is that the Ministry is not able to obtain complete performance information on a 
programme compared with the spending ministries, because it does not directly 
implement the programme. The other behavioural assumption is the self-interested 
opportunism of the spending ministries. Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking 
with guile” (Williamson, 1985, pp. 47-8). Williamson (ibid.) also expands this 
definition: “Opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, 
especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise 
confuse as well as more blatant forms of lying, stealing and cheating”. Spending 
ministries’ opportunistic behaviours can be activated by an information asymmetry 
between the MOSF and themselves, because in general the MOSF has limited access to 
information about a budgetary programme, whilst spending ministries have a lot of 
information about their programmes.  
 
Strategies and the Results of Interactions between Strategies 
 
The Korean government, through the MOSF, introduced SABP to measure and evaluate 
the results of budget spending, because the public sector is less exposed to the market 
and competition than private companies, and therefore has less incentive for increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness through cost saving (Robinson and Brumby, 2005). At the 
same time, SABP focuses the accountability and responsibility of the spending 
ministries. Given these reasons for introducing SABP and its core objectives, we can 
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see that the MOSF’s behavioural strategy is a kind of “economic rationalisation”. On 
the other hand, the spending ministries’ opportunistic behaviours result in a 
“maximisation” strategy, because these ministries recognise that the MOSF has a 
bounded rationality, and its reviewing process has to be based on their own self-
assessment results. The spending ministries’ maximisation strategy can lead to 
dysfunctional characteristics arising from the SABP process, some of which are 
unintended by both the spending ministries and the MOSF, while others are unintended 
by the designers of the SABP system but likely to be deliberate responses by the 
spending ministries, as agents in the principal-agent relationship. The optimism bias by 
spending ministries at their self-assessment stage may be caused by these dysfunctional 
consequences, and is finally expressed in an excessively high SABP score. Conversely, 
the MOSF’s rationalisation strategy leads to drastic cutting of spending ministries’ 
excessively high SABP scores. As a result of interaction between spending ministries 
and the MOSF, with principal-agent problems being affected by an asymmetric 
information situation, significant differences between the SABP scores and grades 
awarded by spending ministries and those awarded by the MOSF can arise.  
 
Implications  
 
On the basis of this conceptual framework, this study will explore what types of 
dysfunctional consequences exist, the extent to which they exist, and how these 
dysfunctional consequences have an influence on the behaviours of both spending 
ministries and the MOSF. Furthermore, the more important thing is to seek useful 
policy alternatives to prevent or reduce various transaction costs or dysfunctional 
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consequences arising from the process of SABP. Policy alternatives include both how 
SABP can reduce dysfunctional consequences and how an incentive system can be 
devised to control the relationships between spending ministries and the MOSF from 
the perspective of the principal-agent theory. These topics will mainly be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Figure 2-2 shows the conceptual framework for analysing 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP mainly through a qualitative approach.     
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Figure 2-2 Conceptual Framework for Analysing the Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP 
 
Note: All dysfunctional consequences are “unintended” by the MOSF, the principal 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored various definitions of performance and performance 
budgeting in the public sector; it has examined diverse dysfunctional consequences 
through a review of relevant literature according to three elements of performance 
management; it has described the principal-agent theory as a useful middle-range theory 
Nature of SABP  Provision of Economic Incentives or Constraints 
  
Actors Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Principal) 
 Spending ministries  
(Agents) 
 
Behavioural assumptions  Bounded rationality  Opportunism 
   
Information asymmetry 
 
Strategy  Economic rationalisation  Maximisation 
 
Dysfunctional 
consequences by agents 
 Unintended dysfunctional 
consequences by agents 
 Intended dysfunctional 
consequences by agents 
   
Tunnel vision Ratchet effect 
  
Myopic management Misrepresentation 
  
Measure fixation Cherry picking 
  
Suboptimisation 
 
 
Behaviours Drastic cutting of spending ministries’ self-assessment results 
 Excessively high self-
assessment results 
   
Results of interactions Significant differences between SABP results  of spending ministries and those of the MOSF 
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to analyse dysfunctional consequences effectively; and it has also developed the thesis’s 
particular typology of dysfunctional consequences of SABP. On the basis of these 
reviews in particular, the chapter has suggested a useful conceptual framework to 
explore dysfunctional consequences of the SABP system. Analysing dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP so as to seek feasible policy alternatives is important not only 
for securing the objectivity and reliability of performance budgeting but also for making 
sure that SABP measures genuine performance and whether the ultimate goal of a 
programme has been achieved. The conceptual framework suggested in this chapter will 
provide an especially useful basis for the qualitative approach, one of the main 
approaches of this thesis, to explore the difference between spending ministries and the 
MOSF in an SABP context. On the basis of these theoretical perspectives, the next 
chapter will examine a more practical side of performance budgeting. First, it will 
review the trends of performance budgeting in many countries, particularly focusing on 
the US case. Then, it will describe the SABP system in detail, including the SABP 
results from 2005 to 2010 and their meaning. It will also review many previous studies 
on the practical results of SABP and the PART, including their implications.                             
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PERFORMANCE BUDGETING IN PRACTICE 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
     
While Chapter 2 offered a rather theory-oriented approach to performance budgeting, 
this chapter describes a more practical side of performance budgeting as it takes place in 
many countries. Performance budgeting has achieved prominence since the 1980s along 
with the influence of NPM. NPM, which is also called market-oriented public 
administration, entrepreneurial management of the public sector and government 
innovation, focuses on the outcomes and efficiency of the public sector by applying 
marketisation and competition to organisations in the public sector (Hood, 1991). James 
(2001, p.15) lists the common characteristics of many arguments for NPM as: “more 
explicit standards and measurement of performance, greater emphasis on output rather 
than input controls, a shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, a shift to 
greater competition and contract based delivery of services, a stress on private sector 
styles of management practice and greater parsimony in resource use”. New Zealand 
and Australia were the first to initiate performance management and budgeting, in their 
present form, in the late 1980s, followed by the US, the UK, Canada and Sweden in the 
early 1990s. Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Germany, Switzerland and 
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Austria introduced various budget reforms (OECD, 2004). In the case of developing 
countries, Malaysia was the forerunner in performance budgeting, in 1989, followed by 
Chile and South Africa in the 1990s. In the 2000s, Thailand implemented performance 
budgeting (Shah, 2007). As mentioned earlier, South Korea introduced SABP in 2005, 
following a trial run from 1999.   
 
This chapter describes the practical aspects of performance budgeting, including SABP, 
in various countries, and then analyses previous studies of actual performance 
budgeting results, focusing on the cases of the US and Korea. To do this, the chapter 
firstly presents an account of the progress of performance budgeting in the US step by 
step from the initial stages of the system, such as PPB and ZBB, to recent efforts, such 
as the GPRA and PART; and it then explains the performance budgeting of other 
countries, including Korea. Exploring the various experiences of many countries can 
give useful information to help us understand the history, contextual background and 
common issues surrounding performance budgeting, and consider the implications for 
devising a better, but feasible, SABP system. Secondly, it introduces SABP, the main 
subject of this study, in detail e.g., the system’s operating mechanisms, its checklist, the 
use of its results, the overall results from 2005 to 2010, and comparison between the 
SABP system in Korea and the PART in the US. Finally, it looks at many previous 
studies employing actual results of performance budgeting in the US and Korea, and 
evaluates their contributions and limitations. Limitations of previous studies, especially 
in relation to analysing the differences between the SABP scores of the spending 
ministries and those of the MOSF, will lead to meaningful research questions using a 
quantitative approach.  
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3.2 Trends of Performance Budgeting 
 
3.2.1 Performance Budgeting in the US 
  
In the US there have been numerous budgetary approaches, such as line item budgeting, 
activity-based budgeting, and performance-based budgeting, to allocate financial 
resources and manage public services. However, performance budgeting started to be 
implemented in earnest when the US Congress enacted the GPRA in 1993. Thus, this 
section describes the development of US performance budgeting before and after the 
GPRA. 
 
Antecedents of the GPRA    
 
Performance budgeting in the US incorporated performance information into public 
budgeting systems. The first trial of performance budgeting was the cost data budget in 
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, in 1913, to show the objectives and 
activities of government; and at the level of the Federal Government, the Department of 
Agriculture first used programme budgeting in 1934. The Commission on the 
Organisation of the Executive Branch of the Government, commonly known as the 
Hoover Commission, recommended a performance budgeting system to President, 
Truman, as an official function of all Federal Government, in 1949 and the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act was enacted in 1951 (Hyde, 1992). The Commission’s 
recommendations were pursued in an effort to reduce the immense government debt 
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after World War II, focusing on achieving the objectives of federal agencies. Although 
this system was not established as a permanent system, due to the difficulty of setting 
the performance measurement unit and unit cost, it became the origin of the 
performance budgeting system (Diamond, 2005).  
 
Over the next four decades, several approaches to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the Federal Government’s expenditures were implemented. Firstly, in 
1961, PPB was introduced in the Defense Department’s budgeting and management 
systems by Robert S. McNamara, President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense. 
PPB was an attempt to forge a link between three-to-five-year long-term planning and 
resource requirements (programmes), as well as budgeting, in order to provide decision-
makers with comparative cost and effectiveness information about various alternatives. 
Also, it required strategic planning, systematic analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis 
to make a decision more rationally (Rubin and Willoughby, 2011). Although the 
Defense Department used PPB for about 30 years more, the other departments did not 
use this system after 1971, due to the large amount of time and money required for 
analysing alternative approaches. While budget experts considered PPB a failure 
(Wildavsky, 1974), some elements of it still remain in the present performance 
budgeting system. Secondly, in 1973, the Nixon administration replaced PPB with 
MBO to manage federal agencies’ and their sub-organisations’ objectives clearly and 
regularly. However, MBO was considered “not as a new budget system but as a 
management approach which might come to be an integral part of the budget cycle” 
(Newland, 1976, p.20). Thirdly, President Carter introduced ZBB into the Federal 
Government in 1977 to resolve huge government debts. Under ZBB, the Government’s 
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programmes were reorganised on the basis of their priorities. The first criterion for 
setting priorities was the government’s accountability, followed by efficiency, 
effectiveness, influence and adaptability. However, ZBB was denigrated as decremental 
budgeting, the opposite concept to incrementalism, and was never implemented 
successfully by the Carter administration (Rubin and Willoughby, 2011; Hyde, 1992).  
 
The GPRA, the PART and the GPRA Modernisation Act 
 
The Clinton administration enacted the GPRA in 1993 to overcome the inefficiency of, 
and improve the accountability and effectiveness of, federal governments. This was 
“primarily a congressional initiative and marked the first time that the US Congress 
took specific legislative action to link strategic planning and performance budgeting” 
(Rubin and Willoughby, 2011, p. 9). The GRPA required strategic plans, annual 
performance plans, and annual programme performance reports (GAO, 1997a, 1997b), 
and strengthened the Federal Government’s autonomy as well as responsibility, linking 
performance results and budget allocation. Federal government departments were 
required to submit strategic plans, including plans for at least five years, to the OMB 
and the Congress. Strategic plans needed to contain a mission statement, general goals, 
specific objectives, and methods to achieve these; and related federal government 
departments, local governments, service contractors, interest groups, employees and 
citizens could participate in drawing up the strategic plans. Annual performance plans 
included specific contents for implementing each programme, such as objective, 
quantified and measurable performance goals, and details of the human and physical 
resources required. Lastly, federal government departments needed to submit annual 
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reports on programme performance for the previous year in March every year to the 
President and the Congress. The GPRA had several successful features (GAO, 1997a, 
1997b, 1999, 2004b). Firstly, the GAO found that the GPRA represented a great step 
forward compared to the early performance budgeting system of the 1950s in terms of 
linking annual performance plans and performance targets, as well as budget 
requirements. Secondly, the GPRA was implemented as a form of law, which was 
different from the previous initiatives, which had been a form of Presidential decree, so 
it could draw on stronger support from Congress. Thirdly, it tried to change the 
budgetary process gradually, whilst previous initiatives had aimed at a rapid change in 
policy. It has been revised several times through trial implementations following its 
introduction in 1993. However, the GAO (1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2004b) also found that 
the GPRA had some limitations in providing useful information for budget allocation 
and other fiscal policies. Firstly, in the case of crosscutting programmes, which 
involved two or more federal governments, there was significant incongruence between 
the various interest groups, and it was difficult to arrive at the same performance goals 
and objectives. Secondly, long-term strategic goals were lacking in details of how to 
link them with performance measures, so it was hard to obtain accurate and consistent 
performance data for measuring performance. Thirdly, it was difficult to link the 
achievement of goals with the efforts of federal government because performance could 
be determined by various external factors, such as the social and economic environment, 
as by well the efforts of federal governments.  
 
The George W. Bush administration declared Budget and Performance Integration one 
of the five President’s Management Agendas in 2001, and the PART was adopted from 
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the fiscal year 2003 in order to “explicitly bring performance information into the 
budget formulation process at the funding-decision level” (Breul, 2007, p.22). The 
PART was introduced to specify the legislative purposes of the GPRA, because the 
GPRA had been criticised for not achieving its intended purpose of bringing sufficient 
use of performance information into budget allocation (Dull, 2006). The PART’s main 
focus was programme target levels, not agency goals, so the first step of the PART was 
the identification of programmes (Joyce, 2011). The PART could provide performance 
information consistent with the federal programmes’ budget decision-making process, 
and the budget was redistributed from ineffective to effective grade programmes, based 
on the PART results of a programme. The PART contributed to increasing the use of 
performance information in budget allocation, and Shea (2008, p.5) points out that 
“more and more agencies recognise that the PART can be a useful tool for improving 
performance”. However, the PART could not give effective feedback to a programme 
because the results were reflected in the next year’s budget for the programme, not the 
current year’s. Also, it was difficult to substantially link PART results with a 
programme’s budget, and the Congress ignored the PART results when it came to 
budgeting, because the PART ratings were just one of the factors which it was 
necessary to consider (KIPF, 2011; Breul, 2007). Moreover, Gilmour (2007) indicates 
the learning effects on agencies over time. This showed that an overall increase in the 
PART score over time might reflect not a genuine improvement in the performance of a 
programme but the effects of learning how to deal with the PART. The details of the 
PART will be treated in a later section, with comparison to SABP.  
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The Obama administration, which began in 2009, did not use the PART any more, but 
improved the GPRA of 1993 by enacting the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) in 
2010. The main change introduced by the GPRAMA was constant monitoring and 
performance management, especially on a small number of High Priority Performance 
Goals (HPPG) and crosscutting policy areas, rather than post-linkage between 
performance results and budget (OMB, 2010). The PART results were only reflected in 
the upcoming year’s budget, while under the GPRAMA performance results cover two 
fiscal years (current and upcoming fiscal year). This is a change not only from the 
comprehensive assessment of all programmes to the selective evaluation of a limited 
number of important programmes, but also from the production of ex-post performance 
information to a constant monitoring and management system (Jung, 2012). The federal 
agencies set three to eight long-term HPPGs and submit annual performance plans, 
including clear performance goals, in line with these priority goals, to the OMB. The 
OMB monitors programmes’ performance quarterly through the Vice-Minister’s 
meeting, and it links performance information with dashboards containing general 
information about a programme, such as procedure, budget implementation and 
personnel, to increase the usefulness and availability of performance information. In 
addition, the GPRAMA tries to restructure programmes through in-depth programme 
evaluation. After implementation of programme evaluation by independent and 
professional institutions, such as the Domestic Policy Council, the National Economic 
Council, the Council of Economic Advisers and the OMB, the results of evaluation are 
released online (KIPF, 2011; OMB, 2010). Comparison of the GPRA and the 
GPRAMA in the strategic planning process is summarised in Table 3-1 below.                           
 
80 
 
Table 3- 1 Strategic Planning and Performance Requirements under the GPRA and the GPRAMA 
 
Topic GPRA requirements GPRAMA requirements 
Strategic 
plan content 
- Mission statement 
- Strategic goals 
- Strategies and identification of     
resources 
- Relationship to performance goals 
- Relationship to federal government  
  priority goals 
- Inter-agency coordination and      
collaboration 
- Identification of agency priority goals  
- Description of incorporation of  
  Congressional input 
Strategic 
planning 
process 
- Revised at least every 3 years and  
  covers at least a 5-year period 
- Consultations with Congress 
- Submitted to OMB and Congress 
- Revised every 4 years 
- Consultations with relevant congress- 
ional committees at least every 2 years 
- Made available online and to President  
  and Congress 
Performance 
plan content 
- Performance goals  
- Cover all programme activities 
- Strategies and resources 
- Performance measures 
- Basis for comparing actual results  
  with performance goals 
- Means to verify/validate data 
- Relationship to agency strategic and  
priority goals and federal government  
performance goals 
- Contributing programmes and activities 
- Milestones 
- Data accuracy and reliability 
- Identification of low-priority programmes 
Performance 
plan process 
- Cover the upcoming fiscal year 
- No set time frame 
- Submit to OMB 
- Cover current and upcoming fiscal year 
- Timeframe with the President’s Budget 
- Made available online 
 Source: Adapted from Rubin and Willoughby (2011) 
 
Recent performance budgeting in the US is not a new form. Rather, it is a kind of re-
established budgeting system, adopting the advantages and addressing some of the 
weaknesses of past budgetary reforms in order to reduce the huge amount of 
government debt accumulated since the 1980s (GAO, 1997a, 1997b). Although the 
GPRAMA has not yet been adopted completely, and it is difficult to predict its effect, it 
focuses on performance improvement of a programme rather than linkage between 
performance results and budgeting, whilst the PART put emphasis on both objectives at 
the same time. However, after implementing constant monitoring for enhancing 
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performance, it is expected that the GPRAMA will also seek to link performance 
information and budget allocation (KIPF, 2011).                        
 
3.2.2 Performance Budgeting in Other Countries 
 
The United Kingdom  
 
The UK’s outcome-oriented performance budgeting system has been implemented as a 
strong fiscal reform since the time of the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in 
the 1980s. For example, the Efficiency Scrutiny (1979), the Financial Management 
Initiative (FMI, 1982), the Next Steps Agency (1988) and the Citizen’s Charter (1991) 
in the Thatcher administration, and Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB, 1998) 
and the Public Service Agreement (PSA, 1998) in the Tony Blair administration, are the 
main reforms (KIPF, 2008). In particular, in order to improve the quality and cost-
effectiveness of public services and maintain sound public finances, the UK government 
made the carrying out of a three-year Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 
compulsory in 1998, and this has been underpinned by outcome-focused performance 
targets through the Public Service Agreement (PSA). The main principles of public 
service performance were “clear long-term strategic goals; independent audit and 
inspection; maximum local flexibility and discretion to innovate; transparency about 
what is being achieved” (Noman, 2007, pp. 194-195). Under the PSA, the ministries set 
the aims, objectives and performance targets, including technical notes about how to 
measure targets, and they were required to make a Service Delivery Agreement (SDA) 
to implement the PSA (Noman, 2007). The number of performance targets in the PSA 
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decreased from 600 in 1998-2001, to 300 in 2001-2004, 110 in 2004-2007 and 30 in 
2007-2010, moving the focus of the PSA from output performance indicators to 
outcome-oriented and crosscutting performance indicators. The proportion of outcome-
oriented performance indicators increased from 15% in 1998 to 100% in 2007 (Park, 
2008; Jung, 2012). With the arrival of the Coalition Government in 2010, the PSA was 
changed into the “Public Sector Transparency Framework”, focusing on managing 
individual ministries’ performance rather than crosscutting programmes’ performance. 
The 2010 CSR contained a Departmental Business Plan, which included the vision, 
priority, restructuring plan, expenditures and transparency of each department, in order 
to reduce government debt while remaining focused on the quality of public services 
(Jung, 2012). Under the PSA, HM Treasury examines each ministry’s spending review 
and all central government departments make a PSA with HM Treasury. The Delivery 
Unit in the Prime Minister’s Office checks the delivery plan of each ministry, and each 
ministry reports its implementation of core programmes to Parliament at least twice a 
year. The National Audit Office inspects the reliability and relevance of performance 
indicators and targets (KIPF, 2011).  
 
Canada    
 
Since programme evaluation was first implemented in the late of 1970s, the government 
of Canada has produced performance information continuously for citizen-focused, 
value-driven, results-oriented and responsible spending. In 1990s the Canadian 
Government established outcome-oriented management, focusing on linking outcomes 
and budgeting, and it launched a Public Service initiative in 2000 and a Declaration of 
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Quality Service (Bang, 2009). The main organisations involved are the Treasury Board 
Secretariat (TBS) as well as the internal audit and evaluation units within major 
departments and agencies. Canada has operated two kinds of performance management 
system: mapping performance information at the level of the government as a whole; 
and establishing performance management systems for each department. The former 
was specified as Canada’s Performance, announced by the TBS from 2001, while the 
Management, Resources and Results Structure (MRRS) renewed in 2005, the 
Programme Evaluation launched in 1977, and the Management Accountability 
Framework (MAF) of 2003 were the core systems of the latter. The MRRS contains 
strategic outcomes, performance indicators and targets, so each department needs to 
develop Programme Activity Architecture (PAA) consisting of strategic outcomes, 
programme activities and a sub-activities level for hierarchical, results-based 
management (McCormack, 2007). Periodic (generally once per five years) Programme 
Evaluation is also being implemented to produce better on-going measurements. 
Besides Programme Evaluation for each department, the TBS has undertaken strategic 
reviews for all programmes directly implemented by the Federal Government in a four-
year cycle since 2007. The Strategic Review selects the lowest performing five 
percentage expenditures and then transfers their budgets into other programmes. The 
World Bank (2010, p.96), interestingly, indicates that the probability of so-called 
“gaming” by spending ministries is low in the Strategic Review for the following 
reasons. “Firstly, it is strongly supported by the Prime Minister. Secondly, TBS officials 
are experts so they are aware of ‘gaming’ possibility. Thirdly, TBS can influence the 
performance appraisals and performance pay of Vice ministers. Fourthly, TBS officials 
thoroughly assess the recommendations of their reviews of Ministers and Vice ministers 
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in advance. Finally, it requires departments themselves to identify their lowest priority 
five percent of expenditures.”  All in all, Canada’s performance budgeting system 
provides useful performance information for budget efficiency as well as general 
management after a long period of trial and error.   
 
Australia  
 
The government of Australia undertook budgetary reforms in 1983 in order to reduce 
public spending and improve the efficiency of public services. Programme Management 
and Budgeting (PMO) introduced the concept of evaluation and performance 
information, and changed the focus of budgeting from input to outcome. The 
Department of Finance (DOF) has a key role in coordinating and promoting the 
reformed system, and each department is required to make a Portfolio Evaluation Plan 
and submit it to the DOF (Bang, 2008). The current budgetary reforms are associated 
with the National Commission of Audit (1996), an independent review commissioned 
by the incoming government (KIPF, 2011). Key features of Australia’s performance 
budgeting and management arrangements are: strong legislative foundations, such as the 
Financial Management and Accountability Act (FMA Act, 1997), the Commonwealth 
Authorities and Companies Act (1997), the Charter of Budget Honesty Act (1998) and 
the Public Services Act (1999, 2000) (Fox, 2007). The FMA Act (1997) suggests 
effective management guidelines for government assets and empowers individual 
ministers with both authority and accountability regarding financial management. The 
second law mainly stipulates requirements for commonwealth authorities and 
companies when it comes to managing non-public finance. The third law provides a 
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whole-government framework for the transparent conduct of fiscal policy. The Public 
Services Act, the fourth law, gives a foundation for accrual budgeting, including accrual 
appropriation, outcome and output-based management (KIPF, 2011). In addition, the 
DOF introduced a Strategic Review Unit in 2006 in order to provide useful information 
about major budgeting concerns for top decision makers. In general, the Strategic 
Review Unit evaluates high spending and crosscutting programmes with high priority 
(Jung, 2012). 
 
The main contents of other countries’ performance budgeting systems are summarised 
in Table 3-2 below.  
 
Table 3-2 Main Contents of Other Countries’ Performance Budgeting Systems 
Country Main contents 
UK 
▪ Strong fiscal reforms such as performance budgeting started in 1980s  
▪ Compulsory Comprehensive Spending Review was introduced in 1998 
  (Underpinned by Public Service Agreement and specific Service Delivery 
Agreement between HM Treasury and Department) 
▪ Outcome-oriented performance indicators are 100% in 2007 
▪ Public Sector Transparency Framework was implemented in 2010 to focus on 
individual ministries’ performance rather than crosscutting programmes 
Canada 
▪ Declaration of Quality Service and Public Service 2000 was implemented in 
1990s to establish outcome-oriented management 
▪ Whole government level: Canada’s Performance announced by TBS from 2001 
▪ Each department level: MRRS was renewed in 2005, Programme Evaluation was 
introduced from 1977, MAF from 2003 
▪ TBS undertook Strategic Reviews in 2007 with a four-year cycle to select the 
lowest performing 5 percent of expenditures in each department 
Australia 
▪ Programme Management and Budgeting were introduced in 1983 
▪ Current reforms are associated with the National Commission of Audit (1996) 
▪ Strong legislative foundations: FMA Act in 1997, Commonwealth Authorities 
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and Companies Act (1997), Charter of Budget Honesty Act (1998), Public 
Services Act (1999, 2000) 
▪ Strategic Review Unit was implemented in 2006 to provide important 
performance information with top decision makers 
 
3.2.3 Korean Performance Budgeting 
 
Framework for Performance Management  
 
Performance management in Korea has been implemented on the basis of two related 
laws: the GPA and the NFA10. The PMO manages the overall performance of central 
government in four functions – major policy, finance, personnel and organisation – on 
the basis of the GPA; while the MOSF controls performance budgeting on the basis of 
the NFA. In order to avoid conflicts between the GPA and the NFA, the PMO and the 
MOSF agreed that the PMO should take performance results by the NFA, like those of 
the finance sector by the GPA, without further assessment. The GPA stipulates the 
concepts, principles and objectives of government performance management more 
comprehensively, and defines performance management as “the activities that develop 
organisational missions, long and short-term objectives, annual targets and performance 
indicators and that manage government performance on the basis of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness” (Art. 2). According to the GPA, ministries and agencies 
should develop a “strategic performance plan” for a five-year period, which includes 
                                                     
10 With the commencement of the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) as a 
new control body for Research and Development (R&D) policies in Korea, in March 2011, 
responsibility for performance assessment on R&D programmes was transferred from the 
MOSF to the NSTC, according to the R&D Programme Performance Assessment and 
Performance Management Act.  
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their missions and strategic goals, and they should revise this at least every three year, 
after checking its validity. In addition, they should make an “annual performance plan” 
that accords with the five-year strategic performance plan (Art 6). The annual 
performance plan includes the missions, strategic goals, annual performance targets and 
indicators, and performance results of programmes by three-year period.  
 
The NFA stipulates three sub-systems of the Korean performance budgeting system 
more directly and concretely: the PMS, SABP and the In-depth Evaluation System 
(IES). According to the PMS, central government departments should make an “annual 
performance plan”, focusing on the financial aspect of their work, and draw up an 
“annual performance report” with performance indicators after implementing an annual 
performance plan (Art 8). Spending ministries (including agencies) which spend public 
budgets should submit an “annual performance plan” and an “annual performance 
report” to the MOSF each year with their budget request (Art. 8). Before submitting 
these to the National Assembly, the MOSF and the KIPF review the appropriateness of 
the performance indicators in each annual performance plan and advise spending 
ministries to revise these if they are not relevant. The differences between performance 
management by the GPA and that by the NFA (PMS) are summarised in Table 3-3 
below.  
 
 
Table 3-3 Comparison of Performance Management by the GPA with Performance 
Management by the NFA (PMS) 
 GPA NFA (PMS) 
Agency in 
charge 
PMO MOSF 
Implementation 1st April 2006 (enactment Mar. 2006) 1st January (enactment Sept. 2006) 
Objects of ▪ Central government departments ▪ Central government departments which 
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performance 
management 
 * excludes independent 
organisations such as the 
Legislature, the Judiciary, the 
Board of Audit and Inspection  
spend the public budget  
  * includes the Legislature, the Judiciary,    
     the Board of Audit and Inspection 
▪ Public fund operators 
Scope of 
performance 
management 
▪ Strategic performance plan(5 years) 
▪ Annual performance plan  
 * no annual performance report 
▪ Annual performance plan 
▪ Annual performance report 
 * no strategic performance plan 
Procedure 
Develop plans → report to relevant 
committee of the National Assembly  
* no guidelines, no submission 
Distribute guidelines to spending 
ministries (MOSF) → develop and 
submit plan and report to the MOSF 
(spending ministries) → submit them to 
the National Assembly with budget 
proposals (MOSF, spending ministries) 
 
Source: Prime Minister’s Office (2008) 
 
While the PMS, in accordance with the NFA, was implemented for managing the 
performance of central government in a macro way, SABP, in accordance with the NFA, 
was designed to control the performance of each budgetary programme in a more 
specific way through the checklist method. SABP is a kind of programme review 
intended to link SABP results and budget allocation. Since performance monitoring 
information from the PMS cannot be used directly in budget allocation, the SABP 
system employs a checklist which includes questions about the planning, management 
and results of each budgetary programme and produces a numeric score from 0 to 100. 
SABP has been implemented since 2005 and spending ministries are required to assess 
a third of all their programmes every year in order to reflect their self-assessment results 
in their budget request. Then, the MOSF reviews and adjusts the spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results on the basis of the SABP manual, presented to spending 
ministries in advance, in order to make a budget proposal for the administration. The 
framework for SABP can be seen in Figure 3-1 below.  
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Figure 3-1 Framework for SABP 
 
Presenting checklist 
(MOSF) 
 ▪ Provide the SABP manual including the checklist and 
criteria for answers according to eight programme types 
↓  
Self-assessment 
(spending) 
▪ “Yes” or “No” answer. If “yes”, grounds must be submitted 
▪  0 to 100 numeric score is converted into one of five  
   grades (very effective, effective, modest, poor, very poor) 
                      ↓ 
Budget request (spending)  ▪ Determine the priority based on self-assessment results 
                      ↓ 
Review and confirmation 
(MOSF) 
 ▪ Review spending ministries’ results and reflect them in  
  Budgeting 
         
Finally, the IES was introduced to evaluate programmes in depth in 2006. The purpose 
of the IES is to analyse the specific performance improvement of programmes and 
describe the factors of success or failure by employing various scientific methods, 
through objective and independent organisations such as the KDI. The objects of the 
IES are programmes which need further evaluation after considering the SABP results, 
crosscutting programmes involving two or more ministries, programmes where it might 
be possible to waste the budget in an inefficient way, and programmes which are 
predicted to rapidly increase their budget expenditures in the future. The results of the 
IES are used in budgeting and improving programme management as well. Even if a 
programme is under way, if it is judged inefficient by the IES, then the MOSF will 
integrate it into another programme or reduce its budget or recommend changes to the 
method of implementation (KDI, 2007).  
 
Although each of the three sub-systems produces rather different performance 
information, they are all closely linked to improving the performance of a programme 
and to increasing the efficiency of budget allocation. To sum up, the PMS is used to 
identify briefly the primary performance of a programme, focusing on performance 
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goals and indicators; SABP is used to link performance results and the budget of a 
programme through specific reviews of its planning, management and results; and the 
IES provides more in-depth evaluation of major programmes by identifying their 
problems and finding alternative solutions for them. The relationship between the three 
sub-systems of Korean performance budgeting is summarised in Figure 3-2 below. 
 
Figure 3-2 The Relationship Between the Three Sub-Systems of Korean Performance Budgeting 
 
 
Besides these post-assessment systems, interestingly, the Korean Government has, since 
1999, also implemented Preliminary Feasibility Studies (PFS) before starting large 
budget programmes (over 50 billion Won). PFS consist of programme overviews, 
economic feasibility assessments such as benefit-cost analysis and net present value 
analysis, policy analysis, and general evaluations using the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy 
 PMS (Monitoring)  SABP (Review)  IES (Evaluation) 
   
▪ Object 
 - Entire programmes 
including non- 
budgetary programmes 
- 49 ministries, 2000  
  programmes annually 
- A third of all budgetary   
programmes every year 
- About 450 programmes  
  every year 
- Selected budgetary  
  programme  
- About 10  
  Programmes 
    
▪Content 
- Regular monitoring 
- No checklist  
- Monitor performance   
goal and indicator in  
annual performance   
plan 
- Use generally  
quantitative way 
- Implement internal  
  Monitoring 
- Regular review 
- Use checklist 
- Review performance  
  goal and indicator + 
  budget implementation,   
results 
- Quantitative, qualitative 
- MOSF finally evaluates  
on the basis of spending  
ministries’ results 
- A single evaluation 
- No checklist 
- Detailed analysis  
- Both ways 
- Internal, external,  
and self-assessment  
all possible 
 
▪ Start  
  year 
- Trial basis in 2003 
- Develop performance  
  indicators in 2004 
- Performance annual  
  plan in 2005 
 - Since 2005  - Since 2006 
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Process) technique. PFS prevent projects with low feasibility from getting started as 
budgetary programmes. Since the main purpose of PFS is to increase the efficiency of 
budgetary programmes, it can be said that SABP is closely related to PFS. Also, it can 
be assumed that the higher the PFS results, the higher the SABP results will be.  
 
The Background to Korean Performance Budgeting 
 
The Korean Government tried to introduce performance management in the financial 
sector for a long time. However, performance budgeting, which links performance 
results and budgeting, has only been implemented since the 2000s. In 1962 and 1963, 
15 programmes in three ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, adopted 
performance management selectively; but it failed, due to a lack of operational skills. 
Also, in 1999, after the Asian financial crisis, 16 ministries tried to implement 
performance management on a trial basis, but it did not spread across the rest of 
government because of a lack of preparation, which caused error in selecting 
programmes and poor content in performance plans and performance reports. After 
some trial and error, the PMS was introduced on a trial basis for 22 ministries in 2003. 
Thirty per cent of the programmes of these ministries had performance goals and 
indicators developed in 2004; and annual performance plans for all 22 ministries were 
completed in 2005. SABP was introduced in 2005 and the IES in 2006. In addition, the 
NFA was enacted in 2006, so the legal framework for Korean performance budgeting 
was complete. As SABP is closely related to other financial reforms, it is necessary to 
explore these in detail in order to understand SABP more completely.  
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Firstly, the medium-term expenditure framework was implemented in 2004 to change 
the direction of budgeting from one-year control to five-year strategy and goal. The 
medium-term budget plan is set in a five-year framework based on economic growth 
predictions, so it helps to decide the amount of future expenditure and to keep 
government debts at an acceptable level in the medium or long term. The medium-term 
expenditure framework is used as a formal framework for annual budget allocation and 
as an annual budget ceiling for each sector, unlike the informal documents of the MOSF. 
It is developed by open discussion from its initial stage and submitted to the National 
Assembly for validation; and it reflects not only the opinions of the MOSF but also the 
results of participation and consensus among related experts, ministries and interest 
groups.    
 
Secondly, so-called “top-down” budgeting was introduced while the medium-term 
expenditure framework was being implemented in 2004. Once the annual budget ceiling 
for each sector under the medium-term expenditure framework is determined, as a result 
of open discussion, spending ministries set priorities among their programmes, 
coordinate opinions among internal bureaux, and reflect the interests of external groups 
within the budget ceiling. The top-down budgeting system has its own advantage in that 
it applies spending ministries’ expertise on the subject of their programmes to selecting 
necessary programmes and the budget size of these. Under the top-down budgeting 
system spending ministries’ autonomy in setting a budget has been increased compared 
to the previous bottom-up budgeting system. In this regard, the necessity for 
performance budgeting has been increased to require spending ministries to have greater 
93 
 
accountability corresponding to their greater discretion by strengthening the links 
between the performance of and budget for a programme.  
 
Thirdly, the digital budget information system was introduced in 2007 to help the 
MOSF monitor the financial activities of central government in real time. It managed all 
kinds of financial information, including revenue, expenditure, budget implementation 
and settlements. In order to advance the budgeting system, the scientific management of 
related information was essential and the digital budget information system offered a 
basis for this. In addition, the digital budget information system provided a basis for 
changing the budget structure from line item budgeting to programme budgeting, 
presenting full costs, including direct costs, labour costs and indirect costs. Programme 
budgeting could increase the accountability and responsibility, as well as the autonomy, 
of spending ministries by measuring performance on a programme basis. Introducing 
programme budgeting was a basis for performance budgeting and a top-down budgeting 
system in Korea. A comparison between line item budgeting and a programme 
budgeting structure can be seen in Table 3-4 below.  
 
Table 3-4 Comparison Between Line Item and Programme Budgeting Structures 
Budget in 2006 (Line item) Budget in 2007(Programme budgeting) Annual  
performance plan category number category number 
Jang 
Kwan 
28 
76 
Field (Jang) 
Sector(Kwan) 
16 
68 
Strategic goals 
Hang 963 Programme (Hang) 771 Performance goals 
Se-hang 2,413 Sub-programme (Se-hang) 3,431 Task 
Se-sehang 8,041 Activities (Se-sehang) 8,831  
Mok 
Se-mok 
49 
102 
Cost element (Mok) 
Cost element (Se-mok) 
23 
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The strategic goals, performance goals and task in an annual performance plan are the 
field/sector, programme and sub-programme respectively in the programme budgeting 
structure. Under programme budgeting, each budgetary programme can be controlled in 
the form of “programme” and “sub-programme”. SABP, the main object of this study, 
has been implemented on a “sub-programme” basis. Since the year 2007, the foundation 
for performance budgeting has been built by changing from line item budgeting to a 
programme budgeting system.  
 
3.2.4 Implications 
 
From the trends in performance budgeting seen in the countries mentioned above, this 
study can draw some useful implications in terms of the use of performance information, 
the method of performance budgeting, outcome-oriented performance indicators, and 
the relationship between performance budgeting and other fiscal reforms. The 
implications mentioned in this section will be fully considered when developing feasible 
policy alternatives for a better SABP system in Chapter 7.  
 
Firstly, regarding the use of performance information, Shick (2007) divided the 
contribution of performance budgeting into analytic tools and decision rules. He 
indicated that the former focused on providing useful information and insights for 
policy makers, while the latter paid more attention to consistency between increasing 
expenditures and improving outcomes. He also commented that, “analytic tools 
empower budget makers, allowing full scope for judgement and subjectivity, whereas 
decision rules constrain them, making budgeting less judgemental and more objective” 
95 
 
(Shick, 2007, p.111). Many OECD countries use performance budgeting to provide 
analytic tools for budgeting decision-making, not as decision rules. For example, the 
PART and SABP have been used as analytic tools because their results are one of the 
main factors which might influence budget allocation. When policy makers regard 
performance budgeting as providing analytic tools, this is something to consider 
cautiously: better integration of performance information into budget allocation is a 
long term challenge, requiring long term effort from the Ministry of Finance and 
spending ministries; and if policy makers want to use performance results in budgeting, 
they need to ensure that links between programmes, outputs and outcomes are clear and 
measured effectively (Fox, 2007).  
 
Secondly, with respect to methods, performance budgeting can be divided into 
performance indicator monitoring, programme evaluation and programme review (KIPF, 
2008). Performance indicator monitoring is the method which develops indicators 
related to outcome, output and process and then evaluates performance on the basis of 
these indicators. The GPRA in the US, the PSA in the UK and PMS in Korea can be 
regarded as performance indicator monitoring methods. Although these methods are 
able systematically to produce and utilise performance information within a relatively 
short time, it is difficult to consider the external factors which influence a programme’s 
budget. Consequently, performance information at the level of performance monitoring 
cannot be directly applied to the budget decision-making process, despite the fact that it 
can be a starting point for performance management (KIPF, 2008). In addition, 
programme evaluation has mainly been used in order to develop policies in spending 
ministries, universities and academic institutes. The Canadian government has 
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implemented it for results-oriented performance management and improvement of 
programmes. Although programme evaluation includes detailed effects, directions for 
improvement, and the question of whether a programme should be continued or 
abolished, it takes more time and costs than other methods. Thus, there are some 
limitations for evaluating programmes comprehensively and providing performance 
information in a timely fashion. On the other hand, the programme review method has 
recently been adopted by many OECD countries: for example, the adoption of the 
PART in the US, Spending Reviews in the UK, a Strategic Programme Review in 
Canada, a Strategic Review in Australia and SABP in Korea. A programme review can 
analyse not only the effectiveness and efficiency of current programmes but also the 
outputs and outcomes of alternative programmes. More importantly, the results of a 
programme review can be reflected in budget allocation (KIPF, 2008). Due to the 
advantages of the programme review method, it has spread widely across many 
countries as an intermediate form between performance monitoring and programme 
evaluation. That is the reason why, of the three types of performance budgeting systems 
used in Korea, this research focuses on SABP.  
 
Thirdly, recent performance budgeting systems put an emphasis on outcome-oriented 
information, because it is hard to understand the real and final effects of a programme 
just by using process or output information. For example, when evaluating whether a 
government’s health investments are effective or not, examining whether rates of life 
expectancy or complete recovery (outcome indicator) are rising might be more 
meaningful than just looking at the increased number of patients treated (output 
indicator). Although the current trend of many countries is to develop outcome-oriented 
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performance indicators, measuring outcomes is technically more difficult, due to their 
complexity and interactions with many other factors. Talbot (2010) indicates some 
problematic issues of performance budgeting (e.g., unit of analysis, conceptual, 
technical, and political and values, problems), as mentioned in Chapter 2. Consequently, 
in order to make good use of outcome information, policy makers should take the 
following points into serious consideration: there is no end point for results-based 
management, and persistence over many years is required; strong and central leadership 
may be needed to build the capacity and culture that produces outcome information; and 
the Ministry of Finance and spending ministries need to focus continuously on 
reviewing outcomes and developing a more systematic approach to review existing 
programmes (McCormack, 2007; Fox, 2007).  
 
Finally, performance budgeting systems in many countries have been developed with 
other financial reforms such as top-down budgeting, programme budgeting, medium-
term budgeting and accrual basis accounting. Thus, a performance budgeting system’s 
success is closely related to the success of other financial reforms. Shick (2007, p.129) 
impressively indicates that, “one of the most important lessons from half a century of 
disappointment is that budgeting cannot be transformed in isolation from the 
management practices and culture in which it is embedded”.  
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3.3 Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP) 
 
3.3.1 Overview and Operating Mechanisms 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, although the PMS in 2004 controlled the performance of 
all the programmes of the central government of Korea, based on performance plans and 
performance indicators, there was a limit to the degree to which it was possible to link 
the performance results and budget of a programme, because performance information 
in the PMS was just monitoring level information 11  (Park, 2008). Against this 
background, SABP was introduced in 2005 in order to increase the linkage between 
SABP results and budget allocation. SABP was implemented in two major steps: a self-
assessment stage for spending ministries (including agencies); and the MOSF’s review 
of the spending ministries’ self-assessment results. Generally, a third of all the 
programmes of each spending ministry are assessed by SABP every year. From 2005 to 
2010, a total of 2,920 programmes were assessed by SABP and the budget for them 
totalled about 220,000 billion Won: 555 programmes (about 35,000bn Won) in 2005, 
577 (35,100bn Won) in 2006, 585 (43,300bn Won) in 2007, 384(37,100bn Won) in 
2008, 346(24,800bn Won) in 2009, and 473 (45,500bn Won) in 2010, as seen in Table 
3-5 below. 
 
 
                                                     
11 This problem was present in a similar way in the GPRA in the US. US federal government 
departments submitted strategic plans, annual performance plans and annual performance 
reports to the OMB and the Congress. However, the Congress did not use them well in the 
process of budget approval. That is why the PART was later adopted.  
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Table 3-5 Number of Programmes and Budgets Assessed by SABP from 2005 to 2010 
 Total 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Programme (unit) 2,920 555 577 585 384 346 473 
Budget (bn Won) 220,000 35,000 35,100 43,300 37,100 24,800 45,500 
 
SABP Checklist and Programme Types  
 
The questions in the checklist for SABP are divided into two types: 12 common 
questions, which can be applied to all types of programme; and 1-2 specific questions, 
which depend on the programme type (MOSF, 2010a). A common question is related to 
three sections, such as planning (including rationale and design, and performance 
planning), management, and results, in order to assess a programme’s performance. A 
specific question reflects the specificity of a programme and is included in the planning 
and management sections. All programmes are classified into one of eight categories: (1) 
IT System programmes; (2) Social Overhead Capital programmes; (3) Capital 
Acquisition programmes; (4) Subsidy to Private Sector programmes; (5) Subsidy to 
Local Government programmes; (6) Loan programmes; (7) Investment programmes ; (8) 
Other Direct programmes (MOSF, 2010a). In the case of IT System programmes, the 
current SABP checklist dates from 2008, as a result of government restructuring after 
the presidential election in 2007. As this study analyses the SABP results from 2005 to 
2010, the SABP results of IT System programmes will not be considered in the study in 
order to obtain data consistency and comparability. An SABP checklist can be seen in 
Figure 3-3 below.  
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Figure 3- 3 SABP Checklist 
Sections 
Questions 
(Performance Indicators) 
Weights Depending on Programme Types 
IT SOC 
Capital 
Acquisi
tion 
Other 
Direct 
Invest
ment Loan 
Sub. to 
Private 
Sector 
Sub. to 
Local 
Gov. 
Plann 
ing 
(30) 
Rational
e and 
Design 
(15) 
1-1. Is the purpose of programme clear and 
valid? 
3.75 3.75 3.75 5.0 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
1-2. Is the programme designed so that it is 
not redundant and does not duplicate any 
other programmes? 
3.75 3.75 3.75 5.0 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
1-3. Are the programme contents and 
implementation plan efficient and suitable?  
3.75 3.75 3.75 5.0 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
<Specific Checklists> 
1-IT. Have possible major conditions been 
considered in planning?  
1-SOC. Has the programme gone through 
objective feasibility studies and was its 
validity confirmed? 
1-CA. Did the programme have any 
procedures to analyze the relevance of 
acquisition? 
1-SubP. Has the programme reassessed 
whether the ongoing subsidy is necessary 
and considered the relevance of the 
beneficiaries and matching conditions?   
1-SubL. Did the programme review and 
reflect local government ’ s business 
conditions? 
1-Loan. Have the terms and conditions 
been properly set?  
1-Inv. Are the investment amounts given in 
the results of the investigation of the 
organization’s conditions proper? 
3.75 3.75 3.75 - 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 
Subtotal 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
Perform
ance 
Planning 
(15) 
2-1. Are there clear relationships between 
the performance indicators and the purpose 
of a programme?  
7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
2-2. Is the target for performance 
ambitious? 
7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Subtotal 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
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Note:  The abbreviations in specific checklists for both the planning and management sections represent 
the programme types considered in the questions. IT means IT System programmes; SOC means Social 
Overhead Capital programmes; Sub. to Private Sector means Subsidy to Private Sector programmes; Sub. 
to Local Government means Subsidy to Local Government programmes 
Source: A Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes in the fiscal year 2009 (MOSF, 2010a) 
Management 
(20) 
 
3-1. Have funds been allotted in a timely 
manner? 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
3-2. Is the programme operating the 
monitoring system so that it takes action to 
solve problems?   
10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
3-3. Has the programme received the 
objective and comprehensive evaluation?  
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
<Specific Checklists> 
3-SOC. Does the programme manage its 
aggregate cost properly?  
3-Loan. Is the revolving rate sound and 
does the programme use the credible cost 
and risk prediction method? 
3-SubP. Are the management and 
supervision over the programme partner 
sufficient?  
3-SubL. Are local governments taking 
useful actions for improving the efficiency 
of allotted funds?   
- 5.0 - - - 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Subtotal 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Results 
/ 
Feedback 
(50)  
4-1. Has the programme achieved its 
planned target of performance indicator?  
30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 
4-2. As a result of programme evaluation, is 
the programme operating effectively? 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
4-3. Has the programme increased the 
efficiency in the process of achieving the 
performance target?  
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
4-4. Have the assessment results and 
outside recommends used to improve the 
structure of programme? 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Subtotal 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Total 
 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Calculation of Assessment Results   
 
Most of questions in the SABP checklist are to be answered with a “Yes” or “No”, and 
spending ministries are required to provide appropriate evidences for a “Yes” answer. 
The planning, management and results sections are weighted at 30%, 20% and 50% 
respectively, in order to produce numeric scores from 0 to 100. In particular, the 
planning section consists of two sub-sections (rationale and design, performance 
planning) and each sub-section is worth 15%. A “Yes” answer is converted into the 
maximum score for each question from 3.75 to 30.0 and a “No” scores zero. It should 
be noted that Question 4-1 has four kinds of answer: “Yes”, “To a large extent”, “To a 
small extent” and “No”. The four levels are translated into different scores, as shown in 
Table 3-6. 
 
Table 3- 6 Four Levels of Answers and Scores for Question 4-1 
Answer No To a small extent To a large extent Yes 
Score 0 10 20 30 
 
SABP was launched to improve the performance of the budgetary programme, so it 
emphasises the importance of performance planning by linking this logically with 
Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 4-1, as shown in Table 3-7. So if the answer to 2-1 is “No”, then 
2-2 is automatically “No”, and the answer to Question 4-1 cannot be above “To a small 
extent”. In other words, a programme for which the answer to Question 2-1 is “No” 
cannot achieve a score above 65. Consequently, although the weight of performance 
planning is only 15%, spending ministries make great efforts to achieve a “Yes” answer 
to Questions 2-1 and 2-2, due to the logical relationship between the questions. This 
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indicates well why performance planning has greater importance than performance 
measurement and performance reporting, and why this study categorises various 
dysfunctional consequences according to three elements of performance budgeting, as 
mentioned in the Section 2.3.1. A standard for answering Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 4-1 
will be explained in detail in the next section.   
 
Table 3- 7 Logical Relationship Between Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 4-1 
 Question 2-2 Question 4-1 
Q. 2-1 = “No” Automatically  “No” - 
Q. 2-2 = “No” - Maximum is  “To a small extent”(score = 10) 
 
The total numerical score of each programme is converted into one of the following five 
grades: “Very effective” (100-90); “Effective” (89-80); “Modest” (79-60); “Poor” (59-
50) and “Very poor” (less than 50). The SABP grades have been increased from four to 
five by dividing the “Poor” grade into “Poor” and “Very poor” from 2008 on, in order 
to enhance the assessment function among poor grade programmes. However, this study 
follows the four grade criteria (“Effective”, “Somewhat effective”, “Modest”, “Poor”) 
to maintain the consistency and comparability of SABP results. According to the 
Budgeting Guidelines (MOSF, 2010b), the budgets of a programme which is finally 
rated “Effective” need to be increased, in principle, the following year, whilst those of a 
programme which is finally rated “Poor” or below must be reduced by more than ten 
percentage points the following year.   
 
 
 
 
104 
 
Procedures of the SABP system 
 
SABP has been applied to all the budgetary programmes of 49 central government 
departments, and the object of SABP, in principle, is the “sub-programme” in 
programme budgeting structure. However, programmes which are not considered worth 
assessing, such as operating costs (including labour costs), comprehensive grants to 
local government, and internal transfers within governments, are excluded from SABP. 
There are three bodies involved in the SABP system: 48 spending ministries (including 
programme divisions and budget divisions); the MOSF (including the Performance 
Management Bureau and the Budget Office), which controls the SABP system; and the 
Advisory Committee, which consists of budget directors from the MOSF and outside 
experts. The Performance Management Bureau in the MOSF distributes guidelines for 
SABP to spending ministries, and these enable the latter to evaluate their budgetary 
programmes. Budget divisions in the spending ministries are required to submit the 
results of self-assessment to the MOSF by March each year, after getting together their 
programme division’s assessment; and they must also submit their budget requirements 
for the following year, reflecting their self-assessment results, by June. The MOSF 
reviews the validity of the spending ministries’ self-assessment results from March to 
June. Until 2008, the Budget Office reviewed self-assessment results first; and then the 
Performance Management Bureau decided the final SABP results. During these periods, 
the MOSF discusses spending ministries’ formal objections and determines final SABP 
results in consultation with the Advisory Committee. The Performance Management 
Bureau gives policy recommendations for each programme to the spending ministries, 
and the Budget Office uses the final SABP results when it comes to making a budget 
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proposal for submitting to the National Assembly by September. The procedures and 
roles of the spending ministries and the MOSF can be seen in Figure 3-4 below. As we 
can see from the figure, in order for SABP to be successful, cooperation and trust 
between spending ministries and the MOSF are essential. Otherwise, SABP users can 
be exposed to various unexpected negative effects when presenting performance plans, 
measuring performance and reporting performance.  
 
Figure 3- 4 The Procedures and Roles of the Spending Ministries and the MOSF 
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3.3.2 Specific Criteria for Answering a Question in the Checklist 
 
This section describes specific standards for answering Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 4-1. 
These questions are closely related to each other and can greatly influence the SABP 
score of a programme, so spending ministries make every effort to achieve a “Yes” 
answer, and therefore the possibility of a difference between the SABP result of a 
spending ministry and the result of the MOSF may be higher than for other questions. 
Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 provide specific criteria for answering Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 
4-1 in the SABP manual (MOSF, 2010a).   
 
With respect to the appropriateness of performance indicators, Question 2-1 requires 
that performance indicators should be related clearly and specifically to the purpose of a 
programme. In particular, in order to achieve a “Yes” answer to the question, firstly, a 
performance indicator should cover all the contents of a programme, that is, it should be 
representative of the whole programme; secondly, the performance indicator should be 
outcome-oriented; and thirdly, the definition of the performance indicator and the 
performance measurement method should be clear and reasonable. In addition, in a case 
where it is difficult to set an outcome indicator, due to the characteristics of the 
programme or the fact that the programme is still on-going, a “quality of output” or 
“process” indicator can also be accepted. These three criteria should all be accepted at 
the same point in the process of the MOSF’s review in order to achieve a final “Yes” 
answer. From the specific criteria for answering Question 2-1, we can see that a device 
for preventing “measure fixation” and “tunnel vision” exists to some extent in the SABP 
manual.             
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Figure 3-5 Specific Criteria for Answering Question 2-1 
Performance Indicator 
(Common question) 
 2-1. Is there a clear relationship between the performance indicators and the 
purpose of a programme? 
      
Purpose 
To determine whether the performance indicators can be used as means for 
measuring the purpose of the programme  
      
Elements of Yes or No 
 
□ Elements of Yes: A Yes answer needs to clearly explain and provide evidence of  
all the following: 
 
o A performance indicator should cover all the contents of a programme 
  * A performance indicator should be representative of the whole programme, 
not a part of the programme, including programme contents and beneficiaries 
 
 
  o An outcome indicator should be set as a performance indicator for a programme  
    * The quality of output can be accepted in a case where there is difficulty in 
setting an outcome indicator, due to the characteristics of the programme 
       (ex) promotion programme: not “the amount of promotion” measuring simple  
              output, but “the extent of recognition of promotion” measuring the quality         
              of output should be presented as a performance indicator 
    * An on-going programme should set both a process indicator, such as the rate 
of progress, and an outcome indicator for the completed part  
* The rate of progress is measured by “total cost over accumulated investment”   
  
o Definition of a performance indicator and method of performance measurement     
   should be specific and reasonable 
  * If there is a specific performance measurement method, then the numerator 
and denominator should be explained in detail. Otherwise, the calculation 
method should be explained in detail 
 
□ Elements of No: A No answer is possible if a performance indictor is applied to  
    at least one of the following cases: 
  o Where there is a lack of relationship between the performance indicator and the 
     programme’s purpose  
  o Where there is a focus on the input or the amount of output 
o Where the definition of the performance indicator and method of performance 
   measurement are unclear and not reasonable   
o Where satisfaction with the indicator is suggested without  
   simultaneously setting the quality of output or quantitative outcome indicator  
 
Source: Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes for the fiscal year 2009 (MOSF, 2010a) 
 
In regard to the relevance of a performance target level, Question 2-2 requires that 
performance targets should be ambitious. In order to receive a “Yes” answer, spending 
ministries should set an ambitious performance target level before implementing a 
programme and consider the extent of automatic achievement without any special 
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efforts as well as performance improvement with efforts. It means that the grounds for 
setting performance target levels should be clear and reasonable. If the performance 
target is set at a level that is attainable without any special efforts, or it just considers 
past achievement and doesn’t reflect efforts for improving performance, then spending 
ministries cannot obtain a “Yes” answer in the MOSF’s review. Furthermore, Question 
2-2 is closely related to Question 2-1, so if the answer to Question 2-1 is “No”, then the 
answer to Question 2-2 is also automatically “No”.      
 
Figure 3-6 Specific Criteria for Answering Question 2-2 
Performance Indicator 
(Common question) 
 
2-2. Is the target for performance ambitious? 
      
Purpose 
To determine whether the performance target is ambitious compared with the 
achievement of, or the trend in achievement of, performance  
      
Elements of Yes or No 
 
□ Elements of Yes: A Yes answer needs to clearly explain and provide evidence of  
    all the following cases: 
  o Where the performance target is set in advance    
o Where the performance target can automatically be achieved  
   without any special efforts 
  * A predictable change in external environment should be considered before  
     setting the performance target  
o Where the performance target includes efforts made for improving the  
   performance, such as an improvement in work methods 
  * The extent of the improvement of performance through the efforts made 
should be considered previously 
 
 □ Elements of No: A No answer is possible if a performance indictor is applied to  
     at least one of the following cases: 
  o Where the performance target is set after the programme’s implementation  
o Where the performance target is set at at a level of achievement which can be 
   attained without any special efforts 
  * Where changes in external environment, are not reflected in the target, which 
is set at the same level as for the previous year or for a lower level than the 
previous year 
o Where the performance target is based simply on past achievement, not 
considering the efforts needed to change things during the past work process    
 
■ If the answer to Question 2-1 is “No”, then that to Question 2-2 is also “No”  
 
Source: Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes in the fiscal year 2009 (MOSF, 2010a) 
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As mentioned above, Question 4-1, which asks whether the programme has achieved its 
planned performance target, is closely related to Questions 2-1 and 2-2. If the answer to 
Question 2-1 is “No”, the answer to Question 2-2 is automatically “No”; and if the 
answer to Question 2-2 is “No”, then the programme cannot achieve above “To a small 
extent” (10 points), although the performance target is achieved 100% according to 
specific criteria for answering Question 4-1. If spending ministries want to achieve a 
“Yes” answer, then they should achieve both a “Yes” answer to Question 2-2 and a 
performance target level of 100% or more.   
 
Figure 3- 7 Specific Criteria for Answering Question 4-1 
Performance Indicator 
(Common question) 
 
4-1. Has the programme achieved its planned target of performance indicators? 
      
Purpose To determine whether the programme has achieved its ambitious target level or not   
      
Elements of Yes or No 
 
□ Elements of Yes: 
o In a case where the answer to Question 2-2 is “Yes” and the programme also 
achieves 100% or more of  the performance target level 
 
□ Elements of To a large extent: 
o In a case where the answer to Question 2-2 is “Yes” and the programme also 
achieves its performance target level to a large extent 
o Although the answer to Question 2-2 is “Yes”, and the programme achieves its 
performance target level 100%,  at least one of the following is the case: 
  * It is not possible to ascertain the ultimate effect of a programme e.g., it is a 
new programme or an on-going programme 
  * The budgets of a programme are not being implemented normally   
 
□ Elements of To a small extent: 
   o In a case where the answer to Question 2-2 is “Yes” and the programme 
achieves its performance target level to a small extent 
 o Although the answer to Question 2-2 is “Yes”, and it achieves its performance 
target level 100%, at least one of the following is the case: 
   * Unreliable performance data is presented 
   * There is continuous low budget implementation  
o In a case where the answer to Question 2-2 is “No” despite the programme 
achieving a performance target level 100% or more  
 
□ Elements of No:  
  o All the other cases 
 
Source: A Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme in the fiscal year 2009 (MOSF,2010a) 
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3.3.3 The Use of SABP Results 
 
Although SABP results have been continuously applied to budget allocation for 
programmes or improving the performance management of programmes through the 
recommendations of the MOSF, the specific method was changed after 2008. From 
2005 to 2007, SABP final scores for each programme were converted into one of four 
types of SABP grade: “Effective” (100-85 points), “Somewhat effective” (84-70), 
“Modest” (69-50) and “Poor” (less than 50). In order to enhance the discriminatory 
power of scores, however, the MOSF changed the four grades into five grades – “Very 
effective” (100-90), “Effective” (89-80), “Modest” (79-60), “Poor” (59-50) and “Very 
poor” (less than 50) – in 2008, because the proportion of “Effective” grades had been 
increasing due to the lessons learned by spending ministries. Also, from 2005 to 2007 
there was no incentive for effective programmes, but the budgets of poor programmes 
were reduced by 10 percentage points compared to the previous year. From 2008 on, the 
budgets of very effective and effective programmes have been increased, in principle, 
by more than the average budget increase rate for other programmes, whilst those of 
poor and very poor programmes have been decreased by 10 percentage points compared 
to the previous year (MOSF, 2010a).  
 
As for the PMO’s performance assessment of major policy, finance, personnel and 
organisation based on the GPA, the PMO and the MOSF agreed to match the assessed 
programmes with each other in the finance sector, in order to avoid conflicts between 
the GPA and the NFA. Consequently, the PMO regards SABP results as the means of 
assessing the finance sector according to the GPA without any further assessment.    
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Some spending ministries (including agencies), such as the National Police Agency, 
apply SABP results to personnel performance evaluation and performance-related salary 
for officials. In addition, many other spending ministries try to use SABP results as a 
means of evaluating personnel performance (Cho, 2010). According to a questionnaire 
survey of the National Assembly Budget Office (2007), 82.5% of central government 
officials surveyed answered that linking performance information with budgeting was 
desirable. Interestingly, in a questionnaire survey carried out by Bang (2009) using 
Likert’s five-point scale, the question asking whether it was necessary to link SABP 
results with budgeting obtained 3.73 points out of five, whilst the question asking 
whether current SABP results were relevantly linked with budgeting obtained only 3.08 
points. This implies that most government officials agreed with the necessity for linking 
performance results with budgeting, but at the same time they perceived that the current 
SABP system might not be as appropriate as was necessary. As a result, although SABP 
results have been applied more widely to budgeting, performance management and 
personnel performance evaluation, it is necessary to examine whether they are working 
well, or whether there are any adverse effects.          
 
3.3.4 Differences in SABP Results between Spending Ministries and the MOSF 
 
Overall SABP Results from 2005 to 2010 
 
Overall SABP results from 2005 to 2010 can be seen in Table 3-8 below. Although the 
number of programmes assessed by SABP from 2005 to 2007 is similar, at around 550-
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600, it decreased sharply from 2008, to about 350-450. This was because the MOSF 
enhanced the assessment object from “activities” to “sub-programme” in the programme 
budget structure mentioned in Table 3-4 while changing the budget structure from line 
item to programme budgeting in 2008. The average budget of assessed programmes for 
six years was about 37,000 billion Won and consisted of about 15% of the total budget 
for each year. For six years the grade most achieved was “Modest”, at around 65%. The 
least achieved grade was “Effective”, at around 6%, and the grade “Poor” was the 
second least achieved, at about 8.2%.         
 
 
Table 3- 8 Overall SABP Results from 2005 to 2010 
Year Programme (number) Effective 
Somewhat 
effective Modest Poor 
Budget 
(bn Won) 
% of total 
total budget 
2005 555 29 (5.2) 102 (18.4) 337 (60.7) 87 (15.7) 35,000 16.7 
2006 577 30 (5.2) 94 (16.3) 388 (67.2) 65 (11.3) 35,100 15.7 
2007 585 69 (11.8) 143 (24.4) 342 (58.5) 31 (5.3) 43,300 18.2 
2008 384 27 (7.0) 108 (28.1) 236 (61.5) 13 (3.4) 37,100 13.9 
2009 346 7 (2.0) 115 (33.3) 210 (60.7) 14 (4.0) 24,800 8.7 
2010 473 13 (2.7) 52 (11.0) 378 (80.0) 30 (6.3) 45,500 15.6 
Total 2,920 175 (6.0) 614 (21.0) 1,891 (64.8) 240 (8.2) 220,000 14.8 
 
Notes: 1. The number in parenthesis is the ratio (%) 
            2. Although the grade “Poor” has been divided into “Poor”, and “Very poor”, and the grade 
“Effective has been divided into “Effective” and “Very effective” since 2008, in order to 
strengthen the criteria for the “Poor” grade, this study employs the former criteria to 
compare the data     
 
The proportion of “Effective” grades doubled from 5.2% in 2005 to 11.8% in 2007, but 
it fell again after 2008 to 7%. The proportion of “Poor” grades fell from 15.7% in 2005 
to 3.4% in 2008 and then remained at a low level. Interestingly, during the six years 
most programmes converged near the “Somewhat effective” and “Modest” grades. In 
the case of these two grades, the Budget Office in the MOSF can increase or decrease 
the budgets of these programmes at their discretion based on other criteria besides 
SABP results. The other parts of this section will focus on differences in the SABP 
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results allocated by spending ministries and the MOSF in order to find some meaningful 
characteristics when it comes to assessing programmes.   
 
Differences in SABP Scores between Spending Ministries and the MOSF 
 
Differences in SABP scores between spending ministries and the MOSF for six years 
can be seen in Table 3-9 and Figure 3-8 below. The characteristics related to differences 
in the SABP scores were as follows. Firstly, there were very high SABP score 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF, and these were over 25 points, 
except for 2008. The average self-assessment score allocated by spending ministries 
was 89.5 points, while that of the MOSF was just 63.1 points. Considering the nature of 
the performance budgeting system, differences between spending ministries and the 
MOSF seem to be a natural phenomenon. However, the most important thing is that 
spending ministries’ average self-assessment scores were nearly 90 points out of 100. 
This surely shows that spending ministries had an optimism bias at the self-assessment 
stage and they did not assess their programmes objectively. Moreover, this led to the 
MOSF’s drastic cutting of spending ministries’ self-assessment results, as mentioned in 
2.3.4. Secondly, of the four detailed sections of SABP, the performance planning and 
results sections showed a high degree of difference between the spending ministries’ 
scores and those of the MOSF, the average difference over six years being 5.3 points 
and 16.5 points respectively, whilst there were almost no score gaps in the rationale and 
design and the management sections. This means that the overall SABP score 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF were mainly explained by 
differences in the performance planning and results sections. In addition, the big 
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differences in the performance planning and results sections can also be explained by 
the logical relationships between Questions 2-1, 2-2 and 4-1 in the SABP checklist, that 
is, if there are big differences in the performance planning section (Questions 2-1 and 2-
2), then there will automatically be big differences in the results section (Question 4-1). 
Furthermore, it might imply that dysfunctional consequences of performance planning 
have greater impacts than those of performance measurement and performance 
reporting, as mentioned in 2.3.1. Thirdly, the high SABP score differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF were not reduced in the six years after the SABP 
was implemented in 2005. This might mean that both the spending ministries’ optimism 
bias and the MOSF’s drastic cutting had been repeated every year for six years, and this 
could lead to a failure to achieve the purposes of SABP in the medium and long-term. 
So, differences in SABP scores between spending ministries and the MOSF have been 
high, significant and persistent, and it is surely worthwhile examining what has 
happened in the SABP system to cause this situation.  
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Table 3-9 Differences in SABP Scores Between Spending Ministries and the MOSF 
(Unit: Points) 
 
Source: SABP Results from 2005 to 2010 (MOSF, 2012a) 
 
Figure 3-8 Graph of Score Differences by SABP Section from 2005 to 2010 
 
Source: SAPB Results from 2005 to 2010 (MOSF, 2012a) 
 
 
 Ministry Total  score 
Plann 
-ing 
(Rationale 
and 
design) 
(Performance  
planning) 
Mange
-ment Results 
’05 
Spending Ministry (A) 86.2 28.1 [14.2] [13.9] 17.7 40.4 
MOSF (B) 60.1 23.1 [13.8] [9.3] 15.1 21.9 
A-B 26.1 5.0 [0.4] [4.6] 2.6 18.5 
’06 
Spending Ministry (A) 86.5 28.9 [14.7] [14.3] 17.8 39.8 
MOSF (B) 59.9 22.9 [14.3] [8.6] 14.7 22.3 
A-B 26.6 6.0 [0.4] [5.7] 3.1 17.5 
’07 
Spending Ministry (A) 91.9 29.7 [14.9] [14.7] 18.6 43.6 
MOSF (B) 66.2 23.6 [14.2] [9.2] 15.5 27.1 
A-B 25.7 6.1 [0.7] [5.6] 3.1 16.5 
’08 
Spending Ministry (A) 85.6 29.5 [14.9] [14.6] 16.9 39.2 
MOSF (B) 66.7 22.8 [14.4] [8.4] 14.3 29.6 
A-B 18.9 6.7 [0.5] [6.2] 2.6 9.6 
’09 
Spending Ministry (A) 92.2 29.1 [14.7] [14.3] 17.3 45.8 
MOSF (B) 65.9 24.5 [14.6] [9.9] 13.6 27.8 
A-B 26.3 4.6 [0.1] [4.4] 3.7 18.0 
’10 
Spending Ministry (A) 89.4 29.1 [14.9] [14.2] 17.7 42.6 
MOSF (B) 63.6 23.1 [14.7] [8.4] 16.6 23.9 
A-B 25.8 6.0 [0.2] [5.8] 1.1 18.7 
’05
-
’10 
Spending Ministry (A) 89.5 29.1 [14.8] [14.3] 17.7 41.9 
MOSF (B) 63.1 23.3 [14.3] [9.0] 15.0 25.4 
A-B 26.4 5.8 [0.5] [5.3] 2.7 16.5 
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Differences in SABP Grades between Spending Ministries and the MOSF  
 
It will be also meaningful to examine the frequency distribution of SABP grades 
allocated by both spending ministries and the MOSF, because the budgets of 
programmes may be affected by SABP grades, according to the SABP manual. 
According to Table 3-10, an average of 95.9% of the spending ministries’ SABP grades 
were distributed between “Effective” and “Somewhat effective”, whilst an average of 
85.8% of the MOSF’s grades were concentrated in “Modest” and “Somewhat effective”. 
In particular, an average of 74.9% of spending ministries’ SABP grades was “Effective”, 
whilst an average of 64.8% of the MOSF’s grades was “Modest”. Furthermore, these 
concentrations of SABP grades allocated by both the spending ministries and the MOSF 
were similar for six years. This might imply that there were big differences not only 
between the SABP grades but also between the SABP scores allocated by spending 
ministries and the MOSF for six years.  
 
Table 3- 10 Frequency Ratio of SABP Grades from 2005 to 2010 
     (Unit: %) 
    Total Poor Modest Somewhat effective Effective 
’05 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.4 6.1 30.1 62.7 
MOSF 100.0 15.7 60.7 18.4 5.2 
’06 
Spending Ministry 100.0 1.2 4.7 27.6 66.6 
MOSF 100.0 11.3 67.2 16.3 5.2 
’07 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.0 2.9 13.8 83.2 
MOSF 100.0 5.3 58.5 24.4 11.8 
’08 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.3 2.6 8.9 88.3 
MOSF 100.0 3.4 61.5 28.1 7.0 
’09 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.0 2.6 16.5 81.0 
MOSF 100.0 4.0 60.7 33.3 2.0 
’10 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.0 3.0 23.5 73.6 
MOSF 100.0 6.3 80.0 11.0 2.7 
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’05-
’10 
Spending Ministry 100.0 0.3 3.8 21.0 74.9 
MOSF 100.0 8.2 64.8 21.0 6.0 
Source: SABP Results from 2005 to 2010 (MOSF, 2012a) 
 
3.3.5 Comparison of SABP with the PART 
 
Before discussing previous studies on the results of both SABP and the PART, this 
section now compares SABP with the PART, because the PART in the US provided 
benchmarks for SABP in Korea. The PART is a systematic tool for assessing 
programme performance, a diagnostic tool for improving programme performance, and 
an informative tool for providing performance information for budgeting (OMB, 2005). 
PART scores are based on responses in four sections – programme purpose and design 
(20%); strategic planning (10%); programme management (20%); and programme 
results (50%) – and the usual number of common questions is 25, consisting of 5-10 
questions in each section. Questions require a “Yes” or “No” answer like the SABP 
system does, and a numerical score of between 0 and 100 is converted into one of five 
grades: “Effective” (85-100); “Moderately effective” (70-84); “Adequate (50-69)”, 
“Ineffective (0-49)” and “RND (results not demonstrated)”. In particular, RND can be 
used when a programme does not have acceptable performance measures or lacks 
baseline and performance data. From 2002 to 2008, 1,015 programmes, 98% of all 
federal programmes, were assessed by the PART and the results can be seen in Table 3-
11.    
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Table 3- 11 PART Scores and Programme Effectiveness 
Programme effectiveness PART scores Number of programmes % 
Total - 1,015 100.0 
Effective 85-100 193 19.0 
Moderately Effective 70-84 326 32.1 
Adequate 50-69 297 29.3 
Ineffective 0-49 26 2.7 
Results not demonstrated (RND) - 173 17.0 
 
Source: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/about.html  
 
Differences between SABP and the PART are as follows. Firstly, SABP was introduced 
as one of four fiscal reforms operated by the administration, while the PART started 
with a common recognition by the administration and the Congress of the necessity for 
reducing public expenditure. The consensus between the administration and the 
Congress was one of the factors that contributed to the success of the PART (Dull, 
2006). Secondly, performance assessment and budget allocation in SABP is controlled 
by the Performance Management Bureau and the Budget Office within the MOSF 
respectively. However, in the PART the Resource Management Office within the OMB 
is responsible for both assessment and budget allocation. Considering the organisations 
related to performance budgeting, the PART seems to focus more on integrating 
performance results into budgeting than SABP does. However, interestingly, the extent 
to which performance results were reflected in budgeting was greater in SABP than in 
the PART, and that is one reason why the PART was not used in the Obama 
administration. Thirdly, programme types were different between the two systems. The 
types of programme on which the PART was used were: Direct Federal programmes 
(DF), Competitive Grant programmes (CO), Block/Formula Grant programmes (BF), 
Regulatory-Based programmes (RG), Capital Assets and Services Acquisition 
programmes (CA), Credit programmes (CR) and Research and Development 
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programmes (R&D). In particular, R&D programmes have been assessed separately 
from SABP since the National Science and Technology Commission (NSTC) was 
created in 2011. In addition, the weights in the PART are slightly flexible, while SABP 
weights are fixed. Finally, SABP results are applied by means of budgeting, 
performance management within the GPA, and personnel performance assessment in 
some ministries, while PART results are applied to budgeting. A summary of 
differences between SABP and the PART can be seen in Table 3-12 below.  
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Table 3- 12 Differences Between the SABP and the PART 
 
SABP PART 
▪Configu
ration 
▪ Checklist 
& 
Weight 
▪ Three sections: planning 30% 
(rationale and design 15%, 
performance planning 15%); 
management 20% and results 50% 
▪ Weights are not changeable by  
ministries and agencies 
▪ Weights of questions are not 
equal. 
▪ Questions: 12 common questions 
and 1-2 specific questions 
depending on programme types 
▪ Four sections: programme 
purpose/design 20%; strategic 
planning 10%; programme 
management 20%; and programme 
results 50% 
▪ Weights are slightly flexible up to 
the point where questions are 
answered 
▪ The weights of questions within a 
section, as a default setting, are 
equal 
▪ Questions: 25 common questions 
and 5-10 specific questions 
depending on programme types 
▪Programm
e type 
▪ Eight programme types: IT, Social    
Overhead Capital programmes 
(SOC), CA, Other Direct 
programmes, Investment 
programmes, Loan, Subsidy to 
Private Sector programmes, 
Subsidy to Local Government 
programmes 
 * R&D programmes have been 
assessed separately from the 
SABP since 2011 
▪ Seven programme types:  
Direct Federal programmes (DF); 
Competitive Grant programmes 
(CO); Block/Formula grant 
programmes (BF); Regulatory-
based programmes (RG) ; Capital 
Assets and Services Acquisition 
programmes (CA); Credit 
programmes (CR) and Research 
and Development programmes 
(R&D) 
▪ Grade 
▪ Four grades: Effective, Somewhat 
Effective, Modest and Poor 
▪ RND (results not demonstrated) is 
not allowed 
▪ Five grades: Effective, Moderately 
Effective, Adequate, Ineffective, 
RND 
▪ Related organisation 
▪ Performance Management Bureau 
within the MOSF 
 
 * Budget Office within the MOSF 
reflects SABP results in budget 
allocation 
▪ The Resource Management Office  
(RMO) within the OMB is 
responsible for both assessment 
and budget allocation 
▪ Use of performance 
information 
▪ Provides information as one of  
the key factors for budgeting. In 
particular, a “Poor” grade brings a 
10 percentage points decrease in 
budgeting 
▪ Apply SABP results to 
performance evaluation in the 
GPA (compulsory) and personnel 
performance assessment 
(voluntary) 
▪ Providing information as one of 
the key factors for budgeting 
Source: Modified Cho (2010) 
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3.4 Previous Studies and Implications  
 
Previous studies that have analysed the results of SABP and the PART have focused on 
verifying the relationship between performance budgeting and the factors which affect 
budget decision-making or performance results. However, there have been almost no 
studies focusing on the differences in performance assessment results between spending 
ministries (federal government) and the MOSF (the OMB). This section presents 
previous studies under three categories: studies on the relationship between performance 
results and budgeting; studies on factors which affect budget decision-making or 
performance results; studies on the differences between spending ministries and the 
MOSF. 
 
Firstly, Gilmour and Lewis (2005, 2006a) found, through regression analysis, that 
PART scores had a positive and statistically significant impact on recommended levels 
in the US President’s budgets for the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These results 
confirmed their hypothesis that programmes that had higher PART scores also got 
higher budgets. However, the “political content” of programmes12, such as those located 
in a “Democratic department”, appeared to produce results that differed between the FY 
2005 budget and the FY 2004 budget. Contrary to their expectations, the study of the 
FY 2005 budget showed that the budgets of programmes located in so-called 
                                                     
12 Gilmour and Lewis expressed the political content of programmes as 7 variables: belonging to 
a Democratic department; belonging to a core Democratic department; belonging to a 
department proposed for closure by the Republicans; the percentage increase in the previous 
year’s budget; and the political environment in which a programme was established 
(Democratic President, Democratic Congress, Unified government). 
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“Democratic departments” 13 were not reduced statistically significantly by the Bush 
administration. Gilmour and Lewis suggest that possible reasons for this are substantial 
collinearity among measures of political content, the possibility of less political content 
in the budget of FY 2005, inadequate political content measures, and the indirect 
impacts of these on budgets (Gilmour and Lewis, 2005). On the other hand, in the study 
of the FY 2004 budget, they found that the budgets of programmes located in 
Democratic departments increased by 1.8 percent, whilst those of other programmes 
increased by an average of 5.6 percent, and this was statistically significant. It means 
that the programmes of Democratic departments were less supported than those of 
Republican departments (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006a). In addition, they found that 
programme characteristics such as programme type, size and age could also impact on 
budget allocation (Gilmour and Lewis, 2005, 2006a). They also found, through 
regression analysis, that the PART scores of political-appointee-run programmes were 
systematically lower in most management areas than those of senior-executive-run 
programmes, indicating the necessity of considering the proper role of political 
appointees in federal programme management (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006b). According 
to the GAO’s questionnaire survey (2001), 43% of respondents answered that 
performance results played an important role in budget decision-making. However, 
Melkers and Willoughby (2001) revealed that just 39% of budgeting administration 
officers replied positively about the impact of performance results on budgeting.  
 
                                                     
13 Gilmour and Lewis classified 7 departments as democratic departments: the Department of 
Commerce; the Department of Education; the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development; the Department of Labour, the Department of Health and 
Human Services; and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
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With regard to SABP, many Korean researchers reveal that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between SABP results (score and grade) and the budget 
allocations in the three budgeting stages (request by spending ministries; proposal by 
the administration; and final decision by the National Assembly), involving many 
variables which may affect budgeting, such as programme type (direct or subsidy), 
ministry type (welfare or economy related), ministry size (ministry or agency), and 
budget size (Park, 2005, 2008; Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010). Park (2005) firstly analyses the 
relationship between SABP results and budget allocation through regression analysis. 
He finds that the SABP results for 2005 do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with the budget for FY 2005, but there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the SABP results and the budget for FY 2006, stating that this may 
be evidence that performance results are being applied to budgeting. He also extends his 
analysis into the relationship between the SABP results from 2005 to 2007 and 
budgeting, and reveals that poor grades had negative effects on all three budget stages, 
and modest grades generally had a negative correlation with budgeting (Park, 2008). 
Bang (2009) also found that SABP results had a strong relationship with budgeting in 
2005 and 2008, whilst the relationship became weak in 2006 and 2007. Also, he argues 
that SABP results are well applied to budgeting at the stage of proposals by the 
administration and at the final stage in the National Assembly, while spending 
ministries do not use SABP results actively. Moreover, he reveals that the relationships 
are negative in large budget programmes, contrary to expectations, showing that large 
programmes were restructured in order to prepare the way for an increase in funds for 
welfare expenditure from 2005 to 2008. In the case of subsidy and welfare-related 
programmes, the relationships are positive, although their SABP scores are low, 
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because members of the National Assembly are greatly interested in subsidy 
programmes and the administration pays more attention to welfare-related programmes 
than economy-related ones (Bang, 2009). In addition, Cho (2010) uses regression 
analysis to suggest that SABP results from 2006 to 2008 had statistically significant 
relationships with budget allocation in the three budgeting stages, and he states that 
some external factors, such as programme type, ministry type and budget size, affected 
budget allocation as well.   
 
Secondly, some studies have focused on examining what factors may affect budget 
allocation or performance results. Yoon (2001), through regression analysis of 27 years’ 
data, finds that a budget is decided according to the previous year’s budget, inflation 
rates and the fiscal revenues of the government. Chang and Yoon (2002) also analyse 
empirically the factors which affect budget allocation on the basis of 27 years data from 
1972 to 1998. Their analysis shows that partisan factors such as the percentage of seats 
held by the ruling party have the largest effect on budgeting, whilst other factors like 
GDP and presidential elections are not statistically significant. Kang (2007) states that 
the impact of the performance system may become greater when the performance 
objectives of an organisation are definite and concrete, performance indices are 
measureable, and the relationship between performance and budgeting is high. Kong et 
al. (2007) find that the performance planning section has more influence on SABP 
results than other sections in the checklist. Also, they argue that direct programmes 
show higher SABP scores than indirect ones, and that large programmes’ SABP scores 
are higher than those of small programmes. Park (2005) reveals that each section in the 
checklist and each programme type have a different impact on SABP results, and Bang 
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and Yoon (2006) indicate through correlation analysis that the difficulty of programmes 
and programme types might influence SABP results. Table 3-13 presents previous 
studies on the relationship between performance results and budgeting, and factors 
which may affect budget allocation or performance results.    
 
Table 3-13 Previous Studies on the Impact of Performance on Budget Decision-making 
Research
ers 
Indepe
ndent Control variables 
Dependent 
variables 
Analysis 
method Major findings 
[Analysis of performance-budgeting relationship] 
Gilmour 
& Lewis 
(2005) 
 PART 
Score, 
Section 
Democratic department 
programme, Rate of 
increase for previous 
year’s budget, Type, 
size and age of 
programme 
Government 
budget rate of 
increase  
Regression 
analysis 
(FY 2005)  
·(+)Score, section 
  → △Budget 
·(x)Political content  
  → △Budget 
Gilmour 
& Lewis 
(2006a) 
PART  
Score 
Democratic department 
programme, Rate of 
increase for previous 
year’s budget, 
Programme age 
Government 
budget rate of 
increase 
Regression 
analysis 
(FY 2004) 
·(+) Score →△Budget 
·(o) Political content→ 
      △Budget 
Park 
(2005) 
SABP 
Score, 
Grade 
Rate of increase for 
previous year’s budget  
Government 
budget rate of 
increase 
Regression, 
correlation  
(2006) 
·(+) Results→△Budget 
·(o)△Prior year→△Bud 
Park 
(2008) 
SABP 
Grade 
Rate of increase for 
previous year’s budget, 
Programme type, 
Budget and Ministry 
size 
Budget rate of 
increase (three 
stages) 
Regression 
analysis  
(’06-’07) 
·(+) Grade →△Budget 
·(o) Generally Control  
       vars. → △Budget 
Bang 
(2009) 
SABP 
Score, 
Grade, 
Section 
Welfare or economic 
related, Programme 
type and size 
Budget rate of 
increase (three 
stages) 
Regression  
and Survey  
(’05-’08) 
·(+) Results → △Budget 
·Some control variables 
affect budget changes 
Cho 
(2010) 
SABP 
Score, 
Grade, 
Section 
Welfare or economic 
related programme,  
Program type, size and 
Ministry size 
Budget rate of 
increase (three 
stages) 
Regression  
and Survey 
(’06-’08) 
·(+) Results → △Budget 
·Some control variables 
affect budget changes 
GAO 
(2001)  Score - Budgeting Survey ·43%, greatly impact 
Melkers 
et al. 
(2001) 
Score - Budgeting Survey ·39%, positive impact 
[Analysis of Factors which Affect Budgeting or SABP results] 
Yoon 
(2001) 
Previous 
year’s 
budget 
Inflation rate,  
Fiscal revenue 
Budget rate of 
increase 
Regression 
(’72-’98) 
·(o) 3 variables →   
       △Budget 
Chang 
&Yoon 
(2002) 
GDP, 
Ruling 
party’s 
seat, etc. 
Environmental factors, 
Budgeting system, 
Officers’ behaviour 
Budget rate of 
increase 
Regression 
(’72-’98) 
·(o) percentage of seats 
held by ruling  
  party → △Budget 
·(x) GDP, Presidential   
  election etc. 
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Note: (+) refers to positive relationships between variables, (o) means that there is a statistically 
significant relationship with variables, (x) means that there is no statistically significant relationship with 
variables, △Budget represents budget percentage changes (%) for the current year 
 
Thirdly, there are some studies indicating possible differences in SABP results between 
spending ministries and the MOSF, and their potential side effects. Cho (2010) states 
that spending ministries show an “optimism bias” when assessing their programme in 
advance, indicating that the self-assessment scores of spending ministries are nearly 90 
points out of 100 points and that, on average, this is 30 points higher than the review 
scores of the MOSF. Also, he mentions that the “SABP scores awarded by spending 
ministries and agencies vary little between programmes, so that they cannot provide 
useful pieces of performance information for prioritising programmes in making budget 
decisions” (Cho, 2010, p.294). Bang (2009) indicates that increases in spending 
ministries’ self-assessment scores from 86.2 points in 2005 to 91.9 in 2007 may show 
the result of “optimism bias” by spending ministries, not the result of real performance 
improvement. Moreover, optimism bias can lead to large differences in SABP results 
between spending ministries and the MOSF, and therefore they may cause problems 
when SABP results are applied to budget allocation (Bang, 2009). Park (2005) simply 
calculates the differences between the SABP results of the spending ministries and 
Kang 
(2007) - 
Programme and 
organization 
characteristics 
SABP results 
Comparative 
Case analysis, 
Interview 
·(o) Program, org. 
      → SABP results 
Kong 
et al. 
(2007) 
SABP  
section 
Programme type,  
Budget size SABP results 
Correlation  
and 
Regression  
∙ Performance planning 
section has greater impact 
·(o) Type, Size 
      → SABP results 
Park 
(2005) 
SABP  
section Programme type SABP results 
Correlation  
andRegression 
·(o) Section, Type 
      → SABP results 
Bang et 
al.(2006) - 
Difficulty, 
Programme type SABP results Correlation 
·(o) Difficulty, Type 
      → SABP results 
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those of the MOSF from the 2005 results, using the concept of “disagreement ratio14”. 
He finds that the disagreement ratio in SOC programmes is nearly 19%, higher than in 
other types of programmes, and the disagreement ratios in the performance planning 
and results sections are about 60% and 80% respectively. However, Cho (2010) and 
Bang (2009) just state the differences in SABP results through simple descriptive 
statistical analysis, and they do not analyse further the factors which affect these 
differences. Although Park (2005) calculates the specific differences by using the 
concept of disagreement ratio, he too does not carry out further analysis regarding the 
factors which might affect the disagreement ratio, and his analysis is limited to the year 
2005. 
  
These previous studies provide some useful insights for analysing the differences 
between spending ministries and the MOSF in this study. Firstly, analyses focusing on 
the relationship between performance results and budgeting are based on the premise 
that performance budgeting itself is being well implemented and its results are reliable 
and reflect the genuine performance of a programme. However, as mentioned in other 
studies, there have been high, significant and persistent differences in SABP results 
between spending ministries and the MOSF, and these raise a question about this 
assumption and the possible necessity for analysing whether SABP results represent the 
“actual” and “genuine” performance of a programme. Consequently, it is worthwhile 
analysing the process of how the final SABP results are arrived at and examining 
whether the SABP system is working well or not.  
                                                     
14 He explains that the disagreement ratio between spending ministries and the MOSF in each 
programme follows the following formula: (number of disagreeing responses / total number of 
responses in SABP checklist) x 100.  
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Secondly, the fact that there have been hardly any studies on the differences between 
the SABP results of spending ministries and those of the MOSF, even though this might 
be very important, means that feasible policy alternatives that would improve the SABP 
system have not yet been fully discussed. High, significant and persistent differences in 
SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF are surely unexpected or 
unanticipated dysfunctional consequences, especially for the MOSF, the designer of the 
SABP system. Analysing the unexpected consequences of SABP will shed a light on 
new policy implications which cannot be obtained from the analysis of expected 
consequences, because unexpected consequences have their own logics in the way they 
lead to these consequences. Creating a new policy without careful understanding or 
consideration of these logics will make the problem more complex or the effort useless 
(Lee, 2009). Consequently, this study seeks to suggest feasible policy implications for 
revising the SABP system by examining the factors which might affect the differences 
between the SABP results of spending ministries and those of the MOSF.  
 
Thirdly, specific factors which might affect the differences in SABP results can be 
drawn from previous studies on the relationship between performance results and 
budgeting, because the reason why spending ministries have an optimism bias in the 
self-assessment stage is that ultimately they want to obtain bigger budgets. Thus, factors 
which might affect budgeting in previous studies, such as the SABP score, budget 
percentage changes for the current year, programme type (direct or indirect), budget size 
of programmes, types of organisation (ministry or agency) and purpose of programmes 
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(economy-related or welfare-related), can also be used to analyse the differences in 
SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF.     
 
These implications will be specified by developing research questions, operationalising 
related variables which affect the differences in SABP results, and constructing a 
multiple regression model in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has described many countries’ actual performance budgeting systems, 
including those of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Korea, and drawn some 
useful implications for this study. Many OECD countries have utilised performance 
budgeting as an analytic tool for budget decision-making and focused on outcome-
oriented information in order to understand the real and ultimate effects of a programme. 
In addition, they have developed performance budgeting with other financial reforms 
such as top-down budgeting, programme budgeting and medium-term budgeting, and 
have mainly adopted the programme review method rather than performance indicator 
monitoring or programme evaluation. SABP in Korea, the PART in the US, the 
Strategic Programme Review in Canada and the Strategic Review in Australia are good 
examples of the programme review method. Considering these trends in performance 
budgeting among many OECD countries, the chapter has explained the SABP in detail, 
focusing especially on the differences between the SABP results of spending ministries 
and those of the MOSF. The chapter finds that these differences have been high, 
significant and persistent for six years. However, most previous studies have just 
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focused on whether the performance results affect budget allocation or what factors 
influence budgeting and performance results, on the premise that the performance 
budgeting system is operating well, and not examining specific reasons for the 
differences. Although there have been some initial studies that have shown an interest in 
the differences in SABP results, there have been almost no studies analysing the factors 
which might affect these. Therefore, the next chapter will specify and fill in the gap 
between actual policy and academic research by suggesting meaningful research 
questions and operationalising various factors which affect the differences in SABP 
results. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned earlier, most studies on SABP have analysed the relationship between 
SABP results and subsequent budget allocations, and have not focused on the process 
for arriving at SABP results. However, differences in SABP results between spending 
ministries and the MOSF seem to have been high, significant and persistent; so it is 
surely worthwhile examining these. This chapter attempts to describe appropriate 
research methodology for analysing this phenomenon. This research employs both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in order not only to explain the factors which 
might cause differences between the SABP results of spending ministries and those of 
the MOSF, through the analysis of numerical data such as six years of SABP results, but 
also to explore the existence of various dysfunctional consequences of SABP and their 
impacts on the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF through the 
analysis of qualitative data such as in-depth interviews. Moreover, the findings of both 
approaches will be discussed to suggest feasible policy alternatives that will produce a 
better SABP system.  
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The chapter begins by presenting the research objectives and the research questions 
established as a result of the review of relevant literature, and then matches the 
underlying philosophical worldviews in the research questions with the research 
methodology adopted in the study, which employs both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. Regarding the quantitative approach, the chapter defines and 
operationalises the related variables influencing the differences in SABP results, and 
constructs a model to verify the relationships between variables. With respect to the 
qualitative approach, eight budgetary programmes in three case study areas that have 
undergone SABP are examined to explore various dysfunctional consequences of SABP 
and their impacts. The chapter explains the criteria for the selection of case study areas 
and specific research methods, focusing especially on in-depth interviews with Korean 
government officials of both spending ministries and the MOSF as well as experts in 
SABP. It also includes a research process for gathering relevant data for understanding 
differing perspectives on the dysfunctional consequences of SABP among ministries.  
 
4.2 The Research Questions  
 
This section explains how the research questions were chosen and why these questions 
are important for the study. The study starts by raising questions about the effectiveness 
of the SABP system, focusing on the differences between spending ministries and the 
MOSF. If the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF have been high, 
significant and persistent, then we cannot be sure that the SABP results are reliable and 
represent the “actual” or “genuine” performance of a programme, and moreover that 
SABP has fulfilled its purposes well. From the review of relevant studies on the results 
133 
 
of SABP in Chapter 3, it was clear that few researchers had focused on the differences 
between the SABP results of the spending ministries and those of the MOSF. Most 
studies had paid attention to the relationship between SABP results and budget 
allocation (Park, 2005, 2008; Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010) and analysed the factors which 
affected budgeting or SABP results (Yoon, 2001; Chang and Yoon, 2002; Kang, 2007; 
Kong et al., 2007; Pak, 2005; Bang et al., 2006). Even where differences in SABP 
results were indicated, the analysis remained at a simple descriptive level, not 
explaining in detail the factors which might affect the differences (Bang, 2009; Cho, 
2010; Park, 2005). So, explaining these factors will provide useful insights for 
suggesting feasible policy implications for the refinement of SABP.  
 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 2, this study categorises various dysfunctional 
consequences of performance budgeting into “unintended” and “intended” ones by 
spending ministries, whilst all are “unintended” by the MOSF, based on the principal-
agent theory. According to this typology, exploring whether dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP actually exist, and what the impact of these might be on the 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF, will also shed light on 
developing feasible policy alternatives.  
 
Against this background, four research objectives are set out: 
 
 To explain the factors which affect the differences between spending 
ministries and the MOSF 
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 To examine the types of, the extent of, and the reasons for, dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP 
  
 To explore the influence of these dysfunctional consequences of SABP on 
spending ministries’ self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores 
 
 To suggest the role of spending ministries and the MOSF in improving the 
SABP system 
 
Accordingly, the main research questions are: 
 
(1) What are the factors which affect the differences in SABP results between 
spending ministries and the MOSF? 
 
(2) What are the types of, extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP? 
 
(3) How do these dysfunctional consequences impact on both spending ministries’ 
self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores? 
 
(4) How can the SABP system in Korea be improved and refined? 
 
These questions are explored using actual SABP results and previous studies on 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the public sector. The first 
research question is closely related to the quantitative approach, focusing on whether 
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factors within the SABP system, such as the MOSF’s review scores, budget percentage 
changes to programmes, programme types, the budget size of programmes and the types 
of organisation involved, can impact on the differences in SABP results which are 
mentioned in Chapter 3, by employing numerical data drawn from SABP results for six 
years. Examining these factors will lead to a more complete understanding of 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP and, along with exploration of the qualitative 
research questions discussed below, will help to draw out useful policy implications for 
revising the SABP system.  
 
The second research question takes a qualitative approach and explores whether various 
dysfunctional consequences, “unintended” and “intended” by spending ministries but all 
“unintended” by the MOSF, as mentioned in Chapter 2, actually exist in the SABP 
system, and if they do, what their extent is and what the reasons for them are. It does 
this by looking at eight programmes in three case study areas. The second research 
question is important because the answers will indicate whether, and to what extent, 
SABP has actually been exposed to the various dysfunctional consequences described in 
many existing studies of performance budgeting in the public sector (Kelman and 
Friedman, 2009; Bevan and Hood, 2006; de Bruijn, 2002; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; 
Smith, 1995; LeGrand and Bartlett, 1993; Bouckaert and Balk, 1991).  
 
As an extension of the second research question, the third research question is designed 
to explore the impact of these dysfunctional consequences, focusing especially on 
spending ministries’ optimism bias in the self-assessment stage and the MOSF’s drastic 
cutting of spending ministries’ results. This question is important because, by 
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examining the relationship between dysfunctional consequences of SABP and both 
spending ministries’ and the MOSF’s SABP scores, we can develop a deeper 
understanding of the cause of differences between spending ministries and the MOSF.  
 
The last research question is the most important and is intended to generate information 
that is likely to have useful policy implications for refining and enhancing the SABP 
system in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of budgetary programmes in 
Korea. This question elicits the fact that the most important thing in performance 
budgeting is not the existence of dysfunctional consequences but the possibility of 
feasible policies to solve them. Also, it suggests that policy makers should be cautious 
when it comes to designing and refining the performance budgeting system.  
 
4.3 The Selection of a Research Design 
 
4.3.1 Philosophical Worldview and Research Approach 
 
Research methodology and research methods should be in line with the researcher’s 
philosophical worldview or paradigm (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2011; Grix, 2010; Namkoong, 2010), and they are designed to provide 
proper data to address the research questions and objectives (Yin, 2009). Creswell takes 
the term “worldview” to mean “a general orientation about the world and the nature of 
research that a researcher holds” (Creswell, 2009, p.6), and other researchers have 
referred to these ideas as “paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970) or “epistemologies” or “ontologies” 
(Archer, 1988). Bryman (1988, p.4) defines a paradigm as “a cluster of beliefs and 
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dictates which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied; 
how research should be done; [and] how results should be interpreted”; and Archer 
(1988, p.273) states that epistemology is related to “the nature of knowledge” and 
ontology is associated with “the nature of reality”. Creswell (2009) divides researchers’ 
worldviews into four categories: postpositivist, constructivist15, advocacy/participatory, 
and pragmatist. According to Creswell (2009, pp.7-10), postpositivists focus on 
assessing cause and outcomes based on a deterministic philosophy, for example, in 
experiments; constructivists look for “the participants’ views of the situation being 
studied”; an advocacy/participatory worldview is interested in “an action agenda for 
reform that may change the lives of the participants”; and pragmatism “emphasises the 
research problem and uses all approaches available to understand  the problem and it 
applies to mixed methods research in that inquirers draw liberally from both 
quantitative and qualitative assumptions”. He also indicates that quantitative approaches 
are more closely related to postpositivists’ philosophical assumptions, qualitative 
approaches tend to employ constructivist or advocacy/participatory assumptions, and 
mixed methods approaches apply pragmatic assumptions. Similarly, Bryman (2008) and 
Grix (2010) state that quantitative research is more concerned with positivism and 
objectivism (the foundationalist’s assumption) whilst qualitative research is more 
related to interpretivism and constructivism (the anti-foundationalist’s assumption).  
 
                                                     
15 Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of the 
natural sciences to the study of social reality, whilst interpretivism is a contrasting epistemology 
to positivism and requires social scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action. 
Objectivism is an ontological position that implies that social phenomena can and should be 
considered objective entities, external to social actors, while constructivism considers that social 
phenomena are continually being accomplished by social actors (Bryman, 2008, pp.13-23). 
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With respect to the possibility of a mixed approach, there are two main versions of this 
kind of approach (Bryman, 2008, p.606): an epistemological version and a technical 
version. From an epistemological point of view, mixed methods research is not possible 
because quantitative and qualitative approaches are considered to be grounded in 
incompatible epistemological principles. The technical version, however, focuses on the 
greater strength of mixed methods research when it comes to collecting and analysing 
data. It too recognises that quantitative and qualitative approaches are based on 
“distinctive epistemological and ontological assumptions”; but it emphasises the 
flexible connections between these. It states that “mixed methods research becomes 
both feasible and desirable” (ibid, p.606) and “has become unexceptional and 
unremarkable in recent years” (Bryman, 2006, p.97) although some researchers express 
unease about this position (Buchanan, 1992; Pawson and Tilly, 1997). The definition of 
mixed methods research has been changed from mixing two methods to mixing in all 
phases of the research process (e.g., mixing philosophical positions, inferences and the 
interpretations of results) (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). King et al. (2001) indicate 
that the differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches only relate to style 
and technical methods, and they are not methodologically and substantively important. 
Also, Namkoong (2010) states that if the differences between two approaches lie in 
research methods they can be used complementarily for explaining and exploring one 
phenomenon. Greene et al. (1989, p. 256) define mixed method designs as “those that 
include at least one quantitative method (designed to collect numbers) and one 
qualitative method (designed to collect words), where neither type of method is 
inherently linked to any particular inquiry paradigm”. Also, Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(1998, p.ix) define mixed methods as “the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
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approaches in the methodology of a study”. However, this study makes no further 
attempts to discuss methodological issues such as whether mixed methods are possible 
or to what extent combining quantitative and qualitative research is desirable. Instead, it 
seeks to develop an appropriate research design for addressing the research objectives 
and research questions on the premise that it is possible to apply both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in order to explain and understand one phenomenon more 
completely and comprehensively under a pragmatic worldview.  
 
4.3.2 Research Design of the Study 
 
The objectives of the study are both to explain the factors which affect the differences in 
SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF by employing a quantitative 
approach and to explore dysfunctional consequences of SABP and their impacts on 
these differences based on a qualitative approach, in order to suggest feasible policy 
alternatives for reducing the differences and preventing dysfunctional consequences. In 
other words, these aims include not only verifying the relationships between some 
factors and the differences between the SABP results produced by spending ministries 
and those of the MOSF but also understanding the subjective meanings of government 
officials’ perceptions, beliefs and behaviours. These objectives are in line with a 
pragmatic philosophical worldview and this approach does not “mix” the different 
philosophical worldviews, but uses an umbrella paradigm such as “pragmatism” for the 
study (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). Under the assumptions of pragmatism, the 
focus of the research is on the consequences of study, on the use of multiple methods as 
well as different forms of data collection and analysis, and on “what” and “how” to 
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research (Creswell, 2009; Cherryholmes, 1992; Morgan, 2007). By employing both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, the study can bring a more thorough account 
and mutual corroboration of the existence of, and the reasons for, the differences 
between spending ministries’ results and those of the MOSF in the SABP system. 
Moreover, quantitative and qualitative approaches can answer different research 
questions and enhance the integrity of findings, and therefore combining two 
approaches will give a more useful insight to policy makers who want to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of SABP (Greene et al., 1989; Bryman, 2006).  
 
In this sense, the first research question is related to the quantitative approach while the 
second and third research questions are associated with the qualitative approach, and the 
last research question is linked with both approaches. As a result, data collection and 
data analysis are to be implemented separately and concurrently, with equal priority, by 
employing quantitative and qualitative analytic procedures up to the point where 
conclusions are drawn during the overall interpretation. The main source for 
quantitative data is six years of numerical results for SABP, while the sources for 
qualitative data are document analysis, archival records analysis and, particularly, in-
depth interviews. Against this background, the rest of this chapter will describe the 
quantitative and the qualitative approaches used in detail.  
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4.4 Quantitative Approach 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this section is to address the first research question, and to obtain useful 
insights for suggesting feasible policy alternatives. That is, this section will examine the 
factors which affect differences between spending ministries and the MOSF by 
employing various kinds of statistical methods (e.g., correlation analysis, t-test, 
ANOVA, regression analysis). More specifically, the study examines potential factors, 
such as MOSF review score, budget percentage change, programme type, budget size of 
programme and purpose of programme, which might affect these differences. Thus, the 
dependent variable is the differences in SABP results between spending ministries and 
the MOSF, which will be operationalised later. Also, as shown by many previous 
studies on SABP results, variables which are internally related to the differences can be 
treated as independent variables, and variables which are externally related to the 
differences can be dealt with as control variables. In this sense, the study sets “MOSF’s 
review score” and “specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the spending 
ministry’s average score in that year” as independent variables; and it divides control 
variables into budget process-related factors, programme-characteristics-related factors 
and policy/politics-related factors. Budget percentage change for the current year can be 
taken as the first group; programme type (direct or indirect), budget size (small or large), 
and type of organisation (ministry or agency) can be taken as the second group; and 
purpose of programme (economy- or social welfare-related) and the number of SABP 
implementations on programmes can be taken as the third group. The next section 
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firstly operationalises the dependent, independent and control variables and explains 
their meanings for the study; it then constructs a model for analysing the relationships 
between various factors and difference in SABP results; and finally it explains the 
methods of data collection and data analysis.         
 
4.4.2 Definitions and Meanings of Variables 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
① Disagreement ratio (DR) 
 
The differences in SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF can be 
measured by compiling the “disagreement ratio of responses in the SABP checklist” for 
each programme. As mentioned in Section 3.4, Park (2005) applies this concept to 
assess differences in SABP results and operationalises it in the following formula: 
(number of disagreeing responses / total number of responses in SABP checklist) x 100 
in each programme. Table 4-1 illustrates simply how the disagreement ratio can be 
calculated for each programme. If there are five questions in the SABP checklist for a 
programme and three of these five questions are answered differently by spending 
ministries and the MOSF, then the disagreement ratio of this programme is 60% 
(3/5*100). This variable therefore captures all the differences in responses between 
spending ministries and the MOSF. In particular, it does not differentiate between a Q2 
or Q3 situation (in which the spending ministry answers “Yes” but the MOSF answers 
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“No”) and a Q4 situation (where the spending ministry answers “No” but the MOSF 
answers “Yes”).  
 
 
Table 4-1 How to Calculate Disagreement Ratio (Example) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No No 
 
Consequently, the DR does not consider the opposite meanings represented by a Q2 or 
Q3 situation (or, as we call it, a “Yes but No” type disagreement) and a Q4 situation (a 
“No but Yes” type disagreement), although the two different types of disagreements can 
be influenced in different directions by the independent and control variables, which 
will be explained later. Thus, we need to consider another type of DR, as discussed 
below, reflecting the opposite meaning of two types of disagreement between spending 
ministries and the MOSF.  
 
② Relative Optimism Ratio of Spending Ministries (ROR) 
 
In order to consider the opposite meanings of a  “Yes but No” type disagreement and a 
“No but Yes” type disagreement, we can give an opposite sign to each disagreement e.g., 
+1 and -1 respectively, and then we can extract other kinds of dependent variable. The 
study calls this variable a “relative optimism ratio (ROR) of spending ministries” and 
focuses more on this variable, because it can represent the opposite implications of two 
types of disagreement for diverse independent and control variables. Table 4-2 shows 
how the ROR of a spending ministry can be calculated for each programme and the 
ROR of this programme is 20% (+1+1-1/5*100). 
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Table 4-2 How to Calculate the Relative Optimism Ratio of a Spending Ministry (Example) 
Q1 Q2 (+1) Q3 (+1) Q4 (-1) Q5 
Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF Spending MOSF 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No No 
 
By comparing the impacts of diverse variables on two kinds of dependent variables (DR 
and ROR), the study can give more comprehensive explanations of the relationships 
between variables. The total number of responses for 2,920 programmes to the SABP 
checklist is 42,648. Spending ministries and the MOSF answered differently on 11,515 
of these responses, so the DR for six years is 27.0%. The average DR in the first SABP 
cycle, from 2005 to 2007, is 25.4%, while that for the second cycle, from 2008 to 2010, 
is 29.9%. On the other hand, among the 11,515 responses, 10,443 (90.7%) are “Yes but 
No” type responses and 1,072 (9.3%) are “No but Yes” type. Thus, the ROR for six 
years is 22.0%. In addition, the ROR in the first cycle is 20.9% while that in the second 
cycle is 24.2%. Interestingly, at first glance it seems that the differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF have not been reduced even though SABP has been 
implemented several times. However, specific relationships between the number of 
SABP implementation and the DR or ROR will be explained later. The details of the 
DR and ROR for each year are presented in Table 4-3 below.  
 
Table 4-3 Number of Responses to the SABP Checklist, the DR and ROR 
(Unit: number of programme and responses, %) 
 
First SABP cycle Second SABP cycle Six 
years  ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 
Number of programmes 555 577 585 384 346 473 2,920 
Total number of responses 8,353 9,840 9,396 4,992 3,806 6,281 42,648 
Number of different responses 2,081 2,612 2,335 1,640 1,100 1,747 11,515 
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Number of “Yes but No” type 
1,947 
(93.6) 
2,324 
(89.0) 
2,127 
(91.1) 
1,484 
(90.5) 
1,019 
(92.6) 
1,542 
(88.3) 
10,443 
(90.7) 
Number of “No but Yes” type 
134 
(6.4) 
288 
(11.0) 
208 
(8.9) 
156 
(9.5) 
81 
(7.4) 
205 
(11.7) 
1,072 
(9.3) 
DR (disagreement ratio) 
24.9 26.5 24.9 32.9 28.9 27.8 27.0 
25.4 29.9 27.0 
ROR (relative optimism ratio) 
21.7 20.7 20.4 26.6 24.6 21.3 22.0 
20.9 24.2 22.0 
  
Note: Ratios for each year are reported in parentheses.  
 
In addition, Table 4-4 shows the ROR of each section of SABP for both the first cycle 
(from 2005 to 2007) and the second cycle (from 2008 to 2010) of SABP. In both cycles 
the ROR is mainly from the performance planning and results sections. The ROR from 
the performance planning and results sections over the six years is 34.85% and 38.15% 
respectively. 
 
Table 4-4 Relative Optimism Ratio of Each Section in SABP 
(Unit: %) 
        
SABP 
section 
Planning  
(Rationale and design) 
Planning 
(Performance planning) Management Results 
Whole 
section 
Six years 1.93 34.85 14.82 38.15 22.44 
’05-’07 1.88 33.06 13.23 35.21 20.85 
’08-’10 1.95 36.67 16.49 41.03 24.04 
 
Note: The ROR between Tables 4-3 and 4-4 may be a little different due to the round-off point. 
 
The ROR for the performance planning section during the first cycle is 33.06%, while 
during the second cycle it is 36.67%, and the ROR for the results section during the first 
cycle is 35.21%, while during the second cycle it is 41.03%. Thus, we see that the ROR 
for both the performance planning and the results sections seems not to have fallen, 
although SABP has been implemented several times, and therefore the analysis will 
provide more useful information if it is divided between the first cycle and the second 
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cycle of SABP. Moreover, from the fact that most of the ROR can be explained by the 
ROR for the performance planning and results sections, we can also see that it will be 
more meaningful if the ROR is examined by dividing it into the ROR for the 
performance planning section, that for the results section and that for the whole section. 
These divisions can be applied to the analysis of the DR as well. Consequently, 
dependent variables of the study are “the DR in performance planning, results and the 
whole section” and “the ROR in performance planning, results and the whole section” 
based on two time frames, the first and the second cycles of SABP. 
 
Independent Variables and Their Meanings 
 
As mentioned earlier, factors which might affect the DR and ROR can be divided into 
two categories: factors related internally to differences between spending ministries and 
the MOSF; and factors related externally. The former can be independent variables, 
while the latter can be treated as control variables. Taking into account variables used in 
previous studies, as discussed in Section 3.4, the study sets “SABP score of the MOSF” 
and “specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the spending ministry’s average 
score in that year (specific score minus average score)” as the independent variables.  
 
The first independent variable is the “SABP score of the MOSF”. The MOSF reviews 
spending ministries’ self-assessment scores and gives a score from 0 to 100 points while 
weighting the rationale and design, performance planning, management and results 
sections at 15, 15, 20 and 50 points respectively. The relationship between this variable 
and the DR and ROR can determine whether there has indeed been optimism bias by a 
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spending ministry in the self-assessment stage and whether this has persisted. As for the 
DR, for example, if spending ministries have given about 90 points to nearly all their 
programmes in the self-assessment stage, the possibility of disagreement between 
spending ministries and the MOSF becomes higher as the MOSF’s review score 
becomes lower. However, if spending ministries have self-assessed their programmes 
strictly and objectively, like the MOSF, then it is not clear whether the DR becomes 
higher when the MOSF review score becomes lower, because there is a possibility that 
spending ministries have given low self-assessment scores when the MOSF review 
score is low. Thus, it can be expected that if there has been a high and persistent 
optimism bias by spending ministries in the self-assessment stage, the MOSF review 
score may have a “negative relationship” with the DR. With respect to the relationship 
between this variable and the ROR, if there has been high and persistent optimism bias 
by spending ministries in the self-assessment stage, the probability of a ”Yes but No” 
type disagreement becomes higher, and that of a “No but Yes” type disagreement 
becomes lower, when the MOSF review score becomes lower. Both these situations will 
lead to increasing the ROR of spending ministries. However, if there has been no high 
and persistent optimism bias by spending ministries in the self-assessment stage, we 
cannot be sure whether the ROR becomes higher when the MOSF review score 
becomes lower. Consequently, it can be expected that if there has been high and 
consistent optimism bias by spending ministries in the self-assessment stage, then the 
MOSF review score may have a “negative relationship” with the ROR. 
 
The second independent variable is “specific score minus average score”. The 
relationship between this variable and the DR and ROR can determine whether there 
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has indeed been drastic cutting by the MOSF of a spending ministry’s generous self-
assessment score or whether the MOSF has not drastically cut a spending ministry’s 
already tight self-assessment score. That is, if this variable is positive and becomes 
larger, it means that a spending ministry assesses a specific programme more 
generously than its other programmes. In this situation, two possibilities can be 
hypothesised: the first case is that the MOSF drastically cuts the spending ministry’s 
generous self-assessment score; and the second case is that the MOSF does not cut it 
drastically. In the former case, the DR becomes higher. Also, the ROR becomes higher, 
because the probability of a “Yes but No” type response increases, while that of a “No 
but Yes” type response decreases, and both will lead to a higher ROR. However, in the 
latter case it is not clear whether the DR and ROR become higher or not. Thus, it can be 
expected that this variable is likely to vary “positively” with both the DR and the ROR 
when the MOSF is drastically cutting a spending ministry’s generous self-assessment 
results.  
 
On the other hand, if this variable is negative and becomes smaller, it means that the 
spending ministry assesses a specific programme more tightly than its other 
programmes. In this situation, we can also hypothesise two possible cases, as above: the 
first case is that the MOSF does not drastically cut the spending ministry’s self-
assessment score; and the second case is that the MOSF does drastically cut it. In the 
former case, the DR becomes lower; and, the ROR also becomes lower, because the 
possibility of a “Yes but No” type response decreases, while that of a “No but Yes” type 
response increases, and both will lead the ROR to be lower. However, in the latter case 
it is not certain whether the DR and ROR become lower or not. As a result, it can be 
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expected that this variable may have a “positive relationship” with both the DR and the 
ROR if the MOSF does not drastically cut a tight self-assessment score by the spending 
ministry.  
 
The one thing which needs to be noted is that spending ministries’ self-assessment 
scores and the MOSF’s review scores do not influence each other. For example, the 
MOSF does not decide its review scores after considering spending ministries’ self-
assessment scores. In other words, spending ministries and the MOSF decide their 
scores independently and behave independently. There might, of course, be a correlation 
between spending ministries’ self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores, but 
this is not the result of influence between the two kinds of score. Consequently, “the 
MOSF review score” and “specific score minus average score” can be used as 
independent variables for the DR and ROR without any simultaneity bias 16  in the 
regression analysis.  
 
Control Variables and Their Meanings 
 
Other factors, such as budget changes for the current year, programme type, budget size 
of programme, type of organisation, purpose of programme and the number of SABP 
implementations on programmes, can also have an external effect on differences in 
SABP scores. If differences between the SABP scores of spending ministries and those 
the MOSF are more likely to be influenced by these factors than by internal factors, 
then we need to consider the impact of these factors when it comes to interpreting the 
                                                     
16 Simultaneity arises when one or more of the independent variables are jointly determined with 
the dependent variable, typically through an equilibrium mechanism. 
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relationship between independent and dependent variables. Therefore, the analysis 
model needs to control these factors so that they do not affect interpretation of the 
relationship between independent and dependent variables in the results of regression 
analysis later. In particular, the study categorises these variables into three groups for 
the convenience of analysis: budget-process-related factor (budget changes for the 
current year), programme-characteristics-related factors (programme type, budget size 
of programme, type of organisation), and policy/politics-related factors (purpose of 
programme, the number of SABP implementations on programmes).  
 
(1) Budget-process-related factor: Budget percentage changes for the current year 
 
Both spending ministries and the MOSF consider each programme’s budget changes in 
the self-assessment and review stages of SABP because SABP results affect the 
programme’s budget allocation. Budget percentage changes for the current year can be 
expressed in the following equation: for example, in the budget year 2010, budget 
percentage changes are [(2010 programme budgets - 2009 programme budgets) / 2009 
programme budgets] * 100. If the budget change for the current year is low, then the 
spending ministry has a tendency to obtain a larger budget in the following year, and 
this tendency might lead to increasing disagreement between the spending ministry and 
the MOSF as well as to “Yes but No” type responses. On the other hand, if the budget 
change for the current year is low, then the MOSF might regard this programme’s 
feasibility as low, and this tendency might lead to not only increasing disagreement 
between the spending ministry and the MOSF but also increasing “Yes but No” type 
responses and decreasing “No but Yes” type responses. Thus, if the budget changes for 
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the current year are low, then both the DR and the ROR might increase. Consequently, 
this variable might have negative relationships with both the DR and the ROR.   
 
(2) Programme-characteristics-related factors 
 
① Programme type: Direct and indirect programmes 
 
According to the SABP manual, all budgetary programmes are categorised into eight 
types: (1) IT system programmes; (2) Social Overhead Capital programmes; (3) Capital 
Acquisition programmes; (4) Subsidy to Private Sector programmes; (5) Subsidy to 
Local Government programmes; (6) Loan programmes; (7) Investment programmes; (8) 
Other Direct programmes (MOSF, 2010a). However, as mentioned earlier, this study 
employs seven types, excluding IT system programmes, in order to maintain the 
consistency and comparability of data, because IT system programmes were 
incorporated into SABP after 2008. Direct programmes managed directly by central 
government include three types of programmes (Social Overhead Capital, Capital 
Acquisition, and Other Direct programmes), whilst indirect programmes implemented 
by other organisations contain four types of programmes (Subsidy to Private Sector, 
Subsidy to Local government, Loan, and Investment programmes). Programme 
characteristics such as whether a programme is direct or indirect might also affect the 
DR and ROR. Spending ministries generally focus on obtaining larger budgets for direct 
programmes which they can manage directly, through which they can exert more 
influence on society and interested groups, and which are more related to their own 
power and interests. On the other hand, indirectly managed programmes, such as those 
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dealing with subsidies to the private sector and local government, generally have a 
complex implementation process17 as well as a high level of difficulty level in their 
execution, and these programmes are less related to spending ministries’ own direct 
interests. Considering these tendencies of spending ministries, it can be expected that 
directly managed programmes might have positive relationships with both the DR and 
the ROR.     
 
② Budget size of programmes: Small and large programmes 
 
Programmes can be grouped according to their budget size and this study uses the 
concept of quartiles. Kong et al. (2007), Bang (2009) and Cho (2010) also divided 
budgetary programmes into four quartiles based on the median. This study divides 
programmes into four groups on the basis of programme budgets for the budget year t 
and the median is 8.3bn Won18. Programmes in the first quartile are less than 2.4bn 
Won, those in the second are from 2.4 to 8.3bn Won, those in the third are from 8.3 to 
32.3bn Won, and those in the fourth are over 32.3bn Won. Small programmes are 
placed in the first quartile whilst large programmes are in the fourth quartile. Generally, 
spending ministries pay more attention to programmes with large budgets than to those 
with small ones, because large budget size programmes are in many cases closely 
related to important policies, so high level government officials tend to be more 
concerned with them. Moreover, spending ministries’ middle and low level officials 
                                                     
17 General process of indirect programme: announcement  selection of suitable trustees  
decision about matching ratio of funds  confirmation of specific programme plan  budget 
distribution to trustees  implementation; general process of direct programme: announcement 
 selection of trustees  budget distribution  implementation 
18 The Won is the unit of Korean money. 1,000 Korean Won is equivalent to nearly 0.60 UK 
pounds, as of February 2013.    
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worry about being regarded as incompetent if they fail to obtain large budgets for large 
programmes, because the MOSF tends to secure budgets for the presidential agenda, 
and for programmes the ministers and the National Assembly are interested in, by 
cutting from programmes with large budgets rather than from many small programmes. 
Also, in order to change budget structures more efficiently, the MOSF focuses on 
adjusting programmes with a large budget, not programmes with small ones. Given this 
background, it might be expected that programmes with small budgets might have 
negative relationships with both the DR and the ROR, whilst programmes with large 
budgets might have positive relationships with both the DR and the ROR. 
 
③ Type of organisation: Ministry and agency programmes  
 
The type of organisation by which programmes are implemented might also affect the 
DR and ROR. In general ministry programmes are more policy-oriented, complex and 
important than those of agencies. Agencies’ programmes are simpler and more process-
oriented. Thus, it is possible that the DR and ROR might be higher in ministry 
programmes than in those of agencies, and it might be expected that ministry 
programmes would have positive relationships with both the DR and the ROR.  
 
(3) Policy/Politics-related factors 
 
① Purpose of programme: Economy-related and welfare-related programmes 
 
Economy-related programmes (Group 1) are operationalised by economy-related 
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ministries’ programmes and social welfare-related programmes (Group 2) mainly by 
welfare-related ministries’ programmes. As regards the classification of government 
expenditures, there is the UN’s classification of the functions of government (COFOG), 
based on government expenditure purposes: general public services, defence, public 
order and safety, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing and community 
amenities, recreation, culture and religion, health, education, and social protection. 
Although economic or welfare expenditures are generally classified according to the 
UN’s COFOG, this study also regards the related ministries’ programmes as one of 
these two types, because classifying 2,920 programmes into one of two kinds of 
programme on the basis of COFOG is almost impossible (Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010). 
With respect to Group 1, there are programmes belonging to eight ministries for 
economic affairs (the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce and Energy, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, and the Small and Medium Business 
Administration) (Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010). Group 2 includes the programmes of four 
ministries for health and social protection (the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the 
Ministry of Labour, the Ministry for Gender Equality, and the Commission for Youth) 
(Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010). Gilmore and Lewis (2006) also group programmes on the 
basis of “what department is responsible for the programme” to analyse the impact of 
the political content of programmes on budget allocation. The budgets of both 
economy-related and welfare-related programmes have been influenced by the policies 
or politics of administrations. The Korean Government has concentrated on developing 
its economy for several decades, so a greater share of the budget has been spent on 
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economy-related programmes. However, after the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s the Korean Government realised the necessity for building a stronger social 
safety net. Since then, welfare-related programmes’ budgets have for many years 
increased at a faster rate than that of budgets as a whole, and this trend has been 
particularly strengthened since 2003, putting an emphasis on the construction of social 
welfare programmes. Consequently, during the period the study focuses on, welfare-
related programmes’ budgets have increased continuously, while economy-related 
programmes’ budgets have decreased. Considering these structural reforms of public 
expenditures, welfare-related programmes might be less affected by SABP results than 
economy-related programmes. This means that the DR and ROR in welfare-related 
programmes might be low, whereas those in economy-related programmes might be 
high. As a result, it might be said that economy-related programmes have positive 
relationships with both the DR and the ROR, whilst welfare-related programmes have 
negative relationships with both the DR and the ROR.          
 
② Number of SABP implementations on programmes 
 
Another possible control variable related to the policy or politics of administrations is 
the number of SABP implementations on programmes. From 2005 to 2010, of 2,920 
programmes, 2,451 were evaluated by SABP once, 425 programmes twice, and 44 
programmes three times. The distribution of programmes evaluated by SABP two or 
more times is shown in Table 4-5. Among 469 programmes, the number of programmes 
evaluated two or more times in the first cycle of SABP is 51 whilst the number in the 
second cycle is 418. This means that most of the programmes were assessed by SABP 
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once in the first cycle (the proportion of programmes assessed by SABP two or more 
times is just 2.4%) while a much greater number of programmes were assessed two or 
more times in the second cycle (34.7%). Considering the learning effect on spending 
ministries, it might be expected that if the number of times SABP is implemented 
increases, then the DR and ROR might become lower. As a result, it might be said that 
the number of SABP implementations has a negative relationships with both the DR and 
the ROR.      
 
 
Table 4-5 Distribution of Programmes Assessed by SABP Two or More Times 
(Unit: number of programmes) 
Number of times 
SABP implemented 
05 06 07 08 09 10 
Total 
The first cycle The second cycle 
Twice 1
st 165 136 113 9 2  425 
2nd   31 144 119 131 425 
Three 
times 
1st 18 18 8    44 
2nd   20 13 11  44 
3rd    3 6 35 44 
 
4.4.3 Constructing a Model: Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
An analysis framework to verify the above relationships can be expressed with the 
multiple regression model shown in Table 4-6 below. While the analysis period is the 
six years from 2005 to 2010, the model uses two time frames – the first cycle (2005-
2007) and the second cycle (2008-2010) – in order to compare the findings of the two 
cycles. Dependent variables are represented by Yijt (i = 1 is DR, i = 2 is ROR; j = 1 is 
the performance planning section, j = 2 is the results section, j = 3 is the whole section; t 
= 1 is the first SBAP cycle, t = 2 is the second SABP cycle, t = 3 is the six-year period). 
“SABP score of the MOSF” and “specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the 
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spending ministry’s average score in that year”, the independent variables, are 
represented by X1t and X2t respectively. A control variable which has ratio scale 
measurement is expressed as X3t (budget percentage changes for the current year) and 
control variables which have nominal scale measurement are indicated by dummy 
variables from D1 to D7. Dummy variables are coded into (1,0) by using the 
operationalised concepts. The programme type variable (X4) is programmes directly 
managed by government (D1); the programme budget size variable (X5) is programmes 
with small budgets (D2) and those with large budgets (D3); the characteristics of the 
organisation (X6) variable is programmes belonging to a ministry (D4); the purpose of 
programme variable (X7) is programmes related to the economy (D5) and programmes 
related to social welfare (D6); and the number of SABP implementations variable (X8) is 
programmes assessed by SABP two or more times (D7). α is the constant, meaning the 
intercept of the Y axis; and β is the unstandardised coefficients in the multiple linear 
regression equation. ε denotes an error term.  
 
Table 4-6 Analytical Model for Verifying the Factors which Affect the DR and ROR 
 
Yijt = α + β1X1t + β2X2t + (β3X3t + β4D1 + β5D2 + β6D3 + β7D4 + β8D5 + β9D6 + β10D7 ) + ε 
 
<Independent variables> 
■ X1t: SABP score of the MOSF at t 
■ X2t: Specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the spending ministry’s 
average score at t (specific score minus average score) 
 
<Control variables> 
■ X3t: Budget percentage changes in the current year  
■ Programme type (X4): 
(D1) programmes managed directly by government (direct programmes 1, others 0) 
■ Budget size of programme (X5): 
(D2) small programmes (small programmes 1, others 0) 
(D3) large programmes (large programmes 1, others 0) 
■ Characteristics of organisation (X6) 
(D4) programmes belonging to a ministry (ministry programmes 1, others 0) 
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■ Purpose of programme (X7) 
(D5) programmes related to the economy (economy-related programmes 1, others 0) 
(D6) programmes related to social welfare (welfare-related programmes 1, others 0) 
■ The number of SABP implementations (X8) 
      (D7) programmes assessed by SABP two or more times (two or more times 1, others 0)      
 
<Dependent variables> 
■ Yijt: Differences in SABP score between spending ministries and the MOSF 
   (i = 1 is DR, i = 2 is ROR; j = 1 is performance planning section, j = 2 is results section,  
j = 3 is whole section; t = 1 is the first SBAP cycle, t = 2 is the second SABP cycle, t = 3 is 
six years) 
 
<Others> 
■ α and β are the constant and unstandardized coefficients respectively in multiple linear  
regression equation  
■ ε denotes an error term 
 
 
The grounds for variables and their scales can be seen in Table 4-7 below. Dependent 
variables use a ratio scale because they are “the disagreement ratio between spending 
ministries and the MOSF” and “the relative optimism ratio of spending ministries”. Two 
independent variables are expressed with SABP scores, so they also use a ratio scale. 
Among eight control variables, budget percentage change for the current year is 
represented by a ratio scale while the other seven control variables use nominal scales as 
dummy variables.  
 
Table 4-7 Grounds for Variables and their Scale of Measurement 
Category Name of variable Scale Coding Ground 
Independent variable 
- (X1t) SABP score of the MOSF 
- (X2t) Specific programme’s 
score minus average score of the 
spending ministry in that year 
ratio 
ratio 
score 
score 
gap 
Gilmour & 
Lewis (2005, 
2006a), Park 
(2005, 2008), 
Bang (2009), 
Cho (2010), 
Chang&Yoon 
(2002), Kong 
Control 
variable 
Budget process - (X3t) Budget percentage changes ratio ratio 
Programme 
characteristics 
- (D1) Direct programmes 
- (D2) Small programmes 
- (D3) Large programmes 
- (D4) Ministry programmes 
nomi
nal 
1,0 
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Policy related 
- (D5) Economy related  
- (D6) Welfare related 
- (D7) SABP two or more times 
nomi
nal 1,0 
et al. (2007), 
Yoon (2001) 
Dependent variable - (Yijt) DR and ROR ratio - 
 
4.4.4 Data Collection 
 
The data employed in this study are the SABP results of 2,920 programmes for 49 
central government departments and agencies from 2005 and 2010. Since a third of all 
the programmes of each ministry (including agencies) are assessed by SABP, SABP has 
a three-year cycle. Thus, the data from 2005 to 2010 include two SABP cycles. The 
study collected SABP results data through the websites of the MOSF, the KIPF, 
spending ministries and the National Assembly. In particular, the MOSF, the controller 
and designer of the SABP system, has published SABP data since 2005. Therefore, the 
MOSF and other organisations’ websites all initially contributed to collecting the SABP 
results applied in the study. In addition, when it came to analysing specific differences 
between spending ministries and the MOSF, for example, counting the number of “Yes 
but No” type and “No but Yes” type responses in each programme, the official data 
published on the websites were not sufficient, so the study also used internal data from 
the MOSF with the help of MOSF officials. Data including SABP scores, SABP grades 
and budgets in each year were recorded using the Excel programme, in order to make it 
easy to analyse them through econometric analysis. Data related to programme type, 
programme budget size, characteristics of organisations, purpose of programme and the 
number of SABP implementation were collected by categorisation of the SABP results 
or descriptive statistical analysis such as four quartiles based on the median.  
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4.4.5 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis was carried out using the following procedures. Firstly, the dependent, 
independent and control variables relating to the differences between spending 
ministries and the MOSF were extracted from both the descriptive statistical analysis 
and the review of relevant literature. Descriptive analysis was employed to compare the 
trends of SABP results and the differences in SABP results between spending ministries 
and the MOSF from 2005 to 2010. In addition, factors which might affect the 
differences in SABP results were ascertained and divided into independent and control 
variables (e.g., budget-process-related, programme-characteristics-related and 
policy/politics-related variables) based on the review of previous studies. Secondly, an 
initial framework for analysing the relationship between diverse variables and the 
differences in SABP results was to be developed by various preliminary analyses. 
Relationships between independent and dependent variables could be determined by 
correlation analysis, and relationships between diverse control variables and dependent 
variables could be certified by t-test. The results of preliminary analyses were to be 
applied when it comes to constructing the multiple regression analysis. Thirdly, 
relationships between diverse variables and the differences in SABP results were to be 
verified in detail through multiple regression analysis employing the SPSS (Statistical 
Package for Social Science). That is, the predicted relations explained in section 4.4.2 
were to be examined through the results of regression analysis. In order to verify the 
statistical significance of the regression model, F-values verifying that all regression 
coefficients were not zero and t-values verifying whether each coefficient was 
substantially different from zero were to be examined. In addition, multicollinearity 
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among variables, which makes regression analysis impossible, was also to be tested. 
Then, R square (the variability in the outcome linked to the independent variables) and 
adjusted R square (the extent to which R square can be generalised) were to be analysed.  
 
4.5 Qualitative Approach 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this section is to address the second and third research questions, and to 
suggest feasible policy alternatives for preventing or reducing various dysfunctional 
consequences mentioned in Section 2.3.2 based on the conceptual framework developed 
in Chapter 2. That is, this section seeks to explore whether dysfunctional consequences 
by spending ministries actually exist, and if so, what are the extents of them, focusing 
on differing perspectives between spending ministries and the MOSF. It then looks at 
the impact of these dysfunctional consequences on the behaviours of both spending 
ministries and the MOSF, and explores feasible policy implications for a better SABP 
system. In order to do this, firstly, the study employs multiple case study as a qualitative 
approach to investigate and understand more thoroughly a particular contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context (Yin, 2009). Secondly, the study conducts 
documentary analysis, archival records analysis and particularly in-depth interviews in 
order to collect data from multiple sources of evidence. Thirdly, for qualitative data 
analysis, Nvivo 9 is utilised during the process of capturing, coding and reporting the 
findings of the case study. The rest of this section will describe a multiple case study as 
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a research strategy, the selection of case study areas, a research process for data 
collection, and data analysis.  
 
4.5.2 Multiple Case Study as a Research Strategy 
 
There are many research strategies that can be used to collect and analyse data (de Vaus, 
2001): experimental, longitudinal, cross-sectional, comparative, action research and 
case study. Among these research strategies, the case study is a suitable approach for 
finding idiographic as well as nomothetic explanations (de Vaus, 2001) and dealing 
with a set of events which investigators will rarely be able to control (Yin, 2009). The 
present study selected the case study as a research strategy not only because it would 
enable me to understand more fully a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life setting 
but also because investigating the existence of dysfunctional consequences of SABP 
and the impact on the SABP results of both spending ministries and the MOSF involves 
very sensitive and complex issues which I could not control (Yin, 2009; Benbasat et al, 
1987). The case study could also be expected to give a good opportunity to understand 
the holistic and meaningful natures of the complex behaviours of spending ministries 
and the MOSF in the Korean context (Yin, 2009; de Vaus, 2001; Bryman, 2008; Grix, 
2010). Furthermore, the study needed a good number of case studies under different 
conditions in order to investigate how consistently its findings held up (Yin, 2009), 
because exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP includes different types of 
programmes (e.g. social overhead capital, investment, loan, subsidy to private sector or 
local government), diverse spending ministries, and various government officials at 
different levels (e.g. low, middle and high). De Vaus (2001, p. 226) argues that “given 
sufficient resources and access to cases, multiple case study will normally be more 
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powerful and convincing and provide more insights than single case study.” In line with 
Yin (2009) and de Vaus (2001) this research sought to test and develop more 
compellingly, rigorously, and robustly the conceptual framework (Herriott and 
Firestone, 1983), and to suggest well-designed policy alternatives to refine the present 
SABP system. Through the use of multiple cases of evidence, the study could 
strengthen construct validity and external validity (Cook and Campbell, 1979). To 
enhance reliability, the study developed a specific case study database with all relevant 
data such as interview transcripts, research memos, final SABP reports, and evaluation 
reports of the National Assembly and the BAI (Yin, 2009).  
 
As for the time dimension of the study, like most case studies and explanatory case 
studies the study incorporates a time dimension, particularly a retrospective design, 
because it collects information relating to an extended period for use on one occasion by 
drawing on qualitative research methods including archival records and document 
analysis and interviews with government officials who took part in or observed past 
events (de Vaus, 2001). With limitations on time and other resources, except for 
people’s ability to recall the past, adopting a retrospective dimension is appropriate, 
rather than tracking changes forward through time. The important thing, as de Vaus 
(2001: 228) argues, is “to build up a clear and reasonably detailed picture of the 
sequence in which events took place and of the context in which they occurred.”  
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4.5.3 The Selection of Three Case Study Areas and Eight Programmes 
 
The case study puts more emphasis on theoretical generalisation, which involves 
strategic selection of cases, than on statistical generalisation, which depends on the 
representativeness of cases (de Vaus, 2001). Walsham (1993, p.15) argues that the 
external validity of case study work can be achieved by “the plausibility and cogency of 
the logical reasoning in describing the results from the cases and in drawing conclusions 
from them rather than the representativeness of cases in a statistical sense.” To enhance 
the external validity of the case study this study employed three case areas and eight 
specific budgetary programmes within them. 
 
The study used a number of criteria and carried out extensive screening in order to 
choose case study areas. Firstly, case study areas were chosen because of the likelihood 
that they would display some indications of dysfunctional consequences of SABP, 
because the main interest of the study was to explore the dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP and to examine the impact of these on the SABP results of both spending 
ministries and the MOSF. Secondly, areas of high political significance were selected, 
which was closely related to the first criterion, because the higher the programmes’ 
political importance, the greater the expected optimism bias by spending ministries and 
the tighter the review of the MOSF might be. Therefore, the possibility of discovering 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP might be higher. Thirdly, the case study areas 
were selected to reflect the different conditions under which SABP operated, such as 
different types of programmes, diverse spending ministries, different levels of 
employees and programmes with different sizes of budget, in order to obtain the 
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plausibility and cogency of logical reasoning under different conditions. Fourthly, the 
time period for the case study areas was the second SABP cycle, from 2008 to 2010, 
since many of the programmes from the first SABP cycle (2005 to 2007) ceased after 
that period, due to the large amount of restructuring of programmes that took place in 
the government reorganisation of early 2008 after the presidential election.  
 
On the basis of these criteria for the strategic selection of the case study areas, I firstly 
examined what the focus fields of each year’s budgets had been from 2006 to 201119, 
through document analysis, and the results are shown in Table 4-8. I then chose three 
case study areas from the common core fields for the six years, and finally I selected 
eight budgetary programmes within three case study areas. 
 
Table 4- 8 Focus Fields of Budgets from 2006 to 2011 
’06 ’07 ’08 
- Future growth expansion field,  
  such as SOC, R&D, education  
- Job creation  
- Support for classes which are  
  suffering from polarisation 
- Ensuring national security  
- Future growth expansion field 
- Satisfaction of basic needs of  
  citizens such as social welfare,  
  education, etc 
- Social job expansion 
- Ensuring national security 
- Future growth expansion field 
- Preparation for low fertility  
  and population aging in Korea 
- Social job expansion 
- Balanced national 
development 
  (including expansion of local  
   public finance) 
- Reducing the national debt 
’09 ’10 ’11 
- Job Creation field 
- Future growth expansion field 
- Stabilisation of ordinary 
  people’s lives  
- Small and efficient government 
- Recovery of economic vitality  
  and future growth expansion 
- Stabilisation of ordinary 
  people’s lives and job creation 
- Maintaining law and order 
- Upgrading the national image 
- Stabilisation of ordinary 
  people’s lives 
- Future growth expansion 
   (including job creation) 
- Boosting local economies and  
  maintaining public order  
- Reducing the national debt 
                                                     
19 The study looked at SABP results from 2005 to 2010, and as results were reflected in the 
budgets of programmes in the following year, I examined the budgets from 2006 to 2011. 
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Source: MOSF press release materials, National Assembly Budget Office Report (2006-2011), and 
Guidance for making a budget for each year 
 
Looking at Table 4-8, we can see that the Korean Government’s focus fields could be 
put into the following four categories (core areas in parentheses). 
 First field: Stabilisation of ordinary people’s lives (housing, pensions, 
healthcare) 
 Second field: Job creation (youth employment) 
 Third field: Future productive capacity expansion (SOC, R&D, education) 
 Fourth field: Other (maintaining public order, ensuring national security, and 
boosting local economies)  
  
The study chose “the stabilisation of ordinary people’s lives”, “job creation”, and 
“future productive capacity expansion” as the focus fields of the Korean Government 
for each year. Core areas in the stabilisation of ordinary people’s lives were public 
housing, pensions and healthcare. With respect to job creation, youth employment was 
seen as the core area, because although the youth employment problem has been 
consistently treated as one of the hottest issues in most OECD countries, including 
Korea, for many years, most of these countries’ programmes have not yet had 
significant results. Regarding the expansion of future productive capacity, SOC, R&D, 
and education would be the core areas. From these seven important areas within three 
fields, three case study areas of interest for the study – public housing, youth 
employment and SOC – could be drawn, for the following reasons.  
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Regarding the pensions and healthcare areas in the first field, the budgets of pensions 
and healthcare programmes were often decided by rules laid down by the relevant laws, 
regardless of their SABP results. So, it seemed meaningless to link SABP results with 
such mandatory expenditures. Thus, in the first field the area of public housing was 
chosen. In the second field, the area of youth employment area was selected, because as 
mentioned earlier youth employment has been the core area of the job creation field in 
many countries for a long time. With respect to the third field, R&D programmes’ 
performances have since 2011 been assessed by another evaluation system run by the 
NSTC, because of the special nature of research and development expenditures. In 
addition, most of the education expenditures stemmed from transfers from central to 
local government, and this kind of internal transfer within governments has been 
excluded from SABP. For example, in 2010 the total amount of the budget in the 
education field was about 38,300bn Won, but 32,300bn Won (84.3%) consisted of 
transfers from central to local government. Thus the R&D and education areas were not 
appropriate case study areas, and so the remaining important area, SOC, was selected as 
a case study area. 
 
After choosing three case study areas, eight specific programmes which had high 
political importance were strategically selected on the following three criteria: whether 
a programme was on the presidential agenda; whether it had a high priority among 
spending ministries’ programmes; whether the National Assembly, the BAI or the NGO 
had an interest in it. In the public housing area, three programmes related to public 
housing were chosen: construction of public rental housing, subsidies for housing rental 
costs, and improvement of old public housing stock. Expansion of public housing was 
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one of the key projects of the Presidential Transition Committee (December 2007 to 
February 2008). The Presidential Transition committee suggested the expansion of 
public housing as one of 43 core presidential agendas in February 2008 (Presidential 
Transition Committee, 2008) and this was included officially as one of the 100 
presidential agendas after the new administration was inaugurated. Subsequently, the 
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) published the “1.5 million 
Bokeumjari public housing construction plan for 2009 to 2018” in September 2008 and 
presented this to the President in December 2008 as one of the core projects for 2009 
(Yeonhapnews, 2008). In 2011, the Minister of the MLTM stated in an interview that 
the construction of 1.5million units of public housing would be continued until 2018, as 
planned (Primenews, 2011). In addition, the MLTM announced a comprehensive public 
housing policy every year (MLTM, 2011, 2010). Moreover, the National Assembly 
Research Service included the programme for the construction of public housing as one 
of the government activities that would be subject to inspection (NARS, 2011), and the 
BAI launched a comprehensive audit and inspection of the public housing construction 
programme, raising concerns over the supply and demand situation in public housing 
(BAI, 2011). The construction of public rental housing, subsidies for housing rental 
costs, and the improvement of old public housing stock have been key programmes in 
the public housing field. As regards budget size, the 2008 budgets for construction of 
public rental housing and subsidies for housing rental costs programmes, at 3,400bn 
Won and 3,100bn Won respectively, were the largest and second largest of all the 
MLTM’s programmes. It can therefore be stated that the priority of these programmes 
within the ministry is very high.  
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With respect to youth employment, it seems unnecessary to point out that budgetary 
programmes related to youth employment have high political importance, but the 
problem was how to choose suitable programmes for the research from 36 youth 
employment programmes in 12 ministries and agencies. The National Assembly Budget 
Office (NABO) (NABO, 2010a) put the 36 youth employment programmes into five 
categories using the OECD’s classification of employment 20  drawn up to analyse 
countries comparatively: on-the-job training (eight programmes); experience, 
international training and internship (14 programmes); employment incentives (four 
programmes); direct job creation (eight programmes); and public employment services 
and administration (two programmes). As a result of an Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) by 20 labour specialists, the NABO gave priority to five types. The specialist 
group ranked the importance of the five types in the following order: on-the-job training 
 experience, international training and internship  employment incentives  public 
employment services and administration  direct job creation. In addition, the second 
of these types was closely related to the presidential agenda of producing 100,000 
global youth leaders. Considering the choices of both AHP and the presidential agenda, 
of the five types, experience, international training and internship (the second type) had 
higher political importance than the other types and was more appropriate for the study. 
After careful programme screening of this type I found that six of the 14 programmes 
were assessed by SABP from 2008 to 2010. The six programmes in the second group 
were: youth job experience (’08), junior college students’ overseas internship (’10), 
global youth leadership training (’10), global trade specialist training (’10), global plant 
                                                     
20 The OECD (2009) put labour market policy into nine categories: public employment services 
and administration, training, job rotation and job sharing, employment incentives, supported 
employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-up incentives, out-of-work income 
maintenance, early retirement. 
170 
 
specialist training (’10), and global exhibition specialist training (’10). However, global 
plant specialist training and global exhibition specialist training programmes were 
included in the global trade specialist training programme, because the purposes of 
these programmes were very similar and the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy 
(MKE) implemented all three programmes at the same time. Finally, considering the 
availability of evidence and interviewees, junior college students’ overseas internship 
(’10), global youth leadership training (’10) and global trade specialist training (’10) 
programmes were chosen for the case study in the youth employment area.          
 
In the SOC area, national highway and railway construction were the main programmes, 
and they had high political importance. The SOC area is divided into four large 
categories: national highway, railway, airport, and port construction. The budgets for 
national highway and railway construction take up the majority of the SOC area’s 
funding (13,400bn Won out of 25,000bn Won, or 53.2%). The SOC programmes were 
all included in the presidential agenda, but the national highway and railway 
construction programmes were also selected as two of 30 major pioneering projects for 
boosting the metropolitan economy which were published in September 2008. 
Consequently, the national highway and railway construction programmes had higher 
priority among the MLTM programmes and were more appropriate for the case study. 
As a result, the study chose eight programmes within three case study areas based on 
the various criteria mentioned above: in the area of public housing, construction of 
public rental housing (P1), subsidy for housing rental costs (P2), and improvement of 
old public housing stock (P3); in the area of youth employment, global youth leadership 
training (P4), global trade specialist training (P5), and junior college students’ overseas 
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internships (P6); and in the SOC area, road construction (P7), and railway construction 
(P8).  
 
Descriptions of the Eight Programmes 
 
This section gives a brief explanation of the eight budgetary programmes in three case 
study areas. The three programmes in the public housing area all have characteristics of 
high public interests as well as political importance, and central-government-initiated 
construction has long been accepted as a desirable social safety net for solving the 
housing problems of the poor. The public housing construction programme (P1) was 
started in 1998 and a reasonable estimation of supply and demand has been developed 
since 2003 through the MLTM’s comprehensive housing plan. The subsidy for housing 
rental costs programme (P2) has lent money to poor tenants at 70% lower interest rates 
than the market level since 1990. The programme for improvement of old public 
housing stock (P3) was started in 2009 in order to enhance the housing environment for 
the poor and boost the local economy. The performance indicator for P1 is “public 
rental housing construction rate”; for P2 it is “budget implementation rate”; and for P3 
it is “rate of budget grants to local government”. These are all indirect programmes 
(loan, loan, and subsidy to local government respectively) and although the MLTM self-
assessed them as effective programmes, the MOSF reviewed them as modest 
programmes. Interestingly, on Question 2-1 for P1 and P2 the MOSF first decided “No”, 
but finally changed its decision to “Yes”21. The specific reason will be explored and 
                                                     
21 From 2005 to 2008, the Budget Office of the MOSF firstly reviewed spending ministries’ self-
assessment results, and then the Performance Management Bureau of the MOSF gave them a 
final assessment. However, from 2009 the Budget Office of the MOSF has not reviewed these 
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discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The main features of the three programmes are 
summarised in the Table 4-9 below.  
 
Table 4- 9 Main Features of the Three Programmes in Public Housing  
Key features P1 P2 P3 
Performance indicator Construction rate Budget implementation rate Rate of budget grants 
Programme period 1998 - 1990 - 2009-2013 
Programme type Indirect (loan) Indirect (loan) Indirect (subsidy) 
Budget size (bn Won) 3,422 3,066 50 
SABP implementation 2008 2008 2010 
Spending 
ministry’s 
self-
assessment 
(MLTM) 
Total 
score 
95.0 (effective) 91.7 (effective) 100.0 (effective) 
Q2-1 Yes Yes Yes 
Q2-2 Yes Yes Yes 
Q4-1 Yes Yes Yes 
Q4-2 Yes Yes Yes 
MOSF’s 
review 
Total 
score 64.2 (modest) 60.8 (modest) 62.7 (modest) 
Q2-1 No → Yes No → Yes Yes 
Q2-2 No No No 
Q4-1 To a small extent To a small extent To a small extent 
Q4-2 No No N/A (new programme) 
 
Note: Q2-1 is related to the appropriateness of the performance indicator; Q2-2 is related to the 
relevance of the performance target; Q4-1 is related to the achievement of the planned 
performance target; and Q4-2 is related to the implementation of comprehensive and objective 
programme evaluation including both quantitative and qualitative analysis 
                
The three programmes in the youth employment area have been the focus of a great deal 
of attention by the administration, the National Assembly and various new media, 
because although youth employment has been a very important problem, it has not yet 
been solved. Thus, as mentioned above, the administration set up a project to recruit and 
train 100,000 global youth leaders as one of the presidential agendas, and the three 
programmes were all included in this project. The global youth leadership training 
programme (P4) was started in 1994 by the Ministry of Employment and Labour 
                                                                                                                                                           
results but just given some opinions when the Performance Management Bureau has finally 
decided the results.  
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(MOEL) in order to increase foreign employment for young people by giving them the 
opportunity to train abroad for three to ten months. The global trade specialist training 
programme (P5) has been implemented since 2007 by the MKE in order to give an 
opportunity for learning about foreign plants and global trading skills to four-year 
university students. In addition, the Ministry of Educations, Science and Technology 
(MEST) has implemented a junior college students’ overseas internships programme 
(P6) since 2005 to enhance the employment rate of two-year university students by 
providing an opportunity for them to have foreign internship experience for about six 
months. In particular, the global youth leadership training programme (P4) has been 
highlighted, so the programme’s performance indicators and performance targets were 
decided by several cabinet meetings with related governments. As with the three 
programmes in the public housing area, the relevant spending ministries all self-
assessed these programmes as effective, but the MOSF reviewed P4 and P6 as modest 
programmes, while it found P5 was a poor programme. Interestingly, in Q2-1 for P5, 
the spending ministry answered “No” although it might know well that Q2-1 was 
logically linked with Q2-2 and Q4-1, and that if Q2-1 was “No”, it might be difficult to 
avoid a poor grade finally. Also, in Q2-1 for P6, the MOSF gave a “Yes” answer on 
condition that the spending ministry would develop more appropriate performance 
indicators later. This will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7. These differences in SABP 
results between spending ministries and the MOSF imply that there might be 
dysfunctional consequences in the SABP system and these might impact on the 
behaviours of both spending ministries and the MOSF. The main features of the three 
programmes are summarised in Table 4-10 below.  
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Table 4-10 Main Features of Three Programmes in Youth Employment  
Key features P4 P5 P6 
Performance indicator 
The number of 
students who 
completed 
programme, 
Employment rate 
The number of 
collaborating 
companies, 
Accretion rate of 
academic credit, 
Matching fund rate 
Improvement rate of 
language skills, Degree of 
student satisfaction 
Programme period 1994 - 2007 - 2005 - 
Programme type Indirect (investment) Indirect (subsidy) Indirect (subsidy) 
Budget size (bn Won) 25 9 5 
SABP implementation 2010 2010 2010 
Spending 
ministry’s 
self-
assessment 
Total 
score 
87.5 (effective) 87.5 (effective) 100.0 (effective) 
Q2-1 Yes No Yes 
Q2-2 Yes Yes Yes 
Q4-1 To a large extent Yes Yes 
Q4-2 Yes Yes Yes 
MOSF’s 
review 
Total 
score 64.3 (modest) 49.0 (poor) 56.5 (modest) 
Q2-1 Yes No Yes (conditionally) 
Q2-2 Yes No No 
Q4-1 To a large extent To a small extent To a small extent 
Q4-2 No No No 
       
The road and railway construction programmes in the SOC area have always been 
highlighted by interested groups because these programmes have large budgets and are 
directly related to the local economy. The road construction programme (P7) was 
started in 1999 by the MLTM in order to link major cities, ports and tourist attractions 
as well as to reduce congestion and distribution costs. The MLTM added outcome-
oriented performance indicators (traffic capacity) as well as two output indicators 
(budget implementation rate and road extension rate). The MOSF recognised the 
MLTM’s efforts, so Q2-1 was marked “Yes” by both spending ministry and the MOSF. 
The railway construction programme (P8) was initiated in 1993, having a similar 
purpose to the road construction programme. Interestingly, on Q2-1 for P8 the MOSF 
gave a “Yes” on condition that the MLTM would add an outcome-oriented performance 
indicator later. In addition, on Q4-2 for both P7 and P8 the MOSF gave a “Yes”, which 
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was different from their verdict on the other six programmes, because the two 
programmes implemented comprehensive and objective programme evaluations, 
including both quantitative and qualitative assessment, to follow the relevant law, which 
stipulated compulsory programme evaluation for programmes whose budget was over 
50bn Won. These will be explored in Chapter 6. As with the other programmes, the 
spending ministry self-assessed the two programmes as effective while the MOSF 
reviewed them as modest. The main features of the two programmes are summarised in 
the Table 4-11 below.  
 
Table 4-11 Main Features of Two Programmes in SOC  
Key features P7 P8 
Performance indicator 
Budget implementation rate, 
Road extension rate,  
Traffic capacity 
Double-tract rate 
Programme period 1999 -  1993 - 
Programme type Direct (SOC) Direct (SOC) 
Budget size (bn Won) 743 1,687 
SABP implementation 2010 2010 
Spending 
ministry’s self-
assessment 
Total 
score 100.0 (effective) 100.0 (effective) 
Q2-1 Yes Yes 
Q2-2 Yes Yes 
Q4-1 Yes Yes 
Q4-2 Yes Yes 
MOSF’s 
review 
Total 
score 60.5 (modest) 65.5 (modest) 
Q2-1 Yes Yes (conditionally) 
Q2-2 No No 
Q4-1 To a small extent To a small extent 
Q4-2 Yes Yes 
   
4.5.4 Research Methods 
 
After choosing the case study as a research strategy, the next consideration was how to 
collect data for it. Data can generally be collected from a variety of sources such as 
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documentation, archival records, interviews, and direct and participant observations 
(Yin, 2009; Becker and Bryman, 2004). Firstly, documentary information and archival 
records are helpful to most case studies, because they can give stable, unobtrusive, exact, 
precise and broad coverage for specific information. However, they can be produced for 
specific purposes and may have an unknown bias related to their author, so, this study 
used them as corroborating information and for further investigation rather than as 
definitive findings (Yin, 2009). Examples of documentation included are (Yin, 2009, 
p.103): 
 
■ Letters, memoranda, e-mails, and other personal documents such as notes 
■ Agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings and other written reports 
■ Administrative documents – proposals, progress reports, and other internal records 
■ Formal studies or evaluations of the same “case” that the researcher is studying 
■ News clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in community  
newspapers 
 
Also, archival records include the following (Yin, 2009, p.105):  
 
■ Public use files such as census and other statistical data  
■ Service records, such as those showing the number of clients served over a given  
period of time 
■ Organisational records, such as budget or personnel records 
■ Maps and charts of the geographical characteristics of a place 
■ Survey data, such as data previously collected about a site’s employees, residents,  
or participants 
 
Secondly, interviews are essential as one of the most important data sources for a case 
study, because a case study generally seeks to explore actors’ real perceptions or 
intentions. Even when documents include actors’ perceptions or intentions, they 
sometimes hide real perceptions or intentions and present them in official rather than 
real ways. In this sense, interview data can complement documentation and archival 
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records by focusing directly on case study topics and providing more insightful data for 
perceived causal inferences and explanations (Yin, 2009). Interviews are generally 
classified into three types: structured, unstructured and semi-structured (Arksey, 2004; 
Yin, 2009)22. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews have “more willingness to 
allow interviewees to use their own words and develop their own thoughts” than 
structured interviews, which use a more structured set of questions (Denscombe, 2003, 
p.167). Unstructured interviews are more interactive and more responsive to the 
language and concepts used by respondents, so they are usually used in very broadly 
defined agenda, initial pre-piloting stages, and life-story and narrative focus (Gillham, 
2005). In semi-structured interviews, a researcher is enabled to compare data from 
actors (e.g., between cases, individuals or groups) through more structured questions, as 
well as to get actors’ feelings, perceptions, interpretations and strategies on the situation 
by asking open questions with prompts (Namkoong, 2010). Semi-structured interviews 
are used when the focus of the interview is a defined and significant development phase, 
so the questions need to be focused and well-ordered (Gillham, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, direct and participant observations can be a useful source for a case study, 
especially when a researcher is investigating real-time events. A researcher can observe 
actors’ behaviours directly or participate in the events that are the focus of the case 
study. These methods can cover the context of “cases” effectively, despite being time-
consuming, risking possible bias from the observer’s manipulation of facts, and the fact 
that they can be expensive (Yin, 2009).  
                                                     
22 Elite interviews and group or focus group interviews are regarded as other types of interview 
(Gillham, 2005).Elite interviews are used in topic areas researchers do not know well and in 
parts of significant networks. Group interviews can be used when broad and exploratory 
investigation is necessary and focus group interviews are narrower and more specific than 
general group interviews. 
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This study collected information about dysfunctional consequences of SABP from 
documentation, archival records and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Other 
methods, particularly observation, seemed inappropriate, because the study sought to 
investigate events which had already happened, not events in real time. In addition, the 
study applied to data collection three principles suggested by Yin (2009, pp.114-124). 
Firstly, the study used multiple sources of evidence, such as documentation, archival 
records and interview data, in order to make the outcomes more convincing, persuasive 
and accurate, because “multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon”. Secondly, the study created a case database with 
all relevant data (e.g., reports by the National Assembly, reports by the  BAI, research 
memos and interview transcripts) in order to increase the reliability of the case study 
(Yin, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Thirdly, the study made an attempt to develop 
a chain of evidence (e.g., case study questions ↔ case study database ↔ case study 
report) to enhance the reliability of the information in the case study. An external 
observer can follow the evidence and trace the steps from initial research questions to 
ultimate conclusions or from conclusions to research questions.  
 
4.5.5 Data Collection 
 
After a conceptual framework for exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP was 
developed through an extensive literature review, eight budgetary programmes within 
three case study areas were selected in July 2011; and then, detailed documentary 
analysis and pilot interviews were employed in order to increase the validity of, and 
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minimise the number of poorly structured questions in the interview guides for the field 
work. These preparations provided a basis for the field work.  
 
(1) Documentary Data 
 
Most of the documentary data was gathered through the websites of central government, 
the National Assembly, the professional public institutes, and the mass media. In 
particular, the MOSF’s reports on the SABP results of the eight budgetary programmes 
were very useful, because they included different perspectives from spending ministries 
and the MOSF, and implied that dysfunctional consequences actually existed, and might 
be extensive. In addition, the NABO’s annual analysis of the government’s performance 
reports and the BAI’s audit and inspection reports directly indicated some types of 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP in the eight programmes, providing useful 
information from a neutral position. In order to avoid “biased selectivity and reporting 
bias” (Yin, 2009, p.102), I analysed many documents, questioning their form and 
functions, and mainly used them for corroborating information and further investigation, 
not to provide definitive findings. Major documentation and archival records which 
were analysed in the study are shown in Table 4-12 below.  
 
Table 4- 12 Major Documentary Data Sources 
Category Major documents collected and analysed 
Data bases Digital budget information system (for budget data from 2005 to 2010) 
Documents 
and archives 
Official governmental 
documents 
Official documents of the MOSF, KIPF, NABO, 
BAI, MLTM, KDI, OECD, GAO, OMB, etc. 
Internal documents SABP results, MOSF internal reports, etc.  
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Formal studies 
Korean Policy Studies Review, Korean Review of 
Public Administration, Korean Journal of Public 
Administration, Korean Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Evaluation, etc. 
Press releases Yeonhapnews, Joong-ang daily, Primenews, etc. 
Statutes and rules GPA, NFA, GPRA, GPRAMA 
 
(2) Interview Data 
 
Semi-structured interviews with key participants were a main source for the case study, 
because these were appropriate methods to extract useful information from complex and 
dynamic social situations (Arksey, 2004). The first 38 interviews were carried out face-
to-face between 25th October and 15th November 2011 in Korea; and the second 31 
supplementary interviews were conducted by internet phone and e-mail from 20th 
October to 20th November 2012 in order to develop feasible policy alternatives for a 
better SABP system by combining and verifying the policy alternatives suggested 
during the first interviews. Thirty eight interviewees were divided into three categories: 
19 spending ministry officials, 13 MOSF officials, and six experts. Thirty two 
government officials who carried out SABP in the eight programmes were chosen, and 
six experts on SABP were selected to broaden the research base. Among the 32 
government officials, four were senior managers (high ranking), 22 were managers 
(middle ranking), and six were assistant managers (low ranking). As for selecting 
interviewees, the study employed “purposive sampling”, because this method can be 
useful to identify subgroups and compare results (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
distribution of the first 38 interviewees is shown in Table 4-13 below and a detailed list 
of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1.  
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Table 4-13 Distribution of the first 38 Interviewees 
Case area 
Spending ministry MOSF Sub-
total 
Ex
pert 
Tot
al Senior 
manager 
Manager 
Assistant 
manager 
Senior 
manager 
Manager 
Assistant 
manager 
Public 
housing 
- 6 - 2 1 1 10 
6 38 
Youth 
employment 
1 2 4 - 5 - 12 
SOC 1 5 - - 3 1 10 
Total 2 13 4 2 9 2 32 
 
Note: Among 19 spending ministry officials, six were budget division and 13 were programme 
division officials. Among 13 MOSF officials, five were Performance management bureau officials, 
eight were Budget Office officials.  
 
Pilot Interviews 
 
Before conducting the first 38 interviews, five pilot interviews with Korean government 
officials who were studying at the University of Birmingham and had experience of 
SABP were carried out in August 2011. Among the five officials, three were from 
spending ministries, two were MOSF officials, one was an assistant manager and four 
were managers. Before commencing the pilot interviews, I explained the purpose of the 
study and how the interview data would be used, and then I elicited the consent of the 
interviewees. Also, I explained that the interviews would be recorded but re-assured the 
interviewees that all data would remain confidential and anonymous. During the pilot 
interviews, I tested the validity and clarity of the questions, identified question 
redundancy, and calculated the approximate time needed to complete the interview (Bell, 
2006). My reflections on the pilot interviews were as follows.  
 
Firstly, most interviewees agreed that the interview questions were generally clear and 
easily understood. However, one interviewee mentioned that the unique features of 
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Korean government culture, such as the general one-year rotation of personnel system 
and ministers’ short tenure of office, could lead to difficulty in focusing on the long-
term or whole objectives of programmes. Also, some interviewees answered that the 
strategy of a spending ministry’s budget division could be different from that of the 
spending ministry’s programme division. For example, the budget division was more 
concerned with good relationships with the MOSF than the programme division was, 
and this might lead it to recommend a highly ambitious performance target level. As a 
result, I added questions related to the unique features of Korean government culture 
and to differences in perspectives on SABP between spending ministries’ budget 
divisions and their programme divisions. Secondly, some pilot interviewees said that the 
interview time was too long, as the interview lasted from two hours to two and half 
hours. Also, they pointed out some redundant questions, the contents of which were 
similar to those of other questions. In order to reflect these opinions, I combined or 
eliminated some questions through careful review of the interview questions. Thus the 
interview questions were reduced from 22 to 16, and the time required was reduced by 
about an hour. Thirdly, I realised that different topic guides might be needed in order to 
review the different perspectives of the spending ministries and the MOSF, as well as 
those of the experts. Finally, on the researcher’s background and role, the possibility of 
subjectivity was raised because I, as a government official of the MOSF, had experience 
of reviewing spending ministries’ self-assessment results and implementing SABP. 
Therefore, I recognised the necessity of having interview questions and interview data 
reviewed by supervisors and PhD colleagues to reduce possible bias. Also, I tried to 
avoid bias by deliberately considering the opposite view to my opinions. After the pilot 
interviews, topic guides for spending ministries and the MOSF, as well as for experts, 
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were completed through several revisions and supervisions. Appendices 2 and 3 
describe these topic guides.  
 
First Interviews and Supplementary Interviews 
 
After the pilot interviews in August 2011, I prepared to make contact with 38 
interviewees. Preparation for interviews was carried out through four steps: (1) 
identifying interviewees and confirming the list through a supervision meeting; (2) 
making calls to obtain consent to an interview and fixing an interview date, time and 
place; (3) sending an e-mail including interview topic guides and SABP reports; and (4) 
confirming the interview date, time and place again via telephone. Firstly, I searched for 
42 potential interviewees by name, position and telephone number through the MOSF’s 
SABP reports for the eight budgetary programmes, because SABP reports include this 
information. In a supervision meeting, my supervisors and I discussed the 
appropriateness of the interviewee list, for example the number of officials from 
spending ministries and the MOSF, their positions and departments, and my supervisor 
agreed with the relevance of potential interviewees. Secondly, I started to make calls via 
internet phone to potential interviewees to obtain consent to interviews. During this 
period, I explained the background of the study, the detailed purpose of the interviews, 
and how interview data would eventually be used. My experience as a MOSF official 
was very helpful when it came to communicating with interviewees and building mutual 
trust between interviewer and interviewee. In particular, most of the potential 
interviewees from spending ministries were happy to agree to the interview, although 
they needed to say they had somewhat different perspectives on SABP from those of the 
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MOSF. Thirty two government officials and six experts finally agreed to be interviewed. 
Thirdly, the interview topic guides and the MOSF’s SABP reports on related 
programmes were sent by e-mail to all interviewees in early October 2011. Interview 
topic guides included a consent form explaining the purpose of the interview, the way in 
which interviewees’ privacy would be protected, the right to withdraw at any time, and 
information about the researcher, such as position and contact number. The MOSF’s 
SABP reports on the eight programmes were also sent to interviewees in order to 
refresh their memory of SABP results in the past. Finally, before departing for Seoul, I 
called all the interviewees again to confirm the interview date, time and place although I 
had to reschedule some appointments after arriving at Seoul due to the sudden opening 
of the National Assembly. During this process, however, I had an opportunity to explain 
the topic guides in detail again, and if interviewees had some doubts about the exact 
meaning of questions, I was able to give them more explanations.  
 
The first field work was carried out in Seoul from 25th October to 15th November 2011. 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face using semi-structured topic guides at 
different venues, such as the respondents’ offices or other meeting places. Each 
interview typically lasted for about one hour. Interviews were conducted in Korean 
because all the respondents were Korean. They were audio-recorded and at the same 
time field notes were taken to facilitate analysis later. All the respondents showed very 
cooperative attitudes and gave their opinions on, and insights into, the SABP system 
very freely, even though they knew that their opinions might be different from those of 
the MOSF. Also, they were eager to suggest useful policy alternatives so that a better 
performance budgeting system could be produced in Korea. During the interviews, I 
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informed interviewees again that the study’s aim was not to indicate the faults of 
spending ministries but to explore differing perspectives between spending ministries 
and the MOSF. I also explained how the results would be used, and that the opinions of 
interviewees would be treated with complete confidentiality. 
 
After returning to the UK, I reviewed and summarised all the interview records as well 
as making 38 full interview transcripts in English for further analysis. The detailed 
process of data analysis will be explained in the next section. When analysing the 
interview data, I realised the necessity of supplementary interviews in order to suggest 
feasible policy alternatives for revising and redesigning the SABP system, because a 
variety of policy alternatives were raised by interviewees during the first interviews. 
Thirty one supplementary interviews were conducted in about a month, from 20th 
October to 20th November 2012, using internet phone and e-mail, with similar 
preparations to those for the first interviews in August to September 2012. However, 
some interviewees could not give interviews due to their busy schedules, so 14 spending 
ministry officials, 12 MOSF officials and five experts participated in the supplementary 
interviews. In addition, some members of the MOSF were replaced by others who had 
more responsibility for revising the SABP system, because the aim of the 
supplementary interviews was to determine feasible policy alternatives. The 
supplementary interviews generally lasted for about thirty minutes and many 
interviewees sent me written replies via e-mail. The supplementary interviews were 
successful not only because I could save time and cost on the study but also because I 
could communicate again as much as I needed with many interviewees, due to the 
advanced telecommunication technology.  
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4.5.6 Data Analysis  
 
Data collected from multiple sources were analysed according to the conceptual 
framework outlined in Chapter 2, including making sense of the concepts of various 
dysfunctional consequences, categorising them, investigating their impact and 
developing the role of spending ministries and the MOSF to improve SABP. The data 
analysis process was carried out based on two strategies: “coding of data” and 
“synthesising cases”. Coding is defined by Miles and Huberman (1994, p.56) as “to 
review a set of field notes transcribed or synthesised, and to dissect them meaningfully, 
while keeping the relations between the parts intact”. The study employed computer-
aided coding of documentary and interview data for assigning meaning to the collected 
information, for classifying the data into subgroups for each research question, and for 
developing relationships between them. Synthesising cases means “aggregating findings 
across a series of individual studies” (Yin, 2009, p.156). So, the study treated multiple 
cases as individual separate studies and probed whether different groups of cases 
showed similarities, reflecting dysfunctional consequences of SABP. Nvivo 9, which is 
qualitative data analysis software, was used for data coding and analysis of the first 
interviews. (In the coding and analysis of supplementary interviews, an Excel 
programme was used because the number of questions was smaller than for the first 
interviews.) This software was developed in order to analyse data which are difficult to 
categorise and organise, including functions related to classifications, queries, reports 
and models (Park, 2011). The process of Nvivo 9 was followed by producing project, 
document, node and attribute coding, and developing relationships and models, queries, 
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and reports (Park, 2011). In particular, the Nvivo programme enabled flexible 
approaches to coding and numerical counts of references in interview data (Bazeley, 
2007). The study also used some strategies for increasing the validity of findings. Firstly, 
for data collection and data analysis, the study used multiple sources of data to minimise 
potential biases related to any single source. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, it 
developed a database consisting of documentary and interview transcript data, and tried 
to maintain a chain of evidences. Thirdly, interview transcripts and initial analyses of 
cases were reviewed with my supervisors and electronically stored on my computer 
with a password to enable other researchers to access them. Finally, the results of 
further analysis of the case study were discussed with many prestigious researchers at 
an academic conference in June 2012 and the conference paper was also sent to key 
participants in the case study. Comments from both the conference and key participants 
made me revisit and re-examine the various data sources to increase the validity of the 
findings.  
 
4.5.7 Ethical Considerations 
 
De Vaus (2001) proposes four ethical issues: confidentiality, privacy, avoidance of 
harm to participants, and informed consent. Bryman (2008) also offers four ethical 
principles: whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a lack of informed 
consent; whether there is an invasion of privacy; whether deception is involved. 
Moreover, Creswell (2009) argues that ethical issues relate to all phases of the research 
process from setting the research problem to writing and disseminating the research. 
This study includes the exploration of opinions and beliefs of government officials on 
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sensitive and complex issues related to differences in perspectives on SABP between 
spending ministries and the MOSF. It was therefore very important to obtain the honest 
opinions of respondents, and so the ethical issues mentioned above needed to be 
seriously engaged with. In particular, how to secure informed consent and how to avoid 
potential harm to participants were the main ethical issues of the study. In order to 
obtain informed consent, I contacted all participants in advance and explained the 
background of research, the purposes of the interviews, the future use of the interview 
results, participant feedback, participant withdrawal, confidentiality, data storage, and 
data access and disposal, as mentioned earlier. As a result, all participants agreed with 
the contents of the consent form. Also, during the interviews I explained these things 
again to the participants and they all agreed with me again. Furthermore, I sent my 
conference paper to all participants in order to ask whether the contents of the paper 
invaded their privacy or harmed them and whether the detailed purposes and findings 
were appropriate. Many participants, including key participants, gave me positive 
feedback and useful comments. After receiving these comments, I revisited and re-
examined the interview data and the findings to increase the validity of the case study.  
 
4.5.8 Reflexivity 
 
Some important methodological issues, such as access to interviewees and my 
background and role, arose during the study. As regards access to interviewees, at first, I 
anticipated some difficulty in accessing spending ministry officials because expressing 
different perspectives and opinions on SABP to those of the MOSF might be 
psychologically stressful to them. However, fortunately, in practice, most of the 
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spending ministry officials who received my invitation to interview were happy to 
accept and participate in the study. Moreover, they answered very honestly and 
sometimes very boldly. For example, they responded that they set the performance 
target levels very conservatively, taking the next year’s target levels into consideration, 
and this was a natural phenomenon for them, or that SABP was not a “self-assessment” 
system because the MOSF changed the spending ministries’ self-assessment results. 
They may have thought of the interview as an opportunity to express their opinions 
more informally to an MOSF official and that the important thing was to find solutions, 
not the problem itself. Consequently, I had a chance to hear various frank voices on the 
subject of the SABP system.  
 
On the other hand, approaches to MOSF officials and experts were very easy and 
convenient for me because most of them had worked with me before I started the study. 
In this sense, the second concern associated with my background and role arose because, 
as one of the MOSF’s officials, I actually reviewed spending ministries’ self-assessment 
results and implemented SABP. Familiarity with the interviewees and research areas 
could lead to significant subjectivity. To help with this problem, my supervisors, 
academic researchers at the conference and colleagues in the PhD programme reviewed 
and commented on the interview transcripts and findings, and their comments were 
helpful in identifying bias. I also made an effort to avoid potential bias by intentionally 
considering phenomena from the perspective of spending ministry officials or neutral 
experts. However, my experience of the MOSF officials gave me some advantages 
when it came to conducting the research. For example, my professional background 
gave me more insights into the inner procedures surrounding SABP implementation and 
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suggested more (i.e. a greater number of) feasible policy alternatives than other 
researchers might have come up with. In addition, I could obtain high quality 
documentary sources, such as the internal reports and data of the MOSF, and I had the 
opportunity to interview highly prestigious people such as a vice-minister or directors-
general in central government. These advantages could make the research more accurate, 
influential and significant.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology for this thesis from the 
philosophical worldview to the research design and the methods adopted. It has 
identified the research questions for both quantitative and qualitative approaches from 
the relevant literature review. Under its pragmatic philosophical worldview, the study 
did not seek to mix different worldviews but to bring a more thorough understanding 
and mutual corroboration by employing both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). As for the quantitative approach, the chapter defined 
and explained the variables and their meanings, constructing multiple regression models 
for verifying the factors which might affect the differences between the SABP scores of 
spending ministries and those of the MOSF. With respect to the qualitative approach, 
the chapter considered multiple case study as a research strategy, explaining why and 
how the case study areas and specific programmes were selected, and why the research 
methods adopted were appropriate for the study. The following chapters will present the 
results of both quantitative and qualitative analysis based on the empirical data. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE 
DISAGREEMENT RATIO AND RELATIVE OPTIMISM RATIO 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF in 
the processes of SABP by analysing the relationships between the variables 
operationalised in Chapter 4 using various statistical methods. The chapter begins with a 
preliminary statistical analysis, including a correlation analysis, scatter diagram and t-
test, to ascertain the relationships between the independent and control variables and the 
dependent variables. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, the rest of the 
chapter explains the relationships between variables by employing multiple regression 
analysis, particularly focusing on verifying whether the results of analysis are consistent 
with the predictions mentioned in Chapter 4. The multiple regression analysis results 
will be presented for three different time periods: the first SABP cycle (2005-2007), the 
second SABP cycle (2008-2010) and the whole period (2005-2010). In addition, the 
dependent variables (the DR and ROR) are examined in the following SABP sections in 
each time period: performance planning, results and the whole section. Furthermore, in 
order to explore the strategic behaviours of spending ministries and the MOSF to a 
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given ROR level, the chapter analyses the dynamic pattern of the RORs of spending 
ministries where SABP has been implemented two or three times. The main results of 
the chapter will be interpreted and discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
5.2 Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Variables 
 
Preliminary analysis results are useful to examine the appropriateness of a regression 
equation in advance. Also, the results can be applied to interpreting the regression 
analysis results. This section firstly describes the differences between SABP scores and 
grades allocated by spending ministries and those of the MOSF, according to 
programme type, programme budget size, organisation type and programme purpose; 
and then an analysis of the relationship between the independent and control variables 
and the dependent variables will be presented.  
 
5.2.1 Differences in SABP Scores and Grades  
 
Firstly, differences in SABP scores and grades between spending ministries and the 
MOSF for the six years are shown as pooled data, according to programme type, in 
Table 5-1. As mentioned earlier, the seven programme types can be divided into two 
types (programmes directly managed by government and those indirectly managed), so 
the differences between each programme type are calculated by sub-total. In total, the 
average SABP score of spending ministries was 89.52, whilst that of the MOSF was 
63.13, and the average SABP grade of spending ministries was 3.70, which is just 
below “Effective”, while that of the MOSF was just 2.25, which is nearly “Modest”. 
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Thus, the differences in SABP scores and grades were 26.39 and 1.46 respectively. The 
SOC programmes, among the three directly managed programme types, and the subsidy 
to local government programme, among the four indirectly managed programmes, had 
the highest differences in SABP scores and grades. The differences in the SABP scores 
and grades of directly managed programmes were 24.93 and 1.36 respectively, while 
those of the indirectly managed programmes were 27.20 and 1.51 respectively. Thus, 
we can see that spending ministries have an optimism bias in the self-assessment stage 
in all types of programme, and that the differences between directly managed and 
indirectly managed programmes (24.93 vs. 27.20 and 1.36 vs. 1.51) might imply that 
programme type had an influence on the differences between spending ministries and 
the MOSF.        
 
 
Table 5-1 Differences in SABP Scores and Grades According to Programme Type (Six-Year Pooled Data) 
(Unit: points) 
 
Programme type 
Program
me 
number 
Spending ministries’ 
self-assessment MOSF’s review Difference 
Score(A) Grade(C) Score(B) Grade(D) A-B C-D 
Total 2,920 89.517 (9.998) 
3.704 
(0.550) 
63.132 
(11.994) 
2.248 
(0.686) 26.385 1.456 
Directly 
managed 
programme 
Sub-total 1,049 90.027 (10.133) 
3.738 
(0.550) 
65.100 
(11.995) 
2.376 
(0.686) 24.927 1.362 
SOC 153 90.412 (10.129) 
3.719 
(0.560) 
64.399 
(12.122) 
2.333 
(0.692) 26.013 1.386 
Capital 
Acquisition 38 
87.100 
(10.018) 
3.579 
(0.543) 
65.443 
(12.300) 
2.421 
(0.702) 21.657 1.158 
Other direct 
programme 858 
90.088 
(10.133) 
3.748 
(0.550) 
65.210 
(11.995) 
2.381 
(0.686) 24.878 1.367 
Indirectly 
managed 
programme 
Sub-total 1,871 89.231 (9.998) 
3.686 
(0.550) 
62.029 
(11.994) 
2.176 
(0.686) 27.202 1.510 
Investment 259 90.664 (10.003) 
3.737 
(0.551) 
63.769 
(12.014) 
2.290 
(0.687) 26.895 1.447 
Loan 245 88.192 (10.173) 
3.649 
(0.554) 
61.172 
(12.075) 
2.127 
(0.691) 27.020 1.522 
Subsidy to 
private sector 817 
88.874 
(10.136) 
3.668 
(0.551) 
62.323 
(12.007) 
2.198 
(0.687) 26.551 1.470 
Subsidy to local 
government 550 
89.550 
(10.136) 
3.704 
(0.550) 
61.155 
(11.989) 
2.113 
(0.686) 28.395 1.591 
Note: 1. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 2. SABP grades are converted as follows: 
poor grade is 1, modest is 2, somewhat effective is 3 and effective is 4. 
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Secondly, differences in SABP scores and grades according to programme budget size, 
which are divided into four categories on the basis of quartile (8.3bn Won), are 
presented in Table 5-2. In first quartile programmes (small programmes), the 
differences in SABP scores and grades between spending ministries and the MOSF 
were about 26.99 and 1.47 respectively. In addition, in fourth quartile programmes 
(large programmes), there were also big differences between the SABP scores and 
grades of spending ministries and those of the MSOF, and these were around 26.39 and 
1.45 respectively. Differences between small and large programmes in SABP scores 
(26.99 vs. 26.39) and SABP grades (1.47 vs. 1.45) might imply that programme budget 
size affects the difference between spending ministries and the MOSF.  
 
Table 5-2 Differences in SABP Scores and Grades According to Budget Size (Six-Year Pooled Data) 
(Unit: points) 
 
Programme budget size 
Progra
mme 
number 
Spending ministries’ 
self-assessment MOSF’s review Difference 
Score(A) Grade(C) Score(B) Grade(D) A-B C-D 
Total 2,858 89.512 (9.998) 
3.706 
(0.550) 
63.150 
(11.994) 
2.251 
(0.686) 26.362 1.455 
First quartile 
(budget<2.4bn Won) 659 
88.911 
(10.002) 
3.665 
(0.551) 
61.922 
(12.010) 
2.197 
(0.688) 26.989 1.468 
Second quartile 
(2.4≤budget<8.3bn Won) 740 
89.255 
(10.009) 
3.691 
(0.551) 
62.909 
(12.003) 
2.223 
(0.687) 26.346 1.468 
Third quartile 
(8.3≤budget< 32.3bn Won) 729 
88.968 
(9.999) 
3.691 
(0.550) 
63.186 
(11.996) 
2.254 
(0.686) 25.782 1.437 
Fourth quartile 
(budget≥32.3bn Won) 730 
90.857 
(9.995) 
3.774 
(0.550) 
64.465 
(12.007) 
2.326 
(0.687) 26.392 1.448 
 
 
Note: 1. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 2. 62 programmes have a missing value. 
 
Thirdly, differences in SABP scores and grades between spending ministries and the 
MOSF, according to organisation characteristics, are described in Table 5-3. The SABP 
scores and grades of ministry programmes were about 27.24 and 1.51 respectively, 
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while those of agency programmes were around 23.54 and 1.29 respectively. These 
differences might imply that organisation characteristics affect the differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF.  
 
 
Table 5-3 Differences in SABP Scores and Grades Between Programmes Belonging to 
Ministries and Agencies (Six-Year Pooled Data) 
(Unit: points) 
Characteristics of 
organisation 
Progra
mme 
number 
Spending ministries’ 
self-assessment MOSF’s review Difference 
Score(A) Grade(C) Score(B) Grade(D) A-B C-D 
Total 2,920 89.517 (9.998) 
3.704 
(0.550) 
63.132 
(11.994) 
2.248 
(0.686) 26.385 1.456 
Programmes belonging  
to ministries 2,248 
89.343 
(9.998) 
3.699 
(0.550) 
62.108 
(11.994) 
2.193 
(0.686) 27.235 1.506 
Programmes belonging  
to agencies 672 
90.099 
(10.019) 
3.722 
(0.552) 
66.559 
(12.046) 
2.432 
(0.689) 23.540 1.290 
 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
Finally, Table 5-4 presents the differences in SABP scores and grades according to 
programme purpose. Differences between the SABP scores and grades of spending 
ministries and those of the MOSF for economy-related programmes were about 25.59 
and 1.38 respectively, while those for welfare-related programmes were around 28.37 
and 1.63 respectively. These results might imply that programme purpose affects the 
differences between spending ministries and the MOSF. 
 
Table 5-4 Differences in SABP Scores and Grades Between Economy-Related Programmes and 
Welfare-Related Programmes (Six-Year Pooled Data) 
(Unit: points) 
Purpose of 
programme 
Number of 
programme 
Spending ministries’ 
self-assessment MOSF’s review Difference 
Score(A) Grade(C) Score(B) Grade(D) A-B C-D 
Economy-related 
programmes 1,018 
89.586 
(10.029) 
3.688 
(0.553) 
63.994 
(12.075) 
2.308 
(0.690) 25.592 1.380 
Welfare-related 
programmes 520 
88.273 
(10.055) 
3.662 
(0.550) 
59.900 
(11.987) 
2.033 
(0.688) 28.373 1.629 
 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Differences in SABP scores and grades according to the number of times SABP had 
been implemented were not described here, due to the difficulty of sorting data. Instead, 
the impact of this variable on the dependent variables is mentioned in the following 
section’s relationship analysis.  
 
5.2.2 Relationship Analysis of Variables 
 
The descriptive analysis in 5.2.1 might imply that variables such as programme type, 
programme budget size, organisation characteristics and programme purpose impact on 
the differences between the SABP results of spending ministries and those of the MOSF. 
However, this analysis cannot provide the necessary information about whether, and to 
what extent, these relationships are statistically significant. This section gives more 
useful information, indicating a statistical significance between variables by employing 
correlation analysis and a t-test before analysing the regression equation.  
 
Firstly, the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables can be 
presented by the correlation analysis and scatter diagram. The MOSF review score had a 
statistically significant relationship with the DR and ROR, at the significance level of 
0.01, in all time periods, and the effective direction was completely negative. In 
addition, a specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the spending ministry’s 
average score in that year (specific score minus average score) had a positive 
relationship with the DR and ROR in a statistically significant way, at the level of 0.01, 
in all time periods. Table 5-5 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the 
two independent variables and the DR for the whole section in the three time periods, 
197 
 
and Table 5-6 presents them between the two independent variables and the ROR for 
the whole section in the three time periods. Correlation coefficients between the two 
independent variables and the DR and ROR generally decreased from the first SABP 
cycle to the second SABP cycle as follows: the correlation coefficient between the 
MOSF review score and the DR decreased from -0.548 to -0.414; the coefficient 
between the MOSF review score and the ROR also fell, from -0.397 to -0.329; and the 
coefficient between the specific score minus the average score and the ROR declined 
from 0.274 to 0.176. By contrast, the coefficient between specific score minus average 
score and the DR increased from 0.076 in the first SABP cycle to 0.141 in the second 
cycle. These trends of coefficients can also affect the trends of R square in the 
regression analysis and the implications of this will be discussed in Chapter 7. In the 
six-year period, the pooled data for the two independent variables had closer 
relationships with the ROR than the DR. The MOSF review score had a -33.2% 
relationship with the ROR and the specific score minus average score had a 21.6% 
relationship with the ROR, while the relationships between these variables and the DR 
were -22.0% and 0.92% respectively.  
 
 
Table 5-5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Two Independent Variables and the DR for 
the Whole Section  
 ’05-’07 ’08-’10 ’05-’10 
MOSF review score -0.548*** -0.414*** -0.220*** 
Specific score minus 
average score 0.076
*** 0.141*** 0.092*** 
 
Note: *** denotes statistically significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed test). Also the case for Table 5-6. 
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Table 5-6 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Two Independent Variables and the ROR 
for the Whole Section  
 ’05-’07 ’08-’10 ’05-’10 
MOSF review score -0.397*** -0.329*** -0.332*** 
Specific score minus 
average score 0.274
*** 0.176*** 0.216*** 
 
 
Furthermore, from Figures 5-1 and 5-2, I was able to confirm that the two independent 
variables had linear relationships with the DR and the ROR for the whole section in the 
three time periods.  
 
Figure 5- 1 Scatter Diagram Between Two Independent Variables and the DR in the Whole Section 
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Figure 5- 2 Scatter Diagram Between Two Independent Variables and the ROR in the Whole Section 
 
   
 
 
From the correlation analysis and the scatter diagrams it was possible to draw the 
conclusion that the two independent variables had statistically significant linear 
relationships with the DR and ROR, and these results confirmed that the two variables 
could be used as the independent variables in the regression equation mentioned in 
Chapter 4.  
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Secondly, the relationship between the control variables and the dependent variables 
could be presented by correlation analysis and a t-test. Budget percentage changes for 
the current year had a statistically significant relationship with the DR in the second 
SABP cycle and in the pooled data for the six-year period, at the significance level of 
0.1. However, this variable did not have any statistically significant relationship with 
the ROR.  
 
Table 5-7 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Budget Percentage Changes for the Current 
Year and the DR in Three Sections 
 ’05-’07 ’08-’10 ’05-’10 
Performance planning section 0.031 -0.043* 0.028* 
Results section -0.031 0.045* -0.010 
Whole section -0.004 0.048* -0.014 
 
Note: *denotes statistically significant at the 0.1 level (one-tailed test) 
 
Table 5-8 Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Budget Percentage Changes for the Current 
Year and the ROR in Three Sections 
 ’05-’07 ’08-’10 ’05-’10 
Performance planning section 0.019 -0.031 0.012 
Results section -0.028 0.003 -0.021 
Whole section 0.013 -0.025 0.003 
 
 
The mean differences of the DR and the ROR for the whole section for the six-year 
period, according to programme type, were statistically significant at the level of 0.01. 
Table 5-9 shows the results of a t-test.  
  
Table 5-9 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR for the Whole Section (’05-’10), According to 
Programme Type (t-test) 
Programme type DR ROR 
Direct programme 0.2504 0.2316 
Indirect programme 0.2677 0.2435 
Mean difference -0.1725 -0.01188 
t-value -3.337*** -2.648*** 
*** p<0.01 
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The mean differences of the DR and ROR for the whole section for the six-year period, 
according to programme budget size, were not statistically significant, but the mean 
differences of the DR and ROR for the results section for the six-year period and those 
of the ROR for the performance planning section for the six-year period were 
statistically significant in the cases of small budget size and large budget size 
programmes respectively. Also, interestingly, both small budget and large budget 
programmes all had positive relationships with the DR and ROR. Tables 5-10 and 5-11 
present these results.  
 
Table 5-10 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in the Results Section (’05-’10), According to 
Budget Size 
Budget size DR ROR 
Small budget programme 0.4748 0.4555 
Other programme 0.4536 0.4260 
Mean difference 0.02119 0.02953 
t-value 1.802* 2.721*** 
* p < 0.1, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5-11 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in Performance Planning Section (’05-’10), 
According to Budget Size 
Budget size DR ROR 
Large budget programme 0.3786 0.5201 
Other programme 0.3708 0.4836 
Mean difference 0.00782 0.03649 
t-value 0.555 2.918*** 
*** p<0.01 
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With respect to organisation type, the mean differences of the DR and ROR for the 
whole section for the six-year period were statistically significant at the level of 0.01. 
Table 5-12 presents the results.  
 
Table 5-12 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in the Whole Section (’05-’10), According to 
Organisation Type 
Organisation type DR ROR 
Programmes belonging  
to ministries 0.2687 0.2449 
Programmes belonging  
to agencies 0.2358 0.2189 
Mean difference 0.03282 0.02601 
t-value 5.249*** 3.927*** 
*** p<0.01 
 
As for economy-related programmes, the mean difference of the DR for the whole 
section for the six-year period was statistically significant at the level of 0.05 and the 
effective direction was negative, but that of the ROR was not statistically significant 
(see Table 5-13). With regard to welfare-related programmes, the mean difference of the 
DR was statistically significant at the level of 0.01 and the effective direction was 
positive. However, that of the ROR did not show any statistical significance (see Table 
5-14).  
 
Table 5-13 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in the Whole Section (’05-’10), According to 
the Purpose of Programmes 
Purpose of programme DR ROR 
Economy-related programmes 0.2529 0.2433 
  Other programmes 0.2660 0.2370 
Mean difference -0.01311 0.00627 
t-value -2.484** 1.320 
 ** p<0.05 
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Table 5-14 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in the Whole Section (’05-’10), According to 
the Purpose of Programmes 
Purpose of programme DR ROR 
Welfare-related programmes 0.2926 0.2398 
  Other programmes 0.2550 0.2390 
Mean difference 0.03762 0.00074 
t-value 5.740*** 0.116 
*** p<0.01 
 
With respect to the number of times SABP was implemented, the mean difference of the 
DR and the ROR for the whole section for the six-year period was statistically 
significant at the level of 0.05 and the effective direction was negative as shown in 
Table 5-15.  
 
Table 5-15 Mean Differences of the DR and ROR in the Whole Section (’05-’10), According to 
the Number of Times SABP Implemented 
The number of SABP implementations DR ROR 
SABP twice or more 0.2559 0.2350 
  Other programmes 0.2689 0.2446 
Mean difference -0.01297 -0.00957 
t-value -2.488** -2.013** 
** p<0.05 
 
Overall, considering carefully the results of these preliminary analyses, it may be said 
that the two independent variables, programme type and organisation type, and the 
number of times SABP had been implemented, showed statistically significant 
relationships with the DR and ROR. However, these results were mainly related to the 
DR and whole section for the six-year period, so an analysis of those in the performance 
planning and results sections might have rather different results. The next sections will 
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analyse in detail the factors which might affect the DR and ROR for the three sections 
in the three different time periods.  
 
5.3 Factors Which Affect the Disagreement Ratio 
 
Factors which affect the DR for the three time periods were analysed23 based on three 
kinds of DR: the DR for the performance planning section, the DR for the results 
section and the DR for the whole section. The impact of the independent variables and 
control variables, as well as the goodness-of-fit test of the regression line (R Square, 
Adjusted R square and F ratio), were analysed sequentially.  
 
5.3.1 Analysis of the Independent Variables 
 
In Table 5-16, the MOSF’s review score affected negatively the DR for three sections in 
the three different time periods, at the significance level of 0.01. For the six-year pooled 
data, the coefficients of the MOSF’s review score are -0.015 for the DR for the 
performance planning section, -0.008 for the DR for the results section, and -0.002 for 
the DR for the whole SABP section. This means that if the MOSF’s review score 
increases by 10 points, then the DR for the performance planning section, results section 
and whole section will decrease by 0.15%, 0.08% and 0.02% respectively with a 99% 
                                                     
23 A multiple regression model was analysed by the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) and regression diagnostics were implemented. Hypotheses of an error term were 
verified through residual analyses such as residual plot (homoscedasticity), Durbin-Watson test 
(non-autocorrelation; near to 2), and normal probability plot (normal distribution). There was no 
multicollinearity between the variables because the VIF (variance inflation factor) was always 
less than 10 and the tolerance value was always less than 0.1. In addition, through both F test 
and t-test the significance of the linear regression line was verified. Enter method as a 
regression analysis method was used instead of the stepwise method because this study’s 
purpose is the verification of the relationship between variables, not designing a prediction 
model.  
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probability. In both the first SABP cycle and the second cycle, the results were similar 
to those in the six-year period. Consequently, the MOSF’s review score had a negative 
relationship with the DR for the three sections and in all the time periods, in a 
statistically significant way, at the level of 0.01.  
 
Also, the other independent variable, specific score minus average score, had a positive 
influence on the DR for the three sections for all the time periods, at the significance 
level of 0.01. For example, in the six-year pooled data, the coefficients of this variable 
were 0.008 for the DR for the performance planning section, 0.007 for the DR for the 
results section and 0.002 for the DR for the whole section, and this means that if the 
difference increases by 10 points, then the DR for performance planning, results and the 
whole section would also increase by 0.08%, 0.07% and 0.02% respectively with a 99% 
probability. As for the first and second SABP cycles, the results were similar to those in 
the six-year pooled data. Consequently, this variable had a positive relationship with the 
DR in three sections for the three time periods, at the significance level of 0.01.  
 
5.3.2 Analysis of the Control Variables 
 
The control variables had different effects on the DR according to the different time 
period. Firstly, budget changes for the current year had a statistically significant effect 
on the DRs for the results section and the whole section in the second SABP cycle, at 
the significance level of 0.05, and on the DR for the results section in the six-year 
pooled data, at the significance level of 0.1. However, the effective direction in the 
second cycle was positive, while that in the six-year period was negative. Overall, this 
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variable might have a statistically significant relationship with the DR, but it was not 
clear whether the effective direction was positive or negative.  
 
Secondly, programmes directly managed by government had a statistically significant 
effect on the DRs for three sections for the first SABP cycle, at the level of 0.01, but the 
effective direction of performance planning was negative, while the effective directions 
of the other two sections were positive. In the second SABP cycle, this variable had a 
negative relationship with the DR for the performance planning section, at the 
significance level of 0.1. In the six-year pooled data, this variable had a statistically 
significant impact on the DRs for the performance planning and results sections, at the 
level of 0.01. However, the effective direction of the former was negative, while that of 
the latter was positive. Overall, although this variable had a negative relationship with 
the DR for the performance planning section in the three time periods, considering the 
impact of this variable on the DRs for the results section and the whole section, it can be 
said that this variable had a positive relationship with the DR.  
 
Thirdly, small programmes had a statistically meaningful effect on the DR for the 
performance planning section for the first SABP cycle and on the DR for the whole 
section in the six-year pooled data. However, the effective direction of the former was 
negative, while that of the latter was positive. Considering the impact on the DR for the 
whole section for the six-year period, it can be said that this variable might have a 
positive relationship with the DR.  
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Fourthly, large programmes had a statistically significant impact on the DR for the 
performance planning section in the first cycle and on the DRs for performance 
planning and the whole section in the six-year pooled data. The effective directions 
were all positive. Consequently, large programmes had a positive relationship with the 
DRs for the performance planning and results sections.     
 
Fifthly, the ministries’ programmes had a statistically significant relationship with the 
DRs for the performance planning and results sections in the first SABP cycle, and the 
effective direction was negative. In the second SABP cycle, this variable had a 
significant effect on the DRs for the performance planning and results sections, but the 
effective directions were opposite to each other. In the six-year pooled data, this 
variable had a significant influence on the DRs for performance planning and the whole 
section, but the effective directions were also opposite to each other. Overall, this 
variable had a statistically significant relationship with the DR, but the effective 
direction was not clear.  
 
Sixthly, economy-related programmes only had a statistically meaningful impact on the 
DR for the whole section in the six-year pooled data, and the effective direction was 
negative. However, it did not have any statistically significant relationship with the DRs 
for the first and second SABP cycles. Consequently, economy-related programmes had 
a negative relationship with the DR for the whole section in the six-year pooled data.  
 
Seventhly, welfare-related programmes had a statistically significant influence on the 
DR in the first SABP cycle, and the effective direction in the performance planning 
208 
 
section and the whole section was positive, while that in the results section was 
negative. In the second SABP cycle, this variable had a statistically significant negative 
relationship with the DRs for the results section and the whole section. In the six-year 
pooled data, this variable had a positive relationship with the DR for performance 
planning, while it had a negative relationship with the DR for the results section. 
Consequently, welfare-related programmes had a statistically significant impact on the 
DR in the three time periods, but considering the effective direction of the whole section 
in the first and the second cycle was the opposite, the effective direction of the variable 
was not clear.  
 
Finally, the number of times SABP had been implemented had a statistically significant 
influence on the DR for the results section in the first SABP cycle, and the effective 
direction was positive. However, it had a negative relationship with the DR for the 
whole section in the second SABP cycle. In the six-year pooled data, this variable had a 
negative relationship with the DR for the performance planning section, while it had a 
positive relationship with the DR for the whole section. So, the number of times the 
SABP had been implement had a statistically significant relationship with the DR in the 
three time periods, but considering the effective direction of whole section in the second 
cycle and in the six-year period was the opposite, the effective direction of the variable 
was also not clear.  
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5.3.3 Analysis of the R square, Adjusted R square, and F ratio 
 
The R square is the extent to which predictors in the regression model can explain the 
variation of the dependent variable. The highest R square is 0.394 for the performance 
planning section in the second SABP cycle; and the lowest one is 0.082 for the whole 
section in the six-year pooled data. This means that 10 variables can account for 39.4% 
of the variation of the DR for the performance planning section in the second SABP 
cycle, whilst they can only explain 8.2% of the variation of the DR for the whole 
section in the six-year pooled data. However, most of the R squares ranged from 0.23 to 
0.35, so the values of R square could be said to be relatively high. Among the three 
sections, the R square for the performance planning section was the highest in the three 
time periods, and that for the whole section was generally the second highest. Also, the 
R square generally decreased from the first cycle to the second cycle. In general, the R 
square tends to increase as the number of predictors increases; but employing too many 
predictors makes it impossible to follow the principle of parsimony, one of the 
important rules for regression analysis, and is likely to result in multicollinearity 
between variables. In this case, it is necessary to adjust the influence of the number of 
predictors on the R square. An adjusted R square can complement the disadvantage of 
an R square and it indicates the extent to which the regression model can be generalised. 
Consequently, the smaller the difference between the R square and Adjusted R square, 
the better. The differences between the R squares and Adjusted R squares for all sections 
in the three time periods were very small, so the results of this regression model can be 
generalised to too great an extent. F values provide information about the predictive 
capability of the regression model. The F values which tested the significance of the 
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equation were all statistically significant, at the significance level of 0.01, for all the 
sections in all three time periods. Thus, the regression model employed in the study 
provided significantly better predictive powers for the effect of the related variables (the 
independent and control variables) on the dependent variables. Also, the t values, which 
determine whether the independent and control variables make a significant contribution 
to the model, could be regarded as statistically meaningful to too great a degree. The 
constant, which refers to the y intercept, and the gradient were both statistically 
significant, at the significance level of 0.01. As a result, considering the R square, 
Adjusted R square and F and t values of the regression model, the explanatory power 
and validity of this model were so high that we could use the results when explaining 
the factors which affected the DR.   
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Table 5-16 Factors Which Affect the DR in the Three Time Periods 
Independent and control variables 
2005-2007 (First SABP cycle) 2008-2010 (Second SABP cycle) 2005-2010 
Performanc
e planning 
section 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
Performance 
planning 
section 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
Performanc
e planning 
section 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
MOSF’s review score -0.013
*** 
(-29.187) 
-0.009*** 
(-20.070) 
-0.005*** 
(-28.957) 
-0.021*** 
(-25.855) 
-0.008*** 
(-11.398) 
-0.006*** 
(-16.513) 
-0.015*** 
(-36.815) 
-0.008*** 
(-22.285) 
-0.002*** 
(-13.607) 
Specific programme’s self-assessment 
score minus average score of the ministry 
0.007*** 
(10.483) 
0.008*** 
(12.611) 
0.003*** 
(11.049) 
0.009*** 
(8.522) 
0.006*** 
(6.447) 
0.004*** 
(8.249) 
0.008*** 
(13.222) 
0.007*** 
(13.742) 
0.002*** 
(6.893) 
Budget changes for the current year 0.000 (0.948) 
-0.001 
(-1.606) 
-9.091E-5 
(-0.608) 
-0.004 
(-0.845) 
0.009** 
(2.409) 
0.005** 
(2.316) 
0.000 
(0.533) 
-0.001* 
(-1.732) 
0.000 
(-0.895) 
Programmes managed directly by 
government (1,0) 
-0.034*** 
(-2.914) 
0.049*** 
(4.303) 
0.015*** 
(3.076) 
-0.032* 
(-1.869) 
0.009 
(0.630) 
0.002 
(0.793) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.829) 
0.031*** 
(3.437) 
0.002 
(0.371) 
Small programmes (1,0) -0.030
** 
(-2.126) 
0.004 
(0.332) 
-0.003 
(-0.463) 
0.015 
(0.739) 
0.014 
(0.780) 
-0.003 
(-0.376) 
-0.013 
(-1.133) 
0.006 
(0.554) 
0.019*** 
(3.070) 
Large programmes (1,0) 
 
0.032** 
(2.270) 
0.008 
(0.577) 
0.004 
(0.720) 
0.013 
(0.697) 
-0.021 
(-1.308) 
-0.009 
(-1.096) 
0.026** 
(2.255) 
-0.001 
(-0.143) 
0.023*** 
(3.874) 
Programmes belonging to ministry 
(1,0) 
-0.058*** 
(-3.752) 
-0.028* 
(-1.886) 
0.007 
(1.068) 
-0.036* 
(-1.835) 
0.035** 
(2.078) 
0.013 
(1.459) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.776) 
-0.004 
(-0.315) 
0.017*** 
(3.609) 
Programmes related to economy (1,0) 0.004 (0.334) 
-0.021 
(-1.636) 
-7.085E-5 
(-0.013) 
-0.005 
(-0.285) 
0.013 
(0.804) 
0.004 
(0.444) 
-0.002 
(-0.199) 
-0.009 
(-0.891) 
-0.015** 
(-2.502) 
Programmes related to welfare (1,0) 0.076
*** 
(4.568) 
-0.045*** 
(-2.806) 
0.036*** 
(5.141) 
-0.035 
(-1.583) 
-0.048** 
(-2.529) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.053) 
0.036** 
(2.590) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.727) 
0.006 
(0.895) 
Programmes implemented SABP by 
two or more times (1,0) 
-0.011 
(-0.947) 
0.026** 
(2.330) 
-0.003 
(-0.644) 
0.011 
(0.691) 
-0.002 
(-0.171) 
-0.014* 
(-1.953) 
-0.021** 
(-2.186) 
-0.001 
(-0.082) 
0.015*** 
(3.129) 
Constant 1.221
*** 
(36.658) 
0.985*** 
(30.590) 
0.564*** 
(40.037) 
1.801*** 
(30.549) 
0.980*** 
(19.468) 
0.693*** 
(25.683) 
1.373*** 
(45.714) 
0.985*** 
(36.203) 
0.321*** 
(52.978) 
F 96.346*** 50.006*** 95.829*** 73.598*** 17.760*** 34.260*** 150.152*** 59.672*** 24.828*** 
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.227 0.362 0.389 0.128 0.228 0.346 0.173 0.078 
R2 0.367 0.231 0.366 0.394 0.136 0.234 0.349 0.175 0.082 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is disagreement ratio in each programme. 2. Unstandardized coefficient value of each variable and t values in the parenthesis are 
reported. 3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
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5.4 Factors which Affect the Relative Optimism Ratio 
 
Analyses of the factors which affected the RORs of spending ministries were carried out in 
the same way as in the previous section. 
 
5.4.1 Analysis of the Independent Variables  
 
From Table 5-17, it can be seen that the MOSF’s review score had a statistically significant 
impact on the RORs for three sections in the three different time periods, at the significance 
level of 0.01. The effective direction was completely negative. Unstandardized coefficients of 
the variables in the three sections in the six-year pooled data were -0.012, -0.008 and -0.004 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, this means that if the MOSF’s review scores increase by 
10 points, then the RORs for performance planning, results and the whole section will 
decrease by 0.12%, 0.08% and 0.04% respectively. The results for the other two time periods 
were similar to those for the six-year time period. As a result, the MOSF’s review scores had 
a negative relationship with the RORs for the three sections in the three time periods, at the 
significance level of 0.01.  
 
The other independent variable had a positive impact on the RORs for the three sections in 
the three different time periods, at the significance level of 0.01, because all unstandardized 
coefficients of this variable were positive. For example, in the six-year pooled data, 
unstandardized coefficients in the three sections were 0.008, 0.011 and 0.005 respectively. 
This means that if the specific score minus average score of that spending ministry increases 
by 10 points, then the RORs for the three sections will increase by 0.08%, 0.11% and 0.05% 
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respectively. Therefore, it can be said that this variable made a statistically significant 
contribution to the RORs in the three time periods in a positive way.  
 
5.4.2 Analysis of the Control Variables 
 
The control variables had different impacts on the RORs in the three time periods. Firstly, 
budget changes for the current year only had a significant effect on the ROR for the results 
section in the six-year pooled data, at the significance level of 0.1, and the effective direction 
was negative. However, in the other two time periods, this variable did not have any 
statistically significant influence on the RORs for the three sections. Thus, it can be said that 
this variable had a negative relationship with the ROR for the results section in the six-year 
pooled data. 
 
Secondly, programmes directly managed by the government had a statistically significant 
effect on the ROR for the results section in the first SABP cycle and the six-year pooled data, 
at the significance level of 0.1, and the effective direction was all positive. However, it had 
no statistically significant impact on the other ROR. So, this variable had a positive 
relationship with the ROR for the results section in the first SABP cycle and the six-year 
pooled data. 
 
Thirdly, small programmes had a statistically significant influence on the ROR for the results 
section in the second SABP cycle and the six-year pooled data, at the significance level of 
0.01, and the effective direction was positive. Consequently, small programmes had a 
positive relationship with the ROR for the results section in the second SABP cycle and the 
six-year pooled data.  
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Fourthly, large programmes had a statistically significant impact on the ROR for the 
performance planning section in the three time periods, at the significance level of 0.01 and 
0.05, and the effective direction was all positive. Thus, large programmes had a positive 
relationship with the ROR for the performance planning section in all the time periods. 
 
Fifthly, programmes belonging to the ministry affected the RORs for the performance 
planning and results sections at the significance level of 0.1 and 0.05 respectively, and the 
effective direction was all negative. However, this variable also had statistically significant 
relationships with the RORs for the results section in the second cycle and the whole section 
in the six-year period, at the level of 0.1, and the effective direction was all positive. 
Considering the impact of the variable on the RORs in the second cycle and the six-year 
pooled data, and particularly on the ROR for the whole section in six-year pooled data, it can 
be said that this variable had a positive relationship with the RORs.  
 
Sixthly, programmes related to the economy had statistically significant relationships with the 
RORs for the performance planning and results sections in the first cycle, at the level of 0.01, 
but the effective directions were opposite to each other. However, this variable had a 
statistically significant impact on the RORs for the results section of the second cycle and the 
performance planning section in the six-year pooled data, and the effective direction was all 
positive. Considering the most significant relationships, this variable had a positive 
relationship with the RORs.  
 
Seventhly, welfare-related programmes affected the RORs for the performance planning and 
results sections, at the significance level of 0.01, but the effective directions were opposite to 
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each other. In the second cycle, this variable had a statistically significant impact on the 
RORs for the results section and whole sections, at the level of 0.05, and the effective 
direction was all negative. In addition, in the six-year pooled data this variable had a 
significant influence on the RORs for three sections, with the effective direction in 
performance planning being positive while those in the other two sections were all negative. 
Considering the various impacts of this variable on the RORs, especially the negative 
direction of the ROR for the whole section in the second cycle and the six-year period, it can 
be said that it had a negative relationship with the RORs.  
 
Finally, the number of times SABP was implemented had a statistically significant impact on 
the RORs for whole section in the first cycle and the six-year pooled data, at the significance 
level of 0.05 and 0.01 respectively, and the effective direction was all negative. Consequently, 
considering the RORs for the whole section in the first cycle and the six-year pooled data 
were negative, this variable had a negative relationship with the RORs in a statistically 
significant way. 
 
5.4.3 Analysis of the R square, Adjusted R square, and F ratio 
 
The highest and the lowest R squares were both in the second SABP cycle. The former was 
0.319, for the performance planning section; and the latter was 0.149, for the results section. 
As mentioned earlier, this means that 10 predictors can explain 31.9% of the variation in the 
ROR for the performance planning section and 14.9% of the variation in the ROR for the 
results section in the second cycle. Also, the R squares generally ranged from 0.20 to 0.30, so 
it seemed that it was relatively high level. Interestingly, the R squares for the three sections in 
the six-year pooled data were all over 0.20, indicating that the R square for the whole section 
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was 0.212. The R square for the performance planning section was relatively higher than that 
for the other sections in the second cycle and six-year period; but in the first cycle, the R 
square for the whole section reached the highest level, while that for the performance 
planning section reached the lowest level. The adjusted R square was similar to the R square 
for all the sections in the three different time periods, and this meant that the regression 
model could be generalised well. The F values which tested the significance of the regression 
model were all statistically significant, at the level of 0.01. So, the regression model 
employed in the study provided significantly higher explanatory powers for all predictors on 
the RORs. In addition, the t values determine whether the independent and control variables 
can also be said to make a significant contribution to the model. The constant, which refers to 
the y intercept, and the gradient were both statistically significant, at the significance level of 
0.01. As a result, considering the R square, Adjusted R square and F and t values, the 
predictive power and validity of the regression model were so high that we could use the 
results of this model in terms of explaining the factors which affected the RORs of spending 
ministries. 
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Table 5-17 Factors Which Affect the ROR of Spending Ministries in the Three Time Periods 
Independent and control variables 
2005-2007 (First SABP cycle) 2008-2010 (Second SABP cycle) 2005-2010 
Performance 
planning 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
Performance 
planning 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
Performance 
planning 
Results 
section 
Whole 
section 
MOSF’s review score -0.008*** (-12.711) 
-0.009*** 
(-19.406) 
-0.004*** 
(-23.243) 
-0.021*** 
(-19.077) 
-0.007*** 
(-9.455) 
-0.006*** 
(-13.286) 
-0.012*** 
(-21.654) 
-0.008*** 
(-20.251) 
-0.004*** 
(-22.924) 
Specific programme’s self-assessment 
score minus average score of the ministry 
0.007*** 
(9.397) 
0.011*** 
(17.726) 
0.004*** 
(18.791) 
0.009*** 
(7.141) 
0.009*** 
(9.911) 
0.006*** 
(8.786) 
0.008*** 
(11.481) 
0.011*** 
(19.544) 
0.005*** 
(17.741) 
Budget changes for the current year 0.000 (0.452) 
0.000 
(-1.566) 
-3.139E-6 
(-0.025) 
-0.001 
(-0.288) 
0.003 
(0.914) 
-0.001 
(-0.535) 
0.000 
(0.300) 
-0.001* 
(-1.724) 
-7.366E-5 
(-0.424) 
Programmes managed directly by 
government (1,0) 
0.020 
(1.560) 
0.021* 
(1.833) 
0.003 
(0.647) 
-0.004 
(-0.186) 
0.019 
(1.260) 
0.006 
(0.624) 
0.003 
(0.276) 
0.016* 
(1.815) 
0.001 
(0.279) 
Small programmes (1,0) -0.011 (-0.735) 
0.017 
(1.290) 
-0.001 
(-0.257) 
0.015 
(0.654) 
0.050*** 
(2.842) 
0.015 
(1.318) 
0.000 
(-0.021) 
0.030*** 
(2.778) 
0.006 
(1.063) 
Large programmes (1,0) 0.043*** (2.888) 
0.017 
(1.258) 
0.002 
(0.343) 
0.046** 
(2.060) 
0.001 
(0.086) 
0.008 
(0.780) 
0.046*** 
(3.478) 
0.013 
(1.292) 
0.006 
(1.132) 
Programmes belonging to ministry 
(1,0) 
-0.029* 
(-1.803) 
-0.031** 
(-2.134) 
0.008 
(1.403) 
-0.020 
(-0.866) 
0.033* 
(1.958) 
0.012 
(1.074) 
-0.019 
(-1.324) 
-0.005 
(-0.415) 
0.010* 
(1.742) 
Programmes related to economy 
(1,0) 
0.054*** 
(3.767) 
-0.033*** 
(-2.614) 
-0.001 
(-0.127) 
0.034 
(1.547) 
0.028* 
(1.734) 
0.018 
(1.637) 
0.041*** 
(3.193) 
-0.007 
(-0.746) 
0.005 
(1.031) 
Programmes related to welfare (1,0) 0.066*** (3.991) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.108) 
-0.007 
(-1.131) 
-0.005 
(-0.189) 
-0.040** 
(-2.067) 
-0.033** 
(-2.587) 
0.040*** 
(2.693) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.693) 
-0.016** 
(-2.541) 
Programmes implemented SABP 
two or more times (1,0) 
0.001 
(0.076) 
0.013 
(1.175) 
-0.009** 
(-2.161) 
-0.006 
(-0.312) 
0.018 
(1.378) 
-0.008 
(-0.884) 
-0.016 
(-1.514) 
0.004 
(0.488) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.508) 
Constant 0.947*** (22.242) 
0.989*** 
(29.606) 
0.470*** 
(38.206) 
1.763*** 
(23.541) 
0.825*** 
(15.909) 
0.637*** 
(18.975) 
1.223*** 
(30.990) 
0.918*** 
(32.461) 
0.513*** 
(36.485) 
F 24.153*** 57.120*** 74.050*** 40.972*** 18.754*** 24.461*** 56.414*** 67.475*** 72.897*** 
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.279 0.311 0.312 0.141 0.176 0.213 0.208 0.209 
R2 0.173 0.284 0.315 0.319 0.149 0.184 0.217 0.211 0.212 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the ROR in performance planning, results, and whole section.  
         2. Unstandardized coefficient value of each variable and t values are shown in parentheses. 
         3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and *** at the 0.01 level.  
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5.5 Comparison of Results Related to the DR and ROR  
 
The previous two sections analysed the factors which affected the DR and ROR. This 
section compares the significant variables which affected the DR and ROR, and 
examines whether the results of regression analyses can verify the predictions of the 
impact of several variables on the dependent variables mentioned in Chapter 4. If the 
independent and control variables had statistically significant relationships with the DR 
and ROR for a specific section, then the extent of the impact might be partial. If there 
were statistically significant relationships with other sections, then the impact might be 
general. Moreover, if the variables had statistically significant relationships with the DR 
and ROR for other sections, especially for the whole section, then the extent of the 
impact could be regarded as strong. Two independent variables strongly supported the 
predictions: that is, the MOSF’s review score had a negative relationship with both the 
DR and the ROR for all sections in the three different time periods, at the significance 
level of 0.01; and the specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the average 
score of the spending ministry in that year (specific score minus average score) had a 
statistically significant impact on both the DR and ROR in a positive direction, at the 
significance level of 0.01. The impacts of control variables on the DR and ROR are 
summarised in Tables 5-18 and 5-19. Budget changes for the current year had a partially 
negative relationship with the ROR, but it was not clear whether this variable had a 
negative relationship with the DR, so the relationship between this variable and the 
ROR might partially support the prediction, whilst it was not clear whether the 
relationship between this variable and the DR supported it. Direct programmes managed 
by the government had a positive relationship with both the DR and ROR, so the 
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relationship between this variable and the DR and ROR might support the predictions. 
However, the extent of these impacts might be partial.  
 
Table 5- 18 Relationships Between Control Variables and the DR 
Control variables 
2005-2007 2008-2010 2005-2010 
Plan Results Whole Plan Results Whole Plan Results Whole 
Budget changes     +** +**  -*  
Direct programmes -*** +*** +*** -*   -*** +***  
Small programmes  -**        +*** 
Large programmes  +**      +**  +*** 
Ministry programmes  -*** -*  -* +**  -***  +*** 
Economy-related          -** 
Welfare-related  +*** -*** +***  -** -*** +** -***  
Number of SABP  +**    -* -**  +*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5- 19 Relationships Between Control Variables and the ROR 
Control variables 
2005-2007 2008-2010 2005-2010 
Plan Results Whole Plan Results Whole Plan Results Whole 
Budget changes        -*  
Direct programmes  +*      +*  
Small programmes      +***   +***  
Large programmes  +***   +**   +***   
Ministry programmes  -* -**   +*    +* 
Economy-related  +*** -***   +*  +***   
Welfare-related  +*** -***   -** -** +*** -*** -** 
Number of SABP   -**      -*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Small programmes had a positive relationship with both the DR and the ROR, so these 
relationships might not support the predictions, and the extent of the impacts might be 
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partial. Large programmes had a positive relationship with the DR and ROR, so this 
might support the predictions, and the extent of the impacts was completely partial. 
Programmes belonging to ministries had a positive relation with the ROR, so this might 
support the prediction, but the extent of the impacts might be partial. However, whether 
this variable had a positive relationship with the DR was not clear. Economy-related 
programmes had a negative relationship with the DR, while they had a positive relation 
with the ROR, so the relationship between this variable and the DR might not support 
the prediction, while the relationship with the ROR might support the prediction. 
Considering the extent of the impacts, the former was partial while the latter might be 
general. As for welfare-related programmes, it was not clear whether this variable had a 
positive or a negative relationship with the DR. However, this variable might have a 
negative relationship with the ROR. Consequently, whether the relationship between 
this variable and the DR supported the prediction was not clear, but the relationship 
between this variable and the ROR might support the prediction. The extent of the 
impact of the former seemed to be general, while that of the latter was strong. Similarly, 
we cannot be sure whether the number of times SABP had been implemented had a 
positive or a negative relationship with the DR. However, this variable had a negative 
relationship with the ROR, so the relationship between this variable and the ROR might 
support the prediction. The extent of the former and the latter might be general.  
 
The predictions, including the effective direction between the variables and the 
verification results, are summarised in Table 5-20. Two independent variables strongly 
supported the predictions. As for the relationship between the eight control variables 
and the DR, just two variables (direct and ministry programmes) supported the 
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predictions, and two variables (small and economy-related programmes) did not support 
them, while it was not clear whether four variables (budget changes, ministry, welfare-
related and number of times SABP implemented) supported the predictions or not. 
However, with respect to the relationship between the eight control variables and the 
ROR, seven variables supported the predictions and just one (small programmes) did 
not. The specific meaning of these results will be interpreted in Chapter 7.  
 
 
Table 5- 20 Verification of Predictions 
(O: Support, X: Not support) 
 
 Predictions Sign DR ROR 
1 
MOSF’s review score may have a negative relationship with the 
DR and ROR if there has been a high and persistent optimism 
bias by spending ministries.  
- O (strongly) 
O 
(strongly) 
2 
Specific score minus average score may have positive 
relationship with the DR and ROR if the MOSF has drastically 
cut spending ministries’ generous self-assessment results.  
+ O (strongly) 
O 
(strongly) 
3 
Budget changes may have a negative relationship with the DR 
and ROR. - 
Not clear 
(partially) 
O 
(partially) 
4 
Direct programmes may have a positive relationship with the 
DR and ROR. + 
O 
(partially) 
O 
(partially) 
5 
Small programmes may have a negative relationship with the 
DR and ROR. - 
X 
(partially) 
X 
(partially) 
6 
Large programmes may have a positive relationship with the 
DR and ROR. + 
O 
(partially) 
O 
(partially) 
7 
Ministry’s programmes may have a positive relationship with 
the DR and ROR. + 
Not clear 
(partially) 
O 
(generally) 
8 
Economy-related programmes may have a positive relationship 
with the DR and ROR. + 
X 
(partially) 
O 
(generally) 
9 
Welfare-related programmes may have a negative relationship 
with the DR and ROR. - 
Not clear 
(generally) 
O 
(strongly) 
10 
The number of times SABP implemented may have a negative 
relationship with the DR and ROR. - 
Not clear 
(generally) 
O 
(generally) 
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5.6 Dynamic Pattern of the RORs of Spending Ministries 
 
This section analyses the dynamic pattern of the RORs of spending ministries from 
programmes which were assessed by SABP two or three times between 2005 and 2010. 
By analysing the dynamic pattern of the RORs, we can identify the strategic behaviours 
of both spending ministries and the MOSF at any given ROR level, and moreover this 
might lead to an opportunity to explore the algorithm of the optimum response by 
spending ministries and the MOSF at any given ROR level. This section uses ROR data 
rather than DR data, not only because most independent and control variables had 
statistically significant relationships with the ROR but also because they fulfilled 
predictions, as analysed in the previous section. For the convenience of the analysis, the 
study assumes two possible situations: the ROR of a specific programme is higher than 
that of the spending ministry in that year; and the ROR of a specific programme is 
lower than that of the spending ministry in that year. From these two possible situations 
we can develop two plausible predictions.  
 
5.6.1 Two Predictions 
 
Firstly, when the ROR of a specific programme is higher than that of the spending 
ministry in that year, it is highly plausible that the spending ministry self-assessed the 
specific programme more generously than other programmes, and the MOSF will 
drastically cut the spending ministry’s self-assessment score, as analysed in 5.4. In that 
case, it might be plausible for the spending ministry to reduce this programme’s self-
assessment score in the next SABP round, because there has been a lot of criticism of 
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this phenomenon. For example, the National Assembly and the news media have 
criticised the spending ministries overestimated SABP scores. The NABO and several 
media have questioned the effectiveness of spending ministries’ self-assessment scores 
(NABO, 2010c; Park, 2009; Asiaeconomy, 2009; Joongangilbo, 2009). As well as the 
spending ministries, the MOSF might also think of big differences between SABP 
scores as unintended dysfunctional consequences of SABP, so the MOSF might try to 
reduce the high ROR by raising its own review score in the next SABP. Actually, in 
order to reduce the big SABP score gap, from 2010 on the MOSF has given penalties to 
spending ministries where the SABP score gap between the ministry and the MOSF is 
20 points or more (MOSF, 2010a, 2011b). From these behavioural expectations of both 
the spending ministries and the MOSF, the following prediction can be developed: 
 
Prediction 1: If the ROR for a specific programme is higher than the average for the 
spending ministry, then the spending ministry will reduce its self-assessment score for 
this programme, while the MOSF will raise its review score, in the next SABP round, 
and consequently the ROR for the programme will fall in the next SABP round.  
 
Secondly, when the ROR for a specific programme is lower than the average for the 
spending ministry in that year, it is highly probable that the spending ministry has self-
assessed the specific programme more strictly than others of its programmes, and the 
MOSF will not drastically cut the spending ministry’s self-assessment score, as 
analysed in 5.4. In that case, the spending ministry might try to raise this programme’s 
self-assessment score in the next SABP round, with the intention of matching the 
programme’s self-assessment score with those of other programmes. Conversely, the 
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MOSF might consider the review score of this programme as more generous than those 
of other programmes of the spending ministry, so the MOSF will reduce its review 
score of this programme in the next SABP round. Therefore, it might be possible to 
make the following prediction:  
 
Prediction 2: If the ROR for a specific programme is lower than the average for the 
spending ministry, then the spending ministry will raise its self-assessment score for this 
programme, while the MOSF will reduce its review score, in the next SABP round, and 
consequently the ROR for the programme will increase in the next SABP round.  
 
5.6.2 Data Analysis 
 
As mentioned earlier, this section analyses the programmes assessed by SABP two or 
three times, and their distribution can be seen in Table 5-21. Among 2,920 programmes 
from 2005 to 2010, 2,451 were evaluated by SABP once, 425 twice, and 44 three times. 
Also, the study examines these programmes by dividing them into two types on the 
basis of the ROR for specific programme in the first SABP round: the ROR of specific 
programme was higher than that of the spending ministry; and the ROR of specific 
programme was lower than that of the spending ministry. 
 
Table 5-21 Distribution of Programmes Assessed by SABP Two or Three Times 
(Unit: number of programmes) 
Number of SABP ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 Total 
Twice 1
st 165 136 113 9 2  425 
2nd   31 144 119 131 425 
Three 
times 
1st 18 18 8    44 
2nd   20 13 11  44 
3rd    3 6 35 44 
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Programmes Assessed by SABP Twice 
 
(1) ROR of specific programme in first SABP round > ROR of spending ministry in first 
SABP round  
 
Among 425 programmes, the number in this category was 209. For these programmes, 
the changes in the spending ministries self-assessment score, the MOSF’s review score, 
the ROR, and the t-test results can be seen in Table 5-22.  
 
 
Table 5- 22 Changes of Self-Assessment Score, Review Score and the ROR (t-test) 
(Unit: points, t-value) 
 Self-assessment score MOSF’s review score ROR of specific programme 
First SABP 90.17 56.23 0.303 
Second SABP 91.28 64.87 0.247 
Mean difference -1.11 -8.64 0.057 
t-value -1.286 -8.777*** 4.646*** 
*** p < 0.01  
   
According to Table 5-22, when specific programme’s ROR in the first SABP round was 
higher than the spending ministry’s ROR in the first SABP round, the spending ministry 
tried to increase the specific programme’s self-assessment score, which was different 
from Prediction 1. However, this was not statistically significant, so it is not clear 
whether the spending ministry increased the self-assessment score of the specific 
programme in a statistically meaningful way. The MOSF also increased the review 
score of the specific programme in the second SABP round, and this was statistically 
significant at the significance level of 0.01. The ROR for these programmes decreased 
from 0.303 in the first SABP round to 0.247 in the second SABP round, at the 
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significance level of 0.01. Consequently, Prediction 1 might be said to be generally but 
not strongly supported, and it might be said that the MOSF tried to reduce the high ROR 
by raising its review score in the next SABP round. 
 
(2) ROR of specific programme in first SABP round < ROR of spending ministry in first 
SABP round   
 
Among 425 programmes, the number in this category was 201. Table 5-23 indicates the 
trend of spending ministries’ self-assessment score, the MOSF’s review score, the ROR 
for a specific programme, and the t-test results. 
 
 
Table 5- 23 Changes in Self-Assessment Score, Review Score and the ROR (t-test) 
(Unit: points, t-value) 
 Self-assessment score MOSF’s review score ROR of specific programme 
First SABP 87.73 69.52 0.128 
Second SABP 91.89 66.82 0.215 
Mean difference -4.16 2.70 -0.086 
t-value -4.340*** -8.777*** -5.281*** 
*** p < 0.01  
 
According to Table 5-23, when specific programme’s ROR was lower than the spending 
ministry’s ROR in the first SABP round, the spending ministry tried to increase the self-
assessment score of this programme in the second SABP round, while the MOSF 
decreased the review score. As a result of these behaviours, the ROR for specific 
programmes increased from 0.128 in the first SABP round to 0.215 in the second SABP 
round. Moreover, these three results were all statistically significant at the significance 
level of 0.01. Consequently, Prediction 2 might be said to be strongly supported in a 
statistically meaningful manner, and this means that the spending ministry had an 
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incentive to raise a self-assessment score relatively lower than that of other programmes, 
whilst the MOSF reduced its relatively generous review score.  
 
Programmes Assessed by SABP Three Times 
 
(1) ROR of specific programme in first SABP round > ROR of spending ministry in first 
SABP round   
 
Among 44 programmes, the number in this category was 22. For these programmes, the 
trend in the spending ministries’ self-assessment score, the MOSF’s review score, and 
the ROR for specific programmes when SABP was implemented three times can be 
seen in Table 5-24. In addition, Table 5-25 shows whether the behaviours of both the 
spending ministries and the MOSF were statistically supported by employing the results 
of Analysis Of Variance between Groups (ANOVA). The spending ministries’ self-
assessment score decreased from 91.79 in the first SABP round to 90.33 in the third 
SABP round, as mentioned in Prediction 1, although in the second SABP round the 
score increased to 93.61. However, the spending ministry’s attempt to decrease the self-
assessment score was not statistically significant. On the other hand, the MOSF’s 
review score increased greatly from 52.90 in the first SABP round to 64.45 in the third, 
and it was statistically significant at the level of 0.01. As a result, the ROR for the 
specific programme fell from 0.334 in the first SABP round to 0.204 in the third, and 
this was also statistically significant at the level of 0.01. Overall, Prediction 1 was 
generally but not strongly supported, like the analysis result of programmes assessed by 
SABP twice, and it implies that the MOSF tried to reduce the high ROR for specific 
programmes by reducing the review score of the programme, whilst it is not clear 
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whether the spending ministries tried to reduce a self-assessment score that was more 
generous than those of other programmes in a statistically significant way. 
 
Table 5-24 Changes in Self-Assessment Score, Review Score, and ROR of Specific Programme 
(Unit: points, ratio) 
 
 1st SABP 2nd SABP  3rd SABP 
Spending ministry’s self-assessment score 91.79 93.61 90.33 
MOSF’s review score 52.90 67.76 64.45 
ROR of specific programme 0.334 0.201 0.204 
 
Table 5-25 Mean Differences between the Self-Assessment Score, Review Score and ROR 
(ANOVA) 
 Sum of squares d.f Mean square F Sig. 
Self-
assessment 
score 
Between groups 91.860 2 45.930 0.547 0.582 
Within groups 4033.112 48 84.023   
Total 4124.972 50    
Review 
score 
Between groups 2070.781 2 1035.390 12.834*** 0.000 
Within groups 3872.396 48 80.675   
Total 5943.177 50    
ROR 
Between groups 0.197 2 0.098 6.988*** 0.002 
Within groups 0.675 48 0.014   
Total 0.872 50    
 *** p < 0.01  
 
(2) ROR of specific programme in first SABP round < ROR of spending ministry in first 
SABP round   
 
Among 44 programmes, the number in this category was 17. The trend in the spending 
ministries’ self-assessment score, the MOSF’s review score, and the ROR for specific 
programmes can be seen in Table 5-26. In addition, Table 5-27 shows the ANOVA 
results for these programmes. According to Tables 5-26 and 5-27, the spending 
ministries greatly increased the self-assessment score of these programmes from 80.55 
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in the first SABP round to 91.33 in the third, as mentioned in Prediction 2, and this was 
statistically significant at the level of 0.01. On the other hand, the MOSF increased the 
review score for these programmes, which was different from Prediction 2. However, 
this result was not statistically significant, so it is not clear whether the MOSF increased 
the score in a statistically meaningful way. As a result of these behaviours, the ROR for 
these programmes increased from 0.138 in the first SABP round to 0.242 in the third, 
and this was statistically significant at the level of 0.05. Consequently, Prediction 2 
might be said to be generally but not strongly supported, and spending ministries might 
have an incentive to raise the self-assessment score, which was relatively lower than 
that for their other programmes.  
 
Table 5-26 Changes in Self-Assessment Score, Review Score, and the ROR for Specific Programme 
(Unit: points, ratio) 
 1st SABP 2nd SABP  3rd SABP 
Spending ministry’s self-assessment score 80.55 93.96 91.33 
MOSF’s review score 60.91 65.27 66.33 
ROR of specific programme 0.138 0.222 0.242 
 
Table 5-27 Mean differences in Self-Assessment Score, Review Score and the ROR (ANOVA) 
 Sum of squares d.f Mean square F Sig. 
Self-
assessment 
score 
Between groups 2222.492 2 1111.246 10.808*** 0.000 
Within groups 6477.572 63 102.819   
Total 8700.064 65    
Review 
score 
Between groups 363.013 2 181.506 2.014 0.142 
Within groups 5678.202 63 90.130   
Total 6041.215 65    
ROR 
Between groups 0.134 5 0.018 3.692** 0.030 
Within groups 1.143 63    
Total 1.277 65    
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Summary 
 
Firstly, when, in the first round, the ROR for specific programme was higher than the 
average for the spending ministry in that year, the ROR for this kind of programme was 
decreased in the later SABP round in a statistically significant way. During this process, 
the MOSF raised the review score to reduce the high ROR for specific programme, and 
this was statistically significant. However, the spending ministries’ behaviour was not 
statistically significant, whether it raised or reduced the self-assessment score of this 
kind of programme. Secondly, when, in the first round, the ROR for specific 
programme was lower than the average for the spending ministry in that year, the ROR 
for this kind of programme was increased in the later SABP round in a statistically 
significant way. During this process, both the spending ministries and the MOSF 
behaved as mentioned in Prediction 2 in the programmes assessed by SABP twice. 
However, in the programmes assessed by SABP three times, the spending ministries 
raised the self-assessment score for this kind of programme in a statistically significant 
manner, although the MOSF’s behaviour was not statistically significant. Consequently, 
it might be said that the MOSF tried strongly to reduce a high ROR by raising its review 
score in the next SABP round. On the other hand, the spending ministries had more 
interest in increasing a low ROR by increasing their self-assessment score than in 
decreasing a high ROR by decreasing their self-assessment score. The results of data 
analysis for the dynamic pattern of RORs are summarised in Table 5-28.  
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Table 5-28 Summary of the Results of the Dynamic Pattern of RORs 
(O: support the prediction, X: not support the prediction) 
  Self-assessment 
score 
Review score ROR Prediction 
SABP 
twice 
ROR of specific 
programme > ROR of 
spending ministry 
X 
(statistically  
not significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
Accepted 
(generally) 
ROR of specific 
programme < ROR of 
spending ministry 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
Accepted 
(strongly) 
SABP  
three 
times 
ROR of specific 
programme > ROR of 
spending ministry 
O 
(statistically  
not significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
Accepted 
(generally) 
ROR of specific 
programme < ROR of 
spending ministry 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
X 
(statistically  
not significant) 
O 
(statistically 
significant) 
Accepted 
(generally) 
 
Note: Shaded part was different from the behaviours mentioned in predictions 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analysed the factors which affect the DR and ROR of spending 
ministries. To do this, after ascertaining the differences between the SABP scores and 
grades of spending ministries and those of the MOSF, it firstly examined the 
relationship between the independent and control variables and the dependent variables, 
by employing correlation analysis, scatter diagrams and t-tests to see whether the 
variables extracted from the relevant literatures actually had some relationship with the 
dependent variables. The chapter found that all the independent and control variables 
had statistically significant relationships with the dependent variables through the 
preliminary statistical analysis, mainly of the six-year pooled data. Secondly, in order to 
verify the relationships between the variables in detail in the three different time periods, 
the chapter employed multiple regression analysis. After diagnosing the linear 
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regression model’s goodness-of-fit through residual analyses and multicollinearity tests, 
such as VIF and tolerance value, it found that all the independent and control variables 
had statistically significant relationships with the DRs and RORs. Moreover, 
considering the relatively high R squares and Adjusted R squares (ranging from 0.20 to 
0.35), the predictive power and validity of the regression model could be also regarded 
as high. As for verifying the predictions mentioned in Chapter 4, the two independent 
variables strongly supported the predictions. All the control variables except for small 
programmes strongly, generally or partially supported the predictions relating to the 
ROR. However, with regard to the predictions relating to the DR, only two control 
variables supported the predictions and two variables did not support them, while it was 
not clear whether four control variables supported the predictions or not, although they 
all had statistically significant relationships with the DR. The detailed reasons and 
meanings of these results will be discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, the chapter also 
analysed the dynamic pattern of the RORs, in order to explain the strategic behaviours 
of both spending ministries and the MOSF in relation to any given ROR level from the 
programmes assessed by SABP twice or three times from 2005 to 2010. The results 
found that the MOSF had strongly tried to reduce the high ROR by increasing the 
review scores, whilst the spending ministries had more interest in increasing the low 
ROR by raising self-assessment scores. The detailed meanings of these results will be 
also discussed in Chapter 7. The next chapter will analyse the qualitative data for 
exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP and their impacts on the behaviours of 
both spending ministries and the MOSF on the basis of the principal-agent relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR DYSFUNCTIONAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF SABP:  
A MULTIPLE CASE STUDY 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the difference between spending ministries and the MOSF by 
exploring the existence of, the extent of, and the reasons for dysfunctional consequences 
of SABP, and the impact of these on the behaviour of both spending ministries and the 
MOSF. Also, it suggests policy implications for improving the SABP system. It 
employs a multiple case study from eight budgetary programmes in three case study 
areas: in the public housing area, construction of public rental housing (P1), subsidy for 
housing rental costs (P2), and improvement of older public housing stock (P3); in the 
youth employment area, global youth leader training (P4), global trade specialist 
training (P5), and junior college students’ overseas internships (P6); and in the SOC 
area, road construction (P7), and railway construction (P8). In order to fully understand 
the differences between the perspectives and behaviours of spending ministries and the 
MOSF, the chapter analyses qualitative data from documents, archival records and two 
rounds of in-depth interviews with Korean government officials and experts by using N-
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vivo 9, the qualitative data analysis software. Most findings of the chapter are the result 
of the first interviews, and the supplementary interviews focus on the impact of 
dysfunctional consequences and possible policy alternatives. The existence of 
dysfunctional consequences is to be explored on the basis of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2: some dysfunctional consequences are “unintended” by both 
spending ministries and the MOSF, while others are “unintended” by the MOSF but are 
“intended” by spending ministries, as “agents” in the principal-agent relationship. When 
it comes to looking at the extent of dysfunctional consequences, the chapter pays special 
attention to the differing perceptions between spending ministries and the MOSF on 
each dysfunctional consequence. Reasons for dysfunctional consequences are to be 
analysed not only by internal reasons, such as SABP design and public programmes’ 
characteristics, but also by external reasons, like the unique Korean government culture, 
the information asymmetry between spending ministries and the MOSF, and time and 
cost. The chapter also verifies that dysfunctional consequences have an influence on 
both spending ministries’ optimism bias and the MOSF’s strict control. Finally, policy 
alternatives that would produce a better SABP system by reducing or preventing these 
dysfunctional consequences are suggested according to three criteria: those that are 
urgent; those that should be implemented in the short-term; and those that can be 
implemented in the long-term.  
 
6.2 Six Key Themes 
 
From the first 32 interviews with government officials, 868 pieces of coded data were 
initially created from eight programmes in three case study areas and then, finally, the 
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data were classified into six key themes for exploring dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP. The number of codings (references) in each case area was similar, at around 300. 
Interestingly, unlike in the pilot interviews, there was no significant difference in 
perspectives on SABP between spending ministries’ budget divisions and their 
programme divisions, so this was not dealt with as a separate key theme. By examining 
these six themes and their sub-themes, it was possible to explore the types of, the extent 
of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of SABP, as well as the influences of 
these dysfunctional consequences on the SABP results of both spending ministries and 
the MOSF. The six key themes were all closely linked to the conceptual framework 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and, among them the impact of dysfunctional consequences was 
the result of my interpretation of the first interviews, because the topic guide did not 
include explicit questions related to it. However, an explicit question was included in 
the supplementary interviews, and the results of these interviews will be explored later. 
Dysfunctional consequences of SABP had the largest number of codings, because the 
theme included the types of, extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences. 
Policy alternatives had the second largest number of codings, because the category 
contained various kinds of alternatives. As for the background questions, most 
interviewees gave general opinions on the consequences of SABP. Although the 
number of codings related to the strategy of the MOSF and spending ministries and to 
opinions on spending ministries’ efforts to prevent dysfunctional consequences was 
rather small, by repeatedly reviewing the results, I was able to draw out common 
patterns from the eight programmes in three case study areas. The six key themes can be 
seen in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6- 1 Coding and Frequency of Six Key Themes in the Three Case Study Areas 
(Unit: number of coding, %) 
Six key themes 
Public housing  Youth employment SOC Total 
Coding Frequency Coding Frequency Coding Frequency Coding 
Freque
ncy 
General opinions on the 
consequences of SABP 68 24.7 51 16.3 39 13.9 158 18.2 
Strategies of the MOSF and  
spending ministries 20 7.3 12 3.8 9 3.2 41 4.7 
Dysfunctional consequences  
of SABP 116 42.2 143 45.8 153 54.4 412 47.5 
Impact of dysfunctional 
consequences 9 3.3 20 6.4 14 5.0 43 5.0 
Opinions on spending 
ministries’ efforts to prevent 
dysfunctional consequences 
13 4.7 12 3.9 14 5.0 39 4.5 
Policy alternatives 49 17.8 74 23.8 52 18.5 175 20.1 
Total 275 100.0 312 100.0 281 100.0 868 100.0 
 
6.3 General Opinions on the Consequences of SABP  
 
Most respondents gave an opinion as to whether the SABP system had generally 
achieved its aims or not, but the opinions were divided into positive and negative by a 
similar number of references from a similar number of interviewees (22 interviewees 
with 31 references had positive opinions, while 23 interviewees with 37 references were 
negative). Some interviewees commented both positively and negatively in the same 
interview. In each case study area, the number of respondents and references giving 
positive responses was similar to the number giving negative ones. The six experts 
showed a similar division of opinions: five experts making five references were positive; 
while four experts making seven references were negative. The reports of the NABO 
analysing the government’s performance management also commented on both positive 
and negative aspects of SABP (NABO, 2007a, 2008, 2009a, 2010c, 2011). The links 
between the SABP results and budgeting on the one hand, and specialised and fair 
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evaluation for the public sector on the other, were indicated as the main reasons why the 
government achieved its aims. However, the penalty-oriented operation of SABP, the 
intrinsic limitations of the performance budgeting system in the public sector (e.g., 
difficulties in measurement, indirect results, and the time taken to achieve performance, 
etc.), the lack of interest by senior officials, and the lack of specialty in both spending 
ministries and the MOSF were indicated as the main reasons for the programmes not 
achieving optimum performance. Consequently, it can be said that the SABP system has 
increased the efficiency of budget allocation and the accountability of spending 
ministries through linking SABP results with budgeting, but at the same time the SABP 
system needs to be improved for an even better performance budgeting system. The 
number of respondents and references in the three case study areas can be seen in Table 
6-2.  
 
Table 6- 2 General Opinions on the Consequences of SABP in the Three Case Study Areas 
(Unit: number of coding and person) 
Main categories 
Public housing Youth employment SOC Total 
Codi
ng 
M
O
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spe
ndin
g 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spe
ndin
g 
Achieves its aims 11 3 3 11 4 5 9 2 5 31 9 13 
 
Links SABP results 
and budgeting 
7 3 2 7 4 3 3 2 1 17 9 6 
Specialised and fair 
evaluation 2 1 1 4 3 1 3 2 1 9 6 3 
Doesn’t achieve aims 13 2 4 11 5 4 13 4 4 37 11 12 
 
Excessive workload 4 1 3 2 1 1 - - - 6 2 4 
Intrinsic limitation 1 - 1 3 1 2 3 1 2 7 2 5 
Lack of discretion 3 1 2 1 - 1 - - - 4 1 3 
Lack of senior 
officials’ interest 
4 2 1 1 - 1 - - - 5 2 2 
Lack of specialty  4 1 2 - - - 1 1 - 5 2 2 
Lack of trust 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 - 6 3 3 
Penalty-oriented 
operation 
8 2 5 5 2 3 4 1 2 17 5 10 
Spending 
ministries’ tactics 
2 1 - 1 1 - - - - 3 2 - 
Others 6 3 3 3 1 2 2 - 2 11 4 7 
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6.4 Strategies of the Spending Ministries and the MOSF  
 
Although questions about the strategies of the spending ministries and the MOSF could 
not be asked of all interviewees, because of the interviewees’ busy schedules, I could 
discern the main characteristics of these strategies through the three case study areas. 
The formal strategy of the MOSF was closely related to SABP aims of increasing the 
efficiency of budget allocation and improving the performance of a programme (six 
references). This formal strategy had been taken for granted by MOSF officials and this 
had led to the strict application of the SABP checklist to spending ministries’ self-
assessment results and finally resulted in “drastic cutting” of the latter.  
 
“Strategically, the MOSF has put emphasis on budget efficiency by using the 
SABP results, even though sometimes spending ministries have appealed 
against the MOSF’s drastic cutting of their results.” (Manager, MOSF, 
interviewed on 9th November 2011) 
 
However, interestingly, the Budget Office of the MOSF sometimes asked the 
Performance Management Bureau of the MOSF, informally, not to lower the SABP 
results as much as they could be lowered in the case of programmes on the presidential 
agenda (six references). The experts also pointed out the MOSF’s informal strategy 
towards the presidential agenda.  
 
“In respect of the presidential agenda, both spending ministries and the MOSF 
are penalised for the award of poor grades, and this leads to disruption in the 
consistency of evaluation.” (Expert, KIPF, interviewed on 4th November 2011) 
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On the other hand, the Performance Management Bureau of the MOSF showed a 
different attitude in its reactions towards the Budget Office’s request, trying to keep to 
the principles of SABP: more budget resources going into efficient programmes; fewer 
into poor quality programmes. Moreover, the National Assembly and the BAI insisted 
that the Performance Management Bureau of the MOSF explain its reasons in cases 
where it did not obey the SABP principle, and this surveillance by external 
organisations seemed to strengthen the MOSF’s principles.  
 
“Sometimes, if the programme was related to the presidential agenda, I would 
informally ask the officials of the Performance Bureau in my ministry to at 
least not give a poor grade…. However, the Performance Bureau tried to stick 
to their principles, despite the request from their own ministry.” (Manager, 
MOSF, interviewed on 27th October 2011) 
 
When both the formal and informal strategy of the MOSF were considered, it seemed 
that the MOSF generally focused on economic rationalisation in line with the principles 
of SABP, and consequently it tended to take a strict view of the spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results.  
 
With respect to the spending ministries’ formal strategy, these ministries focused on 
developing an appropriate performance indicator and performance target levels (six 
references), and providing satisfactory explanations to the MOSF (nine references). 
Informally, they tried to keep in constant contact with MOSF officials (six references) 
and sometimes actively indulged in tactics such as changing the performance indicator 
itself and avoiding the development of a performance indicator that would be 
disadvantageous to them (four references). These tactics might be related to 
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“misrepresentation” by spending ministries, one of the dysfunctional consequences that 
will be explained later. Spending ministries’ formal and informal strategy was 
completely based on opportunism and a maximisation of their performance, in order to 
obtain high SABP results and as big a budget as possible. These strategies could be seen 
as dysfunctional consequences of the SABP system and as leading, eventually, to an 
optimism bias when it came to self-assessment.  
 
“Formally, I tried to choose the performance indicator which would most easily 
obtain a high SABP score, such as an objectives- or outcome-oriented 
indicator.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 27th October 2011) 
 
“Informally, some officials tried to ask MOSF officials they were acquainted 
with to help them to obtain better than a ‘poor’ grade…” (Assistant Manager, 
MEST, interviewed on 2nd November 2011) 
 
Table 6-3 presents the number of codings related to the formal and informal strategies 
of the MOSF and spending ministries in eight programmes in three case study areas. 
 
Table 6-3 Formal and Informal Strategies of the MOSF and Spending Ministries 
(Unit: number of coding) 
Main categories Public housing 
Youth 
employ
ment 
SOC Total 
MOSF      
 Formal 
strategy Focusing on budget efficiency 2 1 3 6 
Informal 
strategy 
Not lowering the score of programmes on the 
presidential agenda 3 2 1 6 
Intentional drastic cutting - 1 - 1 
Spending ministries      
 
Formal 
strategy 
Report to the Minister 2 - - 2 
Self-restructuring means - 1 - 1 
Study performance indicator and target level 3 2 1 6 
Sufficient explanation 3 3 3 9 
Informal 
strategy 
Keeping informal contact 5 1 - 6 
Using some tactics, such as changing 
performance indicator 2 1 1 4 
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6.5 Types of, Extents of and Reasons for Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP 
 
This section explores the existence of, the extent of and the reasons for the diverse 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP mentioned in the conceptual framework. These 
were drawn from eight programmes in three case study areas by analysing related 
documents (e.g., research memos, the MOSF’s final SABP reports, the National 
Assembly and the BAI’s evaluation reports and new releases, etc.) and the results of the 
first round of interviews. 
 
6.5.1 Tunnel Vision  
 
According to the SABP manual (MOSF, 2010a), the MOSF puts emphasis on non-
quantifiable as well as quantifiable performance24, that is, in Question 2-1 the MOSF 
asks whether spending ministries have developed a quantifiable outcome performance 
indicator, and in Question 4-2 it asks them whether they have implemented 
comprehensive and objective programme evaluation to assess the non-quantifiable, or 
the qualitative, performance of a programme. In this regard, in the case studies in the 
public housing area, P1 and P2 had developed only an evaluation of the quantifiable 
performance of a programme25, which was not related to an outcome, and had not 
implemented comprehensive and objective programme evaluation. Thus, the MOSF 
                                                     
24 Question 2-1. Are there definitive relationships between the performance indicator and the 
purpose of the programme? 4-2. As a result of programme evaluation, is the programme 
operating effectively? 
 
25 The performance indicator for P1 is “public rental housing construction rate”; for P2 it is 
“budget implementation rate”; and for P3 it is “rate of budget grants to local government”.   
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gave a “No” answer to Question 4-2 for the two programmes (MOSF, 2008a, 2010d). 
However, interestingly, in Question 2-1 the two programmes were given a “Yes” 
answer, although performance indicators seemed to focus only on quantifiable 
performance, not on outcome and, moreover, for P1 and P2, Question 2-1 was firstly 
reviewed with a “No” by the MOSF’s Budget Office, but finally changed into a “Yes” 
by the MOSF’s Performance Management Bureau. In this sense, the question of how P1 
and P2 could finally get a “Yes” answer, and the question of whether the MOSF could 
ignore political pressure completely when it came to reviewing the spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results, might need to be considered further in Chapter 7. In the case of 
P3, the MOSF gave a “Yes” response to Question 2-1, because the programme’s main 
purpose was to subsidise the budgets of local government, and this was regarded as a 
quantifiable outcome-related indicator. However, P3 also received by a “No” answer to 
Question 4-2, because there was no profound programme evaluation. Backing up the 
MOSF’s report, most respondents agreed that the spending ministries had a tendency to 
focus on the quantifiable performance of a programme (nine interviewees, with 
references). In the youth employment area, the MOSF also stated that although one of 
the two performance indicators for P4 (employment rate) was related to the outcome, 
the performance indicators for P5 and P6 only dealt with quantifiable performance26, 
none of the three programmes presented full programme evaluation (MOSF, 2010c, 
2010e, 2010f). Consequently, in Question 2-1, P4 was given a “Yes” answer and P5 
received a “No” answer. In the case of P6, the MOSF gave a “Yes” answer on the 
                                                     
 
26  The performance indicators for P4 are “the number of students who completed the 
programme” and “employment rate”; for P5 they are “the number of collaborating companies”, 
“accretion rate of academic credit” and “matching fund rate”; and for P6 they are “improvement 
rate of language skills” and “degree of student satisfaction”. The degree of satisfaction in P6 can 
be seen as a kind of qualitative performance indicator.  
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condition that the spending ministries would develop outcome-oriented performance 
indicators later. The NABO stated that the global trade specialist training programme, 
P5, used only quantifiable performance indicators, and there were no indicators of 
convincing, substantial performance (NABO, 2009a). Most interviewees also said that 
spending ministries tended to pay attention to quantifiable performance, but not to 
interesting non-quantifiable performance (nine interviewees, with nine references). In 
contrast to the previous two case study areas, two programmes, P7 and P827, in the SOC 
area had implemented comprehensive and objective programme evaluations for non-
quantifiable performance (MOSF, 2010d). Thus, at first glance, tunnel vision seemed 
not to exist in the SOC area. However, it is compulsory for a programme for which the 
budget is over 50 billion Won to implement comprehensive evaluation, such as PFS, 
according to the MLTM’s construction technology management regulations. This could 
imply that the MLTM implemented programme evaluation to obey the relevant law, not 
as a result of a voluntary decision. In addition, Question 2-1 for P8 received a “Yes” 
answer on the condition that the MLTM would develop outcome-related performance 
indicators later, as for P6. Moreover, the BAI report indicated that the road construction 
programme’s performance indicators were not suitable evidence of the final outcome of 
the programme, and merely represented the programme’s output (BAI, 2011a). Nine out 
of ten interviewees, making 13 references, in the SOC area also answered that spending 
ministries focused only on quantifiable performance.  
 
“I think spending ministries have a strong tendency to regard quantifiable 
performance as more important…” (Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 28th 
October 2011) 
                                                     
27 Performance indicators for P7 are “budget implementation rate”, “road extension rate” and 
“traffic capacity”; and for P8 it is “double-track rate”. 
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“In the case of the railway construction programme, quantifiable performance 
indicators such as construction rate or double-track rate were mainly used as 
performance indicators.” (Manager, MMTM, interviewed on 11th November 
2011) 
 
Therefore, in the SOC area, the fact of implementing comprehensive and objective 
programme evaluation might not be critical evidence of an absence of tunnel vision. 
Rather, the interviews, the BAI report, and the compulsory regulations for the industry 
showed that the spending ministry had a tendency to focus on quantifiable performance. 
As for the overall interview results, a total of 27 interviewees (15 spending ministry 
officials, 12 MOSF officials) making 37 references agreed that tunnel vision existed, 
and there was no disagreement. All six experts also agreed that tunnel vision existed. 
From the above evidence, it might be said that both spending ministries and the MOSF 
strongly agreed that this phenomenon existed.  
 
Most respondents argued that high SABP scores and consequent bigger budgets, 
increasing reliability and fairness, and ease of evaluation were the main reasons for this 
phenomenon. High SABP scores and bigger budgets represented a different expression 
of a spending ministry’s maximisation strategy; and, moreover, this was a common 
reason for all dysfunctional consequences. Also, spending ministries considered that a 
quantifiable performance indicator had more advantages than a non-quantifiable 
indicator in terms of predictability, management, and responsibility. Apart from the 
spending ministries’ maximisation strategy, the other reasons were all related to internal 
characteristics of the SABP design itself, rather than to factors in the external 
environment, such as information asymmetry or the unique Korean government culture.   
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6.5.2 Myopic Management  
 
In order to prevent the risk of a short-term perspective, a long-term performance 
indicator is regarded as a core performance indicator for SABP. So, SABP has been 
conducted in three-year cycles, and the assessment of new programmes can be delayed 
until they begin to demonstrate their performance (MOSF, 2010a). Moreover, the 
MOSF requires spending ministries to develop an outcome performance indicator that 
relates to the long-term strategy and final goal of a programme (MOSF, 2011c). 
However, according to the MOSF’s report, only P3, P4 and P7 submitted a fully 
developed outcome performance indicator, whilst the other five programmes (P1, P2, 
P5, P6, P8) submitted a simple output performance indicator (MOSF, 2010c, 2010d, 
2010e, 2010f). Nonetheless, interestingly, only P5 received a “No”, and seven 
programmes received a “Yes”, in answer to Question 2-1. P1 and P2 first received a 
“No” answer, which was eventually changed into a “Yes” answer by the MOSF, and P6 
and P8 finally received a “Yes” on the condition that the spending ministries would 
follow the MOSF’s recommendation that they develop a full outcome performance 
indicator later, as mentioned in 6.5.1 (MOSF, 2010d, 2010e). The reason and 
implication will be discussed in Chapter 7. Besides the MOSF’s reports, the NABO 
drew attention to the possibility of spending ministries’ pursuit of short-term 
performance rather than long-term strategy (NABO, 2007b, p.119):  
 
“A performance indicator intrinsically evaluates present effort to achieve 
performance, so there must be a time-lag between present effort and an 
eventual outcome. Thus, emphasis on performance can provide a spending 
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ministry with an incentive to pursue short-term achievement rather than a long-
term and strategic goal.” 
 
Most interviewees responded that spending ministries paid more attention to short-term 
performance than to the long-term, and this phenomenon was the most cited 
dysfunctional consequence across all three case study areas (28 interviewees, with 38 
references). Sixteen out of 19 spending ministry officials and 12 out of 13 MOSF 
officials agreed that this phenomenon existed, and there was no disagreement. One 
interviewee even said that spending ministries sometimes tried to purse extremely short-
term performance indicators for a programme.  
 
“…comprehensive government policies have been released in two- or three-
month cycles, and this phenomenon may be a good example of how much 
spending ministries are interested in extremely short-term performance.” 
(Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 31st October 2011) 
 
In addition, the six experts all commented on spending ministries’ myopic tendencies. 
Overall, it might be said that both spending ministries and the MOSF strongly agreed on 
the existence of spending ministries’ myopic management.  
 
As for the reason for this phenomenon, high SABP scores and bigger budgets and the 
unique Korean government culture were the most cited across the three case study areas. 
Spending ministries were more interested in next year’s budget than in the budget for 
two or more years later. Also, the unique Korean government culture, especially the 
general one-year rotation personnel system and ministers’ short tenure of office, have 
greatly influenced spending ministries’ myopic perspective.  
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“The priority of policies in the Korean government is easily changed by high 
level government officials and the President. Moreover, the one-year rotation 
personnel system has reinforced the tendency to focus on short-term 
achievement.” (Expert, KIPF, interviewed on 4th November 2011) 
 
“Spending ministries have mainly been interested in short-term performance 
and this is closely related to the unique Korean culture in politics and 
government. People select the President on the basis not of policy capability 
but of political tendency. So, the President often appoints non-experts to be 
ministers and changes ministers after about a year. This kind of minister also 
changes high ranking government officials…” (Expert, KDI, interviewed on 8th 
November 2011) 
 
In addition, lack of time for building up long-term performance and the characteristics 
of public programmes, such as unpredicted, indirect, spillover effects and small 
assessment levels (“sub-programme” levels in the programme budgeting structure), 
were also cited as reasons for myopic management. The characteristics of public 
programmes and small assessment levels are related to internal reasons of SABP, while 
the unique Korean government culture and problems of lack of time are associated with 
the external environment of the SABP system.  
 
6.5.3 Measure Fixation  
 
The MOSF recognises the possibility of this phenomenon, so it requires spending 
ministries to develop representative performance indicators closely related to the desired 
outcomes for a programme, in order to prevent the problem caused by paying attention 
only to a measurable performance indicator (MOSF, 2010a). However, according to the 
MOSF’s report, P5, P6 and P8 did not develop representative performance indicators, 
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and so P5 was finally given a “No”, and P6 and P8 finally received a “Yes” in answer to 
Question 2-1, on the condition that the spending ministries would follow the MOSF’s 
recommendation that they develop representative performance indicators later (MOSF, 
2010c, 2010d, 2010e). The NABO was also aware of this problem, so it investigated 
whether the spending ministries ever submitted representative performance indicators 
for these programmes; and it continued to point out the lack of representative 
performance indicators every year (NABO, 2007a, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010d, 2011). 
For P2, the NABO indicated the necessity of dividing the performance indicator into 
subsidies for purchasing costs and those for rental costs, in order to fully represent the 
programme (NABO, 2011). For P4, the NABO pointed out that “the failure rate at the 
halfway stage” should be added as a new performance indicator, in order to represent 
the programme’s purpose, alongside “the employment rate” (NABO, 2011). The NABO 
also commented that P5’s performance indicators were not closely related to the 
purpose of the programme, so they were not representative performance indicators 
(NABO, 2009b). Across the three case study areas, most respondents answered that the 
spending ministries focused on measurable performance (20 interviewees with 20 
references). Ten out of 13 MOSF officials and ten out of 19 spending ministry officials 
agreed with this. Three out of six experts also mentioned the existence of measure 
fixation, whilst no experts commented on an absence of measure fixation. 
 
“Furthermore, in order to obtain bigger budgets, programmes have to be graded 
above ‘modest’, at least, so spending ministries have no choice but to depend 
on output-oriented, short-term, and measurable performance.” (Expert, BAI, 
interviewed on 2nd November 2011) 
 
However, interestingly, five interviewees from spending ministries did not fully agree 
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with this judgement. The five interviewees all argued that they paid attention not only to 
measurable performance but also to non-measurable performance, because they thought 
that non-measurable performance was closely related to their programme’s ultimate 
goal.  
 
“I think I paid attention to non-measurable performance in my own way, such 
as trying to develop an informal additional performance indicator which could 
reflect the road construction programme’s performance well. For example, I 
tried to add ‘volume of traffic per hour’ as a new performance indicator, 
because I thought this indicator could measure the quality of road service well, 
although I needed more time.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 31st October 
2011) 
 
Also, characteristics of public programmes such as intangibility, indirectness, 
externality, and complexity (Wilson, 1989; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002) impacted on 
spending ministries’ tendency to focus on the measurable performance of a programme. 
Spending ministries insisted that they had no choice but to pursue measurable 
performance, due to the difficulty of managing and assessing non-measurable 
performance. Considering spending ministries’ primary goal under SABP was to obtain 
high SABP scores and bigger budgets, rather than improving the genuine performance 
of a programme, spending ministries had less incentive to be interested in non-
measurable performance. Overall, the MOSF might strongly agree with this verdict, 
while spending ministries might partly agree with it. The MOSF’s suggestion of 
developing representative performance indicators in order to prevent the problems 
caused by measure fixation seemed not to be actively accepted by spending ministries.  
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets were the reasons most frequently cited for 
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measure fixation, and the characteristics of public programmes were mentioned as 
another reason. Also, lack of time to consider non-measurable performance was cited as 
one of the reasons for measure fixation. Apart from high SABP scores and bigger 
budgets, the characteristics of public programmes might be related to the internal logic 
of SABP, and the lack of time might be related to SAPB’s external environment.  
 
6.5.4 Suboptimisation 
 
Across the three case study areas, a total of 15 interviewees (eight MOSF, seven 
spending ministry), making 17 references, gave positive opinions on the existence of 
this phenomenon. However, three of the spending ministry officials and one of the 
MOSF officials did not agree that spending ministries focused on partial objectives 
rather than the full objectives of the organisation. The interesting thing was that one of 
the MOSF interviewees denied the existence of the phenomenon. However, an even 
more interesting point was that the reason for the MOSF official’s denial was rather 
different from that of the spending ministries: that is, this official emphasised the 
involuntary aspect of choice by spending ministries, whilst the spending ministries 
stressed their voluntary decision-making (see the underlined sections of the following). 
 
“…in the public housing area, the spending ministry seemed to pursue the 
whole objective or the first best solution of the organisation, because the 
performance indicator for this area had been passed in advance in a Cabinet 
meeting, and stipulated the provision of 1.5milion public housing homes in 10 
years. Thus, I think the spending ministry had no discretion when it came to 
pursuing their objective.” (Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 11th November 
2011)  
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“I think my division has pursued the whole objective of my ministry, and of the 
government as a whole, by focusing on building a road that was vitally 
necessary, prioritising the completion of this road, and increasing investment 
efficiency.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 31st November 2011)  
 
“I tried to pursue the overall objectives of the organisation, and if necessary I 
changed the performance indicators to do it.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed 
on 11th November 2011)  
 
Four of the six experts also argued that spending ministries had a tendency to pursue 
partial objectives rather than whole ones. They indicated that spending ministries 
focused on partial objectives in order to avoid the risks of measurability and 
responsibility, and sometimes they tried to play tactical games by questioning the 
evaluator’s expertise in their programme.  
 
“…in private road construction, which contains the obligatory ‘loss of  
compensation’ rule in the case of falling short of the contracted traffic volume 
or passengers, the spending ministry used the process rate of construction as a 
performance indicator instead of traffic volume or the number of passengers.” 
(Expert, KIPF, interviewed on 4th November 2011) 
 
“I think in case of difficulty in achieving the first best solution or the overall 
objectives of the organisation, spending ministries tend to pursue the second 
best solution, or the narrower objectives, at any time.” (Expert, University, 
interviewed on 9th November 2011) 
 
Judging from the fact that many important decisions on public housing or the SOC area 
had been made in advance by cabinet meetings, regardless of what the spending 
ministries wanted, I was given the impression that the MOSF strongly agreed that 
suboptimisation by spending ministries existed. Spending ministries too might partly 
agree that this phenomenon existed.  
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High SABP scores and bigger budgets, and the unique Korean government culture, 
especially the one-year rotation personnel system, the sectionalism both within 
ministries and among ministries, the ministers’ short tenure of office, and the excessive 
emphasis on the presidential agenda, were indicated as the main reasons for spending 
ministries’ tendency towards suboptimisation. Also, as the experts mentioned, efforts to 
avoid the risk of responsibility and accountability might be other reasons for this 
phenomenon. Apart from high SABP scores and bigger budgets, all these reasons 
seemed to be closely related to the external environment in which SABP operated. 
 
6.5.5 Ratchet Effect  
 
Shin and Cha (2010) argue that although a little subjectivity is inevitable when it comes 
to setting a performance target level, the grounds for setting the level should be 
explicitly stated, to enable performance information users to assess the validity of the 
target level. They indicate that reasonable grounds for the target level of a programme 
should include comparison with the results of similar programmes besides the past trend 
of the programme’s achievement. In this regard, the SABP manual (MOSF, 2010a) 
requests spending ministries to submit reasonable grounds for choosing a performance 
target level as well as providing the target level itself, in order that the appropriateness 
of the target level may be evaluated. The NABO (2009b) has stressed the importance of 
ambitious performance target levels, because low target levels could lead to a fall in the 
standard of responsibility and reliability in government activities. However, across the 
three case study areas, all the programmes except for P4 showed strong signs of the 
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ratchet effect. In the public housing area, all three programmes were given a “No” by 
the MOSF’s review, because P1’s target level was lower than that for the previous year, 
and moreover there was no reasonable explanation; P2’s level was a mere reflection of 
past trends; and P3’s 167% achievement rate was considered to be evidence of an 
unambitious target level (MOSF, 2010d). Nine interviewees (three MOSF officials, six 
spending ministry officials) making 11 references also agreed that this phenomenon 
existed. In the youth employment area, P4’s target level was accepted as ambitious by 
the MOSF because this programme’s goal had been determined from 2008 on by 
agreements between related organisations such as several ministries, economic 
institutions and university associations (MOSF, 2010e). This could be taken as evidence 
that continuous negotiations on performance target levels could solve the problems and 
risks of uncertainty and information asymmetry among the parties involved. On the 
other hand, P5’s target level was given a “No” by the MOSF (2010c); and the NABO 
(2009b) also considered this programme’s target level to be unambitious because “the 
accretion rate of academic credit” could be achieved automatically if participants 
finished the programme successfully and “the number of collaborating companies” was 
the same as in the previous year’s target. In P6, the spending ministries did not submit a 
reasoned explanation for the target level, and just suggested 5% more than in the 
previous year (MOSF, 2010f). In addition, 11 interviewees (four MOSF, seven spending 
ministry) with 11 references mentioned this phenomenon. In the SOC case study area, 
P7 and P8 were given a “No” by the MOSF review because P7’s performance target 
level was changed after the implementation of the programme, and no reasoned and 
specific explanation was submitted for the level set for P8 (MOSF, 2010d). Eight 
interviewees (four MOSF, four spending ministry) making ten references also agreed 
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that a ratchet effect existed. In terms of the results of interviews across the three case 
study areas, the highest number of interviewees acknowledged the existence of this 
phenomenon (28 interviewees with 32 references), the same as for myopic management. 
Interestingly, 17 out of 19 spending ministry interviewees were honest enough to accept 
the existence of the ratchet effect. Four out of the six experts also commented that 
spending ministries had no incentive to suggest highly ambitious target levels and 
tended to submit somewhat conservative targets. The above evidence suggests that this 
phenomenon was strongly accepted by both the MOSF and the spending ministries.  
          
“In the case of a programme graded ‘poor’, it was very difficult to obtain 
appropriate budgets for the next year; so attainability was the first criterion for 
setting the performance target level…” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 27th 
October 2011) 
 
“I think spending ministries absolutely did not suggest highly ambitious 
performance targets for their programmes, but just submitted very conservative 
performance target levels...” (Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 11th November 
2011) 
 
“A performance target level is, of course, conservative, not ambitious, because 
the spending ministry has to consider the next year’s target level.” (Assistant 
Manager, MOEL, interviewed on 31st October 2011)  
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets were the reason most cited for the ratchet effect. 
The next most cited reason was the penalty awarded for poorly graded programmes. 
Another interesting reason was the information asymmetry between spending ministries 
and the MOSF. Spending ministries tended to use the MOSF’s lack of specific 
knowledge of their programmes.  
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“In addition, the MOSF seems to evaluate the validity of spending ministries’ 
performance target levels on the basis of rational grounds for a target level; but 
I think the MOSF is not able to obtain accurate information about what rational 
grounds are, because the MOSF cannot know a programme as well as the 
spending ministry.” (Manager, MKE, interviewed on 28th October 2011) 
 
The last reason mentioned was programme supervisors’ concern over highly ambitious 
target levels. Apart from high SABP scores and bigger budgets, all the reasons 
mentioned by interviewees were closely related to the external environment of SABP. 
 
6.5.6 Misrepresentation 
 
The reports of the MOSF, the NABO and the BAI indicated the possibility of distortions 
or manipulations by spending ministries seeking to avoid disadvantageous performance 
data. According to the MOSF’s review of P7, the MLTM submitted a performance 
target level to the MOSF after the programme had already been implemented, so the 
MOSF did not accept the suitability of the performance target level (MOSF, 2010d). 
The NABO (2010c) suggested various types of misrepresentation, such as inadequate 
performance reports and distortion of programmes’ performance. The NABO (2011) 
also commented that P4 needed an additional performance indicator giving the 
percentage of students who completed this programme as well as the number of students 
completing it, in order to measure performance more accurately. Moreover, the NABO 
(2011) stated that the performance indicator for the subsidy for housing rental 
programme (P2) should be divided to show the budget implementation rate for this 
programme and that for the programme for subsidy for housing purchase, to which it is 
closely related. Regarding P1 and P2, the BAI (2011a, 2011b, 2009) also indicated that 
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spending ministries measured their performance by using the methods they favoured, 
not the ones intended by the BAI, and that these ministries reported irrelevant facts or 
facts relating to past achievements, and often failed to report on the performance 
currently under consideration. Across the three case study areas, a total of 17 
interviewees (11 MOSF, six spending ministry) making 17 references responded 
positively to the idea that spending ministries tended to overestimate their performance 
as much as possible and to hide disadvantageous performance data, whilst a total of ten 
interviewees making ten references disagreed with this. These ten interviewees were all 
spending ministry officials. The main reason for not accepting this judgement was the 
continuous stream of requests for performance data from the MOSF, the National 
Assembly, and the press. In other words, it was very difficult for spending ministries to 
hide a disadvantageous performance or overestimate results because the organisations 
mentioned persistently demanded exact performance data. However, six interviewees 
from spending ministries agreed that they had a tendency towards misrepresentation, 
although the extent of this tendency was much weaker than the MOSF was suggesting. 
The MOSF officials argued strongly for the existence of the tendency, using words such 
as “basically”, “never”, “definitely”, while the spending ministry officials used more 
vague, defensive words, like “sometimes”, “especially when”, “if possible” (see the 
underlined sections of the following quotations).    
 
“…if I found some disadvantageous data in the process of evaluation, I would 
not submit this data. Instead, I sometimes gave other, subsidiary information to 
the MOSF, explaining that this data was more important…” (Manager, MLTM, 
interviewed on 27th October 2011)  
 
“The results section has the biggest proportion of SABP marks, so a spending 
ministry might sometimes have an incentive not to provide some 
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disadvantageous performance data to avoid a poor grade. In addition, 
sometimes a spending ministry puts performance data together to hide the low 
performance of a programme.” (Assistant Manager, MEST, interviewed on 2nd 
November 2011)  
 
“I think spending ministries have an incentive to overestimate their 
performance, especially when the performance indicator is more related to the 
quality and not quantifiable.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 11th 
November 2011) 
 
“Basically, spending ministries tried to hide disadvantageous data and they 
never submitted them. They tended to turn in only compulsory data…” (Senior 
Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 3rd November 2011)  
 
“Spending ministries never evaluated their performance accurately, and always 
tried to overestimate it…” (Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 9th November 
2011) 
 
“Spending ministries had a strong tendency to overestimate their performance 
and deliberately did not include disadvantageous data.” (Manager, MOSF, 
interviewed on 11th November 2011) 
 
Five of the six experts also commented that spending ministries basically tried to 
conceal their disadvantageous performance data to avoid taking responsibility for it, and 
moreover they also tried to avoid setting a sensitive performance indicator that might 
force them to submit disadvantageous performance data. Taken together, the above 
pieces of evidence suggest that the MOSF might strongly agree with the existence of 
misrepresentation, while the spending ministries might partly agree with it.         
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets, information asymmetry, and the awarding of 
penalties were commented on as the reasons for this phenomenon. Spending ministries 
always wanted to obtain high SABP scores and bigger budgets, so they had an incentive 
to overestimate their performance and to hide disadvantageous performance data. 
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Information asymmetry and the awarding of penalties related to SABP could strengthen 
the incentive. Apart from high SABP scores and bigger budgets, the other two reasons 
were both related to the external environment of SABP.  
 
6.5.7 Cherry-Picking 
 
The NABO indicated that in order to increase the validity of P2 it had been necessary to 
adjust the income level at which people qualified for a subsidy, and although one of the 
purposes of P6 was to alleviate income polarisation among students by supporting low-
income students, this programme had chosen students only on the basis of grades and 
language skills, regardless of their income or standard of living, in order to attain its 
goal more easily (NABO, 2011, 2009b). From the interviews, I learned that there was a 
great difference between the spending ministries and the MOSF in their perspective on 
whether spending ministries gave adequate consideration to priority groups in their 
programmes. Those recognising the cherry-picking phenomenon were all MOSF 
officials (seven interviewees with seven references), while those denying it were all 
spending ministry officials (ten interviewees with references). However, the argument 
of the MOSF interviewees was not as strong as that of the spending ministries. With 
respect to cherry-picking, the MOSF might partly agree that it existed, whilst the 
spending ministries strongly denied it (see the underlined sections of the following).  
        
“I partly agree that the spending ministries have sometimes tried to select 
priority groups on the basis of how far these helped them to attain their 
performance target…” (Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 27th October 2011)  
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“There was a suspicion of the cherry picking phenomenon, but no supporting 
evidence.” (Senior Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 3rd November 2011) 
 
“In the case of youth employment, this has been a very sensitive social issue, 
so it was not possible to choose priority groups more accurately.” (Assistant 
Manager, MEST, interviewed on 2nd November 2011)  
 
“I never considered the attainability of performance targets when it came to 
selecting priority groups.” (Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 11th November 
2011) 
 
The MOSF officials stated that spending ministries had a tendency to cherry-pick in 
order to obtain high SABP scores, and consequently bigger budgets for the following 
year. On the other hand, spending ministry officials answered that it was not possible to 
choose priority groups for a programme because their programmes’ target groups were 
all ordinary citizens, not a specific group of people.   
 
Table 6-4 presents detailed results for the first 32 interviews on eight programmes.  
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Table 6-4 Dysfunctional Consequences of SABP in Eight Programmes in Three Case Areas 
(Unit: number of coding and person) 
Dysfunctional 
consequences Reason 
Public Housing Area Youth Employment Area Social Overhead Capital Area Total 
Coding M
O 
SF 
Sp
end
ing 
Coding M
OS
F 
Sp
end
ing 
Coding M
O 
SF 
Sp
end
ing 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding P1 P2 P3 Sub P4 P5 P6 Sub P7 P8 Sub 
Tunnel 
vision  6 7 2 15 4 5 2 4 3 9 4 5 5 8 13 4 5 37 12 15 
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets 1 5 - 6 2 2 - 2 1 3 2 1 4 2 6 3 3 15 7 6 
Increasing reliability and fairness 1 1 2 4 2 2 - 3 3 6 3 3 2 2 4 3 1 14 8 6 
Easiness to evaluate 2 1 - 3 1 2 4 4 - 8 1 5 5 4 9 3 5 20 5 12 
Myopic 
management  4 4 2 10 3 5 4 3 4 11 5 6 7 10 17 4 5 38 12 16 
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 1 2 6 1 4 4 3 7 3 4 16 6 9 
Characteristics of public programme - 1 - 1 1 - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 2 - 1 4 1 2 
Small assessment level - 1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 2 1 1 
Time and cost 2 1 1 4 1 3 - 1 1 2 - 2 2 1 3 2 1 9 3 6 
Unique Korean government culture 1 3 1 5 2 3 2 4 2 8 4 3 4 3 7 3 3 20 9 9 
Measure 
fixation  3 2 - 5 2 3 3 3 2 8 4 4 4 3 7 4 3 20 10 10 
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets 1 2 - 3 2 1 3 2 1 6 2 4 4 2 6 4 2 15 8 7 
Time and cost 1 - - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 2 1 3 1 2 5 2 2 
Characteristics of public programmes - - - - - - 1 1 1 3 1 2 - - - - - 3 1 2 
Denial  - 1 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 5 - 5 
Suboptimis
ation  1 2 - 3 1 2 3 2 3 8 4 4 5 1 6 3 1 17 8 7 
 High SABP scores and bigger budgets - 3 - 3 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 10 4 5 Unique Korean government culture 1 2 - 3 1 2 2 1 2 5 3 2 2 - 2 1 1 10 5 5 
Denial  - 2 - 2 1 1 - - - - - - 2 - 2 - 2 4 1 3 
 Cabinet meeting’s decision - 1 - 1 1 -            1 1 - 
Ratchet  
Effect  5 4 2 11 3 6 4 4 3 11 4 7 5 5 10 4 4 32 11 17 
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets 2 4 - 6 3 2 2 1 2 5 3 2 2 3 5 2 3 16 8 7 
Information asymmetry - 2 - 2 2 - 1 3 - 4 1 3 1 1 2 2 - 8 5 3 
Penalty-oriented operation - - 2 2 - 2 1 2 1 4 1 3 3 2 5 2 2 11 3 7 
Supervisors’ concern - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 2 - 2 2 - 2 1 1 5 1 4 
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Dysfunctional 
consequences Reason 
Public Housing Area Youth Employment Area Social Overhead Capital Area Total 
Coding M
O 
SF 
Sp
end
ing 
Coding M
OS
F 
Sp
end
ing 
Coding M
O 
SF 
Sp
end
ing 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding P1 P2 P3 Sub P4 P5 P6 Sub P7 P8 Sub 
Misreprese
ntation  2 4 1 7 4 3 2 1 2 5 3 2 3 2 5 4 1 17 11 6 
 
High SABP scores and bigger budgets - 2 - 2 1 1 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 1 1 - 4 3 1 
Information asymmetry - 1 - 1 - 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 - - - - - 4 2 2 
Penalty-oriented operation - - 1 1 1 - 1 1 - 2 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 4 2 2 
Denial  - - 2 2 - 2 2 1 1 4 - 4 2 2 4 - 4 10 - 10 
 Continuous data request             - 2 2 - 2 2 - 2 No concern over budgets             1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Cherry-
picking  1 1 - 2 2 - 1 - 1 2 2 - 3 - 3 3 - 7 7 - 
Denial  - 1 2 3 - 3 1 1 1 3 - 3 1 4 5 - 4 11 - 10 
 Difficulty in choosing priority groups       - 1 - 1 - 1 1 4 5 - 4 6 - 5 Using other tactics       1 - - 1 - 1      1 - 1 
 
Note: P1 is construction of public rental housing, P2 is subsidy for housing rental costs, P3 is improvement of old housing stock,  
P4 is global youth leader training, P5 is global trade specialist training, P6 is junior college students’ overseas internship,  
P7 is road construction, and P8 is railway construction programme. 
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6.6 Opinions on Spending Ministries’ Efforts to Prevent Dysfunctional Consequences 
 
Interestingly, from the first interviews, I learned that spending ministries thought of the 
non-quantifiable or qualitative, long-term, non-measurable and whole performance of a 
programme as important, even though they focused on the programme’s quantifiable, 
short-term, measurable and narrow performance. They argued that the former 
characteristics were more closely related to the real and genuine performance of 
programmes; but due to the necessity for bigger budgets, the unique Korean government 
culture, and especially the characteristics of public programmes – such as complexity, 
invisibility, indirectness and non-measurability – they had no choice but to pursue the 
latter. However, spending ministries have continuously tried to attain the former 
characteristics at the same time, in order to prevent the problems that arise from 
focusing only on the latter ones.  
 
“Most of my ministry’s programmes are related in some way to the welfare of 
citizens, so non-quantifiable performance is considered as more important, 
even though we are focused on achieving quantifiable performance indicators.” 
(Assistant Manager, MOEL, interviewed on 31st October 2011) 
 
“Although pursuing a long-term strategy would be more desirable for 
improving people’s welfare, in the actual policy scene, spending ministries 
have no choice but to focus on the short-term achievement of a programme..” 
(Manager, MLTM, interviewed on 27th October 2011) 
 
“However, I think non-measurable performance is also important alongside 
measurable performance.…Non-measurable performance reflects the long-term 
and qualitative characteristics of a programme…The more important and more 
genuine performance of a programme might exist in non-measurable objectives, 
and so it is necessary to manage this unofficially…” (Assistant Manager, 
MEST, interviewed on 2nd November 2011)        
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Backing up the answers of the spending ministry officials, the MOSF officials also 
indicated that the spending ministries had tried to pay attention to non-quantifiable, 
long-term, non-measurable or whole performance results of a programme, even though 
this kind of result seemed to be difficult to achieve.  
 
“…spending ministries in recent times have been trying to pay more attention 
to long-term strategy. For example, in the youth employment programme in the 
MOEL, a simple ‘employment rate’ used to be used for the programme’s 
performance indicator; but at now an ‘employment rate over six months’ is 
asked for as a performance indicator, if possible…” (Manager, MOSF, 
interviewed on 2nd November 2011) 
 
“Interestingly, spending ministries had a tendency to focus on their Minister’s 
agendas, although these were non-measurable objectives in SABP…” 
(Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 11th November 2011) 
 
“…non-quantifiable performance indicators were more important in many 
cases, especially in the welfare field. For example, is it possible to evaluate the 
performance of a public child-care centre just by surveying the customers’ 
satisfaction? Can the National Health Insurance system only be evaluated by a 
surplus or deficit in the financial accounts?” (Senior Manager, MOSF, 
interviewed on 3rd November 2011) 
 
Across the three case study areas, a total of 13, nine, 12 and four interviewees gave 
positive opinions on spending ministries’ efforts to prevent only the quantifiable, short-
term, measurable and narrow performance of a programme respectively. However, as 
regards the ratchet effect, misrepresentation and cherry-picking, neither the spending 
ministries nor the MOSF mentioned that the spending ministries had made specific 
efforts to prevent these from occurring. The number of codings and opinions offered on 
spending ministries’ efforts to prevent dysfunctional consequences can be seen in Table 
6-5. 
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Table 6-5 Opinions on Spending Ministries’ Efforts to Prevent Dysfunctional Consequences 
(Unit: Number of coding and person) 
Effort to prevent 
Public housing Youth employment SOC Total 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spe
ndi
ng 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO 
SF 
Spen
ding 
Tunnel vision 4 1 3 5 - 5 5 - 4 14 1 12 
Myopic management 3 - 3 2 2 1 4 - 3 9 2 7 
Measure fixation 4 1 3 4 - 4 4 3 1 12 4 8 
Suboptimisation 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 1 4 2 2 
Ratchet effect - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Misrepresentation - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cherry-picking - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
These results can provide empirical evidence on the categorisation of “unintended” and 
“intended” dysfunctional consequences of SABP. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, various dysfunctional consequences are categorised in detail, according to 
their extent and the reasons for their existence, in the following Tables, 6-6 and 6-7, on 
the basis of the findings mentioned in 6.5 and 6.6. 
 
Table 6-6 Categorisation According to Extent of Phenomenon 
 
Unintended dysfunctional 
consequences 
Intended dysfunctional 
consequences 
Both spending ministries and the MOSF  
strongly agree on existence of phenomenon 
Tunnel vision 
Myopic management 
Ratchet effect 
MOSF strongly 
agrees on existence  
Spending ministries 
partly agree on existence 
Measure fixation 
Suboptimisation 
Misrepresentation  
MOSF partly 
agrees on existence  
Spending ministries 
strongly deny existence 
- Cherry-picking 
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Table 6-7 Categorisation According to Reason for Phenomenon 
 Unintended dysfunctional 
consequences 
Intended dysfunctional  
Consequences 
Internal reason such as SABP design, 
public programmes’ characteristics 
Tunnel vision - 
External reason such as unique Korean 
gov’t culture, information asymmetry, 
time and cost  
Suboptimisation  
Ratchet effect 
Misrepresentation 
Both reasons 
Myopic management  
Measure fixation 
- 
Note: High SABP scores and bigger budgets was the common reason for all types of dysfunctional 
consequences, including cherry-picking, but it was not possible to categorise these into internal or 
external reasons. 
 
6.7 Impacts of Dysfunctional Consequences on SABP Results  
 
The pursuit of high SABP scores and bigger budgets, the most cited reason for all types 
of dysfunctional consequences in the first interviews, lead to spending ministries’ 
optimism bias when it came to their self-assessment stage. On the other hand, the 
MOSF basically distrusted the spending ministries’ self-assessment results because it 
thought that the latter tended to overestimate their self-assessment scores as much as 
possible, and moreover sometimes indulged in tactics such as deliberately lowering self-
assessment results in the case of programmes already completed and programmes the 
MOSF or the National Assembly were particularly interested in, so as to give high 
SABP scores to other programmes that particularly interested them. The MOSF’s 
distrust of the spending ministries’ results lead to the strict application of the SABP 
manual at the MOSF’s review stage.  
 
With respect to tunnel vision, as mentioned earlier, there was no comprehensive and 
objective programme evaluation of the qualitative or non-quantifiable performance of 
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programmes from P1 to P6, and spending ministries submitted and pursued only 
quantifiable performance indicators. However, the spending ministries gave a “Yes” 
answer to the relevant question (4-2) for all programmes in the self-assessment stage, 
because they considered a satisfaction survey or simple evaluation by an outside 
organisation to be a comprehensive and objective evaluation, as mentioned in the SABP 
manual. On the other hand, the MOSF gave a definitive “No” to all programmes in 
relation to this question, because the spending ministries, from the perspective of the 
MOSF, were just focusing on quantifiable performance. Consequently, the tunnel vision 
of spending ministries might lead both to these ministries’ optimism bias and to the 
MOSF’s downgrading of the ministries’ results, and thus the difference between the 
SABP results of the spending ministries and those of the MOSF would be widened.  
 
As for the ratchet effect, spending ministries gave a “Yes” to Question 2-2 for all 
programmes, although they tended to submit rather conservative performance target 
levels in order to achieve them easily and to obtain bigger budgets in the following year. 
Moreover, spending ministries argued that they achieved their target level successfully 
in seven programmes, although these didn’t include P4, and so in answering Question 4-
1 they gave a “Yes” for seven programmes (except P4) and a “To a large extent” for P4. 
However, the MOSF carried out strict reviews of the grounds on which performance 
levels were assessed, as well as of the target levels themselves, because it did not trust 
the integrity of spending ministries’ target levels, and in the end, the seven programmes 
(except P4) received a “No” answer to Questions 2-2 and 4-1. This might imply that the 
MOSF did drastically cut spending ministries’ self-assessment results in the case of 
generous self-assessment. Overall, the ratchet effect could lead to spending ministries’ 
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optimism bias and the MOSF’s strict review of spending ministries’ self-assessment 
results. 
 
The interviews also supported these results of the documentary analysis. In the first 
interviews on the three case study areas, most respondents answered that dysfunctional 
consequences lead both to the MOSF’s drastic cutting of spending ministries’ self-
assessment results and to the spending ministries’ optimism bias at the self-assessment 
stage (16 interviewees with 19 references, and 19 interviewees with 24 references, 
respectively). In addition to the government officials, most of the experts also 
commented on this.  The results of the first interviews can be seen in Table 6-8 below. 
 
“… the MOSF thinks that the spending ministries tend, for strategic reasons, to 
put forward their self-assessment score at rather a high level; so the MOSF has 
a tendency to apply the criteria very strictly to the ministries’ self-assessment 
results.” (Senior Manager, MOSF, interviewed on 1st November 2011) 
 
“…but spending ministries are very sensitive about their SABP results, and 
they only have an interest in the SABP results, not in improving their 
programmes’ performance or budget efficiency.” (Manager, MKE, interviewed 
on 28th October 2011) 
 
 
Table 6-8 Impacts of Dysfunctional Consequences on the MOSF and Spending Ministries 
(Unit: number of coding and person) 
Main categories 
Public housing Youth employment SOC Total 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
MO
SF 
Drastic cutting of 
spending 
ministries’ results 
5 3 1 8 2 4 6 3 3 19 8 8 
Spen
ding Optimism bias 4 2 2 12 3 5 8 3 4 24 8 11 
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In the supplementary interviews I again asked directly about the impact of dysfunctional 
consequences on SABP results, in order to check the results of the first interviews. In 
this round, twenty nine interviewees (11 MOSF, 13 spending ministry, five experts) out 
of 31 responded that spending ministries had a tendency to focus on performance in a 
quantifiable, short-term, measurable and narrower sense, trying to set performance 
target levels as low as possible, sometimes hiding and manipulating disadvantageous 
performance data, and highlighting the impact on priority groups in order to obtain a 
high SABP score and a budget increase. Moreover, they indicated that this tendency of 
the spending ministries towards an optimism bias when assessing their programmes 
could deepen the MOSF’s distrust of the ministries’ self-assessment results and could 
contribute to the MOSF’s drastic cutting of these results. Two interviewees gave me no 
answers on this subject, but did not deny these phenomena.  
 
In addition, many MOSF officials in the supplementary interviews, interestingly and 
practically, indicated that the starting point for these unexpected side effects is the 
differing perspectives on the appropriateness of performance indicators (Q2-1) and 
performance target levels (Q2-2) in the SABP checklist; because if a programme 
receives a “No” for Question 2-1, then it cannot obtain a score over 65, due to the 
logical linking of the questions; and thus the probability of a poor grade is increased. 
Thus, the spending ministries always made efforts to answer “Yes” to Questions 2-1 
and 2-2, while the MOSF reviewed the accuracy of the answers to these questions 
particularly strictly. 
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6.8 Policy Alternatives 
 
Interviewees suggested various kinds of policy implications, and I divided these into 
urgent, short-term, and medium- or long-term policies for preventing the dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP. This section analyses the results of both the first and the 
supplementary interviews. After analysing the first interview data, I found that some 
policy alternatives needed to be considered again, and with great care, because they 
were very important, or because there might be differing opinions between spending 
ministries and the MOSF when implementing them as policy alternatives. Of 14 policy 
alternatives suggested in the first interviews, six were re-examined through the 
supplementary interviews. In the supplementary interviews, in particular, interviewees 
were required to indicate the importance of these policy alternatives by putting them 
into one of the following five categories – Very important (5.0 points), Important (4.0), 
Modest (3.0), Not important (2.0) and Absolutely not important (1.0) – in order to 
compare the perspectives on policy alternatives between spending ministries and the 
MOSF and to put the policy alternatives into an order of priority. Policies discussed in 
the supplementary interviews were as follows: (1) refining the SABP checklist, 
especially by adding questions related to qualitative, long-term, non-measurable and 
whole performance; (2) changing the penalty-oriented operation of SABP; (3) 
introducing a relative evaluation system; (4) elevating the level assessed by SABP from 
“sub-programme” to “programme” level in the programme budgeting structure; (5) 
giving more discretion to spending ministries; and (6) abolishing the stage of self-
assessment by spending ministries. The remainder of this section will explore the 
270 
 
various policy alternatives one by one, based on the results of both interviews. In 
addition, the feasibility of these policy alternatives will be discussed detail in Chapter 7.  
 
6.8.1 Options for Urgent Policy Change 
 
I decided that refinement of the SABP checklist, changing penalty-oriented operation, 
and attracting the interest of senior officials were urgent priorities, considering the 
number of references made to them by interviewees and the influence these items 
appeared to exert.  
 
Refinement of the SABP Checklist 
 
The MOSF has revised the SABP checklist every year e.g., changing the number of 
questions (reducing unnecessary questions and merging related questions), adjusting the 
weight of each question, and adopting a partial scoring system in many of the questions 
in order to reflect accurately spending ministries’ efforts to improve the performance of 
a programme (MOSF, 2007, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010g). Despite the MOSF’s 
annual refinements, most respondents (25 interviewees, with 51 references) and experts 
mentioned the necessity for increasing the weight of questions or adding questions 
related to the evaluation of spending ministries’ efforts to achieve non-quantifiable, 
long-term, non-measurable and whole performance for a programme in the first 
interviews. They also thought that the MOSF should require spending ministries to 
submit evidence of these efforts as an appendix, at least, to the official SABP report. 
Similarly, Kelman and Friedman (2009) suggest adding measures to prevent effort 
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substitution and adapting measures to reflect organisational learning about gaming will 
limit measure fixation. Thiel and Leeuw (2002) suggest that performance paradox can 
be prevented by developing new performance indicators which refer to different aspects 
of a programme.  
 
Against this background, in order to examine the feasibility of this policy alternative, I 
asked some specific questions in the supplementary interviews: whether the 
interviewees agreed that these kinds of dysfunctional consequences existed; whether it 
was necessary to add questions related to the qualitative, long-term, non-measurable and 
whole performance of a programme; whether it was necessary to submit evidence to 
back up claims about performance; and how important interviewees perceived the 
policy alternative to be. First of all, all respondents from both spending ministries and 
the MOSF agreed that these phenomena did actually exist in the SABP system. By 
contrast, two experts focused more on the lack of expertise of spending ministry 
officials rather than potential problems with the SABP system. As for the necessity of 
adding questions and requiring evidence, 23 interviewees (10 MOSF, 11 spending 
ministry, two expert) indicated the necessity for adding questions, especially two 
questions related to the long-term and whole performance of a programme, as well as 
for spending ministries to submit relevant evidence. On the other hand, seven 
interviewees (two MOSF, two spending ministry, three expert) disagreed with these 
specific alternatives, because they thought that the current SABP checklist could avoid 
these side effects by appropriate use of Question 4-2 (comprehensive and objective 
programme evaluation), and they were worried that these policies would significantly 
increase the burden of work for spending ministries. However, overall, most 
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respondents agreed with the severity of these dysfunctional consequences and wanted 
firm action taken to minimise them. These results supported the first interview results 
well. Moreover, respondents in the supplementary interviews regarded the policy 
alternative as important, because the average importance of these changes was 4.0 out 
of 5.0 points (MOSF 4.4, spending ministries 3.8), though the MOSF considered them 
more important than did the spending ministries. 
 
Changing Penalty-oriented Operation 
 
With respect to the penalty orientation of the SABP system, the spending ministries 
argued that the MOSF had followed the penalty rule assiduously, but had not kept to the 
incentive rule. The strong relationship between SABP results and budget allocation, 
especially between poor grades and budget cutting, had contributed to the spending 
ministries having more interest in SABP at the initial stage. However, so far the 
spending ministries’ optimism bias had not decreased as much as the MOSF had 
expected it would, and the main reason for this might be the penalty-oriented operation 
of the SABP system. Although it might be difficult for the MOSF to abandon its 
penalty-oriented policy basis, it might be time to reconsider the way in which SABP 
operated (12 interviewees with 17 references in the first interviews).  
 
On the basis of the results of the first interviews, in the supplementary interviews I 
asked the following questions: whether the interviewees agreed with the existence of 
this phenomenon; whether it was important to give incentives to effective programmes; 
whether such a policy change might genuinely improve the performance of a 
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programme; and what interviewees’ perception of the importance of this policy 
alternative was. In the supplementary interviews, 21 interviewees (nine MOSF, 12 
spending ministry) agreed with the necessity for changing the penalty-oriented 
operation of SABP. Many respondents indicated that SABP results tended to be 
mechanically used as a tool for reducing a programme’s budget, not for providing 
useful performance information for the programme’s management, so spending 
ministries just tried to avoid a poor grade without making any effort to improve the 
programme’s genuine performance. In addition, some interviewees mentioned that 
penalty-oriented operation of SABP encouraged spending ministries to just focus on 
trivial but high-scoring programmes instead of risky but important programmes. 
Moreover, the time lag, which meant SABP results for a past year’s programme being 
applied to the programme’s future budget, was also indicated as a reason why it was 
necessary to change the system’s penalty-orientated operation. In general, most 
respondents disagreed with the mechanical application of SABP results to budget 
allocation, although at the same time they agreed with the necessity for feedback in one 
form or another. The interesting thing was that the MOSF officials considered this 
problem more serious than did the spending ministry officials. The average perceived 
importance score given by MOSF officials was 4.4 points, whereas that of spending 
ministries was just 3.6 points (making the overall average 3.9). This means that the 
designer and controller of the SABP system might consider the way it operated more 
cautiously than spending ministry officials. An even more interesting point was that two 
spending ministry officials and four out of five experts disagreed with changing the 
penalty-oriented operation. Spending ministry officials emphasised that the SABP 
results should be strongly linked with budget allocations in order to provide an 
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opportunity for spending ministries to reconsider their programmes seriously. Four 
experts also commented that it was too early to change penalty-oriented operation, 
because spending ministries still did not understand that SABP’s main purpose was to 
increase the efficiency of budget allocation through linking performance results and 
budgeting. However, the overall opinion of interviewees was that penalty-oriented 
operation would not help to reduce various dysfunctional consequences of SABP, and it 
was time to consider changing it. As for increasing the incentives for effective 
programmes, most respondents replied that both incentives and penalties might be 
necessary to really improve the performance of programmes. Weighing incentives and 
penalties might enable spending ministries to reconsider their performance indicators 
and performance target levels more seriously. These changes would mean that the 
MOSF would not rely on SABP just for control purposes (Smith, 1995). Moreover, all 
the MOSF officials responded that this policy alternative could genuinely increase the 
performance of a programme to a significant extent (ten interviewees) or to a small 
extent (two interviewees), and these answers indicate that the MOSF officials perceived 
the importance of this policy. Eight spending ministry officials agreed that changing the 
penalty orientation of SABP could increase the level of performance of programmes, 
while four of them disagreed with this idea, because performance could be improved by 
many other methods. Four experts responded positively, while one expert disagreed, 
saying that this policy would not enhance the real performance of programmes, because 
spending ministries would try to find appropriate tactics whatever the policy 
implemented. Overall, the supplementary interview results to a large degree supported 
the first interviews results, and changing the penalty-oriented operation of SABP might 
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be essential for minimising and preventing various side effects and enhancing the 
effectiveness of the SABP system.  
 
Increasing Senior Officials’ Interest in SABP 
 
More input into SABP by senior officials was another urgent policy alternative 
proposed by many interviewees (10 interviewees with 12 references in the first 
interviews). Seniors officials included the ministers and vice ministers of each ministry. 
Although the size of the Performance Management Bureau in the MOSF and the 
number of MOSF officials who were responsible for reviewing spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results had decreased between 2005 and 2010, the National Assembly 
and the BAI had become more interested in SABP. The NABO had started to evaluate 
both spending ministries’ performance planning reports and their actual performance 
reports every year. The BAI had strengthened its evaluation of both spending ministries’ 
planning and their performance reports. In 2011 the BAI completed an audit of all 
spending ministries’ performance reports after a pilot auditing project initiated in 2009. 
In order to refine and improve the SABP system in a short period, I came to the 
conclusion that senior officials’ input was vital. In this area, a reform undertaken by the 
Obama administration gave some useful pointers. The Obama administration has started 
to monitor several HPPGs, at quarterly intervals, through the Vice Minister’s meeting, 
and then to link performance data with a dashboard in order to monitor them 
consistently. By enhancing senior officials’ interests in programmes’ performance, and 
monitoring performance consistently, more relevant performance information could be 
made available and applied to programme management. The advantages of the US 
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GPRAMA and the possibility of applying the system to SABP in Korea need to be 
considered in a future study.  
 
6.8.2 Options for Short-Term Policy Change 
 
A More Active Role for Related Organisations 
 
Among short-term policy alternatives, a more active role for the MOSF, the National 
Assembly and the BAI was the most frequently indicated by the first interviewees (11 
interviewees with 16 references). Although it was the MOSF, in 2010, that started to 
give penalties to spending ministries when the gap between a spending ministry’s SABP 
score and the MOSF’s review score was 20 points or more, and to create a systematic 
performance history for each programme (MOSF, 2010a, 2010g, 2011b), the experts 
emphasised the division of work between the related organisations. They commented 
that the MOSF should focus on increasing the appropriateness of performance 
indicators, such as outcome-related and representative indicators, while the BAI should 
focus on verifying the suitability of performance data by checking whether spending 
ministries used official and consistent statistics drawn from reliable statistical databases 
when submitting their performance reports to the MOSF and the National Assembly. In 
this context, the MOSF’s distribution of the manual for developing appropriate 
performance indicators and target levels in various budgetary programmes made an 
important contribution (MOSF and KIPF, 2012). The BAI’s checking could reduce 
misrepresentation by spending ministries very sharply, and the MOSF’s manual could 
be used to evaluate spending ministries’ performance target levels precisely, and this 
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would lead to a decrease in the ratchet effect. In addition, the National Assembly’s 
strong monitoring of the performance reports of central government departments would 
also minimise various dysfunctional consequences of the SABP system.  
 
An Open Evaluation System 
 
In the first interviews, many respondents commented on the necessity for what is called 
an open evaluation system ranging from previous consensuses on performance 
indicators and target levels among spending ministries, the MOSF, the experts, and even 
the National assembly, to opening up performance assessment by related beneficiaries, 
experts, government-affiliated organisations, spending ministries and the MOSF. The 
NSTC had already announced that an open assessment system for research and 
development (R&D) programmes 28 would be introduced from 2012, to increase the 
transparency and reliability of assessment (NSTC, 2011). In particular, consensuses on 
performance indicators and performance target levels among related organisations 
would decrease the dysfunctional consequences at the performance planning stage, such 
as tunnel vision, myopic management, suboptimisation and the ratchet effect.  
 
A Relative Evaluation System 
 
The MOSF also recognised spending ministries’ persistent optimism bias, so it 
announced it was introducing a “relative evaluation system” into the spending ministries’ 
                                                     
28 On the commencement of the NSTC as a new control body for R&D policies in Korea, on 
March 2011, responsibility for performance assessment on R&D programmes was transferred 
from the MOSF to the new body. 
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self-assessment stage from 2011, on a trial basis. This would make it compulsory for the 
proportion of programmes graded “effective” to be less than 20% and those graded 
“poor” to be more than 10% (MOSF, 2011b). Although only three interviewees 
indicated the necessity for this policy change in the first interviews, I wanted to know 
whether the system would prove feasible or not, so the supplementary interviews asked 
for opinions on it. In the supplementary interviews, ten interviewees (six MOSF, three 
spending ministry, one expert) agreed with the policy change and another ten 
respondents (four MOSF, five spending ministry, one expert) partly agreed with it, 
while nine interviewees (two MOSF, four spending, three expert) disagreed with it. That 
is, the number of respondents holding each of the three different opinions was nearly 
same. The first group recognised that compulsory rationing seemed to be inevitable, and 
there were no alternatives for reducing spending ministries’ optimism bias sharply and 
rapidly. The second group agreed with the contribution made by the system; but they 
also mentioned the potential risk it posed, indicating the possibility of spending 
ministries’ strategic behaviours in the process of satisfying the proportions of effective 
and poor grade programmes. For example, it was likely that spending ministries would 
deliberately self-assess programmes the MOSF or the National Assembly were 
interested in as poor, although they knew these programmes were implemented 
effectively, because they knew very well that these programmes were too important for 
the MOSF or the National Assembly to reduce their budgets. In addition, the assignment 
of an effective or poor grade can be determined by the working of interests within each 
spending ministry, not by objective criteria. The third group, including three experts, 
focused only on the negative effects of the relative evaluation system. Three experts 
stated the necessity of preventing unexpected side effects and tactical behaviours by 
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spending ministries, in order to operate the policy change consistently. With respect to 
the appropriateness of the proportions – 20% and 10% – most respondents could not 
answer whether this number was suitable or not, because the MOSF had decided on 
those proportions rather arbitrarily. Moreover, the average level of perceived 
importance for this policy was not so high compared with those for the previous two 
policy alternatives. It was just 3.1 points (3.4 MOSF, 2.9 spending ministry), a modest 
level. Overall, considering the different opinions voiced by groups of similar 
supplementary interviewees and the trial basis implementation of the policy change, it 
will take more time to evaluate the feasibility of this policy.  
 
Others 
 
Besides these policy alternatives, some interviewees indicated that the SABP results 
should be reported publicly every year, in order to enable spending ministries to 
consider ordinary citizens’ satisfaction and to pursue genuine performance of 
programmes (two interviewees with three references in the first interviews). In addition, 
reducing unnecessary workload related to SABP was also suggested by two 
interviewees with two references in the first interviews.  
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6.8.3 Options for Medium- or Long-Term Policy Change 
 
Elevating the Assessment Level from “Sub-programme” to “Programme” 29  and 
Focusing on Core Programmes  
 
With respect to medium- or long-term policy alternatives across the three case study 
areas, elevating the assessment level and focusing on the core programmes of spending 
ministries were the most mentioned policy alternatives (12 interviewees with 18 
references in the first interviews). Many interviewees indicated that the present 
assessment level of SABP was too small to consider the long-term and overall 
objectives of an organisation. This policy alternative reflected the Obama 
administration’s initiative in the US, focusing on just a few HPPGs in each spending 
ministry (KIPF, 2011).  
 
Against this background, the supplementary interviews asked for opinions on elevating 
the assessment programme from the present “sub-programme” level to “programme” 
level in the programme budgeting structure mentioned in Section 3.2.3. Fourteen 
interviewees (four MOSF, eight spending ministry, two expert) agreed with this policy 
alternative, while 15 (eight MOSF, six spending ministry, one expert) disagreed with it. 
In addition, two experts offered rather different opinions. The main reason for agreeing 
with the policy was that many sub-programmes of spending ministries were closely 
                                                     
29 In this policy alternative, I distinguish between the terms “sub-programme” and “programme”. 
The present SABP system was implemented at the “sub-programme” level in the programme 
budgeting structure. Thus, strictly speaking, the term “programme” as it has been used in the 
study until now means  ”sub-programme”. However, in other parts of the study I do not use the 
term “sub-programme”, in order not to cause confusion, because “sub-programme” is a concept 
belonging to the programme budgeting structure, and is not used generally. 
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related to each other within the same programme level, and each sub-programme was 
implemented in systematic cooperation with other sub-programmes. Therefore, some 
outcomes of one sub-programme were produced jointly with those of other sub-
programmes, and so it was necessary to consider their performance more 
comprehensively. In addition, a sub-programme’s performance indicator was generally 
too narrow and small to be understood by ordinary citizens. Consequently, sub-
programme level’s performance information is difficult to consider in terms of long-
term or whole performance. On the other hand, other interviewees argued that 
performance information at the programme level cannot give useful feedback on budget 
allocation, because the programme consists of several different sub-programmes. 
Moreover, a programme can include several non-associated performance indicators of 
several sub-programmes, and so it is difficult to reflect each sub-programme’s 
characteristics well and to decide on its real performance at a programme level. They 
explained that this is why the MOSF prefers to assess budgetary programmes at sub-
programme, not programme level. Two experts commented that setting up an exact 
relationship between sub-programme and programme, before discussing the appropriate 
level of SABP and assessing programme level, is the role of the in-depth evaluation 
system (IES), which is one of the Korean budgeting systems, rather than of SABP. The 
importance level of this policy alternative was just 3.4 points (3.3 MOSF, 3.4 spending 
ministry).  
 
Increasing Expertise 
 
Increasing the expertise of both spending ministries and the MOSF would also be 
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important in order to decrease the information asymmetry between spending ministries 
and the MOSF. By reducing this information asymmetry, the MOSF would be able to 
ask spending ministries to submit exact performance data and to evaluate the 
appropriateness of their performance target levels, and spending ministries would be 
able to understand the genuine purposes of performance management, such as 
increasing the responsibility and accountability, as well as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of budgetary programmes. Thus, increasing the expertise of both spending 
ministries and the MOSF would reduce the possibility of dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP, particularly the ratchet effect and misrepresentation.  
 
Building Trust and Giving More Discretion to Spending Ministries 
 
In the first interviews some interviewees (three MOSF, six spending ministry) indicated 
that changing the SABP system from a MOSF-driven to a spending ministries-driven 
system based on mutual trust might be necessary in order for SABP to be implemented 
in a substantially self-assessing way. It has not been easy for spending ministries to 
focus voluntarily on the qualitative, long-term, non-measurable and whole performance 
of a programme in a situation where the MOSF did not trust spending ministries’ self-
assessment results. Greater trust might lead spending ministries and the MOSF to 
reduce their differences over SABP results and the possibility of dysfunctional 
consequence created by spending ministries. 
 
In the supplementary interviews, 15 interviewees (three MOSF, 12 spending ministry) 
agreed, seven (three MOSF, one spending ministry, three expert) agreed conditionally, 
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and nine (six MOSF, one spending, two expert) disagreed with this policy alternative. 
Interestingly, most spending ministry officials unconditionally agreed with this change, 
while most MOSF officials disagreed or conditionally agreed with it. Issues raised in 
the supplementary interviews were more profound and detailed. The first main reason 
for agreement was that spending ministries have more information about their 
programmes and each programme’s relative importance within the ministry, so they can 
set the direction for how to evaluate even the invisible performance of a programme, 
and how to operate SABP in the long run. The second main reason was that SABP can 
ultimately be successful only if it is implemented on the basis of mutual trust between 
spending ministries and the MOSF. On the other hand, several reasons for disagreement 
or conditional agreement were also mentioned. Firstly, if the MOSF gives more 
discretion to spending ministries, then the optimism bias of spending ministries will 
become larger, and so this change needs to proceed steadily, taking into consideration 
how great spending ministries’ optimism bias will be. Secondly, although the MOSF 
gives some discretion in terms of developing performance indicators and setting 
performance target levels, related organisations, such as the MOSF, the National 
Assembly and the BAI, have continuously indicated the lack of quality and reliability of 
this performance information. Thus, instead of unconditionally increasing the discretion 
allowed to spending ministries, strengthening cooperation or consultancy with the 
MOSF might be needed when it comes to developing performance indicators and 
setting performance target levels. Thirdly, various dysfunctional consequences of SABP 
come not from the lack of discretion allowed to spending ministries but from differing 
perspectives on the appropriateness of performance indicators and performance target 
levels, so increasing discretion cannot be a suitable policy alternative for minimising 
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these dysfunctional consequences. The interesting point, regardless of the number of 
interviewees who agreed or disagreed, was that the perceived importance of the MOSF 
was greatly lower than that of spending ministries (2.8 MOSF, 3.6 spending ministry). 
This coincided with the first interview results, and it might mean that the MOSF still 
thinks that spending ministries lack expertise, objectivity, reliability and responsibility 
in producing their self-assessment results, and moreover there is still distrust between 
spending ministries and the MOSF. Also, many respondents answered that the MOSF’s 
ability to compare performance between programmes would not necessarily be 
decreased if spending ministries’ discretion were increased through the above policies. 
They also indicated the necessity for improving the expertise of the MOSF, regardless 
of the extent of spending ministries’ discretion, in order to increase the ability to 
compare the differences between programmes.  
 
Abolishing the Spending Ministries’ Self-assessment Stage 
 
Although this policy alternative was indicated by just two interviewees in the first 
interviews, I thought that it needed to be investigated more thoroughly in the 
supplementary interviews, because the change could have a great influence on 
implementing the SABP system in the future. In the supplementary interviews, the 
number of agreements and disagreements was nearly same for spending ministry 
officials and MOSF officials. Fourteen interviewees (five MOSF five, seven spending 
ministry, two expert) agreed with the policy and 15 interviewees (six MOSF, seven 
spending, three expert) disagreed with it. Nearly half of all interviewees agreed, not 
only because spending ministries’ optimism bias was so great that the self-assessment 
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stage might be meaningless but also because the MOSF had not accepted spending 
ministries’ self-assessment results as they were, and this could reduce unnecessary 
administrative costs as well as increase administrative efficiency. However, the other 
half of the interviewees disagreed, because spending ministries’ position on many 
programmes could be delivered to some extent through self-assessment results, and 
spending ministries had an opportunity to increase their responsibility for their 
programmes as well as to enhance their capacity to manage programmes’ performance. 
In addition, some interviewees were of the opinion that the fact that spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results were not accepted by the MOSF could not be a reason for 
abolishing the self-assessment stage, and that finding out the reason why spending 
ministries’ self-assessment results were cut drastically at the MOSF’s review stage was 
more important. Moreover, the MOSF considered this change as more important than 
the spending ministries did. The MOSF’s perceived importance level was 3.8 points, 
while that of the spending ministries was 3.1. This might imply that the MOSF was 
playing a more active role in designing and revising the SABP system, while the 
spending ministries were adopting a rather passive position on this fundamental change. 
On the other hand, eight interviewees replied that the MOSF’s confidence in its ability 
to evaluate performance without spending ministries’ self-assessment results would fall, 
whilst 16 respondents answered that this change would not necessarily decrease the 
MOSF’s confidence. Thus, the MOSF’s confidence in its evaluations seemed not to be a 
critical factor when it came to deciding whether or not to abolish the spending 
ministries’ self-assessment stage. Rather, the more important thing seemed to be to 
consider seriously the purpose of SABP.  
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Others 
 
The other two policy alternatives were related to the restructuring of governments or the 
reengineering of related governments’ roles. Interestingly, the necessity for integrating 
the MOSF’s Performance Management Bureau into the Ministry’s Budget Office, on 
the lines of the US OMB model, was suggested by three MOSF officials in the first 
interviews as a means of increasing the expertise of the MOSF. As for similar 
performance management systems, the PMO assessed spending ministries’ major 
programmes, regardless of whether they were budgetary or non-budgetary programmes, 
based on the Government Performance Assessment Act passed in 2006. However, the 
MOSF assessed spending ministries’ budgetary programmes on the basis of the 
National Finance Act implemented in 2007. The PMO and the MOSF agreed to match 
the assessment level of the PMO with that of the MOSF in order to avoid conflicts 
between two Acts. On the other hand, the responsibility for assessing R&D programmes 
was transferred from the MOSF to the NSTC with the setting up of the NSTC in 2011. 
Although the purposes, assessment level and application of results among these 
performance management systems were rather different, spending ministries 
complained about the excessive and unnecessary workloads related to performance 
management systems. However, these policy alternatives should be decided cautiously 
after analysing the advantages and disadvantages of them in the medium and long terms.       
 
The number of references and respondents on policy implications for improving SABP 
in the first interviews can be seen in Table 6-9. 
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Table 6-9 Number of Codings and Respondents for Policy Implications for Improving SABP 
(Unit: number of coding and person) 
Policy 
Public housing Youth employment SOC Total 
Cod
ing 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spen
ding 
Codi
ng 
MO
SF 
Spe
ndi
ng 
Options for Urgent Policy Change 
Refine SABP checklist  15 3 5 15 3 5 21 4 5 51 10 15 
Changing penalty-oriented 
operation 1 - 1 14 4 5 2 1 1 17 5 7 
Senior officials’ interest 5 2 1 4 2 2 3 2 1 12 6 4 
Options for Short-term Policy Change 
More active role (monitoring, 
penalty, education, etc.)  2 1 1 9 3 2 5 4 - 16 8 3 
Open evaluation system 7 2 2 2 2 - 4 1 3 13 5 5 
Relative evaluation system 2 1 1 1 1 - - - - 3 2 1 
Reporting SABP results 
publicly 2 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 3 - 2 
Reducing unnecessary 
workload - - - 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 - 2 
Options for Medium- or Long-term Policy Change 
Elevating assessment level  
and focusing on main 
programmes 
5 2 1 6 3 2 7 2 2 18 7 5 
Increasing expertise 4 1 2 7 2 4 4 2 1 15 5 7 
Building trust and  
giving more discretion 2 - 1 8 2 4 2 1 1 12 3 6 
Abolishing self-assessment 
stage - - - 2 1 1 - - - 2 1 1 
Integrating the Budget Office 
and Performance Mgt Bureau 1 1 - 2 2 - - - - 3 3 - 
Integrating performance 
management system 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 3 1 2 
Others 2 1 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 5 1 4 
 
A summary of the differences in responses to the six policy alternatives between the 
first and the supplementary interviews can be seen in Table 6-10. The feasibility of 
these six policy alternatives will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6-10 Summary of Differences Between First and Supplementary Interviews 
(Unit: number of interviewees, points) 
 
Policy 
First interviews Supplement interviews Perceived 
importance Cod 
ing 
MO 
SF 
Spend 
ing 
Agree Disagree 
MOSF Spending M S 
Refining SABP 
checklist 
51 10 15 12 14 2 2 4.0 
Changing penalty-
oriented operation 
17 5 7 9 12 3 2 3.9 
Relative  
evaluation system 
3 2 1 10 
(4 is partly) 
8 
(5 is partly) 2 4 3.1 
Elevating  
assessment level 18 7 5 4 8 8 6 3.4 
More discretion to 
spending ministries 
12 3 6 
6 
(3 is 
conditional) 
13 
(1 is 
conditional) 
6 1 3.2 
Abolishing self-
assessment stage 
2 1 1 5 7 6 7 3.5 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how the research found that the SABP system had been subject 
to various dysfunctional consequences, some of which were unintended but others of 
which were intentional on the part of the spending ministries, agents in the principal-
agent relationships. Although the perspective on the existence of each dysfunctional 
consequence might not be the same in the spending ministries as it was in the MOSF, it 
was possible to say that various dysfunctional consequences, both large and small, of 
SAPB had led to a strengthening of spending ministries’ optimism bias in their self-
assessment. This could be the reason why significant differences between the SABP 
results of spending ministries and those of the MOSF persisted. However, I would not 
contest the usefulness of SABP. This is because, as previous researchers have found, 
SABP has increased both the efficiency of budgetary programmes and the 
accountability of spending ministries. The important thing is not the existence of 
289 
 
various dysfunctional consequences but the need to solve them. In implementing policy, 
pursuing the second best solution, with every effort made to minimise attendant 
problems, may be more desirable than seeking an optimum solution with no faults. To 
this end, the Korean government, especially the MOSF, has implemented many policy 
modifications indicated by the National Assembly and the BAI. All of these have been 
related to the urgent, short-, medium- or long-term policy aims mentioned in this 
chapter. From the several policy changes suggested by interviewees, I drew the 
conclusion that refining the SABP checklist, changing the penalty-oriented operation of 
the SABP system, and involving senior government officials such as the Minister and 
Vice Minister were the policy changes most likely to improve the SABP system rapidly. 
The next chapter will discuss several issues raised by the findings of both the 
quantitative (Chapter 5) and the qualitative (Chapter 6) analysis, including the 
feasibility of policy alternatives suggested by the first and the supplementary interviews. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter interprets and discusses in detail several issues raised by the findings from 
the quantitative and qualitative research approaches, and distinguishes this study’s 
unique contribution from the contributions and limitations of previous studies. Some 
issues involve findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis. The chapter 
firstly interprets the factors which affect the DR and ROR of spending ministries, and 
then explains the reasons for these phenomena in the context of the Korean performance 
budgeting system. Secondly, with respect to the qualitative analysis, it discusses five 
main issues, including the appropriateness of categorising unintended and intended 
dysfunctional consequences by spending ministries; the impacts of these; and feasible 
policy alternatives. On the other hand, as part of the discussion of the data, findings, and 
interpretations of the quantitative and qualitative analysis, the chapter evaluates the 
validity and reliability of these. Finally, the chapter will discuss four contributions 
(theoretical, empirical, methodological and practical) to knowledge in three main areas.  
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7.2 Implications of the Quantitative Analysis 
 
7.2.1 Factors which Affect the DR and ROR  
 
Relationships Between Two Independent Variables and the DR and ROR 
 
According to the quantitative analysis, “the MOSF’s review score” had a negative 
relationship with the DR and ROR of spending ministries, while “specific programme’s 
self-assessment score minus the spending ministry’s average score in that year (specific 
score minus average score)” had a positive relationship with the DR and ROR in a 
statistically significant way, at the level of 0.01, from 2005 to 2010. These findings 
have the following implications. Firstly, they imply that over these six years there was 
indeed not only a high and consistent optimism bias by spending ministries in the self-
assessment stage of SABP, but also drastic cutting by the MOSF of spending ministries’ 
generous self-assessment results. When we consider that the main purpose of SABP is 
to increase budget efficiency and effectiveness, as well as to improve spending 
ministries’ performance management capability, these findings might suggest that 
SABP has not accomplished its aims so successfully and there have been various 
unintended dysfunctional consequences by the MOSF. In addition, they suggest the 
necessity for feasible policy alternatives to minimise dysfunctional consequences. This 
means that these findings from the quantitative analysis shed meaningful light on 
exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP and searching for useful policy 
alternatives that will refine and redesign the SABP system by employing qualitative 
analysis. 
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Secondly, although the two independent variables had statistically significant 
relationships with the DR and ROR for three sections (performance planning, results 
and whole section) in the three time periods, when comparing the adjusted R squares, 
we can see that the adjusted R square in the performance planning section in the three 
time periods was generally higher than that in the other two sections. For example, in 
the case of the DR, the adjusted R square in the performance planning section in the 
three time periods was 0.363, 0.389 and 0.346 respectively, and in the case of the ROR 
it was 0.166, 0.312 and 0.213 respectively. Except for 0.166 in the case of the ROR in 
the first cycle, the other adjusted R squares were higher than those for the results and 
the whole section. This suggests that in each time period spending ministries’ optimism 
bias and the MOSF’s drastic cutting might be better explained in relation to the 
performance planning section of SABP rather than to other sections. In other words, it 
means that spending ministries did their best to get a “Yes” answer in the performance 
planning section and at the same time the MOSF also considered spending ministries’ 
self-assessment results in the performance planning section more carefully. These 
results can be explained not only by the fact that SABP Questions, especially Questions 
2-1, 2-2 and 4-1, are logically linked to each other, but also by the fact that spending 
ministries have more discretion and tend to self-assess more generously in performance 
planning, for example when they develop performance indicators and set performance 
target levels. Thus, these results mean that preventing dysfunctional consequences in the 
performance planning section might be a priority in order to reduce the DR and ROR. 
Also, they may justify the effort of examining various dysfunctional consequences in 
the separate categories of performance planning, performance measurement and 
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performance reporting. Moreover, policy makers should pay greater attention to 
developing appropriate performance indicators and target levels before implementing 
programmes, although this might reduce spending ministries’ discretion to some extent. 
This implication effectively supports the policy alternative, which will be discussed 
later, of strengthening cooperation between spending ministries and the MOSF when 
developing performance indicators and target levels, while reducing spending ministries’ 
discretion at this stage.  
 
Thirdly, the adjusted R square for the three sections generally decreased from the first 
SABP cycle to the second SABP cycle. For example, in the whole section the DR fell 
from 0.362 in the first SABP cycle to 0.228 in the second SABP cycle, and the ROR 
was reduced from 0.311 to 0.176. This means that if other conditions are equal, the 
extent of the explanatory power of spending ministries’ optimism bias and the MOSF’s 
drastic cutting has been decreased. In other words, it is possible to estimate that 
spending ministries’ optimism bias and the MOSF’s drastic cutting were weakened as 
the SABP process was repeated, due to learning by doing. This interpretation is 
supported by the negative relationship between the number of SABP implementations 
and the ROR in the following. 
 
Relationships Between Control Variables and the DR and ROR  
 
Eight control variables had relationships of different kinds with the DR and ROR. 
Among the relationships between the eight control variables and the DR, only 
programmes directly managed by the government and large budget programmes had 
294 
 
relationships with the DR in expected ways. These findings mean that spending 
ministries can have greater influence on directly managed programmes than on 
indirectly managed ones, so they have paid more attention to obtaining bigger budgets 
for directly managed programmes, and this tendency is likely to increase spending 
ministries’ overestimation of these programmes in the self-assessment stage. Similarly, 
spending ministries tend to have more concerns over large budget size programmes, 
because these programmes generally have a closer relationship with important policies 
within the ministry. At the same time, the MOSF tends to use large budget size 
programmes more efficiently when changing budget structures. These interpretations 
can also be applied to the relationship between the two control variables and the ROR.  
 
However, small budget size programmes and economy-related programmes had 
relationships with the DR that were the opposite of what might be expected. It seems 
that spending ministries also paid attention to small programmes, which is different 
from our initial expectation, because it might generally be easier to obtain suitable 
budgets for small programmes than for large budget programmes, despite spending 
ministries putting less effort into these. In addition, since small programmes often 
include the operating costs of related organisations, such as interested institutions, 
spending ministries are as concerned about these programmes as about large budget size 
programmes. Consequently, spending ministries might have an incentive to give as 
generous SABP scores as possible, despite these being small programmes. This might 
lead to strengthening spending ministries’ optimism bias and the positive relationships 
between small programmes and the DR. This estimation can be also applied to the 
relationships between small programmes and the ROR. Thus, we can say that spending 
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ministries have focused on obtaining bigger budgets regardless of the budget size of a 
programme. Economy-related programmes showed negative relationships with the DR, 
which was different from the initial expectation, while the expected relationships 
between them and the ROR were proved correct. Economy-related programmes’ 
budgets were initially expected to fall, due to increasing welfare expenditure following 
the Asian financial crisis in the latter 1990s; so they might be more affected by SABP 
results, and this would lead to a big difference between spending ministries and the 
MOSF. Thus, the unexpected relationship between this variable and the DR might come 
from ambiguity in the definition of economy-related ministries. In reality, economy-
related ministries often implement welfare-related programmes as well, so simply 
regarding economy-related ministries’ programmes as economy-related programmes 
might not be accurate. The other possible reason is the opposite effects produced by 
“Yes but No” type and “No but Yes” type disagreements, because unlike measuring the 
impact of economy-related programmes on the ROR, the impact of these on the DR did 
not consider the opposite meaning of the two types of disagreements. If economy-
related programmes are operationalised more specifically in future research, then the 
results might be different.  
 
The relationships between four control variables – budget changes for the current year, 
ministry programmes, welfare-related programmes, and the number of times SABP has 
been implemented – and the DR was looked at and it was not clear whether or not these 
variables had the relationships with the DR that would have been expected. However, 
interestingly, these four control variables had the relationships that would have been 
expected with the ROR. The possible reason for the difference might be the opposite 
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effects produced by the two types of disagreement. Although “No but Yes” type 
disagreements account for only about 9% of all disagreements, this might affect the 
relationships between these control variables and the DR and ROR. This means that it is 
necessary to consider the impact of the opposite effects of the two types of 
disagreements on the DR and ROR in order to examine the relationships between 
variables more accurately. Interpreting the findings based on the relationships between 
the four control variables and the ROR has several implications. Firstly, when budget 
increases for programmes for the current year are low, spending ministries try to obtain 
bigger budgets for the following year, whilst the MOSF evaluates these programmes’ 
validity as low. These conflicting behaviours may lead to a widening of the difference 
between spending ministries and the MOSF. Secondly, in the case of ministries’ 
programmes, which are more complex than agencies’ programmes, the difference 
between spending ministries and the MOSF may generally be wider. Thirdly, by 
comparison with economy-related programmes, welfare-related programmes have been 
less affected by budgetary reforms, building a stronger social safety net in preparation 
for a low-birth rate and aging society. Finally, as SABP has been implemented several 
times, as time goes by, the difference between spending ministries and the MOSF may 
decrease due to the learning effect. The existence of a positive learning effect may give 
a good indication that the aims of the SABP system can be achieved.  
 
Taken together, the findings about the relationships between control variables and the 
DR and ROR tell us that, regardless of its budget size, if a programme is directly 
managed by the government, is complex (a ministry’s programme rather than an 
agency’s), has had a low budget percentage change for the current year, and is 
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economy-related, then the difference between the spending ministry’s score and that of 
the MOSF may be higher. On the other hand, this difference may be reduced when the 
SABP is implemented repeatedly, due to the learning effect. Therefore, the MOSF 
needs to consider carefully the greater possibility of an optimism bias by spending 
ministries in the case of directly managed programmes, ministries’ programmes, 
programmes that have low budgets compared to the previous year, and economy-related 
programmes. 
 
7.2.2 Dynamic Pattern of the RORs of Spending Ministries 
 
From the analysis of the programmes which had been assessed by SABP two or three 
times, the study found that the MOSF had paid greater attention to reducing a high ROR 
by raising its review score, whilst spending ministries had focused more on increasing a 
low ROR by increasing their self-assessment score in the following SABP round. This 
means that the MOSF is more concerned by a high ROR than spending ministries, not 
only because the MOSF regards a high ROR among spending ministries as an 
unintended dysfunctional consequence of SABP, but also because a persistently high 
ROR among spending ministries can be criticised for not achieving the purposes of 
SABP by the National Assembly, the BAI and the news media. Moreover, the MOSF 
seems to have more responsibility for creating a successful SABP system as it is the 
designer and controller of the system, as well as the principal in the principal-agent 
relationship. However, spending ministries, as agents in the principal-agent relationship, 
seem to have more interests in high SABP results and bigger budgets than in the success 
of the SABP system itself.  
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In addition, analysis of the dynamic pattern of the ROR suggests that it might be 
possible to find an algorithm of the optimum response by spending ministries to any 
given level, or the exact pattern of the ROR, because spending ministries try to adjust 
specific programme’s self-assessment score in the next SABP round after comparing the 
ROR of the specific programme to the average ROR of the spending ministry. If SABP 
is to be implemented repeatedly in the future, then finding an algorithm of the optimum 
response by spending ministries might be possible.  
 
7.2.3 Validating the Data, Findings and Interpretations 
 
This section discusses the quality of the quantitative data, the results and the 
interpretations. Regarding the validation of the data and findings, the study focuses on 
the internal and external validity, the possibility of causal reference, and the reliability 
of data.  
 
Internal and External Validity 
 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p.37) and Dooley (2001, p.268) divide the validity of 
quantitative social research into four categories: “statistical conclusion validity, internal 
validity, construct validity and external validity30”. However, because internal validity 
includes statistical conclusion validity and external validity contains construct validity, 
                                                     
30 If there is a relationship between two variables, statistical conclusion validity is accepted. 
Construct validity is concerned with the extent of consistency between the particular cause and 
effect constructs involved in the relationship (Cook and Campbell, 1979) 
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this section corroborates the internal and external validity of the study. According to 
Cook and Campbell (1979), internal validity is related to the exactness of the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In addition, external 
validity is associated with the extent to which a particular result may be generalised to 
other persons, settings, and times.  
 
With respect to internal validity, Campbell and Stanley (1966) classify the threats to 
internal validity as maturation, history, selection, mortality, regression, testing, and 
instrumentation, and these are related to the passage of time, additional events during 
the study period or the extent to which a study is based on experiment (Namkoong, 
2010). However, these kinds of threats to internal validity do not appear pertinent to the 
quantitative analysis in this study, because the study uses numerical data that are drawn 
from the past and already fixed (i.e., SABP results and budget allocations from 2005 to 
2010) and does not divide the subjects (budgetary programmes) into control and 
experimental groups, as experimental studies do. In addition, in order to establish the 
internal validity of variables, this study chose the dependent, independent and control 
variables from the relevant literature, such as Gilmour & Lewis (2005, 2006a), Park 
(2005, 2008), Bang (2009), Cho (2010), Chang &Yoon (2002), Kong et al. (2007), 
Yoon (2001). Moreover, the finding that all F ratios were statistically significant at the 
level of 0.01 means that the regression line was satisfied with the goodness-of-fit, and 
therefore the interpretations of the results mentioned above can be said to be valid. 
However, the analysis might be vulnerable to queries on other types of internal validity. 
For example, it may not fully consider extraneous variables that may affect the DR and 
ROR, such as the additional political characteristics of a programme (e.g., presidential 
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agenda programme, programme of interest to the National Assembly). Consequently, it 
might be said that consideration of more extraneous variables is necessary in order to 
improve the internal validity of the analysis. However, adding “presidential agenda 
programme” and “programme of interest to the National Assembly” as control variables 
was very difficult, because it needed a great deal of work and plenty of help from the 
MOSF officials. Adding these variables as control variables needs to be considered in 
further research.    
 
As for the external validity, although the quantitative data in the study were drawn from 
2,920 budgetary programmes from 2005 to 2010, a consistent policy trend towards 
performance budgeting will be followed by the Korean government in the future. 
Therefore, the findings and interpretations of the quantitative analysis can be applied to 
other budgetary programmes at different times. In particular, the results of the study 
could well be applied to the assessment of Research and Development (R&D) 
programmes and other types of performance assessment. As a result, it can be said that 
the data, findings and interpretations of the quantitative analysis have relatively high 
internal and external validity. 
 
Possibility of Causal Reference 
 
One of the main aims of quantitative analysis is to explain the relationships between 
variables. This leads to a consideration of whether the findings are also intended to 
verify the causal relationship between two variables. There have been many 
controversies concerning cause, effect, and the characteristics of relationships. Until 
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recently, the conditions of causal reference suggested by J. S. Mill have been generally 
accepted among scientists. J. S. Mill (1834) suggests three principles of causal 
reference: temporal precedence, constant conjuction, and exclusion of rival hypotheses. 
According to Johnson et al. (2008) and Belli (2008) three conditions are necessary in 
order to argue that a variable X causes a variable Y. These are: (i) variable X and 
variable Y must be related (the relationship condition), (ii) changes in X must happen 
before observed changes in Y (the temporal antecedence condition), and (iii) there is no 
possible alternative explanation for the relationship between X and Y (the lack of 
alternative explanation condition). Firstly, the relationship condition can easily be 
ascertained from the preliminary analysis results. According to the relationship analysis 
in Chapter 5, we can see that correlation coefficients and t-test results between variables 
were all statistically significant. Thus, the first condition for causal reference is fully 
satisfied. Secondly, the time order condition between the independent and dependent 
variables is also fully satisfied, because the DR and ROR, the dependent variables, were 
determined by the results of the independent variables: “the MOSF’s review score” and 
“specific score minus average score”. This might mean that the independent variable 
always precedes the dependent variable. However, the analysis has a disadvantage 
because it was difficult to find out and operationalise all the extraneous variables which 
might affect the DR and ROR, such as the presidential agenda and interest from the 
National Assembly, as mentioned above. Consequently, the findings of the quantitative 
analysis seemed not to succeed in verifying the causal reference between variables. 
Rather, the results were simply enough to explain meaningful associations between 
variables and to verify the expectations in question.  
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Reliability of Data 
 
Quantitative reliability means that other researchers can reach consistent and stable 
results by using the same data (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; Namkoong, 2010). The 
study employed the SABP results from 2005 to 2010 published by the government, so 
there might be no difference among researchers when it comes to measuring variables. 
Thus, the quantitative analysis established the reliability of the data and findings.  
 
7.3 Implications of the Qualitative Analysis 
 
Although the qualitative analysis for the research successfully explored the types of, 
extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of the SABP system, the impacts 
of these consequences, and feasible policy alternatives, there may still be doubts about 
its findings. For example, (1) the influence of political factors on the MOSF’s decision 
making; (2) the role of interviews with MOSF officials as colleagues or supervisors 
regarding the existence and extent of dysfunctional consequences; (3) the 
appropriateness of the categorisation of unintended and intended dysfunctional 
consequences by spending ministries; (4) the impact of dysfunctional consequences; (5) 
and the feasible policy alternatives for reducing or preventing these consequences. This 
section discusses these issues one by one.  
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7.3.1 Influence of Political Factors on the MOSF’s Decision Making 
 
According to the first interviews, the MOSF seemed to focus on economic 
rationalisation and to keep to the principles of SABP as much as possible. Conversely, 
although the performance indicators for P1 and P2 related simply to outputs – 
construction rate and budget implementation respectively – the MOSF changed its 
decision from a first “No”’ to a final “Yes” in Question 2-1, as mentioned in 6.5.1. Thus, 
it is possible to argue about whether the MOSF’s strategy is really economic 
rationalisation and whether its decision is not influenced by political pressure.  
 
One possible reason may be that P1 and P2 are the government fund programmes, while 
the other six programmes are all general account programmes. In general, government 
fund programmes31 are subject to weaker control by the National Assembly than general 
account programmes. Consequently, the MOSF might change its decision without too 
much trouble. The other, more plausible, reason may be the excessively penalty-
oriented operation of SABP. That is, even though a programme is very important, if the 
programme is given a poor grade, then the MOSF has to reduce its budget for the 
following year by more than 10 percentage points. This strict ten percent rule may affect 
the MOSF’s decision making. However, considering the interviews with spending 
ministry officials, as well as those with MOSF officials, the case studies suggest that the 
MOSF eagerly tries to obey the principles of SABP, especially in terms of strictly 
                                                     
31 Government fund is established to accomplish specific purposes in specific fields, and the 
main revenue source for it is a surcharge based on a special law. However, the main revenue 
source for general account programmes is the tax people pay. Consequently, those running 
government fund programmes have more discretion than those running general account 
programmes, and the former are less controlled than the latter. In 2012, there were 65 
government funds in Korea.  
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reviewing generous self-assessment results. For example, in the similar cases of P6 and 
P8, the MOSF gave a “Yes” answer to Question 2-1 on the condition that spending 
ministries would develop outcome-related and representative performance indicators 
later. Moreover, the results of the quantitative analysis also support the statement that 
the MOSF drastically cut the results of spending ministries’ optimism bias. From these 
interpretations, I can draw out two important implications. Firstly, the fact that P1 and 
P2 finally received a “Yes” answer in Question 2-1 from the MOSF does not support 
the spending ministries’ pursuit of non-quantifiable and long-term performance of a 
programme. Rather, it is the result of programme characteristics (government fund 
programme rather than general account one) or the excessively penalty-oriented 
operation of SABP. Secondly, in order to increase the effectiveness of the SABP system, 
the excessively penalty-oriented operation of SABP surely needs to be changed in some 
ways although the MOSF does its best to keep the principle of economic rationalisation 
and not to be affected by political pressure. 
 
7.3.2 The Role of Interviews with MOSF Officials 
 
It is possible to argue about whether exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP, or 
the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF, using interviews with 
spending ministry officials is appropriate or not, not only because this issue is very 
sensitive and complex but also because we cannot be sure that spending ministry 
officials answered questions honestly. However, considering the attitude of spending 
ministry officials during the interviews and the results of the case studies, spending 
ministry officials may have responded very honestly, although the questions in the 
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interviews were very sensitive and difficult to answer. For example, responding to 
questions about three types of dysfunctional consequences – tunnel vision, myopic 
management and the ratchet effect – spending ministry officials strongly agreed that 
these existed. In the case of the ratchet effect, 17 out of 19 spending ministry officials 
answered honestly that they set the performance target levels as conservatively as 
possible because they were considering the next year, and there was no denial of this. 
Although we accept the honesty of spending ministry officials, however, some 
questions still remained unanswered, especially regarding how to interpret the 
difference in opinions on the existence of the other four dysfunctional consequences. In 
particular, in the case of cherry-picking, the MOSF officials partly agreed on the 
existence of this phenomenon whilst spending ministry officials strongly denied it. Here, 
we need to consider the role of the MOSF officials’ interviews. The MOSF officials’ 
opinions on the behaviours of spending ministry officials play a particularly important 
role in exploring dysfunctional consequences of SABP, because spending ministry 
officials know well that their behaviours relating to dysfunctional consequences do not 
follow the SABP manual and do not contribute to achieving a genuinely good 
performance from a programme. Thus, the spending ministry respondents might be 
likely unconsciously to underreport their actual perceptions of dysfunctional 
consequences, which could lead to methods bias. In other words, it is always possible 
that spending ministry officials gave socially desirable answers, even though they 
remained anonymous (Sackett et al., 1989). Under these circumstances, evaluations 
from other people, such as their colleagues or supervisors, by providing external criteria, 
can give a useful insight into the nature of dysfunctional consequences (Kwok et al., 
2005). In particular, MOSF officials working at a similar level to spending ministry 
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officials may give more accurate opinions and evaluations of dysfunctional 
consequences of spending ministries, emphasising “task relevant abilities and 
competencies in appraising others” (Mumford, 1983, p. 873). As a result, although 
spending ministry officials answered honestly, there is still a possibility of unconscious 
underreporting of dysfunctional consequences, especially in the case of intended ones 
such as misrepresentation and cherry-picking. Consequently, policy makers need to 
consider possible underestimations by agents, especially regarding intended 
dysfunctional consequences, when it comes to refining the SABP system.  
 
7.3.3 Appropriateness of Unintended and Intended Dysfunctional Consequences 
 
Some may argue whether the categorisation of dysfunctional consequences into 
unintended and intended ones by spending ministries, and all unintended ones by the 
MOSF, based on the principal-agent relationship, is appropriate.  
 
With respect to four unintended dysfunctional consequences by spending ministries, 
firstly, the case studies indicated that spending ministry officials voluntarily made some 
efforts to prevent or minimise them, as mentioned in 6.6. This result may confirm that 
four dysfunctional consequences are unintended by spending ministries. Secondly, the 
reasons given for unintended dysfunctional consequences in the interviews were not 
related to the intentions or tendencies of spending ministries, but rather associated with 
the characteristics of programmes in the public sector and factors which are difficult to 
control in the short-term. For example, in the case of tunnel vision, most interviewees 
indicated the ease with which it was possible to evaluate and increase the reliability and 
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fairness of some assessments as the reason for this phenomenon. Similarly, Smith (1995) 
points out that the existence of diverse objectives among various stakeholders, the 
difficulty of quantifying many important performances appropriately, and various 
unanticipated externalities in a public sector programme might lead to focusing on a 
small number of quantifiable performance features. De Bruijn (2002) also comments 
that measuring performance in the public sector includes many aspects and so requires 
professionalism. In the case of myopic management, most interviewees cited the 
characteristics of public programmes and the unique features of Korean government 
culture, such as one-year rotation of personnel and the short tenure of ministers. These 
problems cannot be solved by spending ministries in the short-term. Smith (1995) also 
indicates that the myopia problem can be worsened by the short-term careers of workers 
and that many outputs in the public sector can be achieved by long-term efforts and 
strategies, so the current performance indicators can result in managerial myopia. In the 
case of measure fixation, many interviewees cited the characteristics of public 
programmes, and the limitations of time and cost. Similarly, Smith (1995) indicates the 
impossibility of fully representing all associated objectives as the reason for this 
phenomenon. In the case of suboptimisation, many interviewees suggested the unique 
features of Korean government culture, such as sectionalism, one-year rotation of 
personnel and the short tenure of ministers. Similarly, Smith (1995) cites the strict 
hierarchy of organisations and the difficulty of combining the joint outputs of several 
agencies as leading to suboptimisation. De Bruijn (2002) also states that excessive 
competition among organisations makes them less willing to share best practice with 
each other. Consequently, considering the case studies and relevant literature, these four 
dysfunctional consequences are unintended by spending ministries. 
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On the other hand, with regard to the three intended dysfunctional consequences, firstly, 
the case studies confirmed that spending ministries did not make any effort to prevent or 
minimise them, as mentioned in 6.6. This evidence may confirm that the three 
dysfunctional consequences are intended by spending ministries. Secondly, the reasons 
for intended dysfunctional consequences given in the interviews and the literature were 
closely related to the intentions or tendencies of spending ministries. In the case of the 
ratchet effect and misrepresentation, most interviewees pointed out the information 
asymmetry between spending ministries and the MOSF, and the excessively penalty-
oriented operation of SABP, as the reasons. As for the ratchet effect, Smith (1995) also 
indicates the controlling body’s inability to produce comparable evidence. Similarly, 
Hood (2006) and Bevan and Hood (2006) comment that information asymmetry 
between the Treasury and spending departments can be the reason for a ratchet effect. In 
the case of misrepresentation, Smith (1995) points out the lack of professional 
judgement in describing an event and the limited external audit. In the case of cherry-
picking, Kelman and Friedman (2009) cite the job-training organisation’s deliberate 
gaming in which they made no contribution to jobseekers’ prospects. Thirdly, 
researchers’ definitions of the ratchet effect, misrepresentation and cherry-picking 
included deliberate intent by agents, such as “the tendency of managers” and “the 
deliberate manipulation by agents” (Simth, 1995; Bevan and Hood, 2006; LeGrand and 
Bartlett, 1993). These findings by other researchers indicate that the categorisation of 
dysfunctional consequences suggested by this research may be appropriate; and they 
give useful insights for exploring complex phenomena based on the principal-agent 
relationship more dynamically.  
309 
 
 
7.3.4 Impacts of Dysfunctional Consequences on SABP Results  
 
This section discusses the impacts of dysfunctional consequences on the behaviours of 
spending ministries and the MOSF through both the qualitative and the quantitative 
analysis results. The results of the supplementary interviews indicated that various 
dysfunctional consequences might lead both to spending ministries’ optimism bias and 
the MOSF’s drastic cutting of spending ministries’ self-assessment results. These results 
are also well supported by the results of regression analysis in Chapter 5. The 
quantitative analysis shows that the MOSF’s review score has negative relationships 
with both the DR and ROR, and it means that there is an optimism bias by spending 
ministries when it comes to the self-assessment stage, because if spending ministries 
self-assessed their programmes as strictly and objectively as the MOSF, it is not certain 
that the DR or ROR would have negative relationships with the MOSF’s review score 
in a statistically significant way. In addition, the finding that specific programme’s self-
assessment score minus and the spending ministry’s average score in that year has 
positive relationships with the DR and ROR accounts for the MOSF’s drastic cuts to 
spending ministries’ generous self-assessment results. Furthermore, the interviews 
indicated that the difference between spending ministries and the MOSF mainly stems 
from incongruence in Question 2-1 (the appropriateness of performance indicators), 
because if a programme receives a “No” in Question 2-1, the programme cannot achieve 
a score of more than 65 points. These comments verify the argument of this study, 
which insists that dysfunctional consequences in performance planning need to be 
considered as more important than those in the performance measurement and 
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performance reporting stages. Although the MOSF started in 2010 to give penalties in 
cases where the SABP score gap between spending ministries and the MOSF was over 
20 points, we need to watch the effectiveness of this policy for some time, while 
remaining alert to the possibility that score gaps converge around 20 points. Smith, 
(1995, p.305) similarly, indicates that “in practice, many of the outputs of the public 
sector are difficult to identify and measure; many are produced jointed with other 
organisations; and many unfold over a long period”, and so, if performance 
measurement systems in the public sector do not manage and seriously consider these 
characteristics, the systems must fail. This is why seeking more feasible policy 
alternatives for minimising various dysfunctional consequences of SABP, which will be 
discussed in the next section, is so important.  
 
7.3.5 Feasible Policy Alternatives 
 
This section mainly discusses the feasibility of policy alternatives for preventing or 
minimising dysfunctional consequences of the SABP system, especially focusing on six 
policy alternatives which both the first and supplementary interviewees were asked 
about, and it then summarises feasible policy changes.  
 
Refining the SABP Checklist 
 
The findings from the first and supplementary interviews as well as previous studies on 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting indicate the necessity of refining 
the SABP checklist by adding or revising questions in order to reduce various 
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dysfunctional consequences. In particular, most interviewees in both interviews 
suggested the addition of questions asking spending ministries to develop performance 
indicators relating to the non-quantifiable, long-term, non-measurable and whole 
performance of a programme, and the submission of evidence of spending ministries’ 
efforts to achieve these performances.  
 
However, unlike in the first interviews, in the supplementary interviews seven 
interviewees (two MOSF, two spending ministry, three expert) explicitly disagreed with 
the policy alternative for the following reasons. Firstly, they insisted that the non-
quantifiable, long-term, non-measurable and whole performance of a programme can be 
considered under the present SABP checklist. That is, Question 2-1 requires the 
spending ministries to develop “representative” and “outcome-related” performance 
indicators, and Question 4-2 asks them to implement “comprehensive and objective 
programme evaluation” for measuring the qualitative as well as quantitative 
performance of a programme. Secondly, requiring evidences of spending ministries’ 
efforts might just lead to seriously aggravating the ministries’ work burden without any 
big improvement in performance. These results of supplementary interviews provide a 
more diverse perspective from interviewees than the first interviews, and they help us 
understand more thoroughly the perceptions of government officials on these complex 
and sensitive issues. 
 
These opinions seem to be reasonable, but they are missing some important points. 
Firstly, although the present SABP checklist contains questions that can help prevent or 
reduce tunnel vision and measure fixation (Questions 2-1 and 4-2), it certainly does not 
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contain direct questions asking about the long-term and whole performance of a 
programme, and so it might lead to myopic management and suboptimisation. In 
particular, one expert who was involved in developing the SABP system mentioned that 
the question of whether spending ministries should be required to submit information 
about the medium- or long-term performance of a programme was discussed at the 
initial stage of devising the SABP system, but this policy was finally not accepted by 
the MOSF. In addition, the Public Institutions Policy Bureau of the MOSF recently 
reported that the guidance for assessing public institutions’ performance had a new 
question asking public enterprises to submit their medium- or long-term performance 
indicators to the MOSF (MOSF, 2012b). This policy change in the assessment of public 
institutions has useful implications for further improving SABP in the future. 
Consequently, in order to prevent or minimise myopic management and suboptimisation, 
adding direct questions asking about the long-term and whole performance of a 
programme might be inevitable. Secondly, regarding spending ministries’ work burden, 
I think that increasing the workload in the way suggested can be justified. The most 
important thing is to reduce any unnecessary work burden on spending ministries, not to 
avoid necessary work that would improve the SABP system. However, policy makers in 
the MOSF need to consider ways of keeping down the work burden on spending 
ministries as much as possible.  
 
Changing Penalty-Oriented Operation  
 
Most interviewees in the first and supplementary interviews agreed that the penalty-
oriented operation of SABP needed to be reconsidered. However, in the supplementary 
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interviews nine interviewees (three MOSF, two spending ministry, four expert) among 
31 disagreed with this policy change. In addition, five interviewees (four spending 
ministry, one expert) mentioned that the policy change would not improve the genuine 
performance of a programme. In order to assess the feasibility of the policy change, we 
need to consider these opinions carefully.  
 
The main reasons for differing perspectives are as follows. Firstly, the purpose of SABP 
is to increase the efficiency of budget allocation, so penalty-oriented operation is 
inevitable. Secondly, spending ministries still do not understand the purpose of 
performance budgeting well, so a performance culture has not been widespread until 
now. Thirdly, in order to prevent spending ministries’ overestimation and moral hazard, 
penalty-oriented operation might be inevitable. Fourthly, this policy change could bring 
other negative effects without enhancing the genuine performance of a programme.  
 
However, these opinions seem to ignore the following three points. Firstly, the 
acceptance level among spending ministries for the present SABP system is quite low, 
and the main reason for this is the system’s excessively penalty-oriented operation. 
Spending ministry officials argue that there is no reason for making an effort to increase 
the performance of a programme, because the incentive for an effective programme is 
relatively small compared to the penalty for a poor programme. A low level of 
acceptance has led to various dysfunctional consequences and to not achieving either 
efficiency of budget allocation or the improvement of performance capability among 
spending ministries. Secondly, penalty-oriented operation tends to lead to an increase in 
spending ministries’ optimism bias and their moral hazard, rather than reducing these. 
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Thirdly, the most important thing we need to consider is that even the MOSF has 
changed its mind when it comes to reviewing spending ministries’ self-assessment 
results in the case of politically important programmes, such as P1 and P2, just in order 
to avoid poor grades and a 10 percent cut. Taken together, these points suggest it is time 
to reconsider the excessively penalty-oriented operation of SABP.  
 
In addition, the fourth divergent opinion on this policy change shed light on useful 
implications for policy makers when refining the SABP system.  That is, policy makers 
in the MOSF should consider cautiously other unexpected side effects that might be 
caused by any policy change, because it is always possible for the spending ministries, 
as agents in the principal-agent relationship, to try to play some tactics under the new 
policy situation. This implication can be also applied to other policy alternatives 
explained in this section. 
 
Relative Evaluation System 
 
Only three interviewees mentioned this policy change in the first interviews and their 
answers were not specific. However, the supplementary interviews treated this policy 
change as one of the main issues, and 29 interviewees answered the questions. The 
opinions of these respondents could be divided into three types: agree (ten interviewees), 
partly agree (ten interviewees) and disagree (nine interviewees). Considering these three 
categories of opinion, I ascertained that 19 interviewees were concerned at the 
possibility of other unexpected side effects resulting from the policy change. They 
indicated that the policy change could lead to spending ministries’ strategic behaviour 
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when it comes to deciding on which programmes to grade as poor, and the proportion of 
programmes graded as effective or poor could be determined by the internal dynamics 
of each ministry, not by the objective assessment of performance. In addition, they also 
stated that the policy change had been temporarily implemented from 2011 on a trial 
basis, so the figures of 20% and 10% were decided rather arbitrarily by the MOSF 
without any reasonable evidence.  
 
Overall, it seems to be difficult to say at this point whether the relative evaluation 
system is feasible or not. It will take more time to evaluate the feasibility of the policy 
alternatives for reducing dysfunctional consequences of SABP. However, the opinions 
of interviewees raised plenty of controversial issues in terms of adopting policy changes 
and the necessity of resolving unexpected dysfunctional consequences that might be 
caused by them. Consequently, further research relating to this policy change needs to 
include the following issues. Most of all, it needs to address how to prevent spending 
ministries’ other strategic behaviours, such as deliberately labelling the programmes the 
MOSF or the National Assembly are interested in poor grade programmes. It also needs 
to address whether compulsory operation by the MOSF or voluntary operation by the 
spending ministries is the more suitable option; whether using the ratio of the number of 
programmes or that of expenditure, as Canada’s Strategic Spending Review does, is a 
suitable option; and what the appropriate proportion of effective and poor grade 
programmes should be, and how to achieve this.  
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Elevating the Assessment Level from “Sub-programme” to “Programme”  
 
In the first interviews, 12 among 38 interviewees mentioned this policy change, 
especially for minimising myopic management and suboptimisation. However, as this 
policy alternative was one of the main issues dealt with in the supplementary interviews, 
all 31 interviewees had the opportunity to think over the advantages and disadvantages 
of such a policy change and to think over the answers they had made to the questions, 
and consequently two groups, each with a similar number of respondents, expressed 
opposite opinions on it. However, this result may support the idea that repeated 
interviews on the same issues with the same interviewees at intervals of time are a more 
effective way to explore the exact perceptions of participants, and this kind of interview 
method may improve the reliability of findings.  
 
The interviewees who agreed with the policy change in both the first and supplementary 
interviews had similar reasons for accepting the necessity of elevating the present 
assessment level of SABP. They focused on the general limitations of the SABP system 
based on the characteristic of performance budgeting in the public sector, such as the 
difficulty of assessing joint outcomes in several sub-programmes. However, a similar 
number of respondents to the supplementary interviews paid greater attention to more 
realistic problems that would be brought about by elevating the assessment level. They 
were concerned over the difficulty of applying SABP results to budget allocation 
effectively.  
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The reasons of each group seemed to be very persuasive for each other, so I think that it 
would be better to revisit the purposes of SABP when dealing with these controversial 
arguments. As mentioned earlier, the SABP system was introduced to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of budgetary programmes (at sub-programme level) by 
reflecting SABP results in budget allocations in response to spending ministries’ greater 
autonomy under the “top-down” budgeting system (MOSF, 2011b; KIPF, 2008). That is, 
the SABP system needs to focus on the appropriate assessment level – a level which can 
provide useful performance information when it comes to budget allocation and 
performance management. In this regard, the present sub-programme level seems to be 
more appropriate as the SABP assessment level. That is also why many OECD 
countries apply performance budgeting as an analytic tool for better budget allocation 
(Shick, 2007).  
 
However, although we accept sub-programme as a more appropriate assessment level 
for the present SABP system, some questions raised by other groups of interviewees 
still remain unsolved – e.g., how to consider the long-term and whole performance of a 
programme, and how to consider joint outcomes associated with several sub-
programmes. I think that the first question can be solved by refining the SABP checklist, 
changing the penalty-oriented operation of the system, and by other policy alternatives 
which will be discussed later. As for the second question, the IES can consider joint 
outcomes of cross-cutting programmes. As a result, elevating the assessment level from 
sub-programme to programme, as suggested by many interviewees in the first 
interviews, seems not to be feasible any more. However, it is possible that, as 
mentioned by one expert, the policy alternative could be considered again after distinct 
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relationships between the sub-programme and programme levels have been established 
in the near future.  
 
Building Trust and Giving More Discretion to Spending Ministries 
 
As with the policy discussed above, there were big differences in opinion concerning 
this policy alternative between the first and the supplementary interviews. In the first 
interviews, nine interviewees mentioned broadly the necessity for this policy change in 
order to reduce various dysfunctional consequences of SABP. However, when dealing 
with policy change as one of the main issues, all 31 interviewees answered questions 
about the proposal, and the responses fell into three groups: 15 interviewees 
unconditionally agreed with the proposal, seven conditionally agreed, and nine 
disagreed. By interviewing more than once on this policy alternative, I was able to 
explore the exact perceptions of the participants on these complex and sensitive issues.  
 
There may not have been so much difference between the first and supplementary 
interviews regarding the necessity for building trust between spending ministries and 
the MOSF in order to reduce various dysfunctional consequences of the SABP. De 
Bruijn (2002) also indicates that mutual trust and the rules of the game regarding 
product definitions, functions and meanings need to be embedded in the process of 
performance measurement in order to reduce various perverse effects. Similarly, 
Kelman and Friedman (2009) and Heinrich (2007) suggest encouraging the public 
service motivation or stewardship of public employees towards cooperative behaviour 
to prevent negative effects of performance management. 
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However, interviewees in the supplementary interviews expressed different opinions 
about whether the MOSF should give more discretion to the spending ministries. 
Considering these opinions and the importance of reducing dysfunctional consequences 
in the performance planning stage, cooperation between the spending ministries and the 
MOSF when it comes to developing performance indicators and performance target 
levels might be more important than increasing spending ministries’ discretion 
unconditionally. Although it will eventually be necessary to increase the spending 
ministries’ discretion, in the long-term, it is also essential to require spending ministries 
to be more accountable, responsible, objective and reliable in the short-term. As a result, 
increasing the appropriateness of performance indicators and performance target levels 
through cooperation between the spending ministries and the MOSF, as well as 
enhancing spending ministries’ discretion on other procedures of the SABP, such as 
programme management and specific methods for achieving performance targets, might 
be necessary at the same time. It is possible that this policy alternative became more 
precisely specified between the first and the supplementary interviews.  
 
Abolishing Spending Ministries’ Self-Assessment Stage 
 
With respect to this policy alternative, the supplementary interviews provide a more 
complete understanding, because only two interviewees in the first interviews suggested 
the policy change. Two groups containing similar numbers of respondents gave 
opposite opinions in the supplementary interviews. Interestingly, the number of 
interviewees from the MOSF, the spending ministries and the experts in each group was 
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nearly same. More interestingly, and contrary to initial expectation, seven spending 
ministry officials disagreed with the policy change, while seven agreed with it. At first 
glance, all spending ministry officials seemed to agree with the policy change, because 
the MOSF changed nearly all the self-assessment results of the spending ministries, and 
so most spending ministry officials seemed to regard the self-assessment stage as 
useless. However, nearly half of spending ministry officials in the supplementary 
interviews put an emphasis on the opportunity for increasing their responsibility over 
the programme and enhancing their performance management capability. Considering 
the purposes of SABP, which are to improve the spending ministries’ ability to manage 
performance and to establish and spread a performance management culture among 
spending ministries, as well as to increase budgeting efficiency, these opinions seem to 
be very reasonable. As a result, abolishing the spending ministries’ self-assessment 
stage might not be feasible, not only because the self-assessment stage can lead to 
increasing interest in SABP as well as strengthening spending ministries’ responsibility 
and accountability, but also because spending ministries have a useful opportunity to 
experience a learning process through the self-assessment stage. 
 
Summary of Six Policy Alternatives  
 
Out of the six policy alternatives, I was able to confirm the feasibility of two: refining 
the SABP checklist; and changing the penalty-oriented operation of the system. 
Building trust and giving more discretion to spending ministries were found to need 
more detail, both on strengthening cooperation regarding performance indicators and 
performance target levels and on enhancing discretion as to other parts of the procedure. 
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The creation of a relative evaluation system needed to be reconsidered after reviewing 
the results of a trial implementation of such a system. However, elevating the 
assessment level and abolishing the self-assessment stage did not seem to be feasible 
policy alternatives when the purposes of SABP were taken into consideration. Before 
elevating the assessment level from the present sub-programme to programme level, it 
might be necessary to establish a more explicit relationship between the sub-programme 
and programme levels. Abolishing the self-assessment stage of spending ministries was 
also found not to be feasible. A summary of discussions regarding the six policy 
alternatives is given in Table 7-1. 
 
Table 7- 1 Summary of Discussions Regarding Six Policy Alternatives 
Policy alternative Feasibility 
Refine the SABP checklist Feasible 
Change the penalty-oriented operation Feasible 
Relative evaluation system Needs to be reconsidered later 
Elevate assessment level Not feasible 
Build trust and give more discretion  
to spending ministries 
Needs to be more clearly specified 
Abolish self-assessment stage Not Feasible 
 
Besides the interviewees’ evaluation of the feasibility of these policy changes, it is 
notable that the MOSF officials rated the importance of most of the changes more 
highly than did the spending ministry officials. This might imply that the MOSF 
officials took potential changes to the SABP system more seriously, as the principal in 
the principal-agent relationship, and this result is also well supported by the 
implications of the dynamic pattern of ROR of spending ministries mentioned in 
Section 7.2.2.  
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Summary of Feasible Policy Alternatives for Preventing or Reducing Dysfunctional 
Consequences of SABP 
 
First I extracted 14 policy alternatives for preventing or reducing various dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP from the first interviews, and then, through the supplementary 
interviews and reviews of relevant studies, I evaluated the feasibility of six policy 
alternatives which seemed to be thought worth discussing. Among 14 suggested policy 
alternatives, Table 7-2 summarises nine feasible policy alternatives. Five policy 
alternatives need to be reconsidered later or are not feasible. In particular, the impacts of 
two policy alternatives that related to the restructuring and reengineering of government 
departments will need to be looked at in future research, because they need more in-
depth analysis and it will take long time to evaluate these kinds of policies. Moreover, 
Table 7-2 indicates the main actors involved in each policy alternative, in order to 
suggest more customised policy alternatives for related organisations. 
 
Table 7- 2 Summary of Feasible Policy Alternatives 
Policy alternatives 
Unintended dysfunctional 
consequences by agents 
Intended dysfunctional 
consequences by agents Main 
actors Tunnel 
vision 
Myopic 
manage 
ment 
Subopti 
misation 
Measure 
fixation 
Ratch
et 
effect 
Misrepre 
Sentation 
Cherry- 
picking 
Options for urgent 
policy change 
        
Refine SABP checklist √ √ √ √    MOSF 
Change penalty-oriented 
operation √ √ √ √ √ √ √ MOSF 
Senior officials’ interest √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Both 
Options for short-term 
policy change         
More active role 
(monitoring, penalty, 
education, etc.) 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
All related 
organisati
ons 
Open evaluation system √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
All related 
organisati
ons 
Report SABP results 
publicly      √ √ MOSF 
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Reduce unnecessary 
workload  √  √    MOSF 
Options for medium- or 
long-term policy change         
Increase expertise √ √ √ √ √ √  Both 
Build trust, strengthen 
cooperation and  
give more discretion 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ Both 
 
Notes 1. Modified Smith (1995) 2. The symbol ‘√’ indicates a putative positive effect 3. “Both” in main 
actors indicates the MOSF and spending ministries 
 
From the interviews and the review of relevant literature, it can be said that refinement 
of the SABP checklist may reduce four unintended dysfunctional consequences by the 
spending ministries, and the other two options for urgent policy change are likely to 
address all the dysfunctional consequences of SABP, as mentioned earlier.  
 
As for options for short-term policy change, firstly, a more active role for related 
organisations, such as the MOSF, the National Assembly and the BAI, and external 
actors like the ombudsman, grassroots organisations and client panels mentioned by 
Thiel and Leeuw (2002), might reduce all dysfunctional consequences as well. This 
policy alternative includes very extensive policies: not just more fundamental 
approaches, such as developing and distributing a detailed SABP manual for 
appropriate performance indicators and performance target levels, or educating 
spending ministry officials, but also less fundamental approaches, such as strengthening 
the audit of performance data, and even giving penalties for deliberate manipulation of 
performance. Similarly, Smith (1995) indicates the necessity of keeping the system 
under constant review, maintaining a careful audit of data, and developing independent 
benchmarks. Bevan and Hood (2006) also suggest specifying performance targets and 
filling the audit gap for reducing the ratchet effect and output distortion. Heinrich (2007) 
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comments that in order to increase the effectiveness of a performance management 
system, evaluating and recognising performance achievements are necessary.  
 
Secondly, an open evaluation system reaching from the initial stage to the assessment 
stage of a programme could also solve all dysfunctional consequences of SABP. This 
policy alternative involves prior consensus on performance indicators and target levels, 
and expert interpretation of performance indicators, as mentioned by Smith (1995). 
Similarly, Bevan and Hood (2006) suggest increasing face-to-face communication 
between governors and governed, and Heinrich (2007) indicates the necessity of 
increasing openness and fairness regarding the use of performance information to 
reduce the side effects of performance management. Reducing disagreement in the 
performance planning stage by an open evaluation system could be helpful in 
preventing subsequent dysfunctional consequences in the performance measurement 
and reporting stages. In addition, if there is no disagreement between spending 
ministries and the MOSF over performance indicators and their target levels, then the 
MOSF can just focus on evaluating whether spending ministries have achieved their 
performance target levels as expected, and the BAI and the National Assembly can just 
pay attention to verifying whether the grounds for performance achievement submitted 
by spending ministries are appropriate or not. That is, a more desirable division of roles 
between related organisations might be possible under an open evaluation system.  
 
Thirdly, reporting SABP results publicly could be expected particularly to reduce the 
phenomena of misrepresentation and cherry-picking, because it could put pressure on 
spending ministries not to distort their performance and not to intentionally prioritise 
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groups that will produce favourable results. In addition, reducing unnecessary workload 
might give spending ministries more time to wait for the long-term and non-measurable 
performance of a programme, because many interviewees indicated lack of time and 
high costs as the main reasons for myopic management and measure fixation.  
 
Among the options for medium- or long-term policy change, firstly, increasing the 
expertise of both spending ministries and the MOSF could be expected to reduce 
information asymmetry and enhance the MOSF’s capability in evaluating the 
appropriateness of performance target levels and performance results. Thus, this policy 
alternative might address the ratchet effect and the misrepresentation caused by 
information asymmetry. In addition, this policy change is likely to address four 
unintended dysfunctional consequences, by increasing spending ministries’ capability in 
performance management. Secondly, building trust between spending ministries and the 
MOSF, strengthening cooperation in terms of developing performance indicators and 
setting performance target levels, as well as giving more discretion to spending 
ministries in other processes of SABP, might also have a positive effect in reducing all 
dysfunctional consequences, especially those in the performance planning stage, such as 
tunnel vision, myopic management, suboptimisation and the ratchet effect.  
 
Considering all feasible policy alternatives, more fundamental approaches, such as 
refining the SABP checklist, developing a detailed SABP manual for appropriate 
performance indicators and target levels, and educating government officials, mainly 
seem to address unintended dysfunctional consequences by agents, whilst less 
fundamental approaches, such as strengthening audits, sometimes giving penalties for 
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fraud, and reporting SABP results publicly, might generally resolve intended 
dysfunctional consequences by agents.  
 
Moreover, these policy alternatives could be customised, according to the main actors in 
each programme. It is the MOSF that can be expected to play a key role in changing 
policies related to refining the SABP checklist, changing penalty-oriented operation, 
reporting SABP results publicly and reducing unnecessary workload. On the other hand, 
obtaining senior officials’ interest, increasing expertise, building trust, strengthening 
cooperation and giving more discretion to spending ministries are roles both the MOSF 
and spending ministries can undertake. The remaining two policy alternatives are 
associated with all the related organisations, such as the MOSF, spending ministries, the 
National Assembly, the BAI, experts, citizens’ groups, and the press. Here, though, 
there is one thing which needs to be carefully noted by policy makers: all policy makers 
should always consider the possibility that other unexpected dysfunctional 
consequences may be caused by these policy changes when it comes to redesigning the 
SABP system.  
 
7.3.6 Validity of the Data, Findings and Interpretations  
 
This section evaluates the validity of the data, findings and interpretations of the 
qualitative analysis. The coding of qualitative data was implemented by one person, me, 
so the reliability problem does not arise. Thus, the section focuses on the validity, 
determining that the account provided by the study is “accurate, can be trusted, and is 
credible” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011, p.211). Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) 
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indicate several strategies to check for qualitative validity, such as member checking, 
triangulation of the data, and asking for the opinions of others. Firstly, I sent the 
conference paper, which included my main findings, such as case study results, major 
themes and theoretical framework, to the participants in the first interviews and asked 
them whether my findings reflected their answers accurately, as well as whether I had 
respected their privacy. Most participants gave me feedback positively and some experts 
gave useful comments. Secondly, the study employed several sources, many 
participants and multiple case studies, as well as merging the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis results. That is, by not only interpreting multiple sources of 
evidence, such as documentation, archival records, and first and supplementary 
interviews from eight budgetary programmes in three case areas, but also merging 
related findings from both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the study can provide a 
more accurate and complete understanding of dysfunctional consequences of SABP. 
Finally, the transcripts of the interviews, the theoretical framework of the analysis, and 
the major findings were examined by my PhD colleagues, my supervisors and many 
experts at the conference. Also, I tried to explain the major findings to individuals who 
were not familiar with SABP system, such as government officials who had no 
experience of SABP. Consequently, it can be said that the validity of the data, findings 
and interpretations of the qualitative analysis is very high.  
 
7.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
 
This study contributes to academic knowledge in three areas of research. Firstly, it 
contributes to studies on dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the 
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public sector. Secondly, it contributes to the application of the principal-agent approach 
in a Korean context. It has demonstrated that the principal-agent theory developed by 
Western researchers can be well applied to analysing dysfunctional consequences of the 
Korean performance budgeting system, SABP. Thirdly, it offers support to performance 
budgeting policy makers in analysing various dysfunctional consequences and 
considering the refinements that might bring a better performance budgeting system.  
 
7.4.1 Contribution to Performance Budgeting Studies 
 
The research focused on dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the 
public sector in order to provide a theoretically-informed and empirically-rich account 
of them, and moreover it suggested feasible policy alternatives for minimising or 
preventing dysfunctional consequences. The study was mainly built on the work of 
Smith (1990, 1993, 1995, 2005), one of many researchers on the dysfunctional 
consequences of performance management in the public sector. It particularly supports 
his work (Smith, 1995) related to the existence of unexpected dysfunctional 
consequences of performance management and the necessity for policy makers to be 
aware of these as well as of feasible policy alternatives, while developing a more 
detailed theoretical framework to analyse various dysfunctional consequences. 
Furthermore, the results of the study can well be applied to examine not only other 
countries’ performance budgeting but also other performance assessment systems in 
Korea, such as R&D programme assessment, regional development programme 
assessment and public institution evaluation. The specific contributions to performance 
budgeting studies are as follows. 
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Firstly, Smith (1995) suggests eight types of unintended dysfunctional consequences of 
publishing performance data in the public sector based on the principal-agent theory. 
However, this research attempts to suggest a more detailed typology of dysfunctional 
consequences based on the principal-agent relationship, some of them unintended by 
both principal and agents (tunnel vision, myopic management, measure fixation, 
suboptimisation), others unintended by the principal, but intended by the agents (ratchet 
effect, misrepresentation, cherry-picking), and to underpin it by extensive empirical 
evidence. Apart from Smith’s work (1995), there have been few studies which 
categorise dysfunctional consequences into unintended and intended ones by agents, as 
this research does.  
 
Secondly, the research highlights the relationship between the categorisation of 
dysfunctional consequences and the reasons for them. Although many researchers have 
indicated diverse reasons for dysfunctional consequences, and the reasons for each 
dysfunctional consequence are similar to those in this study, they have not explicitly 
linked the reasons with the categorisation of dysfunctional consequences (Smith, 1995; 
de Bruijn, 2002; Hood, 2006; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Kelman and Friedman, 2009). 
However, the findings from the interviews suggest that whether spending ministries 
make efforts to prevent dysfunctional consequences is closely related to their intentions 
with regard to dysfunctional consequences. In addition, the specific reasons for each 
dysfunctional consequence suggested by the interviews are also associated with the 
categorisation of dysfunctional consequences. That is, the reasons for unintended ones 
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are more related to the characteristics of public programmes, while those for intended 
ones are more associated with spending ministries’ deliberate strategic behaviours.  
 
Thirdly, this research sheds light on exploring the difference in the extent of 
dysfunctional consequences between principal and agents. There have been few studies 
describing the difference in the extent of perverse effects on the basis of the principal-
agent relationship. Moreover, the research pays attention to the possibility of 
underreporting of intended dysfunctional consequences by spending ministries, and 
suggests that MOSF officials need to consider this tendency in spending ministry 
officials when it comes to refining the system.  
 
Fourthly, this research focuses on finding feasible policy alternatives for reducing or 
preventing various dysfunctional consequences through two rounds of interviews and an 
extensive review of the relevant literature. Furthermore, the study divides options for 
policy change into urgent, short-term, medium-term or long-term, based on the number 
of respondents and perceived importance level of interviewees, in order to increase the 
timeliness of policy implementation. There have been few studies suggesting policy 
alternatives in the way this study does.  
 
7.4.2 Contribution to the Application of the Principal-Agent Approach in a Korean Context 
 
Firstly, this research has attempted to apply the principal-agent theory developed by 
Western researchers to the Korean performance budgeting system and to provide 
empirically-rich explanations for dysfunctional consequences of SABP. Although many 
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Korean researchers have analysed SABP, most of them have focused on examining the 
relationship between SABP results and budget allocation, or explaining the factors 
which affect budgeting or performance results (Park, 2005, 2008; Bang, 2009; Cho, 
2010; Yoon, 2001; Kang, 2007). Even though some studies have indicated possible 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP, they have not applied the principal-agent theory 
in detail (Bang, 2009; Cho, 2010; Park, 2005; Keum and Lee, 2009; Shin, 2012). 
Consequently, there have been few studies which have analysed dysfunctional 
consequences of SABP on the basis of the principal-agent theory. This has provided the 
researcher with a good opportunity to broaden the scope of analysing dysfunctional 
consequences of performance budgeting based on the principal-agent theory from a 
focus on Western countries such as the UK and the US to findings from Korea.  
 
Secondly, with respect to the methodology, there have been few studies of performance 
budgeting in either western countries or Korea which have employed both the 
quantitative and the qualitative approach. However, this research uses both approaches 
for analysing the quantitative and qualitative data provided by Korean government 
departments and officials. In order to explain and explore the difference in SABP results 
between spending ministries and the MOSF in Korea, it also adopts various kinds of 
research methods, such as correlation analysis, t-test, ANOVA and multiple regression 
analysis, analysis of documents and archival records, and in-depth interviews. In 
addition, the study has attempted to merge the results from two different kinds of 
approach, so the major findings of the quantitative approach support and strengthen 
those of the qualitative approach, and vice versa. For example, statistically significant 
relationships between two independent variables and two dependent variables support 
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the findings about spending ministries’ optimism bias and the MOSF’s drastic cutting of 
self-assessment results provided by the qualitative analysis; and the use of a higher 
adjusted R square in the performance planning section than in other sections strengthens 
the finding about the necessity for careful consideration in the performance planning 
stage in order to avoid subsequent dysfunctional consequences in the performance 
measurement and reporting stages. Furthermore, the research implemented interviews 
with almost the same group of participants twice with a time interval, and this led to a 
more complete and exact exploration of the perceptions of the participants concerning 
very complex and sensitive issues. For example, four out of six controversial policy 
alternatives produced different results between the first and supplementary interviews.  
 
7.4.3 Contribution to Policy Makers  
 
Although many studies on dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting have 
applied the principal-agent theory to suggest useful policy alternatives, few studies have 
tried to match each policy alternative with suitable actors in detail. Also, there have 
been few studies carried out to evaluate each policy alternative’s feasibility concretely, 
through repeated interviews, as this study has done. In addition, there may be main 
actors who play a key role in implementing each policy alternative, so the research has 
tried to indicate suitable actors for this. During this process, a better understanding of 
the complex interests and incentives among related organisations provides a good 
opportunity to discover feasible policy alternatives for diverse policy makers.  
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Firstly, policy makers of all related organisations should pay attention to the following. 
The research points out that making an effort to prevent or reduce dysfunctional 
consequences in the performance planning stage is important in order to avoid 
dysfunctional consequences in the performance measurement and performance 
reporting stages. In particular, prior consensus on the appropriate performance 
indicators and performance target levels between spending ministries and the MOSF 
might be essential for minimising dysfunctional consequences in the performance 
planning stage. This will especially reduce unintended dysfunctional consequences and 
the ratchet effect.  
 
Secondly, at the same time, in order to reduce intended dysfunctional consequences 
more efficiently, policy makers in the BAI and the National Assembly should 
strengthen their auditing of spending ministries’ performance reports. Also, policy 
makers in the spending ministries should develop an official database of data about their 
performance and use these data when submitting the account of their performance to the 
MOSF, the National Assembly and the BAI.  
 
Thirdly, policy makers in both the MOSF and spending ministries should build trust 
with each other and try to increase their expertise in performance budgeting. Mutual 
trust and higher expertise can reduce information asymmetry and various dysfunctional 
consequences. Also, senior managers in both the MOSF and spending ministries should 
pay greater attention to SABP. Their interest may be essential to minimise all kinds of 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP.  
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Fourthly, policy makers in the MOSF should carefully consider changing the excessive 
penalty-oriented operation of SABP, refining the SABP checklist, reporting SABP 
results publicly, and reducing unnecessary workload, in order to prevent various 
perverse effects. In addition, MOSF officials, as mentioned earlier, need to be aware of 
possible underestimations of intended dysfunctional consequences when refining the 
SABP system, because spending ministry officials have a natural tendency to give 
socially desirable answers on these negative effects. Moreover, they need to consider 
more seriously the possibility of spending ministries’ generous self-assessment results 
when it comes to reviewing directly managed programmes, ministries’ programmes 
rather than agency ones, programmes that have lower budgets compared to the previous 
year, and economy-related programmes rather than welfare-related ones.  
 
Fifthly, policy makers in spending ministries should try to reduce opportunistic 
behaviours based on the information asymmetry between them and the MOSF. 
Considering the nature of SABP, although it may not be possible to completely abolish 
spending ministries’ deliberate and intentional behaviours, spending ministry officials 
themselves should make an effort to prevent intended dysfunctional consequences.   
 
Finally, the study suggests that all policy makers should be cautious about designing 
and refining the performance budgeting system, considering both the unintended and 
the intended dysfunctional consequences already evident and those that changes might 
bring.   
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed and interpreted several issues raised by the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. For example, statistically significant relationships 
between two independent variables and the DR and ROR in the quantitative analysis 
supported well the findings of the qualitative analysis, especially the impacts of various 
dysfunctional consequences on the behaviours of both spending ministries and the 
MOSF. “No but Yes” type disagreements affect the relationship between control 
variables and the DR, and that may be the reason why some control variables did not 
have clear relationships with the DR. From the clear relationships between control 
variables and the ROR, several useful implications were extracted. Five major issues in 
the qualitative analysis were discussed, which were closely related to the research 
questions: the type of, the extent of, and the reasons for dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP; the impact of these dysfunctional consequences; and some feasible policy 
alternatives. These detailed discussions and interpretations were intended to confirm the 
answers to the four research questions. Also, the chapter has evaluated the validity and 
reliability of the data, findings and interpretations of both the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, and concluded that both approaches have high validity and 
reliability. Finally, it has indicated that the study makes a contribution to knowledge in 
three key areas: to the study of performance budgeting (theoretical contribution); to the 
application of the principal-agent approach in a Korean context (empirical and 
methodological contributions); and to the work of policy makers (practical contribution). 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the public sector the concept of performance is often elusive, and there are arguments 
about the best way to implement a performance budgeting system. This thesis has not 
set out to focus on these arguments. Instead, it has attempted to examine possible 
dysfunctional consequences of a performance budgeting system, focusing on the 
process of SABP in South Korea, and suggesting feasible policy alternatives for refining 
the SABP system.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches, with various kinds of research methods, 
were used for this study. The quantitative analysis showed that there is indeed a high 
and persistent optimism bias by spending ministries, as well as drastic cutting by the 
MOSF of spending ministries’ generous self-assessment results. The case studies on 
which the qualitative analysis was based indicated that there are “unintended” and 
“intended” dysfunctional consequences of SABP by spending ministries, and that these 
can lead to both an optimism bias by spending ministries and a strict review of spending 
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ministries’ results by the MOSF. In addition, the findings of both approaches shed light 
on developing feasible policy alternatives for improving the SABP system.  
 
This chapter summarises the main answers to the research questions by drawing on the 
findings of both approaches, and then considers the study’s limitations, as well as future 
research areas, before offering some closing remarks.  
 
8.2 Answers to the Research Questions 
 
This study dealt with the following four research questions by employing both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches: What are the factors which affect the 
differences in SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF? What are the 
types of, extent of, and reasons for dysfunctional consequences of SABP? How do these 
dysfunctional consequences impact on both spending ministries’ self-assessment scores 
and the MOSF’s review scores? How can the SABP system in Korea be improved and 
refined? The first research question is related to the quantitative analysis, and the second 
and third questions are associated with the qualitative analysis, while the fourth is 
related to both the analyses. However, as we saw in Chapter 7, the results of both 
approaches were closely related to each other. The answers to the research questions 
examined from Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 are presented below.  
 
In order to address the first research question, by employing quantitative analysis, this 
study firstly defined and operationalised the dependent variables (DR and ROR), the 
independent variables, and the control variables through a review of relevant literature, 
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followed by preliminary analyses – correlation analysis, scatter diagram, t-test, and 
multiple regression analysis – to verify the relationship between variables. Regression 
analysis showed firstly that two independent variables, such as the MOSF’s review 
score and the specific programme’s self-assessment score minus the spending ministry’s 
average score for the year (specific score minus average score), had statistically 
significant relationships with the DR and ROR for all six years being studied, at the 
level of 0.01. The effective directions were negative and positive respectively. The 
former relationship implied that there is indeed optimism bias by spending ministries in 
their self-assessment stage, while the latter one indicated that the MOSF does drastically 
cut spending ministries’ generous self-assessment scores. These findings provided a 
useful insight into the necessity for exploring potential dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP and the impacts of these on the behaviours of both spending ministries and the 
MOSF, using the qualitative approach, as well as for suggesting feasible policy 
alternatives for refining the SABP system. Secondly, regarding the relationship between 
control variables and the ROR, the study found that differences in SABP scores 
between spending ministries and the MOSF may be higher if a programme is directly 
managed by the government, is a ministry rather than an agency programme, was given 
a low budget percentage change for the current year, and is an economy-related rather 
than a welfare-related programme, regardless of programme budget size. In addition, the 
differences may be lower if SABP has been implemented on a programme several times. 
These findings implied that policy makers in the MOSF need to consider spending 
ministries’ possible optimism bias more carefully when it comes to reviewing these 
programmes’ self-assessment results, and that repeated SABP implementation brings 
positive learning effects. Thirdly, the study analysed the dynamic pattern of RORs 
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through the programmes which had been assessed by SABP two or three times from 
2005 to 2010. The findings implied that the MOSF, as controller and designer of the 
SABP system, has seen itself as responsible for improving the SABP system, whilst the 
spending ministries, as agents in the principal-agent relationship, have paid greater 
attention to high SABP scores and the bigger budgets they bring.  
 
With the second research question, the case studies (eight budgetary programmes in 
three case study areas) highlighted the types of, extent of, and reasons for various 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP based on the principal-agent relationship. To do 
this, the study extracted seven meaningful potential dysfunctional consequences of 
SABP through the review of the relevant literature, and then categorised them into 
“unintended” dysfunctional consequences (tunnel vision, myopic management, measure 
fixation, suboptimisation) and “intended” ones (ratchet effect, misrepresentation, 
cherry-picking) by the spending ministries, while accepting that all dysfunctional 
consequences are unintended by the MOSF, which is the principal in the principal-agent 
relationship. The case studies suggested that, in the case of unintended dysfunctional 
consequences, spending ministry officials, as the agents in the relationship, make some 
efforts to prevent them, whilst in the case of intended ones, they do not make any efforts 
to prevent them. In addition, the case studies indicated that the reasons for unintended 
dysfunctional consequences are closely related to intrinsic characteristics of public 
programmes, such as intangibility, indirectness, externality and complexity (Smith, 
1995; Wilson, 1989; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; de Bruijn, 2002), and factors which are 
difficult to control in the short-term, such as unique features of Korean government 
culture, whilst those for intended ones are more associated with the intentions or 
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tendencies of spending ministries to obtain high SABP scores and bigger budgets by 
using the information asymmetry between themselves and the MSOF or avoiding the 
excessively penalty-oriented operation of SABP. Moreover, the case studies confirmed 
that in the case of tunnel vision, myopic management and the ratchet effect, both 
spending ministries and the MOSF strongly agreed on the existence of these; but in the 
case of measure fixation, suboptimisation and misrepresentation, the MOSF strongly 
agreed on their existence while the spending ministries only partly agreed. And in the 
case of cherry-picking, the case studies suggested that the MOSF partly agreed on the 
existence of this, but spending ministries strongly denied its existence. However, after 
discussing the role of MOSF officials as colleagues or supervisors of spending ministry 
officials in Chapter 7, the study reached the conclusion that although we could agree on 
the honesty of spending ministry officials in terms of answers in the interviews, there 
was always the possibility of them unconsciously underreporting dysfunctional 
consequences, especially intended ones, as agents in pursuit of socially desirable 
answers (Sackett et al., 1989). Policy makers need to consider these possible 
underestimations when it comes to redesigning the SABP system.  
 
With respect to the impact of these dysfunctional consequences on spending ministries’ 
self-assessment scores and the MOSF’s review scores, the topic guide in the first 
interviews did not include direct questions about this impact, and so its exploration of 
this was initially somewhat dependent on the interpretation of the first interviews and 
the documentary analysis. Consequently, in the supplementary interviews, the study 
directly asked about the impact of dysfunctional consequences on SABP scores, and the 
interviews suggested that various dysfunctional consequences led both to optimism bias 
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by spending ministries and to drastic cutting of these ministries’ generous self-
assessment results by the MOSF. The study also confirmed that these results were well 
supported by the quantitative analysis results, verifying the statistically significant 
relationships between two independent variables and the DR and ROR for six years. 
Furthermore, during the supplementary interviews many respondents indicated that the 
differences in SABP scores between spending ministries and the MOSF mainly came 
from incongruence in Question 2-1 (the appropriateness of performance indicators), 
which is logically related to subsequent questions such as Questions 2-2 and 4-1. Thus, 
the study confirmed that dysfunctional consequences need to be considered more 
seriously in the performance planning stage than in the performance measurement or 
reporting stages. These results shed light on the importance of seeking more feasible 
policy alternatives for improving the SABP system.  
 
In order to suggest feasible policy alternatives for refining the SABP system, the study 
firstly extracted 14 policy changes from the first interviews, and then examined in detail, 
using the supplementary interview results and reviews of relevant studies, six policy 
alternatives that had aroused particular discussion. The study finally suggested nine 
feasible policy alternatives in the form of options for urgent, short-term, medium-term 
or long-term policy changes, specifying the main actors for each policy change. The six 
policy alternatives that aroused particular discussion were: refining the SABP checklist, 
changing the penalty-oriented operation of SABP, creating a relative evaluation system, 
elevating assessment from “sub-programme” to “programme” level in the programme 
budgeting structure, building trust and giving more discretion to spending ministries, 
and abolishing the spending ministries’ self-assessment stage. The study found that 
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interviewees’ perceptions changed between the first and supplementary interviews, and 
the reason might be that the interviewees had had an opportunity to rethink the 
advantages and disadvantages of each policy alternative in more detail, because in the 
supplementary interviews the six policy alternatives were dealt with as main issues. 
These results shed light on how repeated interviews on the same issues, with the same 
interviewees, and at intervals of time, can be an effective way to understand and explore 
the exact perceptions of participants on very complex and sensitive issues, and to 
increase the reliability of findings. The study looked at how, of the six policy 
alternatives, opinion on four changed from “feasible” in the first interviews to “not 
feasible”, “need to be reconsidered later”, or “need to be more clearly specified” in the 
supplementary interviews. After discussion, the study suggested refining the SABP 
checklist (MOSF), changing excessively penalty-oriented operation (MOSF), and 
encouraging senior officials’ interest (MOSF and spending ministries) as options for 
urgent policy change; more active roles, such as developing a detailed SABP manual, 
educating, auditing or monitoring (all by related organisations), an open evaluation 
system (all by related organisations), reporting SABP results publicly (MOSF) and 
reducing unnecessary workload (MOSF) as options for short-term policy change; and 
increasing expertise (MOSF and spending ministries), and building trust and 
strengthening cooperation between spending ministries and the MOSF when developing 
performance indicators and target levels, while giving more discretion to spending 
ministries in the other procedures (MOSF and spending ministries), as options for 
medium- or long-term policy change. The study also suggested that more fundamental 
approaches, such as refining the SABP checklist, developing a detailed SABP manual, 
and educating government officials, seemed to be more closely related to addressing 
343 
 
unintended dysfunctional consequences by agents, while less fundamental approaches, 
such as strengthening the audit of performance data, sometimes giving a penalty for 
manipulation of data, and reporting SABP results publicly, might be more associated 
with reducing intended dysfunctional consequences by spending ministries. Finally, the 
study recommended that all policy makers should always be aware of the unintended 
and intended dysfunctional consequences which these policy changes might bring, as 
well as the dysfunctional consequences which are already evident.  
 
8.3 Future Research Areas 
 
This research has been successful in explaining and exploring the differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF in the process of arriving at SABP results, and it has 
done this through both quantitative and qualitative approaches. However, further 
research with similar research topics on other policy areas, in Korea and other countries, 
could enrich the findings of this study. In particular, a cross-national comparison could 
provide researchers with an opportunity to find out the different dimensions of various 
dysfunctional consequences of performance budgeting in the public sector. For example, 
a further study might develop another useful typology for analysing perverse effects of 
performance management and exploring the reasons why agents need to game.  
 
Secondly, further research is needed to examine whether the differences between the 
SABP results of spending ministries and the review results of the MOSF are high and 
persistent over time. Longer time-series data on SABP results might be useful to 
analyse whether SABP can achieve its initial purposes. In addition, it might enable 
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researchers to discover some algorithms for the optimum response by spending 
ministries to any given level of ROR through the analysis of dynamic ROR patterns. 
The MOSF also needs to prepare to reduce spending ministries’ strategic behaviours by 
calculating the optimum response.  
 
Thirdly, future research needs to increase the internal validity of the quantitative 
analysis by considering not only additional extraneous variables which may affect the 
difference in SABP results between spending ministries and the MOSF, such as the 
presidential agenda programmes and the programmes of interest to the National 
Assembly, but also more outcome-oriented variables, such as citizen’s satisfaction or 
happiness level. In addition, more delicate operationalisation of the economy-related 
programmes might be helpful in explaining the unexpected relationship between this 
variable and the DR.  
 
Finally, future research needs to consider the advantages of the US GPRAMA and the 
possibility of applying the provisions of this act to SABP in terms of monitoring several 
high priority performance goals and linking performance information with a dashboard 
for constant review. In addition, there may be plenty of scope for further research 
related to the issues of relative evaluation systems and elevating the assessment level 
from sub-programme to programme level. For example, with the relative evaluation 
system, several issues, such as whether compulsory operation by the MOSF or 
voluntary operation by spending ministries is preferable; whether the criterion of the 
ratio of the number of programmes or that of the ratio of expenditure, as in Canada’s 
Strategic Spending Review, is preferable; what the appropriate proportions are and how 
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to create these; and how to prevent spending ministries’ other strategic behaviours, need 
to be considered. Moreover, it would be worthwhile future research considering the 
impact of the restructuring or reengineering of related organisations on the 
dysfunctional consequences of SABP mentioned in the study. 
 
8.4 Closing Remarks 
 
Many countries from the OECD to South America, Africa, and developing regions have 
introduced various kinds of performance budgeting systems in order to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of budgetary programmes in the public sector, although 
these countries have different histories, cultures and political environments. These 
efforts have actually improved programmes’ performance, governments’ accountability 
and transparency, and the democracy of the policy process. However, performance 
budgeting in the public sector cannot be a panacea if policy makers do not consider 
seriously the potential dysfunctional consequences caused not only by the intrinsic 
characteristics of public programmes, such as multiple objectives and difficulties in 
measurement, but also by agents’ deliberate intention of gaming, due to the information 
asymmetry between the principal and agents when it comes to designing and refining 
the system (Smith, 1995; Hood, 2006; Dixit, 1997; Thiel and Leeuw, 2002).  
 
Against these backgrounds, this research provides a better and more complete 
understanding of the differences between spending ministries and the MOSF in the 
SABP system in Korea through both a quantitative and a qualitative approach; and it 
mainly reveals that there has indeed been both optimism bias by spending ministries in 
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their self-assessment stage and drastic cutting of spending ministries’ generous self-
assessment results by the MOSF, and that this is the result of unintended as well as 
intended dysfunctional consequences caused by spending ministries.  
 
However, this research does suggest that a performance measurement regime which has 
produced some dysfunctional consequences has not necessarily failed to improve the 
performance of participating organisations (Smith, 1995; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; 
Pollitt, 1990). Rather, the research argues that the most important thing is not the 
existence of dysfunctional consequences themselves, but the careful consideration of 
them, as well as the pursuit of feasible policy alternatives for minimising or preventing 
them when it comes to implementing or revising the performance budgeting system. 
Kelman and Friedman (2009, p.942) interestingly comment that, “The appropriate 
comparison is between an organization’s performance level with performance 
measurement and the dysfunctional responses, and the counterfactual performance level 
with no measurement, not between an organization’s performance level assuming 
performance measurement with no dysfunctional responses and the level with some 
dysfunctions.” Although the findings and discussions of the research cannot resolve all 
concerns over performance budgeting in the public sector, it is to be expected that they 
can give useful insights for understanding the process of performance budgeting and 
they can be effectively applied to other performance assessment systems, such as R&D 
programmes and public enterprise evaluations, in Korea, as well as to other countries’ 
performance budgeting systems. 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees for the Case Studies 
 
 
1-1. List of Interviewees in the Public Housing Area 
 
1. Manager in the MLTM  
(1) Main career path: Senior Deputy Director, Public Housing programme division 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of SABP results of the MLTM  
(3) Time & Place: 10:30-11:10, 14th November 2011, Cafeteria at the Government 
Complex in Gwacheon, Korea; 5th November 2012 (written reply) 
 
 
2. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Senior Deputy Director, Budget division of the MLTM 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of SABP results of the MLTM 
(3) Time & Place: 11:20-13:00, 31st October 2011, MLTM office in Pyungchon, Korea 
                              17:00-17:30, 2nd November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
3. Senior manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Director of Performance Management division of the MOSF  
(2) Role in SABP: Policy making on SABP, coordinating welfare policy 
(3) Time & Place: 14:20-15:10, 3rd November 2011, MOSF office in Gwacheon, Korea 
                               
 
4. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director of the Public Housing Fund division 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Public Housing programme in the MLTM 
(3) Time & Place: 11:00-11:40, 11th November 2011, Cafeteria at the Government 
Complex in Gwacheon, Korea 
 
 
5. Manger in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director of Public Housing Fund division 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Public Housing programme in the MLTM 
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(3) Time & Place: 13:30-14:10, 27th October 2011, Meeting room in the MLTM 
                              8th November 2012 (written reply) 
 
6. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Budgeting of Social Welfare field 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 11:00-12:00, 9th November 2011, Cafeteria at Gwacheon Complex 
                              17:00-17:30, 6th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
7. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Budgeting of Social Welfare and SOC  
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 15:10-16:00, 11th November 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF 
                              17:30-18:00, 25th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
8. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Public Housing programme division 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Public Housing programme in the MLTM 
(3) Time & Place: 10:50-11:50, 1st November 2011, MLTM office 
 
 
9. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Director, Public Housing programme division 
(2) Role in SABP: Coordinating self-assessment on the Public Housing programme 
(3) Time & Place: 10:00-10:45, 1st November 2011, MLTM office 
                              17:00-17:40, 5th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
10. Senior manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Director General of Fiscal Policy Bureau in the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Policy making on SABP 
(3) Time & Place: 18:20-19:00, 1st November 2011, Cafeteria in Seoul City 
 
11. Manager in the MOSF 
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(1) Main career path: Director of Performance Management division of the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Policy making on SABP, coordinating SABP results 
(3) Time & Place: 17:00-17:30, 13th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
12. Senior manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Director General of Fiscal Policy Bureau in the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Policy making on SABP 
(3) Time & Place: 5th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
1-2. List of Interviewees in the Youth Employment Area 
 
1. Assistant manager in the MOEL 
(1) Main career path: Youth Employment programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment of youth employment programme 
(3) Time & Place: 16:30-17:10, 1st November 2011, Meeting room in the MOEL 
 
 
2. Assistant manager in the MOEL 
(1) Main career path: Budget division of the MOEL 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of SABP results of the MOEL 
(3) Time & Place: 16:40-17:40, 31st October 2011, Meeting room in the MOEL;  
                               29th October 2012 (written reply) 
 
 
3. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Performance Management division in the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MOEL’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 16:20-17:00, 28th October 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF; 
                              17:40-18:15, 2nd November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
4. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Performance Management division in the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MOEL’s self-assessment results 
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(3) Time & Place: 13:00-14:20, 2nd November 2011, Chinese restaurant, Gwangwhamun; 
                               18:00-18:40, 3rd November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
5. Manger in the MKE 
(1) Main career path: Global Trade Specialist Training programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Youth Employment programme in the MKE 
(3) Time & Place: 15:10-15:50, 28th October 2011, Meeting room in the MKE; 
                              17:00-17:30, 8th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
6. Manager in the MKE 
(1) Main career path: Global Trade Specialist Training programme implementation, 
Management of Public Enterprise in the MKE 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Youth Employment programme in the MKE 
(3) Time & Place: 11:00-12:00, 27th October 2011, Meeting room in the MKE; 
                              16:00-16:40, 7th November 2012 (telephone)  
 
 
7. Senior manager in the MKE 
(1) Main career path: Director of Budget division of the MKE 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of the MKE’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 18:00-18:30, 31st October 2011, Office in the MKE; 
                              17:00-17:35, 12th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
8. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Budget Allocation in the Industrial field 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the self-assessment results of the MKE 
(3) Time & Place: 17:15-18:00, 1st November 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF; 
                              17:00-17:30, 30th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
9. Assistant manager in the MEST 
(1) Main career path: Junior College Student Training programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment of Youth Employment programme 
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(3) Time & Place: 14:30-15:10, 2nd November 2011, Cafeteria in the MEST; 
                              31st October 2012 (written reply) 
 
 
10. Assistant manager in the MEST 
(1) Main career path: Budget division of the MEST 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of the MEST’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 15:20-16:20, 2nd November 2011, Meeting room in the MEST 
 
 
11. Manager in the MOSF  
(1) Main career path: Budget Allocation of the Education field 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing of the MEST’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 14:40-15:30, 1st November 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF; 
                              17:45-18:20, 12th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
12. Manager in the MOSF  
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Performance Management division of the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Policy making on SABP, reviewing the MEST’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 16:30-17:10, 27th October 2011, Cafeteria, Gwacheon Complex; 
                             17:40-18:15, 30th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
1-3. List of Interviewees in the Social Overhead Capital Case Study 
 
1. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Senior Deputy Director, Road Construction programme  
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment of road construction programme 
(3) Time & Place: 15:15-16:00, 31st October 2011, Meeting room in the MLTM; 
                              17:00-17:30, 7th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
2. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Road Construction programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment of road construction programme 
352 
 
(3) Time & Place: 16:05-16:35, 31st October 2011, Meeting room in the MLTM; 
                              20th November 2012 (written reply) 
 
3. Senior manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: General Director of Budget division of the MLTM 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall coordinating of the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 17:15-18:10, 11th November 2011, Office in the MLTM 
 
 
4. Assistant manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Budgeting the SOC field (road, railway construction) 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 15:20-16:20, 27th October 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF 
                              18:20-18:55, 25th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
5. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Deputy Director, Performance Management division in the MOSF 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 17:20-18:20, 28th October 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF; 
                              17:00-17:30, 31st October 2012 (telephone) 
 
6. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Budgeting the SOC field (road construction) 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 18:20-19:10, 11th November 2011, Meeting room in the MOSF; 
                              17:00-17:25, 20th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
7. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Railway Construction programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the Railway Construction programme 
(3) Time & Place: 16:15-17:00, 11th November 2011, Meeting room in the MLTM; 
                              2nd November 2012 (written reply) 
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8. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Railway Construction programme implementation 
(2) Role in SABP: Self-assessment on the railway construction programme 
(3) Time & Place: 12:20-13:00, 11th November 2011, meeting room in the MLTM; 
                              16:00-16:35, 13th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
9. Manager in the MOSF 
(1) Main career path: Budgeting the SOC field (Railway Construction) 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 19:00-20:00, 27th October 2011, Meeting room in the MLTM 
 
 
10. Manager in the MLTM 
(1) Main career path: Budget division of the MLTM 
(2) Role in SABP: Overall handling of the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 13:10-14:00, 31st October 2011, Office in the MLTM;  
                              17:00-17:35, 9th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
1-4. List of Interviewees from among Experts 
 
 
1. Executive officer in the KIPF  
(1) Role in SABP: SABP planning, SABP manual development, reviewing the spending 
ministries’ self-assessment results 
(2) Time & Place: 15:30-16:30, 4th November 2011, Office in the KIPF 
 
 
2. Executive officer in the KDI  
(1) Role in SABP: Reporting the SABP system, Consultant to the SABP 
(2) Time & Place: 15:00-16:00, 8th November 2011, Office in the KDI; 
                               17:00-17:30, 29th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
3. Professor in the University 
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(1) Role in SABP: Overall handling of the SABP report in the National Assembly, 
reporting the SABP system, Consultant to the SABP 
(2) Time & Place: 14:40-15:20, 9th November 2011, Office in the University; 
                              17:40-18:20, 6th November 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
4. Researcher in the KIPF 
(1) Main career path: Budgeting of Social Welfare, SOC 
(2) Role in SABP: Reviewing the MLTM’s self-assessment results 
(3) Time & Place: 11:00-12:00, 4th November 2011, Office in the KIPF; 
                              17:00-17:30, 26th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
5. Researcher in the KIPF  
(1) Role in SABP: Reviewing spending ministries’ self-assessment results, educating 
government officials in SABP 
(2) Time & Place: 14:20-15:20, 4th November 2011, Office in the KIPF; 
                               17:40-18:10, 26th October 2012 (telephone) 
 
 
6. Deputy Director of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea 
(1) Role in SABP: Reporting the SABP system, audit and inspection on the MOSF’s 
Performance Management division 
(2) Time & Place: 19:00-21:00, 2nd November 2011, Restaurant in Seoul City; 
                               18:00-18:45, 20th November 2012 (telephone) 
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Appendix 2: Topic Guide for Government Officials of Spending Ministries  
(First interview) 
 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
First of all, I would really appreciate your help, despite your busy schedule. I am a 
doctoral research candidate at the University of Birmingham in the UK. I am doing 
research on the features of the Korean performance budgeting system, Self-Assessment 
of Budgetary Programme (SABP). I am going to give you information and invite you to 
be part of this research. 
 
The purpose of this research is to explore the differing perspectives on the performance 
of programmes between spending ministries and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
which controls the SABP system, and to suggest policy alternatives for a better 
performance budgeting system in Korea.  
 
You are being invited to take part in this research because you are/were one of the civil 
servants who are/were in charge of SABP, or you are an expert in performance budgeting 
or the SABP system.  
 
The research will involve your individual participation in an interview that will take 
about an hour. If you are willing to take part in this research, I will arrange a convenient 
time and place to interview you through telephone or e-mail. Before the interview, you 
will have an opportunity to ask any questions about the research, and then I will ask you 
to sign a consent form. During the interview, if you do not wish to answer any of the 
questions, you may say so and I will move on to the next question. The entire interview 
will be tape-recorded because it will help to make sure that nothing is forgotten, but no-
one will be identified by name on the tape and the tape will be destroyed after the 
research is finished. After the interview, you will have an opportunity to confirm the 
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accuracy of the analyses and findings of the research as it concerns your answers. 
 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether to 
participate or not. Even if you do decide to take part in this research, you are still free to 
stop at any time. If you want to stop, you do not have to give any reason. 
 
I declare that all your answers will be kept confidential and will be quoted anonymously. 
I will not be sharing information about you with anyone. The findings will be presented 
as part of my thesis, but no identifying information will ever be available to anyone.  
 
If you wish to make any additions or amendments to your answers or the research, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you again for your time and consideration. 
     
 
Sanghoon Shin, Ph.D Candidate 
University of Birmingham, UK 
Contact Telephone: 070-4045-3949 
E-mail: shoon117@gmail.com 
 
 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about it and any questions I have asked have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study. 
 
Name of Participant           __________________  
Signature of Participant    ___________________ 
Date                             ___________________________ 
                                            Day/month/year 
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1. Would you give me a short professional resume and tell me about your job, including 
your role in SABP?  
 
2. How do you think SABP has changed the performance and management of budgetary 
programmes? In particular, how has the linking of SABP results and the budget for a 
programme influenced the performance and management of programmes? 
 
3. Does/did your ministry have any strategies for obtaining high SABP grades and 
scores? Is it possible to divide these strategies into formal and informal ones?  
 
4. What do/did you think about the quantifiable and non-quantifiable performance of 
your programmes? Which type of performance do you think more important? Why? Do 
you think that the more important type of performance is/was well reflected in SABP 
grades and scores? If so, why? If not, why not? 
 
5. To what extent do you agree with the statement that SABP has a tendency to focus on 
the quantifiable performance of your programme? Why? How could the SABP system 
be changed to reduce this? 
 
6. In your division, which is/was regarded as more important – long-term strategy (e.g. 
ordering the priority of policy directions) or short-term achievement of the performance 
index? Why? What are/were the effects of this when you come/came to assess the 
performance of your programme in SABP? What could be done to increase 
consideration of the long-term or medium-term perspectives of programmes in SABP? 
 
7. How much attention do/did you give to objectives which are not measured on the 
performance index? Do/did you make efforts not to focus only on the performance 
index? (e.g. increasing the number of items on the performance index, emphasizing the 
other outcomes of a programme) Which non-measurable objectives should be 
considered in SABP? 
 
8. Do you think that in government as a whole the tendency to pursue narrow objectives 
which can easily be achieved, or the second best solution, rather than the overall 
objectives of the organisation, or the first best solution, has increased since the 
introduction of SABP? How about in your ministry? How about in your programme? 
What should be done to reduce this? 
 
9. What are/were the main criteria for setting the performance targets of a programme? 
To what extent do/did you consider the next year’s performance target level when 
deciding this year’s targets? What would be/would have been the reaction of your 
division or ministry if you suggested a rather ambitious performance target? Do you 
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think your programmes’ performance targets are/were highly ambitious? If so, why? If 
not, why not? Any solutions? 
 
10. Have you ever found that your performance has been underestimated or 
overestimated? If you discovered some disadvantageous performance data when you 
were assessing the programme, what would you do/have done? Is/was it possible for 
you to present these as they were? If not, any solutions? 
 
11. To what extent do/did you consider the opinions of related experts, interested parties, 
and ordinary citizens when you assess/assessed the performance of a programme? Do 
you think performance data fully reflect/reflected the need to satisfy citizens or the 
genuine outcome of a programme? If not, any solutions? 
 
12. What do you think the most important criteria are when it comes to selecting high 
priority groups in relation to SABP? (e.g. trainees, in the case of an employment 
training programme) To what extent do/did you consider the attainability of 
performance targets when you choose/chose policy objects? Why? Any solutions?  
 
13. Have there been/were there any differences in SABP results between your ministry 
and the MOSF? How do/did you cope with cases where there are/were differences in 
SABP scores and grades between your ministry and the MOSF? Why do you think 
these differences in SABP score and grade between your ministry and the MOSF 
happen/happened? Any solutions?  
 
14. How do you think the unique features of Korean government culture have impacted 
on SABP? Do you think these cultural features could lead to the differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF? If so, why? If not, why not? Any solutions?  
(e.g. general one-year rotation of personnel system, ministers’ short tenure of office, 
power relations between spending ministries and the MOSF, priority given to the 
presidential agenda etc.) 
 
15. What do you think about the budget division’s recommendations on your self-
assessment results?  
  * In the case of budget division’s officials: What do you think about the programme 
divisions’ self-assessment results? 
 
16. Do you have any further comments on disagreements between your ministry and the 
MOSF? What do you think should be done to fully achieve the objectives of SABP? 
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Appendix 3: Topic Guide for Government Officials of the MOSF and 
Experts on Performance Budgeting (First interview) 
 
1. Would you give me a short professional resume and tell me about your job, including 
your role in SABP?  
 
2. How do you think SABP has changed the performance and management of budgetary 
programmes? In particular, how has the linking of SABP results and budgets influenced 
the performance and management of programmes? 
 
3. Does/did your ministry have any strategies for reviewing spending ministries’ self-
assessment results? Is it possible to divide these strategies into formal and informal ones?  
* For experts: Do you think either spending ministries or the MOSF have any particular 
strategies for SABP? Is it possible to divide these strategies into formal and informal 
ones?  
 
4. What do/did you think spending ministries regard/regarded as more important: the 
quantifiable performance of programmes, or the non-quantifiable performance? Which 
kind of performance do you think more important? Why? Do you think that the more 
important kind of performance was well reflected in SABP grades and scores? If so, 
why? If not, why not? 
 
5. To what extent do you agree with the statement that SABP has a tendency to focus on 
the quantifiable performance of a programme? Why? How could the SABP system be 
changed to reduce this? 
 
6. What do you think spending ministries regard as more important - long-term strategy 
(e.g. ordering the priority of policy directions) or short-term achievement of the 
performance index? Why? What could be done to increase consideration of the long-
term or medium-term perspectives of programmes in SABP? 
 
7. How much attention do you think spending ministries give to non-measurable 
objectives and how much to objectives that can be measured on a performance index? 
Why? What non-measurable objectives should be included in SABP? 
 
8. Do you think spending ministries have/had a tendency to pursue narrow objectives 
which can/could easily be achieved, or the second best solution, rather than the overall 
objectives of the organisation, or the first best solution? What should be done to reduce 
this? 
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9. What do you think spending ministries consider/considered most important when 
deciding the performance targets of a programme? Do you think spending ministries’ 
performance targets are/were highly ambitious? If so, why? If not, why not? Any 
solutions?  
 
10. Do you think there is/was any distortion, underestimation or overestimation in the 
self-assessed results of spending ministries? Or do you think spending ministries 
are/were faithfully presenting their self-assessment results, including disadvantageous 
performance data? If not, any solutions? 
 
11. Do you think spending ministries consider/considered fully the opinions of related 
experts, interested parties, and ordinary citizens when they assess/assessed the 
performance of a programme? In particular, do you think spending ministries’ 
performance data fully reflect/reflected the need to satisfy citizens or the genuine 
outcome of a programme? If not, any solutions? 
 
12. What do you think spending ministries consider/considered the most important 
criteria when it comes/came to selecting high priority groups? (e.g. trainees in the case 
of an employment training programme) To what extent do/did spending ministries 
consider the attainability of performance targets when they choose/chose high priority 
groups? Why? Any solutions?  
 
13. Are there any differences in SABP results between spending ministries and the 
MOSF? How do/did you cope with cases where there are/were differences in SABP 
scores and grades between spending ministries and the MOSF? Why do you think these 
differences in SABP scores and grades between spending ministries and the MOSF 
happen/happened? Any solutions?  
 * For experts: What do you think about the differences in SABP results between 
spending ministries and the MOSF? Why do you think these differences in SABP scores 
and grades between spending ministries and the MOSF happen? Any solutions? 
 
14. How do you think the unique features of Korean government culture have impacted 
on SABP? Do you think these cultural features could lead to the differences between 
spending ministries and the MOSF? If so, why? If not, why not? Any solutions?  
(e.g. general one-year rotation of personnel system, ministers’ short tenure of office, 
power relations between spending ministry and the MOSF etc.) 
 
15. Do you think the budget divisions of spending ministries have a different 
perspective on SABP from that of programme divisions? If so, why? If not, why not?  
 
16. Do you have any further comments on disagreements between spending ministries 
and the MOSF? What do you think should be done to fully achieve the objectives of 
SABP?  
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Appendix 4: Topic Guide for Government Officials and Experts 
(Supplementary interview) 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
First of all, I’d like to say again that I really appreciated your help last year. Having 
studied the results of the first interviews, I have realised that there are widely differing 
perspectives on the performance of a programme between spending ministries and the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF).  
 
I should therefore like to ask you some further questions. In this interview, I want to ask 
your opinions on what might lead to these differing perspectives between ministries, 
and how they can be reduced. Your valuable answers will enable me to put forward 
more realistic and feasible policy alternatives for a better SABP system.   
 
I once more declare that all your answers will be kept confidential and be quoted 
anonymously. I will not be sharing information about you with anyone. The findings 
will be presented as a part of my thesis, and no identifying information will ever be 
available to anyone.  
 
If you wish to make any additions or amendments to your answers or the research, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you again for your time and consideration. 
     
 
Sanghoon Shin, Ph.D Candidate 
University of Birmingham, UK 
Contact Telephone: 070-4045-3949 
E-mail: shoon117@gmail.com 
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1. The results of the first interviews suggested that spending ministries have a tendency 
to focus on the quantifiable, short-term, measurable and narrow performance of a 
programme rather than on the non-quantifiable, long-term, non-measurable and whole 
performance, such as the government’s or the organisation’s objectives. In addition, 
spending ministries have also tried to set performance target levels as low as possible, 
considering their attainability and the next year’s target level. Furthermore, sometimes 
they have hidden disadvantageous performance data and even manipulated these, and 
they have tended to select favourable priority groups. The case study indicated that 
these tendencies might lead both to spending ministries’ optimism bias in terms of self-
assessment results and to the MOSF’s drastic cutting of spending ministries’ self-
assessment results. What do you think about this? 
 
2. The analysis of the first interviews indicated that both spending ministries and the 
MOSF have tried to reduce or prevent the phenomena mentioned above. For example, 
the MOSF has revised the SABP manual every year to reflect spending ministries’ 
opinions, and has tried to give more incentives to effective programmes as well as 
penalties to poor programmes. In the following section, the researcher will ask your 
opinions on these policy alternatives and on other policy alternatives suggested through 
the first interviews. 
 
2-1. According to the first interviews, many people were concerned that SABP did not 
fully take account of the outcomes of programmes, such as (a) qualitative performance 
(b) long-term performance (c) difficult-to-measure performance and (d) overall 
achievement of programmes.     
 
(1) Do you agree with this statement? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(2) Do you believe that SABP should have more questions about (a), (b), (c) or (d)? 
(3) Do you believe that spending ministries should submit evidence that they have 
pursued (a), (b), (c) or (d) for the MOSF to assess spending ministries’ efforts 
properly? 
(4) Overall, how important do you think changes like those mentioned in (2) and (3) 
are? (Please select one of the following: very important, important, modest, not 
important, not very important.) 
 
2-2. Many interviewees indicated that SABP needed to change its operational direction, 
for example its “penalty-oriented operation” or the “strict relationship” it enforces 
between SABP results and budgets, especially budgets for poor grade programmes. 
  
(1) Do you agree with this statement? If so, why? If not, why not? 
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(2) Do you think that increasing incentives to effective programmes is more 
important than giving penalties to poor programme? 
(3) Do you think such a change might lead to increasing the genuine performance of 
a programme? 
(4) Overall, how important do you think it is to make changes like this? (Please 
select one of the following: very important, important, modest, not important, 
not very important)     
 
2-3. From the year 2011 the MOSF introduced what is called a relative evaluation 
system at some spending ministries’ self-assessment stage, making it mandatory for 
effective programmes to make up less than 20% of a ministry’s programmes and poor 
programmes to make up more than 10%. This was done to reduce spending ministries’ 
optimism bias. 
 
(1) Do you favour making this compulsory policy in principle?  
(2) Do you believe the proportions of 20% and 10% are appropriate? 
(3) Overall, how important do you think it is to make this change? (Please select one 
of the following: very important, important, modest, not important, not very 
important)     
 
2-4. Some interviewees also suggested that the assessment level might be elevated from 
“sub-programme” to “programme” level to consider the long-term and whole (overall) 
performance, and at the same time constant monitoring of “programme” level should be 
implemented.     
* The programme budgeting structure of Korea: Organisation  Programmes   
   Sub-programmes (present assessment level)  Activities  Cost elements 
 
(1) Do you agree with this statement? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(2) Overall, how important do you think it is to make this change? (Please select one 
of the following: very important, important, modest, not important, not very 
important)           
 
2-5. The necessity of giving more discretion to spending ministries in terms of self-
assessment methods, selecting performance indicators and setting performance target 
levels was mentioned by many people as a means of increasing the trust between 
spending ministries and the MOSF and implementing SABP as a real self-assessment 
system by spending ministries. 
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(1) Do you agree with this statement? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(2) To what extent would this policy decrease the MOSF’s ability to compare 
performance between programmes? 
(3) Overall, how important do you think it is to make this change? (Please select one 
of the following: very important, important, modest, not important, not very 
important)        
 
2-6. Some interviewees argued that spending ministries’ self-assessment stage should be 
abolished and spending ministries’ role should be limited to submitting performance 
data for the MOSF’s performance evaluation of a programme, considering the MOSF’s 
continuous drastic cutting of spending ministries self-assessment score.   
 
(1) Do you agree with this statement? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(2) How is it possible to trust in the MOSF’s performance evaluation without 
knowing spending ministries’ self-assessment results?  
(3) Overall, how important do you think it is to make this change? (Please select one 
of the following: very important, important, modest, not important, not very 
important)       
 
3. Besides the policy alternatives mentioned above, if you have any other ideas for 
improving the SABP system, please give details. 
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